Europe

Brexit negotiations mean uncertainty not just for the UK but for the countries it leads behind in the EU, nowhere is this truer than on the issue of whether Brexit will lead to greater unity of disunity within the Union.

In the classic British satirical comedy Yes Minister the civil servant Sir Humphry explains to the bumbling Minister Hacker the reasoning for Britain joining the EU was a cynical way for Britain to maintain power and influence by ensuring disunity within the European project.

In reality, however, Britain’s history and relationship with the EU has, of course, been a little more complicated and complex than this; in many ways Britain’s position within the EU as a perceived obstacle to unity and greater convergence has ensured that divergent views are expressed and opposing ideologies met with compromise. The UK has historically encouraged a much more liberal approach to areas of trade and the social contract – a key example being its opt-out form the Schengen Visa system – often in stark opposition to the other central powerful EU state such as France and German.

Yet now that the UK is leaving a starkly different EU may emerge. Once the UK leaves the EU there will be a dramatic shift in the balance of power within the EU. The UK was one of the EU’s most influential players and alongside France and Germany was regarded as an economic and political pillar. Its strength and position, alongside its ambivalence to the grander EU project, allowed it more, than any other country, to extract the most exemptions and opt-outs, such as membership of the Euro and Schengen.

So with its departure, will the EU move to greater convergence after Brexit? This is surely the hope and wishes of Germany and now France (with one of its most pro-European presidents); both of which are pursuing greater cooperation and convergence, putting aside superficial differences in place of a vision for the post-Brexit EU.

Historically France and Germany have always been the drivers of the post-war Europe project, whilst British positions have more often than not been the brakes on European unity. This may be due to the fact that Britain only joined in 1973, 16 years after the Treaty of Rome, due mainly to French opposition.

However, Britain’s departure will also lay bare the stark and growing differences within the EU project, especially between the core and peripheral countries, in both the economic and political realm. Economically, Greece is still struggling; following near economic collapse and a number of issues need to be resolved in the country to ensure the stability of Greece and the EU such as Greece’s debt sustainability and management.

Furthermore, whilst the EU project has predominantly been an economic project, there is a clear political component to the EU, and this will no doubt be one its greatest tests post-Brexit. There is a growing collection of central and eastern European states which in many ways are avowedly pro-EU according to public sentiment but, in many ways, have deeply nationalist governments. Leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban have espoused the idea of “illiberal democracies” and seek political inspiration from international figures such as President Putin in Russia. Poland and the Czech Republic, to name two, also appear to seek similar political paths as Hungary.

How the EU deals with the rise of 21st century neo-nationalism will be one of its ultimate tests, especially for its future unity. This may be where Brexit will leave its lasting legacy. If countries with strong neo-nationalist forces, like Hungary, see Britain not only managing but thriving outside the EU, it may provide the ammunition populists like Viktor Orban need to argue for a Hungary outside the EU. Once the UK leaves, the EU will have to confront fundamental issues that for various reasons have been avoided. Its survival depends on reconciling in some cases paradoxical differences. Time will tell if the UK outside will be a unifier for the rest of Europe or a beacon for European disillusions.

When Britain leaves the EU, there will be great challenges facing those its leaves behind. Ensuring unity – or even seeking greater convergence – for the remaining EU member states will have to face a number of political and economic barriers in a markedly changed Union.

David Lee has a Masters in Diplomatic Studies and is a Policy Assistant at a national think tank. He lives in London.

Despite Theresa May’s weakness reasonable progress has been made in Brussels. No no deal. No Brussels trouncing. Why did her weakness not lead to weakness in the negotiations and what can we learn from this?

2017 was, at the very the least, an ill-starred year for UK Prime Minister Theresa May and her Conservative government. May was dogged by gaff, scandal and disaster at home, all whilst attempting to negotiate the Brexit settlement abroad.

Compounding the Prime Minister’s misery were the parliamentarians and pundits, on hand after every misfortune to explain why her crumbling authority would have negative consequences for Britain in the Brexit negotiations. Dire predictions abounded; the negotiations were going to be a Brexi-nightmare and Britain was to be Brexi-bulldozed.

And yet here we are. Many would argue that a seemingly reasonable compromise has been reached on the Irish border, citizens’ rights and the divorce bill. Furthermore, it appears that the UK has not been bullied into capitulating wholesale at the negotiating table despite May’s weakness. What are we to make of this state of affairs?

First, we should not be surprised. American political scientist, Robert Putnam, showed negotiations are two level games: the agreement is negotiated internationally at level 1 and ratified domestically at level 2. Each negotiating team has a set of all possible agreements which could be reached at level 1 (the international level) and that ratifiers (members of the cabinet, parliament and the public) could accept at level 2 (the domestic level).

Providing a deal does not fall apart then the negotiators at level 1 will usually arrive at an agreement somewhere in the middle where their domestic win sets overlap and they can be confident of ratification.

So, if we take the divorce bill and citizens rights both sides began by touting their preferred options before ceding ground until an acceptable middle ground was reached. This is how negotiations between relative equals proceed – domestic weakness does not mean foreign surrender.

Second, and more speculatively, perhaps the law of unintended consequences has helped May, albeit perversely. The stronger a government is, the greater the number of potential agreements they can accept at the international level because they know they can simply force them through at the domestic level. Strangely therefore, strong governments can end up ceding more at the negotiating table. Had May done well in the June election she would have gone to Brussels with a strong parliamentary majority and her own personal mandate. As it turned out her gamble backfired catastrophically leaving her with no parliamentary majority and a divided party. Perhaps this has allowed her to withstand demands from the EU for say, a greater amount in the divorce bill, on the grounds that she would not be able to get the deal ratified at home.

However, this does not automatically mean that a negotiating team will be able to gain concessions. This is only possible if a government’s best alternative to no agreement is credible. In the UK, this would be to separate without continuity from the EU, falling back on WTO rules in the critical area of trade. If the EU did not believe this was credible and could have negative implications for the EU as well then they may well have taken advantage of May’s weakness to try and force a punitive deal upon the UK. Yet they have not.

Therefore, finally, EU leaders are committed to securing a sensible deal for both parties. They do not want to see a no deal scenario and such a scenario now looks highly unlikely. This could explain why EU leaders are publically praising May. Perhaps they feel that it is better to prop up a weak but amenable Prime Minister than deal with her potential replacement who would possibly be more prepared to destabilise negotiations by playing the ‘no deal’ card.

Dire domestic politics does not necessarily translate into a dire position at the negotiating table abroad. It now appears that May and the EU will reach a deal. That deal will not be optimal for either side but if the wiser heads prevail it will be fair and Britain will not be bulldozed.

Chris Kunkler (24) is a graduate student and lives in London. He is currently studying for a master’s degree in global politics at LSE.

 

 

The Irish concern that, post-Brexit, we will no longer be able to speak of “our unfenced country” is well-voiced. The soft border has become a symbol of reconciliation and peace following the Troubles. The implications of a change to freedom of movement would be wide-ranging and deeply felt, economically, politically and personally.

“The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there”

A return to a ‘hard border’ is the most publicised potential change to Common Travel Area arrangements, and would be the most discernible. The dilemma of a potential hard border is highly political and politicised – yet it is largely unrecognised that a post-Brexit border would in some regards have to be even more strictly manned and monitored than that of the Troubles era. Border controls were previously implemented only during particularly unstable periods of the Troubles. Border checkpoints were therefore concerned with terrorism alone, not with customs and immigration, as would be the case following Brexit.

On the face of it, such a situation may seem unsavoury and complicated, but not impossible. It is estimated that approximately 30,000 people currently commute cross-border. The border is punctuated at 257 points (a substantial figure, given that there are 137 crossing points on the eastern EU frontier from Finland to Greece). While the UK has tabled a proposal for a ‘frictionless border’ which would possibly be controlled technologically, the realistic viability of such a plan is highly contested. The necessary infrastructure to establish an operational customs border would be conspicuous, expensive and inconvenient, and the potential for smuggling immense.

“Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?”

A further potential effect would be the reemergence of a ‘psychological border’ between Northern communities, and between both parts of the island. There is a real risk that, should a visible border reemerge on the island of Ireland, a politics of history and identity would become potent once more. EU membership provided an umbrella identity which both encompassed and transcended the politics of belonging and identity which had dominated Northern Irish politics and society for decades. Without the buffer of a common, uncontentious EU identity, and with a physical border as an inescapable reminder of partition, old questions of belonging could become relevant once more.

Were relations with the South to become less fluent and more distant, a sense of alienation would likely emerge amongst the 25% of Northern Irish citizens who identified themselves as Irish only at the time of the 2011 census.

This could undermine Northern Ireland’s efforts become more self-sufficient politically and economically. A strengthened sense of Northern Irishness, a centre-ground where both groups can meet, is the region’s best hope for future cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Traditional Unionist-Nationalist identities were binary and mutually exclusive, whereas the term ‘Northern Irish’ is nonexclusive and neutral.

United we stand, divided we fall

It is for that reason that the UK government ought to give serious consideration to the EU Parliament’s suggestion that Northern Ireland remain in the customs union, or to other suggestions that it obtain some form of ‘special status’. Not only would the soft border be protected and economic upset minimised, but the political dynamic could also be favourably and fundamentally changed.

An awareness of Northern Irish interests separate to those of the rest of the UK would foster greater cohesion amongst Northern Irish communities and would require internal politics of the past to be put aside in favour of a common vision for the future. Economic and logistical cooperation in areas such as dairy processing and the Integrated Single Electricity Market could continue with the rest of the island of Ireland, while cross-border communities could maintain their current work and living arrangements relatively unimpeded.

Ties with mainland Britain would be somewhat loosened, in that customs checks would be relegated to passage between the Isles. At the same time however, political Union with the rest of the UK would be preserved and supported. While a ‘United’ Ireland promoted by the Nationalist community refers to the merging of two parts, the ‘United’ Kingdom refers to a political union of distinct entities. Therefore, current political arrangements could theoretically continue unproblematically. Furthermore, Unionists may seek comfort in the fact that a soft border is a more resilient one.

“There is no road that is right entirely”

There is no simple answer to the ‘Northern Irish question’ – that much at least is obvious. The flexibility and imagination proffered by both sides must be actually substantiated aspirations of soft border maintenance to be realised. With regard to Brexit, change is the only certainty, and therefore cooperation and concessions from all sides will be necessary. The positive side of such uncertainty is that there is no place for fatalism – nothing is predetermined. Were political will to be harnessed, there is no reason why obstacles cannot be overcome. “[I]n brute reality there is no road that is right entirely”, but all parties agree that a road without a hard border is a step in the right direction.

Grace McLoughlin is a student of English Literature at Trinity College Dublin. She spent last year in Berlin, where she was an active member of Agora’s sister think tank, Polis180.