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Planning for no deal: the frank and fearful facts

Planning for no deal: the frank and fearful facts

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After three years of flux, faffing and floundering, it is a frightening reality that we may be soon leaving the EU without a deal. The precise long-term consequences of this will, of course, take some time to materialise, but the recent publication of the Yellowhammer documents has made it clear that a ‘no deal’ outcome would produce significant challenges in numerous policy areas.

Challenges to UK political and economic stability are the most pressing and salient issues relating to a ‘no deal’ Brexit, in both the short and longer term. With regard to the economy, reverting to World Trade Organisation rules when trading with the EU would require all UK-EU trade to be immediately subjected to tariffs. Whilst some of the EU’s international trading tariffs are relatively low, British cars would be subject to a 10% tax increase in EU markets, whilst additional taxes on dairy products would be 35%. Under the 2017 WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, the EU is obliged to treat the UK “fairly” regarding tariff imposition. Fairly does not mean special treatment, however, and outside of the Union the UK would be subject to the same tariffs and border checks as any third country.

Although a ‘no deal’ exit would not leave the EU financially unscathed, it is in a stronger position to withstand the sizeable, concomitant economic and logistical disruption. Recognising that the UK is the bloc’s largest bilateral trading partner, the EU institutions and each of its member states have produced detailed and efficient plans for it ‘no deal’ should become a reality. The French government, for example, have already promised to train seven hundred customs officials by 2020, specifically for its port cities, and has committed to spending €50m on expanding its port infrastructure to ensure that any new customs process can run as smoothly as possible. Even without these programmes, the EU has a far larger economic cushion to fall back on, with no change to either its external trade agreements with countries such as China and the USA or the functioning of its internal market.

‘No deal’ also risks further domestic political turmoil, including threats to the UK’s domestic union. Irrespective of how the UK leaves the EU, the divide between nations on Brexit preferences and stances has widened since the referendum. The fact that some campaigned against Scottish independence because it would result in a loss of EU membership – Scotland, following independence, would have had to leave the EU and apply again as a separate state – is now problematised by Brexit. A ‘no deal’ outcome would also necessitate a major reassessment of the competencies assigned by devolution, as some, such as agricultural and environmental regulation, were largely regulated by EU law. This reassessment has the potential to threaten the union, should the powers — which were originally assigned to devolved powers, but coordinated by EU legislation — be reclaimed by Westminster.

Moreover, the challenge of ensuring peace in Northern Ireland in the wake of a Brexit is a concern that people are not taking seriously enough. A ‘no deal’ exit has the potential to force the Government to choose between keeping the union together and realising Brexit at the expense of conflict. The ‘Irish question’ may even be back on the table.

Over the past three years, we have seen the degeneration of civilised politics in the UK, with significant intransigence in the House of Commons on Brexit, and deepening divides across society. The Conservative Party’s current approach is counter-productive, and is disruptive of the little progress that had been made by Theresa May. Labour has decisively failed to take a stance on Brexit, and has instead vacillated between its commitment to its voting base and its own internal biases, divisions and political ambitions. Parliament has had numerous opportunities to avoid ‘no deal’. Instead it has chosen to vote down every alternative option presented whilst still crying wolf.

It is clear that Brexit is an era-defining event that will change the face of British and European politics and society. It is also increasingly clear that there will be few winners should ‘no deal’ become a reality. For these reasons, it is necessary that the Government and the UK’s other elected representatives do all that they can both to prevent a ‘no deal’ and to mitigate against the worst of what such a scenario would present, should it become a reality.

Maia Miller-Lewis is a third year Politics and International Relations student at the University of Bristol.

The spotlight is on UK Special Forces, whether the Government likes it or not

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Allegations that UK special forces were assisting Saudi-backed militias in Yemen led to a short-lived public and parliamentary backlash. However, the Government should not be too quick to forget this backlash or the lessons it offers.

In March, the Daily Mail reported that at least five British Special Boat Service (SBS) soldiers had been wounded in a gun battle in Yemen. The story alleged that there were “up to 30 British troops based in Sa’dah” and that they had been fighting alongside Saudi-funded militia, many of which purportedly relied on child soldiers. These stories directly contravened statements by the UK government made as recently as January, “that we are not a party to the conflict. We are not a party to the military conflict as part of the coalition”.

It remains unclear how much of these allegations were true, and now they appear to have been mostly forgotten by the UK media. However, it is worth dwelling on their lessons a little longer and, particularly, the serious questions they raise around the UK’s policy of blanket opacity over its use of special forces.

No comment policy

In the UK, all questions about special forces are met with a boilerplate response in the style of “it is the [Ministry of Defence’s] long-held policy is not to comment on our Special Forces”. With this policy in hand, the Government has routinely deflected questions on all aspects of special forces, including information about where they are being used, how they fit into wider UK foreign policy, and what roles they are playing on the ground.

It makes strategic sense, of course, that certain information about special forces is not released to the public, as they are – by definition – units that operate covertly. However, in an era dominated by smart phones and burgeoning access to the internet, a policy which completely prevents the Government from participating in debates over an increasingly large part of the UK’s military activity abroad – debates that will happen with or without them – has proven be out-dated, unsustainable and, most importantly, counter-productive.

The dogged adherence to this policy seems particularly illogical since the Government itself has made it clear that it greatly values control over narratives in contemporary conflicts. The UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review states that “the growth of communications technology will increase our enemies’ ability to influence, not only all those on the battlefield, but also our own society directly. We must therefore win the battle for information, as well as the battle on the ground”. By refusing to engage in a constructive dialogue on UK military actions – even after a significant amount of information is available in the public domain – the Government is directly constraining its own ability to pursue this objective.

Even before this recent incident, the UK government has been reluctant to discuss its support of the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen with the media and the British public. This is despite the fact that the campaign has been steeped in controversy around the breaching of international law. Even parliamentary committees have argued that they do not have access to sufficient information on the topic, with the First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills and International Development Committees of Session 2016-17 concluding that “this is an area in which there is much confusion and greater clarity is needed”.

While the lack of engagement may have allowed the UK government to avoid difficult questions and debates around its role in a conflict that has caused the “worst humanitarian crisis in the world”, it has also undermined the UK’s ability to justify its relationship with Saudi Arabia, potentially stoking greater mistrust and concern.

Shaping the debate

Nowhere is this clearer than with the allegations by the Daily Mail. Unsurprisingly, these have led to outrage on the opposition benches. Shadow Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Emily Thornberry said of the recent report that, if true, “it would confirm that our forces are not just a party to this conflict but witnesses to war crimes”. Even senior Conservative MPs like former International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, a respected voice on the Yemen conflict, has expressed frustrations at these “exceedingly serious, credible, and authoritative allegations”. He added that “were it not for the all-consuming nature of Brexit, I suspect the House would want to explore this as a matter of urgency”.

As the Government seeks to downplay these revelations and reassert its ‘no comment’ policy, it is worth revisiting the dangers of doing so. This recent incident, like many in the last few years, has clearly shown that such an approach is no longer tenable or even desirable. If nothing else, recent interventions have shown the importance of a frank and honest debate with British public and Parliament to allow the UK to argue the case for its operations, instead of narrative to be hijacked, misinterpreted, or misunderstood by others.

Megan Karlshoej-Pedersen is a Research and Advocacy Assistant at the Oxford Research Group’s Remote Warfare Programme. Abigail Watson is a Senior Research Officer at the same programme and a Trustee of Agora. Both research, write and present on the legal, military and political implications of light footprint military engagement.

Modern slavery and the UK immigration system

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The International Labour Organisation estimates that there are 40 million men, women and children globally who are victim to modern slavery on any given day. Today, the issue of modern slavery is commanding increasing levels of international attention, with the UK government positioning itself as a ‘global leader’ in the fight for its eradication. However, while the UK government characterises modern slavery as caused by exploitative criminal groups, the issue ultimately has deeper structural roots.

Britain’s prioritisation of modern slavery

‘Modern slavery’ is a fairly new term within British political discourse. Having evolved from the older term of ‘human trafficking’, it was first given substance by the 2014 Modern Slavery Strategy and is defined as encompassing “slavery, servitude, forced and compulsory labour and human trafficking”. The Home Office estimates that there are between 10,000 and 13,000 potential victims of modern slavery in the UK, and government expenditure on this issue has grown rapidly in recent years. In 2017/18 an estimated £39 million was spent, and this figure is projected to rise to a high of £61 million in 2018/19.

The UK government characterises modern slavery through the lens of organised crime, and places the blame firmly upon the organised criminal networks that exploit vulnerable victims for their own financial gain. The acts of these criminal networks are defined in the Government’s 2014 report with the moralistic language of manipulation and abuse: “traffickers and slave drivers coerce, deceive and force individuals against their will into a life of abuse, servitude and inhumane treatment”. This conceptualisation of the issue – and the powerful language used to describe it – directs the state into a particular form of response, one which mobilises the weight of the criminal justice system and the British enforcement apparatus, including the National Crime Agency (NCA), the police and the Home Office. A key piece of legislation in this battle was the 2015 Modern Slavery Act, which Prime Minister Theresa May claimed created “tough new penalties to put slave masters behind bars where they belong”.

Addressing structural drivers

Whilst understandable, this characterisation is problematic as it diverts attention from a more pressing reality, namely that the exploitation that defines modern slavery is itself embedded into the structure of the UK’s restrictive immigration regime. At its core, modern slavery is defined by exploitation, whether that be physical or psychological, cultural or social. A prerequisite of exploitation is an imbalance of power, and the UK immigration system, including the ‘hostile environment’ strategy pursued by the Home Office, contributes to the emergence of these imbalances.

The UK immigration system is highly restrictive for low-skilled labour, and as such it is difficult for these individuals to obtain legitimate working visas. Low-skilled migrants are hence pushed underground into illegal employment, working in restaurants, on building sites and as cleaners. Their status puts these workers in a precarious position as they are not covered by the legal employment guarantees that ensure a base level of worker protection. In the absence of legal protection, power imbalances can easily transform a case of illegal working into one of modern slavery, when, for example, an employer forces an individual to work with little or no pay or to work when sick, or engages in sustained physical or verbal abuse.

Beyond this, there is a further coercive mechanism that prolongs exploitation, namely that the result of escape from an abusive situation can often lead to removal from the country. The National Referral Mechanism (NRM) is the body within the Home Office responsible for handling cases of modern slavery. Once a referral is made to this body, an investigation is initiated and a positive or negative decision is reached on whether an individual is a ‘confirmed victim’. Crucially, neither decision entails a permission to stay in the UK, with confirmed victims only being offered a 45 day ‘move-on’ period in which, in the absence of other leave entitlements, they must depart the country. Where the alternative to exploitation is removal from the UK, this creates a structural disincentive for victims of modern slavery to escape their abusive situations.

Reframing the causes

The Government’s discourse characterises modern slavery as an issue of organised crime, the blame for which rests with the criminals who exploit others for their own financial gain. This discourse hides a deeper reality, that the UK’s restrictive immigration regime and the Home Office’s policies create the conditions through which exploitation – and, ultimately, modern slavery – proliferate. It is therefore difficult to resist the conclusion that the responsibility for modern slavery cannot be solely attributed to criminals and the organised crime groups they populate; the Government itself and the policies it enacts also share in moral culpability.

Oliver Goodman is a graduate student in Migration Studies at the University of Oxford.

Covert action and overt war: Israeli special forces and the risk of regional conflict

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Israeli special forces are the envy of many nations and a key factor in Israel’s military successes. However, failure of their operations could inadvertently trigger regional war in one of three regional flashpoints: Gaza, Syria or Lebanon. The UK, as an important special forces operator, could learn from the risks inherent in Israel’s reliance on special forces.

Israel has used its large and varied range of special operations forces throughout the past 40 years with exceptional success. Its credentials were cemented in the famous Entebbe Raid – a successful hostage-rescue mission in Uganda on 4 July 1976 – and in clandestine operations, such as the assassination of Syrian Army General Muhammad Suleiman in 2008.

Israel’s miniscule population relative to its Arab neighbours caused it to focus on developing a ‘qualitative edge’ in military capabilities over its rivals. Furthermore, the profound lack of strategic depth Israel faced vis-a-vis its immediate neighbours necessitated a policy of direct action with regards to potential threats.

Failures can and will happen, however. Such was the case in November 2018 when an Israeli covert operation into Gaza resulted in the death of one Israeli special forces operator. Despite the unit escaping Gaza, the incident led to two weeks of reciprocal violence between Hamas and Israel until peace was brokered by Egypt. Likewise, the disastrous September 1997 raid against Hezbollah, which saw 11 special forces soldiers die, precipitated a day long fire fight between Israel and Hezbollah. These are two examples of the destabilising effects of botched special forces operations. The severity of this risk is only increased by the fact that Hezbollah and Hamas are organisations with a proven ability to adapt and innovate. The inconclusive result in the 2006 War showed that Hezbollah can frustrate Israel’s military capabilities, whereas Hamas has developed a degree of resilience in the face of systemic covert action.

While the above examples have not resulted in major regional conflict, there are a number of regional fault lines where the risk of botched Israeli covert action could precipitate regional war. The primary risk posed by such mistakes would involve the killing or capture of Israeli special forces. Israel has gone to war over captured soldiers twice in 2006, against Hezbollah and Hamas.

There are three main areas in which botched raids could trigger regional conflict. The most obvious is with Hamas in Gaza. If, in later raids, soldiers were to be captured then Israel would certainly begin large scale military action. A similar situation exists with Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, unique to Hezbollah is the support they receive from Iran, adding a regional element to the tension. Large scale operations conducted against Hezbollah in response to a failed special forces raid could draw Israel into conflict with Iran. Iran has forward deployed assets to Syria, and has likely used these to target Israel previously. Thus any conflict with Hezbollah will involve Iranian support, creating regional violence. Lastly, and relatedly, covert actions taken against the Syrian regime or Iranian forces in Syria which end in calamity would probably result in war. Israeli special forces are likely to be at least peripherally involved in any operations in Syria. If personnel are captured or killed, the past actions of Israel indicate aggressive military action could take place.

The experience of Israel offers important takeaways for the UK, not only because Israel represents an important actor in a key region for British military engagement but also because its experiences provide many lessons for the UK that need to be internalised for future operations as the role of special forces grow while the end strength of the British Armed Forces declines. The UK fields world class special forces in the form of the Special Air Service, the Special Boat Service, and other covert units. The UK’s steadfast commitment to combating terrorism internationally has seen this capability increase. As the UK seeks to readjust to a more global focus, the proven ability of the UK special forces community is likely to play a more active role in this realignment. However, the UK government must be careful not to see the deployment of special forces as ‘clean’ or ‘risk free’. The Israeli experience shows that these elite forces can be just as likely to trigger greater conflict as conventional troops if used irresponsibly.

The UK should learn from Israel and avoid over-reliance on special forces so as to avoid potentially costly blowback. Crucially, the UK should explore the full range of political and military responses to any future crisis to avoid unnecessary escalation through high-risk deployment of covert units.

Jack Sargent is pursuing a Masters in the History of International Relations at the LSE, with a particular interest in non-state actors in the Middle East.

The recycling problem: who will take our waste?

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In the everlasting discussion of policy, trade deals, and environmental crises, one giant shadow looms on the horizon: Who will take our waste?

It is the recurring parable about consumer culture, from which the lesson has still not been learned. We shop, we consume, we discard; the linear economy of consumption and disposal is still running its course as the dominant pattern of use. But changes in China may impact our current habits in waste and recycling of these materials.
The average consumer is largely detached from the size and complexity of the ‘supply chain’ of waste and recycling. This is to the detriment of informed debate about the current broken model, which sees the UK trapped in an unsustainable cycle of shipping waste abroad, rather than looking to reassess how it can re-use and repurpose of discarded materials.

In fact, the glass bottle you put in your recycling bin every week can potentially end up as far away as China for it to be fully recycled. That likelihood is changing, however. Last year China – one of the largest importers of waste from other countries – announced a monumental ban on foreign waste imports following the realisation that the import of so-called ‘recycling’ was leading to a significant pollution crisis. Much of the recycling waste was being sent to landfill, incinerators, or for the informal work economy due to lack of sufficient infrastructure to process the scale of waste entering the country.

This follows another strategic ban by the Chinese government in 2017, as well as planned additional measures to be implemented in late 2019, designed to further refine and control the types of waste being imported into the country and reduce the issue of foreign waste and pollution that has remained uncontrolled for years.

The scale of the waste export crisis has implications for both the waste producers and waste importers in the flow of these items. In the western world, it presents a dilemma for local governments and companies. Now that waste management is outsourced to companies like Veolia, the exports and sales of these materials now faces wider scrutiny from their destinations and, in the worst case, are likely to be returned. The waste market has potentially been disrupted, because the costs of recycling and waste disposal rising has been met with a decrease in the potential return through export. So what solutions have been posed?

The primary solution so far has been to target other developing economies that already import waste. Countries such as Malaysia and Thailand, who previously accepted waste from the West, began accepting extra foreign waste following the first stages of the Chinese import ban. However it is unlikely to be a permanent solution, as China has proven to the world, they do not necessarily need to be the receptacles of the waste of Western livelihoods forever. In fact, India has recently announced plans to potentially ban all imports of plastic waste from other countries.

The remaining solutions leave a lot to be desired. The UK itself already runs a semi-intensive EfW (Energy from Waste) programme designed to reclaim energy from municipal waste through incineration. Currently, the waste that is not exported or sent to EfW, is sent to landfill, which comes with its own consequences of land-use and additional pollutants. This offers a glimpse into the extent of our waste and shows how our own systems are not reaching their fullest and most sustainable potential in the UK.

There is a clear and pressing need for a radical change in the way we consume and dispose of waste, and one of the strongest arguments being presented is that of a ‘circular economy’. Unlike a linear economic model, the circular economy aims for the repurposing and minimising of waste and achieving the most potential from resources. If looking at the case of a simple glass bottle, instead of it being sent to landfill or traded off to other countries, the glass is repurposed or reused for the same product after being sanitised. The resource thus continuously re-enters the supply chain instead of being discarded after one use.

With costs of waste disposal steadily rising, and the environmental implications of human livelihoods potentially reaching breaking point, there is more the need to consider and change these aspects of waste than ever before. The UK could pave the way in not just shipping its waste abroad but looking for sustainable methods of re-addressing our whole waste system to adopt a circular method of resource consumption even for the most harmful of materials, like plastic, and could be a vital part of the Government’s new strategy released last year. After all, if it is our waste, we should be the ones to deal with it.

Micheil Page is Head of Agora’s Energy and Climate Programme.

Morality or diplomacy? The UK’s role in assisting Pacific states who have been directly affected by the impacts of climate change

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What is the role of developed economies such as the UK in assisting smaller developing states in mitigating and adapting to the impacts of climate change.

When projections become daily realities

Unbeknownst to many, we are teetering on what could be referred to as a climate armageddon. The intrinsic threat of climate change to so many different facets of life on this planet makes it particularly unique. Yet, what is especially alarming for certain countries is the simple reality that they are not ready – or, in many instances, not able – to tackle climate change head on. Varied capabilities and acute vulnerabilities will bear unimaginable social and economic stress on countries that did not have a sizable role in contributing to the underlying causes of global climate change.

Small Island Developing States (SIDS) believe their determined efforts to unite nations in addressing climate change have not gained the traction nor the reward that they were intended to. A combination of self-interest, concentration of political and economic power as well as different levels of development have all contributed to SIDS and other states experiencing repeated diplomatic and political disappointments. Perhaps best exemplified by the failure of Copenhagen Agreement (where a combination of political and organisational drawbacks failed to produce a legally binding agreement), financial considerations and technical expertise continue to impede the potential progress made at climate change conferences. This then raises the question: what is the role of countries that have so far remained relatively unscathed from the impacts of global climate change?

What role can the UK play?

To quote British Prime Minister Theresa May “there is a clear moral imperative for developed countries such as the UK to help those around the world who stand to lose the most from the consequences of manmade climate change.” At the United Nations General Assembly in 2018, her government announced a raft of bold and commendable measures to assist countries that are affected by climate change. £160 million will be directed to countries to transition to cleaner/greener energy systems and provide the necessary support to communities already affected by climate change. This commitment is additional to the already sizeable £5.8 billion of funding between 2016-2020. It also follows the Climate Change Act, which was passed in 2008 and serves as the legislative basis for the UK’s approach to reducing carbon dioxide emissions and responding to climate change.

In directing this noteworthy amount of funding, the UK should provide technical assistance to SIDS on three key elements: first, combining the current social/environmental momentum to spur and enact developments and processes of climate legislation in SIDS; second, through the UK’s expertise in the fields of energy markets and clean growth, government led socio-economic initiatives could be implemented to assist economies struggling to adapt to the effects of climate change; and third, the UK should lead on efforts to adopt stricter and more progressive provisions and policies of climate resilience at international climate conferences and other supranational settings. Thus, climate change offers an opportunity for the UK to revitalise its role as a climate leader and improve its reputation and standing in the global arena.

Looking ahead

It would be a mistake to believe that developed nations hold sole responsibility for the problems facing SIDS. Instead, what must be demonstrated is leadership. Leadership that rises above the complexities of climate change and encompasses its different facets including obligation, capabilities, fairness and universal participation. This requires that SIDS look also to their own role and capabilities in developing ecological sustainable development, which reflects their needs and the global requirement.

By utilising financial, technological and diplomatic efforts, the UK must address the needs of SIDS through a pragmatic lens. Addressing these needs should not be viewed as a form of charity or aid. Instead it is an explicit obligation owed to these countries by the UK and the wider international community. Previous multilateral environmental agreements recognise the enormity of the challenge faced. Yet, a concerted global effort needs to focus on an equitable and distributive approach that speaks to the most vulnerable and cements what is a common problem with many shared responsibilities.

Andrew Williamson is currently working in international development and has a keen interest in environmental diplomacy and governance.