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The dangerous consequences of COVID-19 for gender equality in global education

The dangerous consequences of COVID-19 for gender equality in global education

The full consequences of COVID-19 are unknown, but there are several critical factors which will accentuate its impact on girls’ education.

The consequences of COVID-19 are countless. Many of them we do not know about yet, and will only become apparent in the coming years. Nevertheless, it is clear that the pandemic has already had a dramatic impact on schooling and that students will experience it differently based on their gender. There are several critical factors which will accentuate the impact of COVID-19 on girls’ education around the world, and recovery initiatives will need to consider these gendered experiences if they are to succeed.

In the current health crisis, education is being undertaken through laptops, tablets, and smartphones outside of the classroom. However, few are discussing how these changes will exacerbate the gender digital divide. This divide, which long proceeded the spread of coronavirus, is where women and girls have less access to technology and the internet than men and boys. For instance, a recent study by the International Telecommunications Union found that the share of women worldwide using the internet is 12% lower than the share of men using the internet, and this rises to 25% in Africa. The same problem is seen with mobile phone ownership. In South Asia, for instance, women are 23% less likely than men to have their own mobile, according to the Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA).

With this in mind, what happens when you impose remote studying to students across the world? It is a real possibility that many girls may never recover the time and education that they would have gained if they were able to physically go to school. Indeed, our relationship with technology will never be the same as it was before the pandemic. The way we work, shop, exercise, travel, and entertain ourselves has been revolutionised, and the majority of these changes will remain in place long after we have overcome the challenge of COVID-19. Alongside the advantages of this transformation, the hard truth is that our economies and societies will leave behind those without access to digital technologies and the skills to use them, and many of these will be women and girls.

Beyond the digital skills gap, women and girls face an additional barrier impeding their access to education. Prior to the present pandemic, research from UN Women found that women across the globe were already doing three times as much unpaid care and domestic work as men. In forcing people into their homes, coronavirus has increased this gender skew, with women taking on the bulk of the housework and care responsibilities (often combining this with their newly-remote job). Data collected by IpsosMORI in May suggests that women around the world are more likely than men to find that their care responsibilities have increased during the pandemic.

UNICEF has shown that this inequality starts from an early age, with girls between the ages of five and 14 spending 40% more time on unpaid household chores than boys of the same age. Combined, that represents 160m hours per day of time which could be spent elsewhere, including studying. What does this mean for girls who were previously going to school, and are now required to pursue their education from home? It likely translates into them having less time to focus on their schooling than previously, because their support is required on domestic tasks and care duties instead.

Furthermore, these girls might be prevented from going back to school once the pandemic is over, particularly if they need to take on new domestic tasks and care responsibilities as a result of illness or death in the family caused by COVID-19. The Malala Fund estimates that an additional 20m secondary school aged girls could be permanently out of school once this pandemic has passed. Again, this would effectively result in a generation of girls being prevented from reaching their full potential in school, with the plethora of consequences this has on the social and economic opportunities available to them later in life.

Our recovery from COVID-19 will take decades, but it is important that we think about these issues now and take the necessary steps to ensure that women and girls around the world are not disproportionately affected by the pandemic’s impact on school closures. So much effort has gone into getting girls into school to begin with that we simply cannot afford such a monumental setback.

Maëlys Bablon is a research analyst working on gender equality.

The UK must work with its allies to stop Russian escalation in Libya

Russia’s deployment of combat aircraft to support warlord Khalifa Haftar in the ongoing Libyan Civil War indicates a desire to retain a permanent footing in Libya. This has serious implications for the UK, NATO, and the EU.

The civil war in Libya

Following the fall of leader Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, efforts to deliver real and lasting political stability in Libya have failed. The weak government institutions, formed after Qaddafi was removed, could not prevent armed violence and non-state groups proliferating.

Amidst the chaos, Khalifa Hafter seized Libya’s oil infrastructure. He would then lay siege to the UN recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in the country’s capital, Tripoli. Recently, he has been pushed back from the city and is poised to withdraw from western Libya.

The conflict between General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army and the GNA has become increasingly internationalised. The international backers of both Haftar and the GNA have committed significant support. Hafter enjoys the support of Russia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and others. The GNA has strong backing from Turkey. As Haftar suffers heavy losses and retreats from western Libya, Russia has escalated its involvement, by quietly deploying 14 combat aircraft to Libya.

The rise of Russia

An increased Russian role in Libya has a number of risks for the EU and NATO, either through a permanent military presence, strong political influence, or both.

Firstly, Russia could weaponise the major migration routes that move through Libya. Libya is a major transit hub for migrants seeking to reach the EU, because of its porous southern borders and proximity to regions experiencing severe economic and political issues. This was previously weaponised by Qaddafi, who exploited Europe’s nativist fears to secure billions in investments. Following the fall of Qaddafi, migration through Libya to Europe rose dramatically. To combat this, Italy signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA, which involves the GNA intercepting migrant vessels and forcing their return to Libya, where migrants are detained indefinitely in grave conditions.

Russia has been accused of weaponising migration previously in Syria. This, according to one US and NATO Commander, drove hundreds of thousands of Syrians to Europe “to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve”. It could do the same again in Libya. Manipulating migration patterns into southern Europe could be used to sow dissent and discord within the EU and NATO.

Secondly, Russia could deploy assets to eastern Libya to threaten NATO’s southern flank and frustrate access to the mediterranean. Given the UK’s military bases in Cyprus and naval facilities in the Middle East, this could seriously threaten access to Suez and the eastern Mediteranean. This is particularly worrying, given how Russia possesses weapons systems that can be rapidly deployed with little infrastructure support. Russia has already deployed the SU-24 – a strike aircraft with significant anti-ship capability and an effective range over 1000KM – to Libya. More lethal aircraft could be deployed if necessary.

Two systems merit consideration: the S-400 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system and the P-800 Anti Ship Missile (ASM) system. The S-400 can target aircraft out to 250-400km, and the P-800 can target ships up to 300km offshore. Both the S-400 and P-800 are wheeled, all-terrain mobile systems that require limited manpower to operate. When they are deployed in appropriate numbers and with readily available support systems – aircraft, drones, satellites and other missile systems – they are highly effective.

The UK response

Russian strategy has been deeply opportunistic (capitalising on western ambivalence) in seizing territory in Georgia and Ukraine, and intervening in Syria. Its escalating involvement in Libya fits comfortably within this pattern; the conflict in Libya is highly internationalised, with a number of nations wielding decisive influence.

The UK and its allies must advocate for peaceful negotiations to achieve a cohesive government that is not expressly beholden to the interests of foreign powers. To do this, the UK and its close allies can influence Khalifa Haftar’s main backers – Turkey, Russia, UAE, Egypt – individually, to effect broad change. If they want to avoid increased Russian leverage over them, the UK, EU, and NATO must prevent the exploitation of Libya by Russia.

Jack Sargent is co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme.

The UK should pay closer attention to the impacts of climate change in MENA

The local is global. Climate change is likely to exacerbate conflicts and areas of instability. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), an already volatile region, stands to be particularly affected. UK foreign policy needs to improve its awareness of the impact climate change may have on the region and the wider security repercussions.

Climate change has already resulted in a 1°C rise in temperatures compared to the previous century. The UK’s Global Strategic Trends assessment views it as one of the most certain and influential global trends affecting all geographic and policy areas.

The MENA region is no exception. Research has shown that the region will suffer from an even higher number of hot days than it currently is, with warnings of droughts and overall water deficit. There is a risk of these impacts increasing, should the overall warming of the world go beyond 1.5-2°C.

Climate change may be indirectly linked to an increase in conflict, due to it exacerbating pre-existing issues such as resource scarcity, economic issues, and weak governance. Institutions and proper governance are important factors in being able to deal effectively with climate change. Where there is already fragmented governance, states could be further weakened by the consequences of climate change.

There is limited understanding regarding the impact climate change will have on global security, however. This includes a lack of knowledge as to how already vulnerable areas may be affected by climate change itself and how climate change-related instability could aggravate existing tensions or create new instability.

The MENA region is currently experiencing widespread insecurity due to ongoing and systemic violence and unrest. This is exacerbated by self-serving interventionist external powers, such as the Russian intervention in the Syrian conflict, or the Russian and Turkish intervention in Libya’s civil war. Climate change may exacerbate the instability prevalent in the region. Of particular importance is the impact climate change could have on water scarcity, food insecurity, disease, and conflict in the region.

Water scarcity is a pressing issue in the MENA region. Tensions have risen between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over the Tigris‐Euphrates basin. This is caused by an unequal water flow from the rivers to the three countries, grievances around water management, and the use of water as a way to exert pressure on downstream countries. In North Africa, Ethiopian plans to build a dam on the Nile would have serious consequences for Egyptian agriculture which depends on the river. While discussions over the dam are ongoing, Egypt has previously threatened war with Ethiopia over its construction, and tensions remain high. Additionally, water scarcity would likely lead to increased food insecurity, with consequences being famines or malnutrition, as 70% of the region’s agriculture depends on rainfall, which is projected to decline by 60% should temperatures increase by 4°C.

Climate change could also act as a threat multiplier to countries with weak governance. In Iraq, there are reports the Islamic State (IS) used periods of drought to entice people to join its ranks. In Syria, Libya, and Yemen, populations are already in precarious situations and governments would be either unable or unwilling to alleviate climate change driven issues. This may provide opportunities for non-state groups to take control and spread further instability, as was witnessed with the rise of the IS, facilitated by weak governance in Iraq and Syria.

Climate change fuelled instability and insecurity in MENA will have a direct impact on neighbouring countries and regions, including Europe. This may lead European countries being faced with increased migration. External powers may need to provide humanitarian assistance to populations in response to situations that may be brought, or exacerbated, by climate change, or even requested to intervene in regional conflicts.

Climate change will also impact the rest of the world. Europe, including Britain, will be dealing with its own climate change issues. This raises the question of whether the UK can cope with climate change fuelled difficulties both at home and in other regions.

To address this, the UK must begin early planning and preparation for the impacts of climate change in the MENA region and seek to help reduce climate change driven instability. Preventative measures include helping improve governance, facilitating discussions over water sharing, and aiding the development of policies and strategies focused on coping with the effects of climate change.

Ultimately, the UK’s climate change preparations should also seek to offset the wider impact on global security that could be provoked by climate change-related instability, as both will come hand in hand.

Sarah Grand-Clement is a defence and security policy researcher, and holds an MSc in Arab World Studies from Durham University.

The term ‘BAME’ misrepresents history and identity

Finding the proper word to describe the diverse minority groups within Britain is about more than just semantics; it becomes an issue of finding a single word that is both accurate and respectful. In contemporary Britain, the acronym ‘BAME’ (Black, Asian, and minority ethnic) is often used as a catch-all term to describe non-white people. However, this superficially conflates Black and Asian identities and promotes a false sense of unity in favour of linguistic expediency.

Reviewing the historical dynamic between Africans and Indians in the British Caribbean exemplifies how the burden of societal injustice is seldom borne uniformly; using a single umbrella term to encapsulate an inherently diverse experience obfuscates the social realities of each group.

In the wake of the emancipation of African slaves in 1833, British plantation owners were desperate for a new source of cheap labour. To fill the labour vacuum, destitute Indians were recruited by the hundreds of thousands through the promise of a better life in the British Caribbean. Known as the indentured labour system, Indians who were otherwise unable to pay for the voyage signed a contract binding them to approximately five years of plantation labour for a fixed wage in exchange for passage to the British Caribbean. Between 1845-1917, 147,592 Indians arrived in Trinidad under the indentured labour system and an approximate total of 239,000 Indians arrived in Guyana. While slavery was technically illegal, indentured servitude became a new form of government-sanctioned ‘unfreedom’.

The influx of cheap Indian labour kept wages artificially low. Workers were unable to strike for higher wages or better treatment because the constant arrival of new Indians with contracts binding them to low-wage labour made all workers dispensable. Additionally, the draconian terms of Indian labour contracts, strictly enforced by colonial authorities, meant that any insurrection or refusal to work would result in heavy fines and imprisonment. Although initially the white plantation owners were outraged by African emancipation, the indentured labour system filled the labour vacuum as Africans moved to other occupations, which ultimately enabled the British to consolidate power and production that might have otherwise been challenged by freed Africans on their own.

Although Indian indentured labourers occupied the lowest socio-economic positions in Trinidad and Guyana, emancipated Africans generally viewed these new arrivals as an existential threat to their economic livelihood. Few freed Africans worked for their former slave masters. Rather, their newfound economic mobility had laid the foundations for a fragile yet burgeoning middle class. In his book Caribbean Masala: Indian identity in Guyana and Trinidad, Dave Ramsaran explains how “Africans, once at the bottom of the social scale, now had an easily recognisable class to which they could feel superior”. Furthermore, “Indo-Trinidadians were also hostile to African Trinidadians […] because of the colour of the Africans’ skin and the texture of their hair, Indo-Trinidadians equated them with the followers of the demon god Raavan from the Hindu Ramayana”. British colonial authorities recognised and manipulated these economic and political conditions to consolidate the social divisions amongst Indians and freed Africans, thereby pre-empting any threat of a unified African-Indian front.

While there is inherent power in solidarity, this extends only as far as it does not compromise the unique interests of each group. In the case of colonial Trinidad and Guyana, both Africans and Indians may have benefitted from lobbying collectively for fairer labour laws. However, despite both groups being oppressed under British rule, the African and Indian experience under this repressive rule diverged greatly. Using a single term to describe this oppression would unjustly conflate the experience of both groups and promote a false sense of historical unity.

Similarly, using the term BAME when describing the nuances of contemporary societal injustices, would be as futile as trying to use this umbrella term to understand the diverse historical reality of oppressed groups in colonial Trinidad and Guyana.

Furthermore, the term BAME explicitly singles out two groups: black and Asian. Yet delineating a rigid separation between these two groups implies that ethnic identities are mutually-exclusive. In reality, according to the CIA World Factbook, around 20% of Guyanese and 23% of Trinidadians today identify as ‘mixed race’ to some degree. Umbrella terms with specific delineations, therefore, run the risk both being too ambiguous and too specific to represent the true intersectional nature of identity.

Viewing racial oppression in colonial Trinidad and Guyana through a BAME lens exemplifies how superficial terms often lead to a superficial understanding of reality. The contemporary use of the term in the UK equally conflates the unique experience of each group it is meant to represent, which undermines its overall utility as an accurate descriptor. While there is space in the English vernacular for certain umbrella terms, BAME attempts to balance the intersection between generalisation and specificity, but ultimately fails at both.

Christopher Lindrud is the International Coordinator at the Trade Center of the Americas.

Nationalism, populism, and the impact of right-wing discourse on immigration during the COVID-19 pandemic

With border restrictions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK government must avoid nationalist rhetoric as it will harm its most vulnerable populations.

The outbreak of COVID-19 early this year has caused mass border closures. Even now, as governments begin to reopen their borders, controlled migration through approved travel corridors looks to be the ‘new normal’.

Governments are prioritising mitigating the economic repercussions of restricted travel on their own countries. In the wake of such inward-looking policies, it is important to understand how nationalist sentiments can impact the governance of some of the UK’s most vulnerable population: asylum seekers and other refugees.

Nationalism has long been a pervasive factor in UK migration policies. Before Boris Johnson entered the picture, the Parliament had already passed the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016. These were introduced to limit non-European Economic Area (EEA) migration into the UK and create a ‘hostile environment’ for undocumented migrants in the country. Non-EEA migrants in the UK were faced with increasingly stringent policies in an effort to deter them from living in the UK. Since migration from the EEA is predominantly white, these policies disproportionately targeted non-white people, thereby creating a framework where the national identity could be manufactured around the white identity. Former Prime Minister Theresa May’s manifesto for the 2017 snap election echoed previous Conservative Party leader, David Cameron’s desire to ‘bear down on immigration from outside the European Union’.

The global nature of this pandemic has been instrumental for nationalist, right-wing voices to amplify their concerns over immigration. Migration Watch UK, an anti-immigration think tank, has announced a controversial policy proposal to ban the entry of those over the age of 50 coming from non-EEA countries into the UK and restrict visas for other age groups.

The right-wing immigration rhetoric: erasing refugees from the picture

Populism and nationalism revolve around defining a person through their shared heritage and the country they were born in. This national identity is then juxtaposed with an ‘other’, someone who does not share the same lineage of a particular demographic. Right-wing nationalism in particular, founded on the ‘us’ vs ‘them’ narrative, privileges the lives of the citizens (‘us’) over immigrants (‘them’).

With COVID-19 resulting in rapid border controls and an inconsistent restriction on international movement; refugees are further defined as ‘others’. The Government is more concerned over the management of its governable population – its citizens – than that of immigrants.

At present, there are 51,906 documented asylum seekers still awaiting a decision on their status as a refugee in the UK. Asylum seekers are often too afraid to access healthcare in fear of their possible refugee status being overturned. They are not legally allowed to work to make a living and have to depend on ill-equipped government systems to sustain themselves.

Refugee migration will continue even as the pandemic rages. While a global pandemic may halt some economic activities, it does not stop wars, natural disasters, or tyrannical regimes from committing human rights violations on their own citizens. Thus, even during a pandemic, the drivers of migration continue. History has shown us time and time again that migration cannot be curbed simply by imposing stricter border controls. In fact, the number of migrants crossing the Channel from France to the UK has risen to more than 1,400 in the month of June from a mere 200 earlier this year.

The UK’s migration management policy needs to see a drastic shift from merely containing refugees to creating structures that can better oversee their governance. Providing a healthcare system that is accessible to refugees and spans both physical and mental health should be a priority for the Government. This global pandemic has shown the myopic nature of nationalist immigration policies but it has also provided us with an opportunity to learn and improve our systems of governing immigration.

Paakhi Bhatnagar studies International Relations at King’s College London.

COVID-19 holds a mirror up to identity-based divides in the UK

The #YouClapForMeNow campaign emerged following a video in which key workers from immigrant backgrounds recited a poem, targeting an audience who demonstrate anti-immigrant sentiments. A hashtag using the poem’s title has now come to symbolise a powerful online wave, which is thanking the ethnically diverse community of key workers. With the streets of Britain filled with clapping every Thursday evening to celebrate the efforts of a multicultural NHS, this video urged those clapping to not forget this nationwide diversity in a post-coronavirus Britain.

The poem in the video aims to break down identity-based divides and appreciate immigrant workers. Nevertheless, the importance given to solidarity is convoluted by the repeated reference to antagonising differences. Constructed around the binary of ‘you’ and ‘me’, a hashtag for solidarity became one bound up in a separating logic, exacerbating the issue of ethnic differentiation. Yet perhaps it is this awareness of systemic, racial segregation that gives the poem its power. By consciously critiquing a historically divisive rhetoric, it demands an acknowledgement and re-articulation of anti-immigrant sentiments, hinting towards an inclusive future beyond reductive identity-based divides.

A multicultural society must recognise ethnic minorities’ contributions towards collective, socio-economic progress. In the recently published Research and Development Roadmap Policy paper, Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Alok Sharma writes that “we want to send a powerful signal to talented people around the world: come to the UK, be part of this exciting new future”. Society must recognise that this ‘future’ relies upon diverse talent.

With visa regulations favouring ‘skilled’ workers and graduate routes favouring those attaining higher education, many ethnic minorities – especially key workers – are slipping through the net. In spite of the increasing demand for workers, ethnically diverse workers who might not technically qualify as high-skilled are notably underrepresented. For the UK to truly build a brighter future for all, society must move to displace the deep-rooted perception that ethnic minorities are taking jobs, and instead value their present resilience and courage. Yet, as we remember the efforts of immigrant workers in a post-COVID-19 society, these efforts should not constitute their place in a UK allegedly ‘for all’; a place where inclusivity must not be contingent on tangible contributions.

Frequent circulations of the phrase ‘COVID-19 doesn’t discriminate’ has perhaps only exposed and exacerbated the societal structures that do. As the global crisis intensified, the conversation shifted to its disproportionate impact on certain domestic demographics. Belly Mujinga, a key worker for TfL, suffered a racially motivated attack when she was spat on by a man claiming to have COVID-19. A few days later, Mujinga tested positive, dying after two weeks. In spite of her respiratory problems, she was expected to resume work on the concourse as usual, where she was not supplied with personal protective equipment (PPE). Alongside the attack, Mujinga’s deprivation of PPE reflects the systemic, discriminatory treatment of many ethnic minority workers. her death represents the ultimate outcome of a societal injustice where socio-economic structures are both a causal and enabling factor.

As racial prejudices often impact the quality of life of individuals and communities, we must be able to trace the racially divisive foundations on which these are built. To envision a post-COVID-19 UK that intrinsically appreciates and celebrates ethnic diversity, policy makers must deconstruct the umbrella of racism when examining the correlation of socio-economic divides with ethnicity. We know that 63% of healthcare workers who died due to COVID-19 were from a BAME background, prompting researchers to investigate why ethnic minorities are overwhelmingly vulnerable. As Judith Butler has asserted, “the virus alone does not discriminate, but we humans surely do”.

Socio-economic inequality has isolated minorities in their particular battles with the pandemic. Due to existing social and economic factors, COVID-19 is worsening inequality in a society already laced with, and built upon, structures that discriminate. Amidst a pandemic encouraging an increasingly global consciousness, society and governing structures must assume this mindset in the UK as well. To normalise diversity, we must act upon the reality of racial disparities exposed by COVID-19, epitomised by the binary of ‘you’ and ‘me’; a binary that reflects the prevailing treatment of ethnic minorities. A future that is able to break-down identity divides must celebrate the claps that are fuelling national efforts to investigate ethnic inequality, proposing a future consciousness that seeks to overcome racial divisions and is built on present hopes for a more inclusive society.

Mahi Shah studies German and Spanish at the University of Cambridge.