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Avoiding a ‘hard’ Irish border may have created opportunities for human traffickers

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A Brexit agreement based on ‘future technological arrangements’ will pose problems for Irish border officials and provide a potential haven for smugglers and traffickers.

Due to the island of Ireland’s unique political and geographical importance, it has always been a hotspot for both smugglers and traffickers. Along the roads connecting Northern Ireland with the Republic, smuggling and trafficking was common from the Irish War of Independence up until the start of the troubles in 1969. With the Good Friday Agreement and the official end of The Troubles, the European Union built numerous border crossings to promote trade cooperation between the nations and closed 40% of police stations near the border.

These changes have come back to the fore through Brexit negotiations, with the UK and EU determined to avoid a ‘hard’ border given the recent conflict. Prime Minister Boris Johnson has promised to address this through technology with his new deal. So far the details are vague, with motion sensors, scanners, infra-red, and surveillance cameras all being talked about that as possible solutions. There already appears to be a number of problems with this proposal, however.

These problems not only speak to a border that may be ineffective but also one that could create opportunities for goods smugglers and human traffickers. The most recent Annual Trafficking in Persons report from the US State Department downgraded Ireland to a tier two country, meaning it is no longer deemed to be meeting the minimum standards required in the fight against human trafficking.

The Withdrawal Agreement looks set to exacerbate this in three ways: failing to account for the complexity of the ‘technology fix’, changes to taxing regulation, and failing to address problems with the UK’s sex industry.

First, maintaining an open international border with technology is a much more difficult feat than is often accounted for. Norway and Sweden – two of the most technologically advanced countries in Europe – have been attempting this very exercise for many years and have yet to reach an answer that does not require physical customs checks at the border itself. These solutions are a multi-decade project.

Given the physical geography and historical context of the Irish border, the interim period between an open border, manned by technology alone, represents a unique opportunity for both goods smugglers and human traffickers. In fact, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) predicts that border staff will be asked to process a further 220 million customs declarations and that authorities “are likely to become overwhelmed” at the border; which could lead to an easier path for both traffickers and smugglers to enter the EU.

Second, the fact that goods would be taxed upon reaching Northern Ireland from Great Britain may provide an enticing market for smugglers. Smugglers are able to undercut the market in two ways, namely on speed and price. Although the tax will be refunded for goods which leave Northern Ireland to enter into the Republic, the initial heightened fees for buyers within Northern Ireland will affect trade. This, combined with the likely logistical problems at the interim border, may lead traders to use to alternative avenues to move their goods in and out of the EU. Illegal markets thrive in times of economic uncertainty; the incentives will be there for business, especially those handling perishable goods, to bypass regulation to ensure their food gets in on time.

Third, the current situation has been exacerbated by the growth of the UK sex industry, which has benefitted in recent years as a result of both job insecurity and the failure of universal credit to provide families with safety and security. This growth has attracted sex traffickers from around the EU to move people into Britain as the UK industry becomes increasingly lucrative. This growth is in line with research conducted by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime published earlier this year which found that the number of reported sex trafficked victims in Northern Ireland had risen from 98 in 2014 to 179 in 2016. Johnson’s failure to address this in his deal his likely to make matters worse.

The logistical issues cannot be solved before the 31 October and the transition period is set to be equally turbulent on the border. The technological solutions are not in place, and there is no evidence from other parts of the world to suggest that it is even possible to implement such checks. If the Government cannot find these solutions soon, Johnson’s deal may have major economic and humanitarian knock-on effects for decades to come.

Tom Whitting works as a researcher for the PIOT Foundation for the Human Rights of Migrant Workers.

Reconsidering security under climate change

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Following a Parliamentary resolution in May, MPs have declared a “climate emergency”. Climate change is still primarily framed as an environmental problem, however. By reframing it as a security threat, policy makers will be better equipped to implement the drastic policies required.

Media outlets and politicians continue to focus on the environmental impacts of climate change: deforestation, rising sea levels, loss of habitat, increasing ocean acidity, drought. But the violent social consequences of these events have been overlooked.

It is increasingly accepted that climate change will diminish resource availability, destabilising political environments and sparking armed conflicts. While experts and commentators have been warning about this for years, mainstream coverage of climate change has yet to acknowledge the security ramifications of these natural disasters, partly due to the difficulty in analysing hypothetical scenarios.

However, we don’t need to turn to hypothetical scenarios to examine the link between climate change and violence. The first climate change war has already occurred in Darfur.

The first ‘climate change war’

The civil war in Darfur, Sudan, was arguably the first modern climate change war. In the 1980s, severe droughts in the region turned previously arable land into dust, leading to crop shortages and the death of livestock. Predominantly Arab Muslim herders were forced to migrate south in search of new pastures. This migration led to conflicts with the Christian farmers in the region over the limited resources. These conflicts over farmland exacerbated ethnic tensions, resulting in the Darfur wars of 1987-90 and 1994-98. By 2003, the intra-state violence had become a civil war, encompassing state, non-state and other ethnic groups.

In 2004, a peace agreement was signed. Drought raged on, however, intensifying the now decades long tensions over access to agricultural resources between the Christian farmers and Muslim herders. The conflict escalated into genocide, with government backing, perpetrated by Arab Muslims against Christian farmers.

Starvation and illness, caused by the extreme food shortages and the conflict itself, resulted in the deaths and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people in the region. Then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon said of the crisis: “Amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change”.

Implications for the Region

Darfur illustrates the causal relationship between environmental stress and conflict. This relationship is not deterministic and does not alleviate the responsibility of the perpetrators, but the factors that led to Darfur are not isolated to Sudan. Climate change will continue to limit resources and exacerbate existing social stresses, including poverty, ethnic tensions, and political instability.

Most African nations rely on rain-fed agriculture for their economy and food supply, and 80% of the population of the Horn of Africa relies upon subsistence farming. Added to this, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reported that last year alone 5.5m were displaced in the region due to conflict and 2.6m people due to natural disasters, accounting for more than a quarter of all displacements worldwide.

The pattern that emerged in Sudan is repeating in the region. In 2018 armed conflict erupted in Nigeria between herder and farmer groups, aggravated by drought. In a highly populated region like Sub-Saharan Africa, conflicts have high casualty rates and the human cost of climate change can be greatly felt.

What next?

The international community is slowly beginning to realise the security ramifications of climate change. In the UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson has accepted the science and the Government has pledged £193m for development aid concerning climate change. There is still a long way to go, however. Johnson’s voting record reveals a more ambivalent position, particularly concerning preventative measures against climate change. With the threat of a ‘no deal’ Brexit looming, structured cooperation between nation states looks set to fracture, risking the much needed international cooperation to combat climate change.

Climate change will not affect all states equally, and a state’s ability to mitigate and adapt to the adverse changes in the environment will depend on its wealth. The countries which will be most impacted by climate change are those with the least political clout in the international system.

To address this, the international community must stop framing climate change as primarily an environmental issue, and emphasise the relationship between climate and security. This altered emphasis could allow the UK to repurpose some of the £36.9bn defence budget to tackle the greatest threat to human security in the 21st Century, namely climate change.

Shona Warren holds a Masters of International Relations from the University of Melbourne and works in international development.

The UK’s environmental policy must adapt to a post-EU world

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While the environment is often treated as a national issue, international co-operation remains pivotal to producing the results that will adequately tackle climate change. As such the UK needs to re-imagine its environmental relationship with the EU27.

The environment should transcend national policy and contribute to foreign policy, considering the grave threat climate change poses towards the whole world and not just a few states. Such is the interconnectivity of countries and economies today that it should be expected that the UK’s environmental policies will come under strain from external shocks that could stem from a number of different geopolitical factors. Yet the most pressing of these might derive from the EU’s future relationship with the UK.

The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has predicted that global temperatures will rise by 3°C by 2100 and 2°C within the next 12 years, despite some international co-operation on the issue, testament to the gravity of the problem.

One could argue that drawbacks lie with the official charters only including advisory and voluntary aims to reduce global warming, with the Paris climate change agreement proving especially flimsy in its achievements. America’s exit and its own inability to reach targets is also a cases in point. Clearly, there is a lack of tangible incentives for countries to work together in fear of being hurt economically by the increased red tape, and in this way becoming uncompetitive in terms of output compared to those who continue to produce vast volumes of emissions and pollution such as China.

The EU has proven itself to be different. It has developed a clear goal in pushing member states to contribute to a “resource-efficient, green, and competitive low-carbon economy”. Since the region has integrated further, European states have worked well to tackle the environmental issue through collective effort despite significantly less pressure 30 years ago then as there is now due to growing awareness, green parties, and activist movements. In 2017 the EU emitted 4,466m tonnes of greenhouse gases compared with 5,720 in 1990, an impressive decrease in trend when considering the fact that more nation states have joined the union in the time period and the destabilising nature of the 2008 global financial crisis that could have stalled progress. While its own targets have not been met recently, progress still continues.

Such success heightens the importance of the environment in the UK’s future relationship with the EU. With most media outlets focusing on trade and security, it is easy to overlook the benefits enjoyed by the UK in being a member of a group that is constantly pushing for innovation to improve the environmental state of Europe. Environmental charity Friends of the Earth looked into the relationship further, with a paper titled ‘UK Environmental Policy Post-Brexit: A Risk Analysis’. They found that the Government’s strategy not only proved vague regarding the issue, but also held targets that were less ambitious than the EU’s. The notion that interstate cooperation within the EU helps harmonise environmental goals is ultimately reinforced by the study’s conclusion that better environmental outcomes for the UK would be enjoyed with a closer relationship to Europe.

Of course, the type of Brexit deal will affect relations between the UK and EU. A ‘no deal’ Brexit would prove the most disruptive in terms of policy links with the EU, while a ‘hard Bresit’ could see only the most important environmental regulations retained in the UK. On the other side, if Brexit were completely stopped then Britain would return to the European Parliament reputation damaged but still a leading member state on the environment, perhaps being able to compel others to declare a climate emergency as the UK and Republic of Ireland have.

Global warming alone should be an issue important enough to transcend Brexit and bring negotiators on both sides, if not any others, to consensus on the issue. Shaking off European environment laws to reduce regulations would be done to the detriment of the UK’s clear progress on the environmental issue as part of the European project, and the politicians will do well to acknowledge that nuance.

Thomas Bradbury, studies politics at the University of Exeter.

How politicians talk about identities really matters

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Thirty years after the ‘cricket test’ was first proposed by Norman Tebbit as a way of assessing ones allegiance to a country, political rhetoric in the UK and the US still questions who truly belongs in the country.

In 1990 the politician Norman Tebbit controversially developed a method for determining how loyal British Asians and Caribbeans, as well as their children, were to England. It became known as the ‘cricket test’. It asks which team a person supports in a cricket match between England and the country of their heritage (generally where their parents or grandparents are from). The outcome of the test, according to Tebbit, is that the person who supports their heritage country over England has not fully integrated into British society and rejects crucial aspects of British culture. He said, “a large proportion of Britain’s Asian population fail to pass the cricket test. Which side do they cheer for? It’s an interesting test. Are you still harking back to where you came from or where you are?”.

This is only one example; many policymakers in the US and the UK continue to question the allegiance and identity of people in their country. This rhetoric has the power to shape perceptions towards ones citizenship, particularly for those in the first and second generation, including myself.

This was captured during the 2008 presidential campaign in the US. There were accusations that candidate Barack Obama was not American enough to lead the US. Although Obama went on to become the first African-American President of America, the controversy raised important questions around how much minorities are considered to “belong” in the US.

For several decades, America has been known as a ‘nation of immigrants’. Given this, it is curious to claim some people are not American enough if they have a minority background.

Trump brought this claim up during his own presidential campaign and again in mid-2019 when he said that four US Democratic Congresswomen should “go back and help fix the totally broken and crime infested places from which they came,” adding that they “can’t leave fast enough”. It is notable that three of these Congresswomen – Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib and Ayanna Pressley – are US-born and Ilhan Omar came to America when she was a child. It is doubtful that they would have received such comments if they were not of minority origin; their minority background meant that they were not perceived to be truly American. The comments were subsequently condemned as racist by many commentators.

The reaction of UK policymakers was worrying. During the UK Conservative Party’s leadership election this year, Jeremy Hunt said Trump’s comments were “totally offensive”, and Boris Johnson replied saying they were “unacceptable”. it is notable, however, that whilst many other commentators condemned the remarks as racist, neither of the Prime Minister candidates did so, possibly as a means of protecting UK-US relations for the future. A short while after, Nigel Farage added that the comments were “genius”.

Those in power have the ability to shape which comments and narratives are legitimised and acceptable in personal conversation and on the international stage. If political leaders make and condone these remarks across nations, it sets the tone for which rhetoric is acceptable in wider society. Without fully condemning and rejecting this rhetoric, it is normalised, leaving people as vulnerable targets to these comments in everyday conversation.

This is crucial when many people of migrant descent have heard similar words themselves in private conversation. Seeing these comments in the media can evoke fear over their belonging and it can bring back foul memories for those who have heard these comments before. Indeed, when the New York Times asked readers to share their tales of being told to ‘go back’, 16,000 people in America alone responded sharing their stories of being made to feel unwelcome in their country of birth or naturalisation. It only takes a quick search online or a chat with colleagues to find these shared stories across the UK and in the US.

If political leaders have a relatively fixed idea of what it means to be a native, then this raises questions about belonging for those whose identity transcends this fixed idea. Leaders have the power to shape how inclusive national communities are, on the international stage and in the private sphere, using their rhetoric. Toxic rhetoric, such as the examples outlined, incite fear and hatred, often with traumatising long-term impacts on those who receive the remarks. Political leaders have the power to incite inclusivity and stronger communities, but for that, the rhetoric must change, and it starts with how our leaders set the tone.

Preeti Pasricha is co-Head of Agora’s Democracy & Governance Programme.

Planning for no deal: the frank and fearful facts

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After three years of flux, faffing and floundering, it is a frightening reality that we may be soon leaving the EU without a deal. The precise long-term consequences of this will, of course, take some time to materialise, but the recent publication of the Yellowhammer documents has made it clear that a ‘no deal’ outcome would produce significant challenges in numerous policy areas.

Challenges to UK political and economic stability are the most pressing and salient issues relating to a ‘no deal’ Brexit, in both the short and longer term. With regard to the economy, reverting to World Trade Organisation rules when trading with the EU would require all UK-EU trade to be immediately subjected to tariffs. Whilst some of the EU’s international trading tariffs are relatively low, British cars would be subject to a 10% tax increase in EU markets, whilst additional taxes on dairy products would be 35%. Under the 2017 WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, the EU is obliged to treat the UK “fairly” regarding tariff imposition. Fairly does not mean special treatment, however, and outside of the Union the UK would be subject to the same tariffs and border checks as any third country.

Although a ‘no deal’ exit would not leave the EU financially unscathed, it is in a stronger position to withstand the sizeable, concomitant economic and logistical disruption. Recognising that the UK is the bloc’s largest bilateral trading partner, the EU institutions and each of its member states have produced detailed and efficient plans for it ‘no deal’ should become a reality. The French government, for example, have already promised to train seven hundred customs officials by 2020, specifically for its port cities, and has committed to spending €50m on expanding its port infrastructure to ensure that any new customs process can run as smoothly as possible. Even without these programmes, the EU has a far larger economic cushion to fall back on, with no change to either its external trade agreements with countries such as China and the USA or the functioning of its internal market.

‘No deal’ also risks further domestic political turmoil, including threats to the UK’s domestic union. Irrespective of how the UK leaves the EU, the divide between nations on Brexit preferences and stances has widened since the referendum. The fact that some campaigned against Scottish independence because it would result in a loss of EU membership – Scotland, following independence, would have had to leave the EU and apply again as a separate state – is now problematised by Brexit. A ‘no deal’ outcome would also necessitate a major reassessment of the competencies assigned by devolution, as some, such as agricultural and environmental regulation, were largely regulated by EU law. This reassessment has the potential to threaten the union, should the powers — which were originally assigned to devolved powers, but coordinated by EU legislation — be reclaimed by Westminster.

Moreover, the challenge of ensuring peace in Northern Ireland in the wake of a Brexit is a concern that people are not taking seriously enough. A ‘no deal’ exit has the potential to force the Government to choose between keeping the union together and realising Brexit at the expense of conflict. The ‘Irish question’ may even be back on the table.

Over the past three years, we have seen the degeneration of civilised politics in the UK, with significant intransigence in the House of Commons on Brexit, and deepening divides across society. The Conservative Party’s current approach is counter-productive, and is disruptive of the little progress that had been made by Theresa May. Labour has decisively failed to take a stance on Brexit, and has instead vacillated between its commitment to its voting base and its own internal biases, divisions and political ambitions. Parliament has had numerous opportunities to avoid ‘no deal’. Instead it has chosen to vote down every alternative option presented whilst still crying wolf.

It is clear that Brexit is an era-defining event that will change the face of British and European politics and society. It is also increasingly clear that there will be few winners should ‘no deal’ become a reality. For these reasons, it is necessary that the Government and the UK’s other elected representatives do all that they can both to prevent a ‘no deal’ and to mitigate against the worst of what such a scenario would present, should it become a reality.

Maia Miller-Lewis is a third year Politics and International Relations student at the University of Bristol.

The spotlight is on UK Special Forces, whether the Government likes it or not

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Allegations that UK special forces were assisting Saudi-backed militias in Yemen led to a short-lived public and parliamentary backlash. However, the Government should not be too quick to forget this backlash or the lessons it offers.

In March, the Daily Mail reported that at least five British Special Boat Service (SBS) soldiers had been wounded in a gun battle in Yemen. The story alleged that there were “up to 30 British troops based in Sa’dah” and that they had been fighting alongside Saudi-funded militia, many of which purportedly relied on child soldiers. These stories directly contravened statements by the UK government made as recently as January, “that we are not a party to the conflict. We are not a party to the military conflict as part of the coalition”.

It remains unclear how much of these allegations were true, and now they appear to have been mostly forgotten by the UK media. However, it is worth dwelling on their lessons a little longer and, particularly, the serious questions they raise around the UK’s policy of blanket opacity over its use of special forces.

No comment policy

In the UK, all questions about special forces are met with a boilerplate response in the style of “it is the [Ministry of Defence’s] long-held policy is not to comment on our Special Forces”. With this policy in hand, the Government has routinely deflected questions on all aspects of special forces, including information about where they are being used, how they fit into wider UK foreign policy, and what roles they are playing on the ground.

It makes strategic sense, of course, that certain information about special forces is not released to the public, as they are – by definition – units that operate covertly. However, in an era dominated by smart phones and burgeoning access to the internet, a policy which completely prevents the Government from participating in debates over an increasingly large part of the UK’s military activity abroad – debates that will happen with or without them – has proven be out-dated, unsustainable and, most importantly, counter-productive.

The dogged adherence to this policy seems particularly illogical since the Government itself has made it clear that it greatly values control over narratives in contemporary conflicts. The UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review states that “the growth of communications technology will increase our enemies’ ability to influence, not only all those on the battlefield, but also our own society directly. We must therefore win the battle for information, as well as the battle on the ground”. By refusing to engage in a constructive dialogue on UK military actions – even after a significant amount of information is available in the public domain – the Government is directly constraining its own ability to pursue this objective.

Even before this recent incident, the UK government has been reluctant to discuss its support of the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen with the media and the British public. This is despite the fact that the campaign has been steeped in controversy around the breaching of international law. Even parliamentary committees have argued that they do not have access to sufficient information on the topic, with the First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills and International Development Committees of Session 2016-17 concluding that “this is an area in which there is much confusion and greater clarity is needed”.

While the lack of engagement may have allowed the UK government to avoid difficult questions and debates around its role in a conflict that has caused the “worst humanitarian crisis in the world”, it has also undermined the UK’s ability to justify its relationship with Saudi Arabia, potentially stoking greater mistrust and concern.

Shaping the debate

Nowhere is this clearer than with the allegations by the Daily Mail. Unsurprisingly, these have led to outrage on the opposition benches. Shadow Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Emily Thornberry said of the recent report that, if true, “it would confirm that our forces are not just a party to this conflict but witnesses to war crimes”. Even senior Conservative MPs like former International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, a respected voice on the Yemen conflict, has expressed frustrations at these “exceedingly serious, credible, and authoritative allegations”. He added that “were it not for the all-consuming nature of Brexit, I suspect the House would want to explore this as a matter of urgency”.

As the Government seeks to downplay these revelations and reassert its ‘no comment’ policy, it is worth revisiting the dangers of doing so. This recent incident, like many in the last few years, has clearly shown that such an approach is no longer tenable or even desirable. If nothing else, recent interventions have shown the importance of a frank and honest debate with British public and Parliament to allow the UK to argue the case for its operations, instead of narrative to be hijacked, misinterpreted, or misunderstood by others.

Megan Karlshoej-Pedersen is a Research and Advocacy Assistant at the Oxford Research Group’s Remote Warfare Programme. Abigail Watson is a Senior Research Officer at the same programme and a Trustee of Agora. Both research, write and present on the legal, military and political implications of light footprint military engagement.