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Liberal democracies are stuck in the middle of geopolitical divergence

COVID-19 is precipitating the emergence of a new world order, characterised by waning American leadership and a shift of power towards China. In this context, Western democracies will be challenged on cooperation and unity.

Nobody was expecting this decade to begin with such domestic and international disruption. Currently, three billion people wait to be released from their homes, hoping for a short-lived quarantine. Regardless, the socio-political impact will be much longer lasting. COVID-19 has uncovered deficiencies of the post-industrial world order, showing that globalisation constantly hangs by a thread. In particular, the doubtful response from some international institutions has pushed certain economies and governments towards more isolationism. As countries envision their role in the post-COVID-19 world, the international stage is readjusting.

Multilateral world order

For the past fifty years, much of the world has tended towards a Western model of multilateralism and integration. International organisations and laws have become an integral part of the governance system, limiting warfare and improving living standards in many parts of the world. The economic and military dominance of the United States has made it a suitable example to follow in the pursuit of growing trade networks, intensive farming, nuclear dissuasion, and political liberalisation.

Withering leadership

Even before the current crisis, there were already signs of this world order dwindling. The digital revolution has challenged institutions’ legitimacy and distributed power into the hands of new actors. It has changed the way we work, trade, and learn. Such economic transformation has complemented the rise of China-centred Asia into a powerhouse of innovation and investment, which comes as the primary challenge to American leadership.

US President Donald Trump has tended towards an isolationist strategy rather than cooperation, pulling out of international alliances and institutions, most notably the Iran Nuclear Deal and Trans-Pacific Partnership, creating a vacuum for other nations to exert influence in strategic regions. Even if the upcoming American election were to turn the tide, four years of refusing multilateralism has deteriorated American leadership.

Opportunity for influence

These changes look set to be exacerbated by COVID-19. Trump’s EU travel ban and failed acquisition of vaccine patents will not be forgotten in Europe anytime soon. Political scientist Joseph Nye has been amongst those to criticise the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ position, which appears to focus more on competition with China than addressing the spread of the disease.

Alongside this, others have played a leadership-like role. In March this year, Europe emerged as the pandemic’s epicentre. In response, China sent aid and Russia deployed personnel to Italy before any EU member state. China has also made an effort to present itself as a reliable partner, increasing its involvement in international institutions and exporting masks and medical kits around the world.

China sees the pandemic as an opportunity to extend its influence and power. President Xi Jinping’s visit to Wuhan drew eyes to the efficiency of his state governance in fighting the virus. The CPC has found an opening to diffuse its propaganda, in the hope that its political system will come out strong. Nonetheless, China is already facing a resurgence in cases, and the resulting economic blow will be tough. Lack of certain medicines in Europe has sparked debate on Chinese overreliance. Industries are relocating closer to home or to other parts of Asia. It remains to be seen whether China can continue to dominate supply chains.

The place of Europe

In Europe, individual member state action and a sluggish initial response from Brussels prompted leaders such as Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte and former European Commission President Jacques Delors to warn that lack of solidarity would have profound effects on the European project after the end of the crisis.

‘Westlessness’ was the slogan at the Munich Security Conference this year, or the decades long shift of power balance away from the old continent. The EU must use the period after the COVID-19 pandemic to provide momentum for finding a new purpose on the global stage, taking leadership on matters of climate change and data regulation. This can only be done as a united bloc. Current emergency measures should be used to reduce internal fragility.

A more independent Europe should increase collaboration with countries traditionally alienated by the US. In particular, French President Emmanuel Macron has called for more alignment with Russia and Turkey, who are reemerging as neighbouring poles of influence in their own right. The UK would also be best placed aligning with European allies, given Trump increasingly views Britain, much like the rest of the old continent, as a battleground against his Chinese rival.

Barnabé Colin is a graduate student at the LSE’s Department of Government.

The EU’s coronavirus economic travails will force a harder Brexit negotiating stance

Significant economic contraction in the EU, resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, will strengthen the allure of the Eurosceptic message on the continent. To quell the popularity of Eurosceptic populist parties, EU institutions will be compelled to adopt an uncompromising stance in negotiations with the UK.

The economic impact of COVID-19 across Europe is exacerbating fault lines at the heart of the EU project. Despite EU finance ministers agreeing to support a €540bn package to support the bloc’s ailing economy, the proposal of ‘coronabonds’ – a financial mechanism that would serve to mutualise member state debt – has been strongly opposed by decision-makers in Berlin, Amsterdam, and elsewhere.

Opposition to greater pooling of financial risk is nothing new. During the debt crisis post-2008, the bailouts and accompanying conditions handed to countries such as Greece created huge friction between the northern and southern Eurozone member states. Monetary union without fiscal union posed a threat to European solidarity, whilst stoking the embers of Euroscepticism in Europe. Many of the underlying issues from that crisis remain unresolved, and so similar tensions could easily re-emerge. 

The Populist Opportunity

This curbing of economic agency has long been utilised by populist leaders, such as Matteo Salvini of Italy’s Lega Nord and Marine Le Pen of the Rassemblement National in France, to argue that the EU imposes unacceptable limits on national sovereignty.

Such criticisms are part of a broader populist narrative that the European project is inimical to national interests, with both Lega and RN frequently stoking anti-immigration sentiment through their criticism of the principle of freedom of movement.

Both Salvini and Le Pen have established their parties as serious contenders for governmental leadership in recent years. The inevitable economic slowdown resulting from stringent lockdown measures imposed in response to the coronavirus pandemic will serve to benefit these populist parties. According to projections from the IMF, France’s economy is expected to contract by 7.2% in 2020, with Italy’s economy contracting by 9.1%.

In Italy, in particular, an anti-EU shift in public opinion is striking. According to recent polls, 88% of Italians feel that Europe is failing to support Italy in the crisis, with 67% of Italians considering EU membership a disadvantage. If such trends continue, the legitimacy of the European project itself is at risk.

The EU’s double bind

European leaders are highly aware of this risk. On 16 April, Macron suggested that a failure by the EU to agree on how to fund a coronavirus relief package would threaten the EU as a political idea. His view appears to anticipate the credence that such a failure would lend Eurosceptic populist parties in Europe.

This challenge reveals an inherent contradiction at the core of another existential threat to the EU: the bloc’s future relationship with the UK. With the transition period due to end on 31 December 2020, the EU cannot afford to appear too flexible to UK demands at a time when Eurosceptic populist parties will be reaping the benefits of the economic fallout of the coronavirus crisis.

Conversely, if projections from the IMF prove correct and the EU economy shrinks significantly, an agreement allowing continued frictionless trade with the UK, mitigating against further economic damage, may begin to look attractive.

EU leaders thus find themselves in a double bind of economic versus political logic. Compromise too little with the UK, and the EU will find itself exacerbating an already deeply challenging economic situation, inadvertently emboldening the Eurosceptic message of EU economic impotency in the process. Compromise too much, and the EU will reinforce the legitimacy of the Eurosceptic vision that the economic benefits of the bloc can be decoupled from the political structure that underpins the European project.

Statements from Michel Barnier and European leaders suggest that, faced with this trade-off, the EU is incentivised to choose politics over economics. Since the outset of Brexit negotiations, the EU has not wavered on its red lines, making compromise at this stage seem unlikely. The possibility of the EU offering the UK an extension to the transition period has been mooted, with the aim of offsetting further economic uncertainty. Even if such an extension is accepted, however, the underlying political paradox will remain fundamentally unaltered.

Without defining a meaningful difference between the benefits afforded to members and non-members of the EU through the medium of the Brexit negotiations, populist parties will continually espouse the message that they can be next to successfully depart the bloc. The EU, faced with this existential challenge, will choose a stance that expresses political strength over economic flexibility.

Antonio Tucker holds a Masters in International Relations from the University of St Andrews

Where does energy from waste fit into the UK post-Brexit?

Britain’s circular economy strategy is part of a wider plan to mitigate climate change and will change how society operates; the materials we use, how we generate electricity, and how we consume and manage our waste.

The circular economy

The circular economy model is a key framework to realise a more sustainable future. It focuses on keeping materials and resources within the system for as long as possible or, if possible, indefinitely. As opposed to a linear model, where a resource is extracted, refined, consumed, and disposed, the circular model ensures the material is repurposed and reused either through recycling into another product, extraction of key metals and other materials, or potentially even conversion into energy. This approach is one of many potential catalysts for a sustainable future, where fewer virgin resources are extracted from rapidly depleting sources.

The role of waste

To fully embrace and refine this model, a major part of the circular economy is managing waste. The UK is currently following the EU strategy, with the aims to achieve a 60% recycling target for municipal waste by 2030. Landfill capacity is expected to expire by 2023 and, while newer sites will become available, they are not being opened fast enough to meet demand. The UK does not yet have its own strategy on dealing with waste management as part of the circular economy and, with the looming shadow of Brexit, it is unclear if these targets will be maintained or others developed.

Currently, UK policy is having a positive impact on waste. While 48% of total waste in 2016 was recycled and around 25% went to landfill – which includes municipal waste from construction and industry – the weightage amount is still too high to be sustainable. Municipal solid waste is defined as waste coming from homes, schools, shops and small businesses. Since 2010, there has been a 40% reduction in municipal waste sent to the landfill.

Energy from waste

One of the ways that we can reduce waste sent to landfill and support a more sustainable economy is by extracting energy from the waste for heating and electricity generation, a process known as energy from waste (EfW). The process outputs heat, which can be used for district heating, while the energy can be used to create steam, which is in turn used to generate electricity. Materials such as glass and metals, which do not combust in the process, are left at the bottom, known as bottom ash and can be used as aggregates in construction, with the remaining metals being sent for recycling.

There are many advantages of this approach. For instance, when we compare carbon emissions of EfW against sending waste to landfill, EfW has much lower emissions. Research on EfW has also shown that the health risks – cancerous and non-cancerous – from waste incineration are five times lower in comparison to landfill. Given that we are running out of landfill space, EfW can take as much as 60Mt out of landfill in the coming decade and be used to provide electricity to 1.8m homes. Currently, around 3.5m tonnes of waste are being sent abroad to be utilised to generate electricity, which the UK is then buying back.

There are still problems with EfW, the EU has recently removed EfW from its directives to be incorporated into the circular economy on the grounds that, compared to traditional fossil fuels, EfW produces twice as much carbon per unit of electricity generated, passing the limit set by the EU. Research into the technology involved in ensuring the emissions are purified is improving, however, and treatment of air pollution control (APC) residues may rectify some of these problems in the coming years.

What does this mean for the UK?

Weighing up the pros and cons, EfW should be a key part of the UK’s post-Brexit policies. Given we are unable to meet space demand for landfills, EfW will enable us to free up space and reduce the amount of CO2 emissions that would normally be generated. Exporting waste – to be turned into electricity and to be bought back – makes no sense when there is an option to reduce costs, provide investment opportunities, and create domestic capacity for baseline power generation.

EfW does not necessarily need to be a long term strategy for the UK. With society undergoing a transformation in the energy sector and climate being at the top of the agenda, using EfW in a short-to-medium term could provide a stepping stone to a cleaner world. While there are concerns about EfW emissions, a comprehensive national strategy needs to be developed to effectively place EfW in the future of the UK’s circular economy.

Usman Farooq is a data scientist at an international engineering consultancy.

MANPADS: An underrated threat to the UK and their allies

MANPADS are a widespread, yet continually underestimated, weapon system that threatens the UK armed forces and their partner nations.

MANPADS (Man Portable, Air Defence Systems) are lightweight, shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles. These are short-range systems that particularly threaten low flying and slow moving aircraft. They originated in the Cold War to provide mobile air defence for ground forces and have spread widely. MANPADS are lethal to civilian aircraft during takeoff or landing.

MANPADS have struck 40 civilian aircraft since the 1970s, causing 800 deaths and 28 crashes. According to US estimates there are 500,000-750,000 MANPADS across the world. MANPADS are also potent against military aviation, downing 269 Soviet aircraft during the Soviet-Afghan War. They are attractive to underfunded militaries, as they provide a limited form of air-defence for a fraction of costly long range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.

Despite international efforts, MANPADS can still be illicitly distributed. Not only does corruption in many areas of the world ease the spread of these weapons, the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya rendered vast stockpiles of MANPADS unaccounted for. Likewise, the Syrian Civil War saw the dramatic loosening of control over regime stockpiles. A similar situation currently exists in Yemen.

MANPADS have also been supplied directly to terrorist groups by states. Gaddafi’s Libya supplied the Irish Republican Army with MANPADs. Iran and Syria are suspected of supplying MANPADS to Hamas and Hezbollah. Herein lies the threat of MANPADs, there are multiple illicit supply lines and a demonstrated effectiveness.

The UK armed forces needs to adopt measures to protect forces in combat environments from MANPADS. For example, the slow moving cargo aircraft that are critical to supplying forces in Afghanistan are highly vulnerable on takeoff or landing. The Taliban possess MANPADS and have targeted NATO heavy lift aircraft with them.

Further, MANPADS will be a part of any conflict in which the UK finds itself, such as a regional conflict with Iran in the Middle East. They could prove effective in frustrating efforts at deploying forces, evacuating nationals, and targeting allied nations. Iran manufactures its own MANPADS which have seen successful use with the Houthis in Yemen. Likewise, MANPADS could prove especially lethal to UK partner nations currently fighting terrorist groups in Africa. Nigeria’s operations against Boko Haram are aided greatly by their airpower, and MANPADS could frustrate this advantage.

This is also the case with Al-Shabaab, who have attacked Kenyan forces and military installations. Al-Shabaab possess MANPADS of varying sophistication, using one to shoot down a UN transport plane in 2007. This speaks to the broader trend of developing nations with limited military capacity being on the frontline of combatting terrorism. Without a viable counter, MANPADS could degrade these nation’s airpower and mobility (a critical advantage when fighting terrorist groups).

While modern air defence systems such as the UK Sky Sabre could potentially intercept MANPADS with its Common Anti-Air Modular Missile, this was designed to target cruise missiles and guided munitions, so it is unclear whether MANPADS are considered. Sky Sabre is also limited by its 25km range, which renders it unable to protect aircraft providing close air support and troop transport. Increased funding is needed to provide training and develop systems which can be shared with partner nations, and operated with minimal ground support on vulnerable aircraft. Such systems include electronic countermeasures (ECMs) and infrared countermeasures (IRCMs).

While these can be effective, they struggle against multiple coordinated volleys of modern missiles. Their patchy usage among the forces of developing nations leaves much room for improvement. The current enthusiasm for developing countermeasures to drones can provide a launchpad for renewing efforts to develop effective counters to MANPADS.

In addition to developing countermeasures, the UK should also pursue a policy campaign to drive the greater control of these systems. The Wassenaar Arrangement’s Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS is a welcome development in this field as it imposes strict regulations on participating states relating to the manufacturing, storage, and export of MANPADS. Nations who possess or manufacture large numbers of MANPADS, such as China, Egypt, Iran, North Korea and Pakistan, are, however, not party to it. The UK should actively seek to encourage their involvement.

Additionally, the implementation of ‘buyback’ programmes such as those carried out by the US during the Iraq and Afghan War, and in Libya may warrant consideration. In Libya, local militias sell their MANPADS to local government, who either secure or destroy the systems. While controversial, these programmes have secured hundreds of MANPADS in the past. Their success merits consideration.. MANPADS are certain to remain an ever present threat to British civilian and military interests, and the UK must do more to secure itself and its interests in the face of this widespread threat.

Jack Sargent is Co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme

The UK can use COP26 to prove its climate credentials

The next COP summit on climate change will be hosted in Glasgow. In the face of the climate crisis and the past few years of political uncertainty, the UK should use the meeting to successfully deliver on their large climate change promises.

Following the Conservative Party’s win in the December general election, the new government is expected by various public sectors and stakeholders to deliver in multiple fields of policy, from dealing with problems facing the NHS, to relationships with the United States, to combatting homelessness, to the rise in rental prices in the UK.

Among these is the most important of all: climate change. Following it’s postponement, the UK is due to host the 26th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP26) in 2021, the first such international forum to be hosted in Britain. With climate change becoming increasingly important across the world, the demand and pressure to deliver a substantial agreement is greater than ever.

The UK has long heralded itself as a ‘world leader’ in the fight against climate change, the reality of which is a matter for debate. Despite landmark victories in declaring a ‘climate emergency’, palpable progress on environmental policy in the UK is slow, with the only significant recent victory being the U-turn on policy approaches to new onshore wind farms.

Many parts of the Government and other MPs are currently discussing new approaches through Parliamentary groups and Whitehall Departments. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) recently focused on achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. Then Chair of the BEIS Committee Rachel Reeves stated in March: “Putting the 2050 net zero target into law was a big sign of the UK’s climate change ambitions. However, the target is only the first step, it’s crucial the Government now comes forward with a roadmap to achieve it”.

The UK has remained a reliable signatory to agreements and participant in further negotiations that arise from COP summits. The country has an additional opportunity to develop a vital, though potentially only cosmetic, association with climate policy. Throughout COP, there are multiple instances where essential agreements become enshrined in the body of climate dialogues. We all recall the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement and, with the summit in Glasgow, the UK can stamp its name into the environmental history books.

The road ahead is still rife with bumps and potholes. The Government has already had to change the President of the proceedings, from the former Minister for Energy and Clean Growth, Claire Perry O’Neill, to the current Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Alok Sharma. In addition, the EU may be seeking to exert its influence both ahead of and during COP26 in Glasgow, with the bloc already having separate discussions on increasing European emissions’ targets for 2030. Additionally, as a result of the coronavirus crisis, the summit has now been postponed, throwing yet another wrench into the works in the lead up to COP26.

With an additional year ahead of the conference, it would be foolish to rule out further trials and tribulations. Undoubtedly, 2020 marks an important year for both British and international climate policy, and we must keep a critical eye on what unfolds in the lead up to and during the proceedings at COP26 next year.

Micheil Page is Head of Agora’s Energy & Climate Programme.

Coronavirus will prolong the Brexit transition period. It’s better to request an extension now

Reaching agreement on the future EU-UK relationship within a year was always ambitious. Now, with Ministers and civil servants focused on fighting coronavirus, it is impossible. An extension to the transition period is needed to protect citizens and the economy.

In December last year, British voters gave Boris Johnson a strong parliamentary majority, having been promised that his Conservative Party would “get Brexit done” by the end of 2019. Once formed, the new Government almost immediately committed to another self-imposed Brexit deadline, this time telling voters that the transition period would not be extended beyond 2020.

A transition period was written into the Withdrawal Agreement to fulfil a need – recognised by both the European institutions and the May administration in the UK – to provide citizens and businesses with a level of certainty and continuity during the time between Britain leaving the EU and a deal being ratified to govern the future relationship between the two polities.

As many politicians and commentators have noted, attempting to strike a trade agreement that will, unavoidably, be both complex and unprecedented is ambitious to say the least. Let us use the Government’s favourite comparison, CETA, to illustrate this point. The EU-Canadian FTA was signed in 2016 and entered into force the year after (although some provisions are still not in action). Those negotiations were launched in 2009, after half a decade of cooperative scoping exercises.

At times, when there is less media attention, members of the Cabinet admit that twelve months is a tight timescale for negotiating and ratifying an FTA with the EU. Minister Michael Gove, who is coordinating future relationship negotiations across Whitehall, conceded during a select committee hearing in early March that negotiations may spill over into 2021 and beyond in areas such as internal security. This suggests the Government may privately have a strategy to strike a limited trade deal first and move on to negotiate other, more contentious sectoral agreements at a later date.

A year is not a long time to strike a trade agreement, even one of limited scope (we can ignore for now the fact that the relationship which both the UK and EU committed to in the Political Declaration goes far deeper than any FTA that has ever existed). This would be true even if three months had not already passed and negotiations were taking place. But, due to the coronavirus pandemic, talks have been frozen. The UK has pushed back the publication of its draft legal text for its preferred future relationship with the bloc and a Commission briefing to the EU27 reportedly said that negotiations via video conference had proved impossible.

Increasingly, there are calls to extend the transition period. Speaking in January, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned British negotiators that “you cannot expect to agree every single aspect of our new partnership” within a year. Earlier this month, representatives from the European Parliament’s main political groups in the influential Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) Committee proposed a cross-Committee statement urging the UK to request an extension and avoid that recurring threat of the ‘no deal’ cliff edge.

Two main arguments have been employed by those opposed to such an extension. The first is sovereignty. It is true that the transition period leaves the UK in an undesirable position as a ‘rule taker’ without formal political representation, but equally undesirable would be rushing through a trade agreement without proper scrutiny (an inevitability at a time where parliamentary activity is largely suspended and political energy is necessarily focused on fighting coronavirus).

The second argument centres around money. Extending the transition period would likely require the Treasury to contribute to the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework, either directly or indirectly, however any such payment would be nugatory compared with the COVID-19 package already announced by Chancellor Rishi Sunak. More importantly, the double blow of a pandemic and a ‘no deal’ Brexit would be paralysing to the national finances and should be avoided at all costs.

Attempting to conclude a future relationship agreement with the EU by the end of the year would not only be unacceptably undemocratic, it would result in a worse deal. Failure to extend or reach a deal would cost the economy dear, in terms of tax receipts and job losses. These are things any rational person would want to avoid.

If an extension to the transition period is required, then better to request it sooner rather than later. Earlier notice gives certainty to citizens and to businesses. The public has already proved itself to be understanding of extraordinary measures and political decisions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not an ideological question of remain or leave, left or right; it is a question of democratic principles and sound economic management. The Government must request a transition extension now.

John McStravick is Vice-Chair of Agora. @JS_McStravick