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Reforming democracy: the revolution of citizens’ assemblies

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Citizens’ assemblies seem like the epitome of good democracy, allowing ordinary citizens to have their say on major policy issues. The recent climate change citizens’ assemblies in France and Britain provided valuable insights for the future potential of deliberative democracy.

What are citizens’ assemblies?

Citizens’ assemblies aim to strengthen the deliberative nature of the decision-making process in policy-making. Deliberative democracy is strengthened when citizens have the opportunity to debate issues before decisions are made on them. In the UK, there have been three notable examples of citizens’ assemblies: Democracy Matters in Autumn 2015, Brexit in 2017, and climate change in January 2020. Citizens’ assemblies have taken place in many countries, including France, Belgium, United States, Australia, and Poland.

In these examples, the assemblies brought together citizens and policy-makers in a sphere where citizens can directly voice their views. Through this process, the public is able to debate key issues with politicians and regional leaders, which brings the issues closer to local communities by giving them the opportunity to share their knowledge and experiences. In theory, this leads to more effective outcomes, with more informed citizens and more legitimised decisions.

In this way, citizens’ assemblies try to address a democratic deficit by adopting a more democratic model. Ordinarily, this opportunity for people to have their voices heard on pertinent issues is limited. In an ideal democracy, this should exist by default. But, in democracies where the integrity of parliaments is questioned and representation is limited on high levels, there is a need for a platform that can fill these gaps. Citizens’ assemblies aim to achieve this by developing the principles of random selection and deliberation through inviting a group of representative people to share their views.

People-shaped solutions to global issues

The use of citizens’ assemblies in both France and the UK in January 2020 provide an opportunity to learn about the role of these fora in solving global issues.

A downfall of the Brexit citizens’ assembly in 2017 was that it was poorly publicised; in fact, many politicians called for such an initiative on Brexit afterwards, unaware that one had been held already. It was strongly implied that any outcome of this citizens’ assembly would be dismissed unless it offered a recommendation that politicians wanted to hear. This gives the impression of hypocrisy: are citizens’ assemblies only effective when they offer what politicians want?

But the latest climate change assemblies provide hope. In 2020, 110 randomly selected citizens became members of the UK Climate Change Citizens’ Assembly, and in France 150 citizens were randomly selected by sortition.

This citizens’ assembly was called for in response to one of the three core demands of the climate activist group, Extinction Rebellion. Although climate change is an international problem, Extinction Rebellion saw value in engaging citizens on a local level to have their views heard by local leaders. This allowed the issue to transcend traditional partisan party lines that can lead to divisive policies, and alleviated the risk that people’s experiences could be forgotten in central policy-making.

In the UK, members tried to inform Parliament on how policies can be redefined to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The members learned about climate change from experts before forming their decisions. In France, members also discussed measures to fight against climate change, and both assemblies raised challenging questions to leaders, spanning from how homes should be heated to how businesses and governments should tackle climate change together. One goal of these assemblies was to put pressure on politicians to act faster; this is especially important since climate change is a pressing issue that cannot wait for a typical five-year term length.

The future of citizens’ assemblies

The presence of climate assemblies across borders, whilst debating the same issue, suggests there is an important role that citizens’ assemblies can adopt. This comes at a time when the University of Cambridge’s Centre for the Future of Democracy found that 57.5% of people surveyed were dissatisfied with democracy in 2019 (compared to 47.5% in the mid-1990s).

If democratic institutions are not meeting the needs or expectations of people, then one way to address this could be by establishing more legitimacy and bringing democracy closer to people with citizens’ assemblies. The examples from the UK and France helped to bring together ordinary people to debate global issues. The long-term outcomes of these climate assemblies is yet to be seen, but for the future, it could lead to a more interactive democracy, where citizens’ assemblies are seen as a normal feature of government decision-making.

Preeti Pasricha is co-Head of Agora’s Democracy & Governance Programme

The EU cannot face external challenges without solving its internal ones

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The new European Commission is ambitious about improving the EU’s capacity to act on the international stage and ability to respond to the challenges of the next decade. But policymakers should understand that solving internal challenges and divisions is just as crucial as facing external crises.

Due to its focus on economic integration, the EU has often struggled to respond to geopolitical crises it has had to face during the last decade. The new leadership of the European Commission, as well as several EU leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron, is planning to change this in the near future, arguing that Europe needs to develop the means of becoming a geopolitical actor.

At this year’s World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, the Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, argued that Brussels should complement its diplomatic efforts in Libya with hard power measures. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, said Europe should develop an “appetite for power” in its security and defence policy. Macron has been pushing for greater military capabilities for the EU, arguing that it would bring “credibility in terms of foreign policy”.

Such comments raise the expectations that Europe could finally overcome its classical dilemma of not living up to its foreign policy ambitions. But, as it thinks about how to respond to the challenges of the next decade, the new EU leadership must also consider internal obstacles and relations between the EU institutions and EU27 member states that prevent progress on this issue.

Foreign and defence policies are still run by member states, and there is no commonly held desired level of integration in defence. On one hand, there is an increased desire to move on in the sphere of defence – including spending and procurement – even though it is too premature to speak of a ‘European army’. Von der Leyen is planning to push for “a genuine European Defence Union” in the next five years.

On the other hand, several member states fear that it would affect transatlantic relations and refuse to contribute more. In an attempt to find a compromise between the different security interests of the EU27, the Commission presented a Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) proposal which cut funds from several defence initiatives such as space programmes, and consequently reduces Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ ambitions.

There is also a lack of coherence between different initiatives at the EU level (such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund) and outside of EU structures (such as the European Intervention Initiative, set up under France’s leadership). This is partly due to the differences in French and German visions and strategic cultures. Under Macron’s leadership, Paris is eager to emphasise capabilities and preparedness to respond to crises together, while Berlin follows a more integrationist approach.

Another internal challenge is the inability, or unwillingness, to change European voting rules in foreign and security policy. The Commission is pushing to move to qualified majority voting (QMV) on some foreign policy issues, as unanimity voting effectively gives a veto to all member states and constitutes an easy obstacle to efficient decision making.

Recently, Austria blocked the creation of a new EU mission in the Mediterranean, arguing that it would encourage more migration flows to Europe. Hours of discussion were needed before a common decision could be found. Such an approach is not reliable in the event of a crisis situation that requires an urgent response. As many member states do not show the political will to change voting rules, internal divisions will continue to plague the EU’s ability to act effectively.

Finally, there are visible internal disagreements about how to deal with the neighbourhood, whether it is the enlargement process in the Western Balkans, relations with Russia, or the conflict in Libya. The EU27 will now have to reconsider the format for its new security relationship with the UK, which will remain a major defence actor on the European continent. So far Brussels has been reluctant to grant the UK a special status in EU defence initiatives, meaning bilateral relationships, ad hoc meetings, or a new European Security Council with the UK’s participation could be the way to go.

Policymakers in Brussels and many national capitals would like the EU to be more relevant on the international stage in the next decade, but there is still much confusion about how this should be achieved. Going beyond the lowest common denominator will be crucial for Europe to develop its ‘strategic autonomy’. Nevertheless, current internal divisions between member states over issues such as the direction of defence integration, voting rules, or dealing with neighbours are likely to persist and be as challenging as any external crises the EU will face.

Anna Nadibaidze is an analyst of European politics focusing on foreign policy and security.

Climate change could transform the way we think about democracy

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Though it is mainly seen as an environmental catastrophe today, climate change will fundamentally alter our political and economic institutions, including popular rule. For democracy to survive, we need to expand it in definition and practice as part of the response to climate change.

When historians review the 21st century, they may well conclude that climate change ran through all the historical, political, and economic shifts of the era. As environmental collapses destabilise economic systems through resource scarcity, alter societies through mass migration, and jeopardise national security through environmental hazards, global political institutions will fundamentally shift.

One of these institutions we hold dear more than most is democracy, defined by US President Abraham Lincoln as “government of the people, by the people, for the people”. Although we focus on the populist election victories in the West since 2016 as the key challenge to democracy today, there may be a greater one hidden around the corner: what will the impact of climate change be?

A quick prognosis will not yield positive results. The short-term orientation of democratic term limits do not lend themselves to the long-term solutions climate change requires, and the unpalatability of the necessary reforms mean it is safer for democratic politicians to appeal to the rhetoric of climate change, rather than make real progress.

This was seen in Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s proposition that Canada should declare a climate emergency, shortly before he approved the construction of a trans-mountain oil pipeline. For re-election, the bad publicity was preferable to rising fuel costs.

Additionally, solutions must be on a global scale to have a realistic chance of success at fighting climate change. Treaties such as the 2015 Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal, proposed in May 2019 by the incoming European Commission, are an effective way to make sure every country takes action against climate change. In a world were these solutions have to be increasingly globalised, is there any room for the voice of small communities?

These arguments obscure the fact that climate change opposition can empower democratic institutions. For one thing, the notion that elected representatives try to avoid long-term climate policies is only really the case in majoritarian democracies such the UK; adherence to climate change policies is higher in more proportional democracies. This includes the many continental European nations with popular green parties, such as the Dutch GroenLinks who found popularity in elections in 2017.

Moreover, climate change activism is galvanizing young people to more participation in, not disenchantment with, democratic politics. This has led to increased support for presidential candidates in the US with strong climate change policies, and the global school strikes for the climate (we might also expect politicians to respond faster to climate change if the franchise were extended to 16-year-olds).

Additionally, viewing international agreements as globalisation out of the control of the masses is misleading when it comes to climate agreements. They are not imposed on citizens unfairly through unrepresentative organisations, rather people are encouraging states to abide by commitments though the international arena. This is through both traditional political participation and through activism taken to an enormous scale, such as the six to seven million people protesting in late September in a global climate strike. The decision for dozens of US cities to continue adhering to the Paris Climate Agreement, after the American refusal to abide by it in 2017, also reflects the support of communities beyond the state for these arrangements.

From here, we can see democratic principles beginning to shift. States currently employing majoritarian systems of democracy may have to make them more representative if they want to avoid climate disaster, and popular protests play an ever-increasing role in influencing policy makers. Yet while protests are traditionally national affairs in support of state aims, these new climate protests challenge the state system by organising worldwide for common goals and demanding that states adhere to international agreements. These emerging patterns point the way to a future where popular rule does not conform to traditional two-party power structures, nor even to state borders.

Lincoln gave his famous definition during the American Civil War, claiming that Union soldiers died so that democracy “shall not perish from the earth”. Soon we will find ourselves in a similar position, but the people shall no longer be of one nation, but of one, dying, earth. Maintaining democracy in the face of global challenges is far from inevitable, in fact it is unlikely. But maintaining democracy has always been a challenge, and in continuing its maintenance we must widen and deepen the idea of what it could mean to a broader, more global, and fundamentally fairer process.

Ross Twinn is a history student at the London School of Economics.

For a coherent European security, France and Germany must meet in the middle

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Whilst European strategic autonomy may be a vision for the longer-term, strategic planning regarding the vulnerability of European infrastructure to external players is essential now. Despite strained relations and differing visions, France and Germany, as the powerhouses of Europe, need to find a way of working together to realise this.

Events of recent weeks suggest that Franco-German discord on security and foreign policy matters may be a consequential side-effect of the UK’s EU withdrawal. Without the presence of the UK as a partner whose views and resources are as consequential in decision-making and forward-planning as their own, the disparity in vision between France and Germany is increasingly clear. Whilst Germany is hampered by internal political woes, Macron has been widely criticised for a singular approach to addressing Europe’s challenges. Macron is understood by many to be keen on realising his own vision for Europe, and impatient to wait for others, such as Germany, to catch up or contribute their thoughts. Blocking the beginning of EU accession talks with North Macedonia is a case in point, as are Macron’s controversial comments that “we are currently experiencing […] the braindeath of NATO”.

The response of Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, German Minister of Defence, to Macron’s NATO comments provides important insight. By her interpretation, Macron wishes to replace NATO, whilst the Germans “want to strengthen it”. She continues that “When France talks about more European cooperation in defence, they’re talking about strategic autonomy. […] France has a different military culture than Germany.”

Strategic autonomy has often been discussed in European foreign policy circles, and with particular earnestness following the election of Donald Trump and the subsequent doubt cast over the American security guarantee. Differing military traditions and ambitions within Europe (as Kramp-Karrenbauer’s comments illustrate) have, however, long impeded the realisation of European security and defence cooperation with the potential to ultimately supercede the role of NATO.

It is, therefore, fair to say that strategic autonomy for Europe is a way off, if on the horizon at all. However, while hard power is undoubtedly important in the current global context, hybrid warfare and trade wars are also consequential. ‘Strategic autonomy’ might not, and indeed ought not, be wholly limited to traditional military means. The purchase and influence which foreign players have over and within national systems matter, as does the strength of Europe as a trading bloc. Europe cooperates most successfully economically and the strength of its trade deals demonstrates that, when united, European states can collectively protect their interests. Norm-setting initiatives such as the GDPR have also proven highly successful in safeguarding European citizens within a largely unregulated global commons.

Macron seems to understand this. Over recent years, he has argued at length that, in order for the EU to remedy the ills besetting it and to remain a global power, national sovereignty must be ceded and collectively pooled in the areas of finance, economics, the environment and immigration, as well as foreign policy and defence. He called for significantly more consideration than his German counterparts before opening European 5G markets to Chinese tech giant Huawei, suggesting vigilance against making Europe more vulnerable to external influence than is absolutely necessary. Germany, by contrast, has seemingly failed to learn from the ongoing saga of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which not only exposes the German economy to potential future Russian interference but has also recently received backlash from Ukraine, alongside criticism and threats of intervention from the Americans.

If France and Germany — the traditional ‘axis’ on which Europe traditionally rotates — are at odds, radical change in European defence policy is unlikely, at least for the short-to-medium term. Nevertheless, Europe should at a minimum aim for strategic prudence, coupled with as much economic and political autonomy as it can manage. Reducing exposure and vulnerability to potentially antagonistic players to the greatest possible degree is integral to achieving this. France and Germany must find a way of seeing eye-to-eye on this, and of prioritising consideration and coordination in matters pertaining to the security of infrastructure across the bloc.

Macron’s methods may leave something to be desired; his independent approach likely prevents his ideas from being fully appreciated, and may even be interpreted as somewhat hypocritical in an ostensibly consensus-driven European context. His intent is sensible, however. Joined-up thought on strategic matters is fundamental for Europe to forge a path to greater autonomy, security and consequence in the global sphere. This will be especially necessary once the UK — arguably the most capable defence power in the EU — exits the bloc. A crucial task — for France, for Germany, and for other European partners — will be to find a way of achieving such joined-up thinking by meeting one another in the middle.

Grace McLoughlin is head of Agora’s Europe programme.

Why Germany will not come to the UK’s rescue in Brexit negotiations

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Too many in the UK assume that Berlin will intervene in Brexit negotiations, pushing for exemptions to preserve the strong economic relationship between the two countries. This expectation is misplaced and has helped allow the British government to avoid confronting the choices they must make.

The contemporary relationship between the UK and Germany is a complex one, with Europe’s richest and most populous country occupying a peculiar place in the British national psyche. On the one hand, there continues to be an inescapable association between Germany and the two World Wars that tore the continent apart. Sadly this continues to surface in ugly ways. A recent social media post from the pro-Brexit Leave.EU campaign featured a photo of Chancellor Angela Merkel with her arm raised in an apparent salute and the line “we didn’t win two world wars to be pushed around by a Kraut”. On the other hand, however, there is widespread – if at times begrudging – respect for a country seen as politically stable and economically prudent.

This preoccupation with Germany has emerged throughout Brexit negotiations. Many pro-Brexit Conservative MPs and commentators have asserted that the economic self-interest of the EU27 will trump the preferences of the European Commission in negotiations, and that the UK will eventually be granted continued frictionless trade despite leaving the Single Market, Customs Union, and ECJ jurisdiction. Berlin – viewed as a uniquely practically-minded political ally in Europe – is repeatedly expected to be first into the ring to fight London’s corner on this front. Perhaps it is no coincidence that Realpolitik is one of the most popular Teutonic words in the English lexicon.

This expectation of the German government has turned out to be nothing more than misplaced hope. It remains the official stance of both the Commission and European Council, Germany included, that the absence of tariffs and non-tariff barriers for the UK is contingent on applying European laws and standards to goods entering the internal market from Britain. No side-deals have yet been offered in areas such as defence and security cooperation, and Chancellor Merkel has consistently warned the Brits against ‘cherry picking’.

The causes of this stance are often misdiagnosed. At Conservative Party conference last month, I repeatedly heard a false dichotomy drawn between the economic union that Brits believed they had joined in 1973 and the ‘political project’ which Germany and other countries on the continent were pursuing. While it may be true that this is a motivation for some in Brussels and Berlin, the idea that it is the primary concern of politicians in the Bundestag is nothing short of fanciful.

The reasons for Germany not intervening in Brexit negotiations are grounded not in ideology but in logic. Firstly, Berlin’s influence on European affairs is not as great as is sometimes assumed. True, the German Chancellor can exert more power than most, but it is wrong to think that any one country can make unilateral decisions on behalf of the EU.

Secondly, Brexit is a far lower priority for Germany – and, indeed, the rest of the continent – than is sometimes assumed in the UK. With a new European Parliament recently elected and a new college of Commissioners about to take up their posts, policy minds in Berlin and Brussels are preoccupied with issues such as the bloc’s budget and economic reform. Brexit is a second, or even third, tier concern not worth expending political capital on.

The third and key reason is that the integrity of the Single Market is of paramount importance to German business. Former Brexit Secretary David Davis’s assertion that “within minutes of a vote for Brexit the CEO’s of Mercedes, BMW, VW and Audi will be knocking down Chancellor Merkel’s door demanding that there be no barriers [to trade]” has aged badly.

On the contrary, President of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) Dieter Kempf stressed in 2017 that “defending the Single Market, a key European project, must be the priority for the EU. Europe must maintain the integrity of the Single Market and its four freedoms: goods, capital, services, and labour”. Other influential German trade organisations have also made clear that they do not want to be undercut by less regulated British goods post-Brexit.

It is crucial that the British government understands the organisation and countries it is distancing itself from. Politicians in the UK should spend less time focusing on their own Brexit red lines and more time understanding those held by their negotiating partners and the capitals they represent. If Britain respects the priorities of countries like Germany, Berlin may well be a constructive partner that works to retain smooth access to a key market. Until then, the UK must stop waiting for a reprieve from Germany, and instead confront the tough choices it faces outside of the EU.

John McStravick is Vice-Chair of Agora. He tweets at @JS_McStravick.

This piece was originally published by Polis180.

Avoiding a ‘hard’ Irish border may have created opportunities for human traffickers

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A Brexit agreement based on ‘future technological arrangements’ will pose problems for Irish border officials and provide a potential haven for smugglers and traffickers.

Due to the island of Ireland’s unique political and geographical importance, it has always been a hotspot for both smugglers and traffickers. Along the roads connecting Northern Ireland with the Republic, smuggling and trafficking was common from the Irish War of Independence up until the start of the troubles in 1969. With the Good Friday Agreement and the official end of The Troubles, the European Union built numerous border crossings to promote trade cooperation between the nations and closed 40% of police stations near the border.

These changes have come back to the fore through Brexit negotiations, with the UK and EU determined to avoid a ‘hard’ border given the recent conflict. Prime Minister Boris Johnson has promised to address this through technology with his new deal. So far the details are vague, with motion sensors, scanners, infra-red, and surveillance cameras all being talked about that as possible solutions. There already appears to be a number of problems with this proposal, however.

These problems not only speak to a border that may be ineffective but also one that could create opportunities for goods smugglers and human traffickers. The most recent Annual Trafficking in Persons report from the US State Department downgraded Ireland to a tier two country, meaning it is no longer deemed to be meeting the minimum standards required in the fight against human trafficking.

The Withdrawal Agreement looks set to exacerbate this in three ways: failing to account for the complexity of the ‘technology fix’, changes to taxing regulation, and failing to address problems with the UK’s sex industry.

First, maintaining an open international border with technology is a much more difficult feat than is often accounted for. Norway and Sweden – two of the most technologically advanced countries in Europe – have been attempting this very exercise for many years and have yet to reach an answer that does not require physical customs checks at the border itself. These solutions are a multi-decade project.

Given the physical geography and historical context of the Irish border, the interim period between an open border, manned by technology alone, represents a unique opportunity for both goods smugglers and human traffickers. In fact, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) predicts that border staff will be asked to process a further 220 million customs declarations and that authorities “are likely to become overwhelmed” at the border; which could lead to an easier path for both traffickers and smugglers to enter the EU.

Second, the fact that goods would be taxed upon reaching Northern Ireland from Great Britain may provide an enticing market for smugglers. Smugglers are able to undercut the market in two ways, namely on speed and price. Although the tax will be refunded for goods which leave Northern Ireland to enter into the Republic, the initial heightened fees for buyers within Northern Ireland will affect trade. This, combined with the likely logistical problems at the interim border, may lead traders to use to alternative avenues to move their goods in and out of the EU. Illegal markets thrive in times of economic uncertainty; the incentives will be there for business, especially those handling perishable goods, to bypass regulation to ensure their food gets in on time.

Third, the current situation has been exacerbated by the growth of the UK sex industry, which has benefitted in recent years as a result of both job insecurity and the failure of universal credit to provide families with safety and security. This growth has attracted sex traffickers from around the EU to move people into Britain as the UK industry becomes increasingly lucrative. This growth is in line with research conducted by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime published earlier this year which found that the number of reported sex trafficked victims in Northern Ireland had risen from 98 in 2014 to 179 in 2016. Johnson’s failure to address this in his deal his likely to make matters worse.

The logistical issues cannot be solved before the 31 October and the transition period is set to be equally turbulent on the border. The technological solutions are not in place, and there is no evidence from other parts of the world to suggest that it is even possible to implement such checks. If the Government cannot find these solutions soon, Johnson’s deal may have major economic and humanitarian knock-on effects for decades to come.

Tom Whitting works as a researcher for the PIOT Foundation for the Human Rights of Migrant Workers.