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Climate change could transform the way we think about democracy

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Though it is mainly seen as an environmental catastrophe today, climate change will fundamentally alter our political and economic institutions, including popular rule. For democracy to survive, we need to expand it in definition and practice as part of the response to climate change.

When historians review the 21st century, they may well conclude that climate change ran through all the historical, political, and economic shifts of the era. As environmental collapses destabilise economic systems through resource scarcity, alter societies through mass migration, and jeopardise national security through environmental hazards, global political institutions will fundamentally shift.

One of these institutions we hold dear more than most is democracy, defined by US President Abraham Lincoln as “government of the people, by the people, for the people”. Although we focus on the populist election victories in the West since 2016 as the key challenge to democracy today, there may be a greater one hidden around the corner: what will the impact of climate change be?

A quick prognosis will not yield positive results. The short-term orientation of democratic term limits do not lend themselves to the long-term solutions climate change requires, and the unpalatability of the necessary reforms mean it is safer for democratic politicians to appeal to the rhetoric of climate change, rather than make real progress.

This was seen in Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s proposition that Canada should declare a climate emergency, shortly before he approved the construction of a trans-mountain oil pipeline. For re-election, the bad publicity was preferable to rising fuel costs.

Additionally, solutions must be on a global scale to have a realistic chance of success at fighting climate change. Treaties such as the 2015 Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal, proposed in May 2019 by the incoming European Commission, are an effective way to make sure every country takes action against climate change. In a world were these solutions have to be increasingly globalised, is there any room for the voice of small communities?

These arguments obscure the fact that climate change opposition can empower democratic institutions. For one thing, the notion that elected representatives try to avoid long-term climate policies is only really the case in majoritarian democracies such the UK; adherence to climate change policies is higher in more proportional democracies. This includes the many continental European nations with popular green parties, such as the Dutch GroenLinks who found popularity in elections in 2017.

Moreover, climate change activism is galvanizing young people to more participation in, not disenchantment with, democratic politics. This has led to increased support for presidential candidates in the US with strong climate change policies, and the global school strikes for the climate (we might also expect politicians to respond faster to climate change if the franchise were extended to 16-year-olds).

Additionally, viewing international agreements as globalisation out of the control of the masses is misleading when it comes to climate agreements. They are not imposed on citizens unfairly through unrepresentative organisations, rather people are encouraging states to abide by commitments though the international arena. This is through both traditional political participation and through activism taken to an enormous scale, such as the six to seven million people protesting in late September in a global climate strike. The decision for dozens of US cities to continue adhering to the Paris Climate Agreement, after the American refusal to abide by it in 2017, also reflects the support of communities beyond the state for these arrangements.

From here, we can see democratic principles beginning to shift. States currently employing majoritarian systems of democracy may have to make them more representative if they want to avoid climate disaster, and popular protests play an ever-increasing role in influencing policy makers. Yet while protests are traditionally national affairs in support of state aims, these new climate protests challenge the state system by organising worldwide for common goals and demanding that states adhere to international agreements. These emerging patterns point the way to a future where popular rule does not conform to traditional two-party power structures, nor even to state borders.

Lincoln gave his famous definition during the American Civil War, claiming that Union soldiers died so that democracy “shall not perish from the earth”. Soon we will find ourselves in a similar position, but the people shall no longer be of one nation, but of one, dying, earth. Maintaining democracy in the face of global challenges is far from inevitable, in fact it is unlikely. But maintaining democracy has always been a challenge, and in continuing its maintenance we must widen and deepen the idea of what it could mean to a broader, more global, and fundamentally fairer process.

Ross Twinn is a history student at the London School of Economics.

For a coherent European security, France and Germany must meet in the middle

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Whilst European strategic autonomy may be a vision for the longer-term, strategic planning regarding the vulnerability of European infrastructure to external players is essential now. Despite strained relations and differing visions, France and Germany, as the powerhouses of Europe, need to find a way of working together to realise this.

Events of recent weeks suggest that Franco-German discord on security and foreign policy matters may be a consequential side-effect of the UK’s EU withdrawal. Without the presence of the UK as a partner whose views and resources are as consequential in decision-making and forward-planning as their own, the disparity in vision between France and Germany is increasingly clear. Whilst Germany is hampered by internal political woes, Macron has been widely criticised for a singular approach to addressing Europe’s challenges. Macron is understood by many to be keen on realising his own vision for Europe, and impatient to wait for others, such as Germany, to catch up or contribute their thoughts. Blocking the beginning of EU accession talks with North Macedonia is a case in point, as are Macron’s controversial comments that “we are currently experiencing […] the braindeath of NATO”.

The response of Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, German Minister of Defence, to Macron’s NATO comments provides important insight. By her interpretation, Macron wishes to replace NATO, whilst the Germans “want to strengthen it”. She continues that “When France talks about more European cooperation in defence, they’re talking about strategic autonomy. […] France has a different military culture than Germany.”

Strategic autonomy has often been discussed in European foreign policy circles, and with particular earnestness following the election of Donald Trump and the subsequent doubt cast over the American security guarantee. Differing military traditions and ambitions within Europe (as Kramp-Karrenbauer’s comments illustrate) have, however, long impeded the realisation of European security and defence cooperation with the potential to ultimately supercede the role of NATO.

It is, therefore, fair to say that strategic autonomy for Europe is a way off, if on the horizon at all. However, while hard power is undoubtedly important in the current global context, hybrid warfare and trade wars are also consequential. ‘Strategic autonomy’ might not, and indeed ought not, be wholly limited to traditional military means. The purchase and influence which foreign players have over and within national systems matter, as does the strength of Europe as a trading bloc. Europe cooperates most successfully economically and the strength of its trade deals demonstrates that, when united, European states can collectively protect their interests. Norm-setting initiatives such as the GDPR have also proven highly successful in safeguarding European citizens within a largely unregulated global commons.

Macron seems to understand this. Over recent years, he has argued at length that, in order for the EU to remedy the ills besetting it and to remain a global power, national sovereignty must be ceded and collectively pooled in the areas of finance, economics, the environment and immigration, as well as foreign policy and defence. He called for significantly more consideration than his German counterparts before opening European 5G markets to Chinese tech giant Huawei, suggesting vigilance against making Europe more vulnerable to external influence than is absolutely necessary. Germany, by contrast, has seemingly failed to learn from the ongoing saga of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which not only exposes the German economy to potential future Russian interference but has also recently received backlash from Ukraine, alongside criticism and threats of intervention from the Americans.

If France and Germany — the traditional ‘axis’ on which Europe traditionally rotates — are at odds, radical change in European defence policy is unlikely, at least for the short-to-medium term. Nevertheless, Europe should at a minimum aim for strategic prudence, coupled with as much economic and political autonomy as it can manage. Reducing exposure and vulnerability to potentially antagonistic players to the greatest possible degree is integral to achieving this. France and Germany must find a way of seeing eye-to-eye on this, and of prioritising consideration and coordination in matters pertaining to the security of infrastructure across the bloc.

Macron’s methods may leave something to be desired; his independent approach likely prevents his ideas from being fully appreciated, and may even be interpreted as somewhat hypocritical in an ostensibly consensus-driven European context. His intent is sensible, however. Joined-up thought on strategic matters is fundamental for Europe to forge a path to greater autonomy, security and consequence in the global sphere. This will be especially necessary once the UK — arguably the most capable defence power in the EU — exits the bloc. A crucial task — for France, for Germany, and for other European partners — will be to find a way of achieving such joined-up thinking by meeting one another in the middle.

Grace McLoughlin is head of Agora’s Europe programme.

Why Germany will not come to the UK’s rescue in Brexit negotiations

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Too many in the UK assume that Berlin will intervene in Brexit negotiations, pushing for exemptions to preserve the strong economic relationship between the two countries. This expectation is misplaced and has helped allow the British government to avoid confronting the choices they must make.

The contemporary relationship between the UK and Germany is a complex one, with Europe’s richest and most populous country occupying a peculiar place in the British national psyche. On the one hand, there continues to be an inescapable association between Germany and the two World Wars that tore the continent apart. Sadly this continues to surface in ugly ways. A recent social media post from the pro-Brexit Leave.EU campaign featured a photo of Chancellor Angela Merkel with her arm raised in an apparent salute and the line “we didn’t win two world wars to be pushed around by a Kraut”. On the other hand, however, there is widespread – if at times begrudging – respect for a country seen as politically stable and economically prudent.

This preoccupation with Germany has emerged throughout Brexit negotiations. Many pro-Brexit Conservative MPs and commentators have asserted that the economic self-interest of the EU27 will trump the preferences of the European Commission in negotiations, and that the UK will eventually be granted continued frictionless trade despite leaving the Single Market, Customs Union, and ECJ jurisdiction. Berlin – viewed as a uniquely practically-minded political ally in Europe – is repeatedly expected to be first into the ring to fight London’s corner on this front. Perhaps it is no coincidence that Realpolitik is one of the most popular Teutonic words in the English lexicon.

This expectation of the German government has turned out to be nothing more than misplaced hope. It remains the official stance of both the Commission and European Council, Germany included, that the absence of tariffs and non-tariff barriers for the UK is contingent on applying European laws and standards to goods entering the internal market from Britain. No side-deals have yet been offered in areas such as defence and security cooperation, and Chancellor Merkel has consistently warned the Brits against ‘cherry picking’.

The causes of this stance are often misdiagnosed. At Conservative Party conference last month, I repeatedly heard a false dichotomy drawn between the economic union that Brits believed they had joined in 1973 and the ‘political project’ which Germany and other countries on the continent were pursuing. While it may be true that this is a motivation for some in Brussels and Berlin, the idea that it is the primary concern of politicians in the Bundestag is nothing short of fanciful.

The reasons for Germany not intervening in Brexit negotiations are grounded not in ideology but in logic. Firstly, Berlin’s influence on European affairs is not as great as is sometimes assumed. True, the German Chancellor can exert more power than most, but it is wrong to think that any one country can make unilateral decisions on behalf of the EU.

Secondly, Brexit is a far lower priority for Germany – and, indeed, the rest of the continent – than is sometimes assumed in the UK. With a new European Parliament recently elected and a new college of Commissioners about to take up their posts, policy minds in Berlin and Brussels are preoccupied with issues such as the bloc’s budget and economic reform. Brexit is a second, or even third, tier concern not worth expending political capital on.

The third and key reason is that the integrity of the Single Market is of paramount importance to German business. Former Brexit Secretary David Davis’s assertion that “within minutes of a vote for Brexit the CEO’s of Mercedes, BMW, VW and Audi will be knocking down Chancellor Merkel’s door demanding that there be no barriers [to trade]” has aged badly.

On the contrary, President of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) Dieter Kempf stressed in 2017 that “defending the Single Market, a key European project, must be the priority for the EU. Europe must maintain the integrity of the Single Market and its four freedoms: goods, capital, services, and labour”. Other influential German trade organisations have also made clear that they do not want to be undercut by less regulated British goods post-Brexit.

It is crucial that the British government understands the organisation and countries it is distancing itself from. Politicians in the UK should spend less time focusing on their own Brexit red lines and more time understanding those held by their negotiating partners and the capitals they represent. If Britain respects the priorities of countries like Germany, Berlin may well be a constructive partner that works to retain smooth access to a key market. Until then, the UK must stop waiting for a reprieve from Germany, and instead confront the tough choices it faces outside of the EU.

John McStravick is Vice-Chair of Agora. He tweets at @JS_McStravick.

This piece was originally published by Polis180.

Avoiding a ‘hard’ Irish border may have created opportunities for human traffickers

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A Brexit agreement based on ‘future technological arrangements’ will pose problems for Irish border officials and provide a potential haven for smugglers and traffickers.

Due to the island of Ireland’s unique political and geographical importance, it has always been a hotspot for both smugglers and traffickers. Along the roads connecting Northern Ireland with the Republic, smuggling and trafficking was common from the Irish War of Independence up until the start of the troubles in 1969. With the Good Friday Agreement and the official end of The Troubles, the European Union built numerous border crossings to promote trade cooperation between the nations and closed 40% of police stations near the border.

These changes have come back to the fore through Brexit negotiations, with the UK and EU determined to avoid a ‘hard’ border given the recent conflict. Prime Minister Boris Johnson has promised to address this through technology with his new deal. So far the details are vague, with motion sensors, scanners, infra-red, and surveillance cameras all being talked about that as possible solutions. There already appears to be a number of problems with this proposal, however.

These problems not only speak to a border that may be ineffective but also one that could create opportunities for goods smugglers and human traffickers. The most recent Annual Trafficking in Persons report from the US State Department downgraded Ireland to a tier two country, meaning it is no longer deemed to be meeting the minimum standards required in the fight against human trafficking.

The Withdrawal Agreement looks set to exacerbate this in three ways: failing to account for the complexity of the ‘technology fix’, changes to taxing regulation, and failing to address problems with the UK’s sex industry.

First, maintaining an open international border with technology is a much more difficult feat than is often accounted for. Norway and Sweden – two of the most technologically advanced countries in Europe – have been attempting this very exercise for many years and have yet to reach an answer that does not require physical customs checks at the border itself. These solutions are a multi-decade project.

Given the physical geography and historical context of the Irish border, the interim period between an open border, manned by technology alone, represents a unique opportunity for both goods smugglers and human traffickers. In fact, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) predicts that border staff will be asked to process a further 220 million customs declarations and that authorities “are likely to become overwhelmed” at the border; which could lead to an easier path for both traffickers and smugglers to enter the EU.

Second, the fact that goods would be taxed upon reaching Northern Ireland from Great Britain may provide an enticing market for smugglers. Smugglers are able to undercut the market in two ways, namely on speed and price. Although the tax will be refunded for goods which leave Northern Ireland to enter into the Republic, the initial heightened fees for buyers within Northern Ireland will affect trade. This, combined with the likely logistical problems at the interim border, may lead traders to use to alternative avenues to move their goods in and out of the EU. Illegal markets thrive in times of economic uncertainty; the incentives will be there for business, especially those handling perishable goods, to bypass regulation to ensure their food gets in on time.

Third, the current situation has been exacerbated by the growth of the UK sex industry, which has benefitted in recent years as a result of both job insecurity and the failure of universal credit to provide families with safety and security. This growth has attracted sex traffickers from around the EU to move people into Britain as the UK industry becomes increasingly lucrative. This growth is in line with research conducted by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime published earlier this year which found that the number of reported sex trafficked victims in Northern Ireland had risen from 98 in 2014 to 179 in 2016. Johnson’s failure to address this in his deal his likely to make matters worse.

The logistical issues cannot be solved before the 31 October and the transition period is set to be equally turbulent on the border. The technological solutions are not in place, and there is no evidence from other parts of the world to suggest that it is even possible to implement such checks. If the Government cannot find these solutions soon, Johnson’s deal may have major economic and humanitarian knock-on effects for decades to come.

Tom Whitting works as a researcher for the PIOT Foundation for the Human Rights of Migrant Workers.

Reconsidering security under climate change

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Following a Parliamentary resolution in May, MPs have declared a “climate emergency”. Climate change is still primarily framed as an environmental problem, however. By reframing it as a security threat, policy makers will be better equipped to implement the drastic policies required.

Media outlets and politicians continue to focus on the environmental impacts of climate change: deforestation, rising sea levels, loss of habitat, increasing ocean acidity, drought. But the violent social consequences of these events have been overlooked.

It is increasingly accepted that climate change will diminish resource availability, destabilising political environments and sparking armed conflicts. While experts and commentators have been warning about this for years, mainstream coverage of climate change has yet to acknowledge the security ramifications of these natural disasters, partly due to the difficulty in analysing hypothetical scenarios.

However, we don’t need to turn to hypothetical scenarios to examine the link between climate change and violence. The first climate change war has already occurred in Darfur.

The first ‘climate change war’

The civil war in Darfur, Sudan, was arguably the first modern climate change war. In the 1980s, severe droughts in the region turned previously arable land into dust, leading to crop shortages and the death of livestock. Predominantly Arab Muslim herders were forced to migrate south in search of new pastures. This migration led to conflicts with the Christian farmers in the region over the limited resources. These conflicts over farmland exacerbated ethnic tensions, resulting in the Darfur wars of 1987-90 and 1994-98. By 2003, the intra-state violence had become a civil war, encompassing state, non-state and other ethnic groups.

In 2004, a peace agreement was signed. Drought raged on, however, intensifying the now decades long tensions over access to agricultural resources between the Christian farmers and Muslim herders. The conflict escalated into genocide, with government backing, perpetrated by Arab Muslims against Christian farmers.

Starvation and illness, caused by the extreme food shortages and the conflict itself, resulted in the deaths and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people in the region. Then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon said of the crisis: “Amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change”.

Implications for the Region

Darfur illustrates the causal relationship between environmental stress and conflict. This relationship is not deterministic and does not alleviate the responsibility of the perpetrators, but the factors that led to Darfur are not isolated to Sudan. Climate change will continue to limit resources and exacerbate existing social stresses, including poverty, ethnic tensions, and political instability.

Most African nations rely on rain-fed agriculture for their economy and food supply, and 80% of the population of the Horn of Africa relies upon subsistence farming. Added to this, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reported that last year alone 5.5m were displaced in the region due to conflict and 2.6m people due to natural disasters, accounting for more than a quarter of all displacements worldwide.

The pattern that emerged in Sudan is repeating in the region. In 2018 armed conflict erupted in Nigeria between herder and farmer groups, aggravated by drought. In a highly populated region like Sub-Saharan Africa, conflicts have high casualty rates and the human cost of climate change can be greatly felt.

What next?

The international community is slowly beginning to realise the security ramifications of climate change. In the UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson has accepted the science and the Government has pledged £193m for development aid concerning climate change. There is still a long way to go, however. Johnson’s voting record reveals a more ambivalent position, particularly concerning preventative measures against climate change. With the threat of a ‘no deal’ Brexit looming, structured cooperation between nation states looks set to fracture, risking the much needed international cooperation to combat climate change.

Climate change will not affect all states equally, and a state’s ability to mitigate and adapt to the adverse changes in the environment will depend on its wealth. The countries which will be most impacted by climate change are those with the least political clout in the international system.

To address this, the international community must stop framing climate change as primarily an environmental issue, and emphasise the relationship between climate and security. This altered emphasis could allow the UK to repurpose some of the £36.9bn defence budget to tackle the greatest threat to human security in the 21st Century, namely climate change.

Shona Warren holds a Masters of International Relations from the University of Melbourne and works in international development.

The UK’s environmental policy must adapt to a post-EU world

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While the environment is often treated as a national issue, international co-operation remains pivotal to producing the results that will adequately tackle climate change. As such the UK needs to re-imagine its environmental relationship with the EU27.

The environment should transcend national policy and contribute to foreign policy, considering the grave threat climate change poses towards the whole world and not just a few states. Such is the interconnectivity of countries and economies today that it should be expected that the UK’s environmental policies will come under strain from external shocks that could stem from a number of different geopolitical factors. Yet the most pressing of these might derive from the EU’s future relationship with the UK.

The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has predicted that global temperatures will rise by 3°C by 2100 and 2°C within the next 12 years, despite some international co-operation on the issue, testament to the gravity of the problem.

One could argue that drawbacks lie with the official charters only including advisory and voluntary aims to reduce global warming, with the Paris climate change agreement proving especially flimsy in its achievements. America’s exit and its own inability to reach targets is also a cases in point. Clearly, there is a lack of tangible incentives for countries to work together in fear of being hurt economically by the increased red tape, and in this way becoming uncompetitive in terms of output compared to those who continue to produce vast volumes of emissions and pollution such as China.

The EU has proven itself to be different. It has developed a clear goal in pushing member states to contribute to a “resource-efficient, green, and competitive low-carbon economy”. Since the region has integrated further, European states have worked well to tackle the environmental issue through collective effort despite significantly less pressure 30 years ago then as there is now due to growing awareness, green parties, and activist movements. In 2017 the EU emitted 4,466m tonnes of greenhouse gases compared with 5,720 in 1990, an impressive decrease in trend when considering the fact that more nation states have joined the union in the time period and the destabilising nature of the 2008 global financial crisis that could have stalled progress. While its own targets have not been met recently, progress still continues.

Such success heightens the importance of the environment in the UK’s future relationship with the EU. With most media outlets focusing on trade and security, it is easy to overlook the benefits enjoyed by the UK in being a member of a group that is constantly pushing for innovation to improve the environmental state of Europe. Environmental charity Friends of the Earth looked into the relationship further, with a paper titled ‘UK Environmental Policy Post-Brexit: A Risk Analysis’. They found that the Government’s strategy not only proved vague regarding the issue, but also held targets that were less ambitious than the EU’s. The notion that interstate cooperation within the EU helps harmonise environmental goals is ultimately reinforced by the study’s conclusion that better environmental outcomes for the UK would be enjoyed with a closer relationship to Europe.

Of course, the type of Brexit deal will affect relations between the UK and EU. A ‘no deal’ Brexit would prove the most disruptive in terms of policy links with the EU, while a ‘hard Bresit’ could see only the most important environmental regulations retained in the UK. On the other side, if Brexit were completely stopped then Britain would return to the European Parliament reputation damaged but still a leading member state on the environment, perhaps being able to compel others to declare a climate emergency as the UK and Republic of Ireland have.

Global warming alone should be an issue important enough to transcend Brexit and bring negotiators on both sides, if not any others, to consensus on the issue. Shaking off European environment laws to reduce regulations would be done to the detriment of the UK’s clear progress on the environmental issue as part of the European project, and the politicians will do well to acknowledge that nuance.

Thomas Bradbury, studies politics at the University of Exeter.