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Freeze thaw: the Arctic, Russia and the naval threat to UK

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The recent strategic attention being given by the House of Commons to the Arctic is overdue but budget constraints are likely to hamper good strategy. Given dramatic increases in Russian activity in the Atlantic and High North and the UK’s location on the Northern Sea Route, the UK Armed Forces must grow their ability to operate in this challenging theatre.

Over the past six months, we have seen a flurry of parliamentary strategies on the Arctic from a diplomatic, ecological, economic and security perspective. The Defence Committee’s report published in August 2018 is dedicated to this latter issue, considering the preparedness of the UK in a region with a rapidly changing ecological and geopolitical environment. Granted, the UK only holds observer status on the Arctic Council and has no claims to the 5.5 million square miles of frozen terrain. However,  increased Russian military presence in the region and the opening of Northern shipping lanes on the edge of British waters impact the UK’s security, making it crucial that the UK has the ability to promote peace, stability and environmental responsibility through diplomatic and military means.

Preparation for a future with warmer winters and receding ice shelves requires a security policy that anticipates busier shipping lanes in Arctic waters north of the UK. Greater reliance on passage through Northern waters for European supply chains may put further pressure on future naval resources. In particular, the ‘GIUK gap’ between Greenland, Iceland and the UK on the Northern sea route risks becoming a strategic choke point. All of this means that the maritime environment is becoming more important, more hostile and closer to home.

The UK has neglected the Arctic and High North since the Soviet Union’s collapse. August’s parliamentary report emphasises that “the focus on operating in this challenging environment has been reduced over the long years of engagement in expeditionary operations in hot weather climates.” Indeed, HMS Trenchant’s experience in ICEX 2018 ends an eleven-year hiatus of Royal Navy participation in a biennial U.S. Navy Submarine Force tactical development and torpedo exercise in the Arctic Ocean (ICEX), suggesting a degradation of UK extreme cold weather operational skills.

While there is increasing recognition that the Arctic Ocean is fundamental to the security of the North Atlantic, this has not yet fed through to the UK’s defence policy and capabilities. Crucially after the retirement of Nimrod in 2010, the RAF currently lacks a Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) capability, the backbone of anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The first new P-8 Poseidon MPA is not due until 2020 with the full squadron of nine expected to be operational by late 2023. Until then, the UK is dependent on NATO allies flying sorties from RAF Lossiemouth. The postponement of the Type 31e frigate procurement, which is due to play an active role in ASW missions, threatens the degree of British deterrence in an ever-changing region. The long-awaited defence review and a future National Security Capability Review should reprioritise ASW missions and the Arctic theatre, addressing these concerning naval capability gaps, although this remains unlikely.

Russia appears to have been emboldened by the decline in NATO’s extreme cold weather and ASW capabilities, as evidenced by the huge rise in recent maritime and military activity in the region. The recapitalisation of a previously ageing Russian submarine fleet under the Russian military modernization programme (GPV 2020) since 2008 has helped facilitate a “tenfold increase in the amount of submarine activity in the North Atlantic on behalf of the Russians” according to Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson in February 2018. At the same time, Chatham House Russia & Eurasia Research Fellow and Arctic specialist, Mathieu Boulegue, highlights Russia’s increasing military footprint in the Arctic through new bases, equipment and training in Russian territory in the Arctic and High North. While efforts must be made to avoid an Arctic arms race, Russia is beginning to assert itself beyond its defensive right to uphold its sovereignty.

In this security environment, the UK’s long-term freedom of navigation depends on growing its cold weather capability and Arctic interoperability with NATO allies. This includes an emphasis on bolstered submarine under-ice operations, Arctic training across the Army and Royal Marines, extreme cold weather requirements for equipment procurement and a robust Arctic concept of operations. The MoD faces difficult trade-offs due to post-Brexit budget constraints, weaker Sterling and competing policy priorities that include Tempest, F-35, two carrier groups, plus neglected operation and maintenance budgets. Gavin Williamson’s announcement on 30 September of plans to rotate 800 British commandos to Norway on an annual basis for the next 10 years is progress in the right direction. However, there is little doubt that improving British cold weather capability requires increased long-term MoD funding and a coherent, actionable “Arctic defence strategy” due to its close proximity to the UK and the fast-changing security situation. The UK must, therefore, work for the best but prepare for the worst on an environmental and a strategic level to maintain the policy goal of a “peaceful, stable and well-governed Arctic.”

Dan Fitter is Head of the Defence & Security Programme at Agora.

What future for intelligence cooperation between the UK and the EU post-Brexit?

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Common and borderless threats require strong intelligence cooperation and joint operations between European states to minimise risks. It is essential that the UK and the EU develop a new security partnership which reflects the depth of their current collaboration.

Europe is currently facing growing borderless threats; terrorism, violent extremism, nuclear weapons, misinformation, and cyberattacks to name but a few. While intelligence is at the heart of national sovereignty, the answer to those threats can only have a positive outcome with an increasing and durable intelligence cooperation, data sharing and joint operations among European countries. Security and defence collaboration has become a source of leverage for several prominent decision-makers and a cause for concern in the Brexit talks. In her speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2018, Theresa May stressed the need to maintain and strengthen security cooperation with European countries. Andrew Parker, gave the first-ever public speech of an MI5 Director outside of the UK in Berlin, emphasising the importance of the vital intelligence partnerships the UK has bilaterally and within European institutions. Although neither the UK nor the EU is willing to compromise the safety of their citizens and institutions, intelligence cooperation is being exploited by British leaders as a bargaining chip to minimise post-Brexit losses and by the EU as a threat.

The main reason for intelligence cooperation is pragmatic. However, such collaboration is highly dependent on common threat perception, shared interests and trust. States, therefore, tend to prefer collaborating bilaterally instead of multilateral settings where there are higher risks of data misuse, breaches of confidentiality to third parties and reputational damage. In the case of the UK, bilateral partnerships will not be affected by Brexit. Trust with European partners will not cease following Brexit as it has been proven over years of mutual collaboration. Furthermore, those partnerships take place outside of the European institutions, so it will not be negatively influenced by any deal outcomes.

At a European level however, the UK will most likely be forced to withdraw from European intelligence institutions after Brexit. While the necessity of European intelligence cooperation is certainly not called into question since it addresses common threats and shared interests, the access to key data and strategic intelligence platforms will be diminished. The main European intelligence sharing agencies or systems affected are Europol’s platform for criminal intelligence sharing and police cooperation, Intcen, the European intelligence entity providing analytical assessment on current threats and the Schengen Information System II (SIS), which allows European countries to include and check live alerts on missing individuals, suspects as well as goods. Additionally, the UK will be restricted in its ability to access the Passenger Name Record Directive (PNR), the system to better detect and follow criminals and terrorists travelling in the EU.

Theresa May, supported by Andrew Parker and the Heads of the foreign intelligence agencies of Germany and France among others, promotes the indispensable collaboration among European agencies. She also declared that a security alliance between the UK and the EU was “fully achievable.” Nevertheless, no such partnership illustrating the depth of UK-EU relations currently exists between the EU and a third country. Theresa May is right to defend the necessity of a strong alliance with the UK along with her affirmation of the importance of British intelligence. Michel Barnier, the EU chief Brexit negotiator, declared in June 2018 that the UK decided to leave the European “ecosystem” and could only expect to be treated as a third country. Nonetheless, the UK undeniably has substantial assets in the domain of intelligence. Firstly, it is one of the main participants, providing crucial data and resources to Europol, Intcen and SIS as well as further European security programmes such as the European Arrest Warrant or Galileo. The UK is also a close partner to the US, which provides significant intelligence and know-how in the domain of security worldwide. Lastly, the UK is part of the Five Eyes, which is the intelligence sharing arrangement of five leaders in the global intelligence community: the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

The UK possesses strong bargaining chips to conceive a potential special intelligence relationship with the EU. Yet, British decision-makers also need to be more realistic and reduce their red lines, particularly regarding the European Court of Justice, which should be recognised as the institution overseeing joint operations and resolving legal disputes with the EU. If no agreement on security collaboration is found or if the UK is seriously limited through the new alliance, the EU will lose a major source of intelligence and the security situation of both sides will end up worse off. Political realism and pragmatism must prevail to ensure the safety of European citizens.

Marine Paclet works in public affairs in London and holds a Master degree in Public Policy.

Can we make Brexit work for the environment?

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Michael Gove’s Environmental Principles and Governance after EU Exit consultation document should be used as an opportunity to set up binding environmental standards.

Climate change will affect all of us: rising temperatures, poor air quality and unpredictable weather do not distinguish. When announcing a consultation on the contents of the new Environmental Principles and Governance Bill, which shall lead to the creation of a new, world-leading, statutory and independent environmental watchdog, environment secretary Michael Gove has stated that ‘we will discuss with the devolved administrations the possibility of shared environmental principles and whether they wish to be covered by the new body. Alternatively, they may wish to create their own national arrangements’. Now that the UK is leaving the EU, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will be autonomous on this subject and differences among their regulatory frameworks may occur.

As this issue that affects all British citizens equally, whether in Glasgow or Portsmouth, the UK government together with devolved administrations should seize the opportunity to ensure all regions of the UK are held to the same minimum environmental standards. To do so effectively, it should establish a watchdog holding all governments accountable over delivery of and compliance with environmental law.

The current consultation instead would concern and affect environmental governance in England only, although the government is also exploring with national administrations whether they want to follow a similar approach. If disparities among regions’ environmental policies are permitted, regions which have less stringent regulations will hurt people from across the country. Air, water and earth are shared commodities.

In addition, in his March speech announcing ‘Green Brexit: a new era for farming, fishing and the environment’, Gove kept labelling people and mentioning differences between Leavers and Remainers, as if environmental issues affect these groups differently. When speaking about the environment, the Environment Secretary should rather abandon this referendum rhetoric, as this may actually detract him from his greater goals: strengthening environmental protection and establishing an effective environmental watchdog for the UK.

In fact, the majority of UK citizens does believe we need to do more to tackle climate change. A poll conducted by ComRes in 2017 found that 69 per cent of people polled in Scotland, 67 per cent in Wales and 63 per cent in England believe that climate change is a reality Moreover, 80 percent of respondents considered harm to wildlife and nature as a key concern. Accordingly, protecting the environment shall transcend the shallow ‘Leave/Remain’ boxes.

Whether a Leave or Remain voter, Scottish or Cornish, all British citizens deserve an enforced minimum of environmental standards. The fight to save the environment is bigger than Brexit, and tribal labels should remain outside of the conversation.

Roz KennyBirch (22) is a Communications Officer at Local Partnerships, living in London.

The problem of Russia for post-Brexit Britain

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Following the poisoning of Sergei and Julia Skripal, the UK has crystallised its identity as opposed to Russia. However, this position may be undermined by the growing cleavages in European politics, and the UK’s inability to shape EU policy in the future.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is expected to face unpredictable changes upon Britain’s departure from the European Union. The UK is considered to be more powerful as a member of a collective of European democracies with largely similar values and interests. While the UK will most likely retain a strong relationship with the EU in terms of defence and security cooperation, it could also lose the ability to amplify its interests from within the EU. Having derived a significant part of its international identity from EU membership, the UK could appear politically weaker and more isolated to foreign actors as a result of an inadequate representation. Present ongoing tensions suggest that Russia is a growing area of concern.

Historically speaking, with the exception of a brief rapprochement between Blair and Putin, British relations with post-Soviet Russia have been fraught with crisis and mistrust. According to the Russian narrative, NATO’s neo-imperialist expansion into the post-Soviet space is unjustified and poses a threat to Russian sovereignty. This specific narrative has been used to justify Russian military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine and, more recently, in Syria. In contrast, the British narrative holds that the Kremlin has continually and calculatedly violated international law in relation to its role in the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko on British soil, the illegal annexation of Crimea, its war crimes in Syria, the maintenance of an unlawful military presence in Ukraine, and recent allegations over disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks. These tensions have led to the re-emergence of Cold War rhetoric and a rejection of the Kremlin’s Russian unlawfulness has become an important factor shaping Britain’s foreign policy.

After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the EU member states multilaterally imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia. As an EU member state, the UK, alongside the Baltic States, Poland and Denmark, successfully lobbied for the continuation of these anti-Russian sanctions. However, in recent years Russia has exploited cleavages in European politics fomented by the migration crisis and gained support amongst neo-nationalist parties in the EU. In Austria, Hungary and Italy these parties have acceded to power and are calling for an end to anti-Russian sanctions. At the same time, more influential states in the EU – France, Germany and the Netherlands – are currently opposed to escalating tensions, largely due to their productive energy deals with Russia. From the British perspective, the annulment of the multilateral sanctions would undermine the sanctity of international law and leave Britain isolated as other EU member states benefit from closer trade deals with Russia. Brexit has strengthened the resolve of those calling for a revision of the economic and diplomatic penalties, weakening the UK’s foreign policy position.

Given these tensions, the poisoning of Sergei and Julia Skripal on British sovereign soil was acutely politically charged. Although the Kremlin denies any involvement, British intelligence services, which were corroborated by the European Council and the US security services, concluded that it was a Russian initiative. In response, the UK expelled 23 Russian diplomats – the largest-scale diplomatic ejection since 1985. Significantly, by pleading its case in Brussels, the UK managed to corral 18 out of 28 EU member states into expelling their own Russian diplomats. What does this reaction tell us?

The immediate British response was mild; the expulsion of diplomats was a measure used in 2006 following Litvinenko’s murder and clearly did not work as a deterrent. However, recently British MPs have backed the introduction of a British version of the Magnitsky Act, an effective measure which directly targets Putin’s inner circle of kleptocrats in ‘Londongrad’ by freezing their assets and refusing them visas. This legislation sends a clear message that Britain rejects the human rights violations of the incumbent Kremlin regime. However, the show of European solidarity was nominal – approximately 2 diplomats were expelled by each of the 18 EU member states. This shows the reticence of EU states to seriously confront Russia’s contraventions of international law and the growing fissures in European politics are a concern for post-Brexit Britain.

The British response to the Salisbury poisoning further crystallised the UK’s identity as opposed to Russia, but it remains to be seen if this position will be supported. Unanimity on the continuation of sanctions will be the true litmus test of European solidarity against the gross human rights violations of the Kremlin regime.

Angus McWhirter is studying at UCL for a MA in Politics, Security and Russian.

Remainers must make the case for the Single Market

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Many argue that the referendum of June 2016 was won by a Leave campaign that sought to appeal to the heart as opposed to the mind. However, now for remainers to achieve their best post-Brexit outcome it is more important than ever to show that winning minds is not only possible but desirable in modern political campaigning. Most importantly, this will involve arguing effectively for the best possible access to the Single Market.

Theresa May confirmed in January last year that the UK will leave the EU’s Single Market. Her announcement was typical of a Government that has focused on the narrative of a “hard Brexit” rather than on a more nuanced debate over negotiations and options for the UK. She said “hard Brexit […] cannot mean membership of the Single Market”.

However, remainers must change this narrative and much harder for access to the Single Market. The most successful endgame would be a level of membership (important to distinguish between this and access) of the EU Single Market. This would most probably look something like the European Economic Area (sometimes referred to as the ‘Norway option’).

In terms of trade, this option is arguably better than a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Whilst a FTA might eliminate tariffs and keep trade flowing between the two blocs, such agreements deal almost exclusively in goods and often is not as concerned with services. This could be problematic for a UK economy so reliant on these sectors. The UK has large deficits in goods with the EU and so it is probable that a situation may occur in which the EU will have an upper hand in discussions on any post-Brexit trade agreement. Whilst EU businesses will want to keep selling their goods competitively to the UK market, they have trade with the rest of the EU bloc to fall back on. As well as the countries with which the EU already has agreements with e.g. South Korea and Canada. The UK on the other hand is only just beginning to negotiate these trade deals. These negotiations could well be long and complex, given the the necessity to plug the gap left by the current tensions, temporary or otherwise, between the UK and the EU.

Here is where the argument must be made. The highlighting of the economic consequences has to be foremost. A paper by the Institute for Fiscal Studies estimates that retaining Single Market membership in the form of the European Economic Area could be worth an extra 4% GDP growth. Similarly, the Independent stated “a huge 44% of Britain’s exports go to the EU – £220bn out of £510bn – according to the Office for National Statistics. If the UK did not negotiate a favourable trade deal with the EU, those exports would be subject to import tariffs as well as extra administrative costs”.

In making the case for the best possible access to the Single Market, the route towards this must be a relentless focus on an economic message: that the hardest Brexit is financially irresponsible. Bill Clinton once said that it was ‘the economy stupid’ and political operatives have long framed issues around its impact on the Pound or Dollar in your pocket. Remainers should be no different.

It will not be easy for remainers to reform around a push to stay in the Single Market but it may be the best chance they have to improve the future prospects of the UK. As the debate appears evermore emotive, playing to people’s minds rather than hearts will encourage a more informed British debate.

Ben Campbell (24) works in the charity sector in Birmingham. He is interested in European politics and most recently the impact Brexit will have on British industry. He is a contributor to Agora’s European program

Brexit Britain’s blue economy

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How can Great Britain, an island nation with a historic presence on the world’s oceans, work to sustainably manage their oceans post-Brexit?

In the face of the overwhelming rise of ecological devastation around the world, our seas need to be managed sustainably, both leading up to and post-Brexit. The past couple of decades has been rife with several ecological disasters and build ups, from billions of gallons of crude oil spilling into waters, to pollution pile-ups ranging in size from microplastics to entire fishing nets. Thus, we have to engage with the idea of a ‘Blue Economy’.

The Blue Economy, as defined by the World Bank, is an economic model ‘designed to promote the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods and jobs, and ocean ecosystem health’ through multiple different flows of finance and resources. In particular this includes the navigation of oceanic resources such as minerals and biodiversity, of which their mismanagement has had some of the largest impacts on our oceans. This could even consist of tougher regulation on offshore drilling, unsustainable fishing practices such as ghost fishing or deep-sea trawling, or even a ban on microplastics so as to ensure that the resources the ocean provides is protected and able to be used far into the future for both local communities and the national economy.

So far, the UK allegedly made steps to develop a sustainable approach to oceans. Last April, the Environmental Audit Committee stated: “We will look at emerging marine industries, and how the Government can build a sustainable ‘blue’ economy.” Yet, how concrete is this claim in the face of a potentially volatile relationship with other markets after Brexit?

The power of the fishing industry and its scepticism of the rights and quotas could well have an impact on the UK’s ability to achieve these goals. Even prior to Brexit, the fishing industry’s relationship with the other countries was tumultuous, being the source of previous tensions with Spain, and one of the causes of the Cod Wars – a trade war in the North Atlantic with Iceland during the second half of the 20th Century.

The UK boasts the second largest fishing fleet in Europe in terms of output, contributing £775 million in landings (the catches of marine fish landed in foreign or domestics ports) alone in 2015. However, the dropping rate of catch predicted for the future years is estimated to cost the economy millions of pounds as a result of fishery mismanagement.

A potential solution to this is sustainable management of fisheries and oceanic resources as dictated in a Blue Economy. The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is one of the largest advocates for sustainable fishing in Europe. They have long advocated, with some notable success, for more sustainable British consumption habits. They have worked to ensure that fish that is caught is from certifiably sustainable sources, which allows for fish stocks to be managed at adequate levels for recovery and accounts for the environmental impacts that the industry may have on the ecological balance. However, the MSC is a not-for-profit organisation, and as such may not actually be that well placed in policy-making sectors to be able to ensure such sustainable policy is implemented in Brexit Britain alone, and it should be approached perhaps with a combination of research and advocacy groups too.

Beyond this, Britain’s Blue Economy also has to deal with issues like mineral exploitation and pollution. This may be difficult for the UK, which has long been one of the largest oil and natural gas producers in Europe. This is slowly changing. As of 2005, British production of oil and natural gas dropped lower than its consumption and, thus, Britain became a net importer of fuel.

Despite the decline in production, the UK government still offers many tax breaks benefiting production of fossil fuels, and was one of the few G20 countries to increase their subsidies in recent years, as reported in a study by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Thus, it’s hard to gauge the dedication of the current parliament to a Blue Economy, or even sustainability in general, whilst subsidies for exploration and mineral extraction in our oceans – which can sometimes result in oil spills – continue to be offered.

Britain claims to be dedicating time to establishing a sustainable economy with our oceans, especially given our stake in them; however, the government’s history of ocean management leaves a lot to be desired both domestically and internationally. If the UK hopes to be a world leader on these issues post-Brexit it needs to rectify this immediately and commit in both words and actions to a Blue Economy.

Micheil Page is currently reading an MSc in Global Energy and Climate Policy at SOAS, University of London, specialising in Arctic governance. He is a fellow at the Polar Research and Policy Initiative, and is also one of the Co-Directors of UniSolar, the UK’s first student-led community energy enterprise.