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The (Wind)rush to Britain, 70 years on

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Seventy years after the Empire Windrush completed its historic voyage from Kingston, Jamaica to Tilbury, formal requests for a National Windrush holiday to celebrate the contribution of first generation migrants to British identity and society have yet to be answered.

This year marks the 70th anniversary of the arrival of the ‘Windrush generation’ in England. On 22 June 1948, the ex-troopship Empire Windrush docked at the Tilbury port in Essex. On board were around 500 men and women from various Caribbean islands seeking a new life in Great Britain. Although West Indians had been living in Britain before 1948, the Windrush wave is recognised as the most significant one, paving the way for numerous newcomers from all over the Empire. The symbolism of this migration, of the Empire Windrush arrivals, transcends West Indian identity and represents something much larger: post-war migration from the British colonies to Britain.

In 2013, a petition was launched by a collective of politicians, academics, faith groups and artists, requesting the official and formal recognition of the hardships faced by the Windrush generation and of their transformative contributions to British society. The petition’s aim was to make the 22 of June a public holiday, a celebration of modern day multicultural Britain. Were it to be accepted, it would be far more than just an official gesture; it would remind us and posterity that multiculturalism was not always tolerated. It has been a long, bumpy journey – and an ongoing one at that. It matters because the experience of the Windrush generation ties into what many other colonial migrants (from India or from Pakistan) have faced, while navigating their new lives in Britain.

The matter is urgent, all the more so as very few of the original ‘Windrushers’ are still alive to witness such a historic moment. The aim of the Windrush70 Project, staged by the Windrush Foundation to celebrate the anniversary, is to honour the legacy of 70 ‘Windrush Champions’, such as Lord Kitchener, a famous Trinidadian Calypsonian who conceived his famous tune ‘London is the Place for Me’ as he stepped off the Empire Windrush in 1948. Music like this shows how much hope and enthusiasm the United Kingdom inspired in some of the newcomers. Another memorable champion is Allan Charles Wilmot, a Jamaican World War II veteran, who fought for the British Royal Navy, and became a singer, conquering the London entertainment scene of the 1950s and 1960s with his male singing quartet The Southlanders. After returning to Jamaica in 1946, he decided not to settle there, and instead set sail for the UK.

In terms of foreign policy, The British Nationality Act of 1948 granted British citizenship to all subjects from British colonies, which also recognised their right to work and settle in the UK along with their families. Apart from attracting additional labour force to rebuild the country after World War II, it is said that this open-door immigration policy was a cohesive measure to prevent the already contested British Empire from crumbling. Approximately half a million Caribbean nationals migrated to the UK between 1948 and 1970, helping to pave the way towards a more inclusive British society. However, the new arrivals from the colonies faced hostility from the local population. They were often denied decent housing and pushed into low-skilled jobs, and 23 years later, the British Nationality Act gave way to the 1971 Immigration Act, which considerably restricted the ‘right of abode’ in the UK for Commonwealth Citizens. From then onwards, the right to settle in the UK was limited to those with a prior link, such as a proof of a parent or grandparent who was born in the UK. Although these restrictions considerably reduced primary immigration, many of the settled communities remained.

The current Immigration Act 2016 builds upon the 1971 ideology by seeking to enforce measures to ‘combat the threat of illegal immigration to the UK’. The ‘broader strategy’ includes a reduction for the demand of skilled migrant labour and a ‘crack down on the exploitation of low-skilled workers’. However, reading between these official lines, one is inclined to think that the main priority is to keep migrants out, even if their skills could benefit the British economy. It appears that the overall mentality toward migration has not greatly changed since 1971.

Creating a National Windrush Day is not about creating a ‘one-size-fits-all’ collective memory of what the ‘migrant to Britain’ must have experienced at the time, nor is it about undermining the cultural diversity of Britain. It is about honouring the nearly 2.5 million women and men from the colonies who volunteered to fight in the British ranks during World War II. It is about celebrating the diversity of the peoples from all over the former British Empire coming together in what many hailed to be their ‘Mother country’. For numerous third and fourth generation descendants of primary migrants, identifying as British is perfectly compatible with honouring their heritage. Creating a National Windrush Day would be a decisive step towards the acknowledgement of current realities, reflecting the plurality of British identity.

The recently uncovered Windrush scandal, referring to the hardship some have been facing, despite living and working in the UK for decades makes it all the more pressing to honour the facts: that these individuals have been denied health care or other benefits, lost their jobs or even been threatened by deportation because they were unable to produce ‘satisfactory documentation’ proving they have the right to be in the UK, were British citizens by law when they first arrived between 1948 and 1971. The careless disposal of landing cards by the Home Office back in 2010 may have placed thousands of ‘Windrush babies’ in citizenship limbo, but it cannot erase history.

Caroline Burleigh is Head of the Identities Programme at Agora.

The future of Britain’s financial primacy

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Much ink has been spilt discussing the impact of Brexit on Britain’s financial institutions but despite its importance to the future of the UK it remains a little understood area.

In recent times some of the world’s premier financial institutions have chosen to make London their European home, with access to corresponding markets their primary motivation. In accordance with this growth, financial services have become a powerful sector in the UK. Making up 10.7% of the UK economy and delivering a £72 billion trade surplus (our most exported product).

Since the decline of its manufacturing base the UK economy has become dominated by its services sector. This has resulted in the accumulation of huge trade deficits, a trend which has only been exacerbated in the wake of the UK’s decision to leave the EU. December 2017 saw the total good and services deficit grow to £4.9 billion, as a weak pound didn’t see as a big a boost in cheaper exports as expected.

In the face of such an economic outlook, a buoyant services market has kept the UK’s head above the water. So whilst the UK may be heavily reliant on imported goods, it remains competitive on services – with trade surpluses regularly delivered. An integral part of this has been the financial industry and its reputation as being a world leader in its field.

It is perhaps unsurprising then that, according to a House of Commons briefing paper published late last year, the UK has trade deficit with the EU in goods (£96 billion) but a surplus in services (£14 billion). The UK’s exporting of financial services to the EU is facilitated by the ‘passport’ system, a current privilege that will come to an end if the UK leaves the Single Market. To put it simply it means the free exchange of services, meaning banks in the City of London can sell their services throughout Europe without the hindrance of trade barriers.

When it comes to negotiating a final Brexit agreement, there are a few ways that this could be looked at. One is that the UK, due to the EU’s reliance on our banking, accountancy and insurance firms, hold the upper hand. As a consequence, the EU will be pressurised by European business who use these services into maintaining the status quo. Another way of looking at it is that the UK relies so much on Europe as a trading partner and their imports that an ‘off the shelf’ trade deal like CETA (between Canada and the EU) will have to be prioritised. Although these agreements deal only with goods only, the motivation would be the mutual desire to keep tariffs low. The UK will need to fulfil its current reliance on European goods and EU business want to continue supplying a market where there is such a demand at competitive prices.

As Jonathan Ford explained in the Financial Times late last year, the City of London retains a global importance that EU banks simply cannot turn their backs on. A crucial aspect of this is the US dollar markets which are based in London through the CLS International Bank. Combine this with the subsidiaries (and the extra capital needed) that would have to be created by EU and UK banks in each other’s territory to keep current business intact. The loss of the passport rights would signal the end of the current system of bank ‘branches’ in different countries, this is highly efficient in the consumption of capital, so is very beneficial for the entirety of the finance industry.

Losing this system could cause substantial losses in revenue for all of the industry. However, as Ford points out, there would be a disparity in the revenue ‘at risk’ for each institution. For example, UK banks (Barclays, RBS etc.) might lose out but this pales into insignificance when compared to the amounts at stake for European banks such as Deutsche Bank and BNP Paribas.

Therefore, the power the City of London can boast, and the integral position it holds for the operations of European banks, set the tone for this aspect of the Brexit talks. In fact, this much maligned industry could save us from the hardest of hard Brexits.

Ben Campbell works in the charity sector in Birmingham. He is interested in European politics and most recently the impact Brexit will have on British industry.

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: regulating war beyond the human

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There is something unsettling about the idea of ‘lethal autonomous weapon system’ (LAWS), so it is hardly surprising that it has sparked hot debates. Much of this discussion has been speculative as today humans are still supervising weapon systems. Automatic weapon systems already exist. They are often rather simple mechanisms that respond in a predictable way to external inputs such as landmines. Autonomous weapons in contrast, demonstrate more complex behaviour, which cannot be fully deduced from their programming. They display a certain degree of self-determination and self-learning.

Last November, CEO of Tesla, Elon Musk and other industry leaders presented an open letter warning against LAWS. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots launched in London in 2013 with the objective of banning LAWS; it argues that they significantly transform war and are unable to resolve ethical dilemmas on the battlefield. Human Rights Watch released a report in 2012 also calling for pre-emptive bans. The case against autonomous weapons has already become a point of discussion at the United Nations.

As the UK commands one of the most technologically advanced armed forces, it will inevitably be confronted with questions of the legal and moral consequences of autonomous military technology. After Musk and others published their letter, the British government declared that future unmanned systems will always be under human supervision except in cyber warfare. However, there has not been further specification what such control constitute. Robotics expert Professor Noel Sharkey applauded this statement but pointed out that ‘control’ could simply mean that humans confirm a lethal strike on a target selected by AI. In 2015, the British government refused to support an international ban on LAWS, arguing that current international humanitarian law already provides enough regulation.

Major concerns from activist groups about the impact of LAWS include a disruption of strategic stability through an arms race in autonomous systems as well faster, more intense escalation of violence. There have already been signs of this, for example Chinese and Russian leaders have stated their desire to acquire LAWS. Others fear that replacing human soldiers with robots will make the decision to go war easier by seemingly reducing the domestic political consequences – given that the loss of a machine is more acceptable to society than human lives. These are valid concerns that require evaluation and appropriate measures in order to prevent the risks of mistakes.

Machines may also lack the larger context of a particular course of action. The example of Stanislav Petkov, a Soviet Lieutenant Colonel who disobeyed direct orders to launch nuclear missiles after recognising a false alarm, illustrates this conundrum. Had a few lines of code been responsible for of launching the missiles on input from the alert system, a nuclear war would have erupted. To make a decision like Petkov’s requires knowledge of military and political context, accurate judgement of human behaviour and intuition. It is questionable whether machines can ever be programmed to a near-human degree of situational and emotional perception.

On the other side of the debate, many have been critical of the term “killer robots” which seems to render the debate overly emotional. Similarly, they note that, it is important to note that humans make mistakes as well; problems such as stress or a demonisation of the enemy can increase the chance of miscalculation or excessive violence. In fact, they argue, that machines have the potential to significantly reduce these risks and act more rationally than a human would in the same situation.

At the moment, it seems unlikely that further research on LAWS will be prevented. While the UK announced that it will maintain ‘human-in-the-loop’ systems, there are projects in the US, Russia, Israel and other countries to develop autonomous military robots. A future with autonomous weapons is plausible. As soon as one state develops functional LAWS, others will see the need to follow suit. A ban might therefore be impossible to realise.

Nevertheless, it is imperative to have a public debate about the potential implications of LAWS on the battlefield, particularly with regards to how machines will select targets and decide when to engage. The international community can however pre-emptively organise frameworks to regulate the use of LAWS. A UN body on autonomous weapons already exists, based on which future measures can be built.A priority should be given to determine the precise nature of ‘human control’ is. Multilateral deliberation between experts in robotics, delegates of humanitarian organisations and government representatives is essential to identify the shortcomings of LAWS and evaluate which measures are effective, sufficient and feasible to ensure that the use of autonomous weapons will be compatible with international law.

A war where humans are no longer the prime actor may one day exist and the UK, as well as the rest of the world, must make sure it’s ready.

Would an EU-Canada style agreement work for the UK after Brexit?

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Estimates say that around 2.2 million people work in the financial and related services sector. A sector that makes up a staggering 10.7% of the UK economy (£176 billion in 2015) and is the leading contributor to the UK’s export portfolio, delivering a £72 billion trade surplus. The fate of this sector will be one of the most eagerly anticipated conclusions of any post Brexit arrangement.

It is believed that Michel Barnier (European Commission’s chief Brexit negotiator) sees the trade deal agreed between Canada and the European Union on the 30th October 2016 (applicable 21st September 2017) as the most viable way forward. However, such a free trade deal could hamper the prosperity the financial sector currently enjoys, thus negating the significant contribution it makes to the UK’s economy. No trade deal could contain provision for the export of services meaning the current trade arrangements (commonly known as services passport) would be scrapped upon the UK’s withdrawal from the Single Market. Eagerness to avoid such an outcome has led calls from David Davis for CETA + + + or a special deal for the City which would allow for market access after Brexit and the expiry of any transitional phase. Barnier dismisses this idea as both parties brace themselves for what will be painstaking negotiations on the future of trade. From the financial industry itself the message is clear. JP Morgan’s Chief Executive Jamie Dimon says that more than 4000 jobs could leave London if sufficient access to the EU’s trade arrangements is not maintained and Goldman Sachs may do the same. The think tank Bruegel estimates 30,000 related jobs could relocate from London to the EU. Combine this with the loss of the European Banking Authority (it is moving to Paris), constitutes a precarious future for the sector.

On the face of it CETA is an ambitious and far reaching agreement, and by virtually eliminating all tariffs trade will increase between Canada and the EU (already worth 60 billion euros). However, the deal mainly relates to goods and products. For example, CETA will eliminate tariffs on bread, biscuits, pastries and chocolate but many quotas on the amounts traded will remain. Sweetcorn, beef and pork will be tariff free but limited by quotas, whilst the quota on cheese has been increased from 8000 tons to 18,500 tons.

So, UK decision makers will be aware of the restraints of a free trade deal and the probable reality that the benefits of the status quo cannot be replicated. It’s also worth noting that before it leaves the UK could benefit from CETA as part of the EU and any additional trade that is accrued.

We must also consider the greater geopolitical trends at play here. Anti-globalisation fervour has coloured most political events not only in Britain and the USA, but also across the European Union. Marine Le Pen in France, Norbert Hofer in Austria and the AFD (Alternative for Germany) have all found political traction in recent times. The establishment Left in the UK remain overwhelmingly pro-EU, and although many voters in Labour’s northern heartlands backed an exit, 65% of labour voters went with remain. However, imagine if much of the concerns raised about CETA and the access it would grant for private companies to our public services turned out to be prescient. If a similar agreement to CETA or TTIP (proposed deal between the EU and the USA) was struck in the UK, a left-wing backlash could be provoked. An already weak Prime Minister could find herself caught in a pincer movement between the anti-privatisation Left on the one side and the anti-EU Right on the other.

To summarise, the CETA trade deal between Canada and the EU will be an effective agreement that will strengthen economic ties between the two. However, the relationship between the EU and Canada is very different from the one it currently enjoys with the UK. We are far more integrated, relying on reciprocal trade in both services and goods. The unprecedented nature of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU means that we cannot simply rely on a ‘copy and paste’ approach using previous templates. It must find a way to carve a path calibrated to our unique needs and past reliance on EU regulations and institutions.

Ben Campbell works in the charity sector in Birmingham. He is interested in European politics and most recently the impact Brexit will have on British industry.

Air-tight or sprouting leaks? Comparing the UK and European Commission’s plastics policies

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Comparing the European Commission’s strategy on plastics and the sub-chapter exploring plastics in the UK’s 25 year environmental plan is akin to examining the differences between a tightly sealed plastic bag and a plastic bag with a small puncture in it: they look entirely alike, yet only the former is air-tight.

The UK proposes to work towards the goal of achieving zero avoidable plastic waste by the end of 2042 through a four-point circular plan, focusing on:

  • Production
  • Consumption
  • End of use stage
  • End of life/waste management stage

The European Commission’s strategy also touts the benefits of a circular approach, to:

  • Improve the economics and quality of plastics recycling
  • Curb plastic waste and littering
  • Driving innovation and investment towards circular solutions
  • Harnessing global action

This will ensure that:

  • All plastics packaging placed on the EU market is either reusable or can be recycled in a cost-effective manner by 2030
  • More than half of plastics waste generated in Europe is recycled by 2030. Separate collection of plastics waste will reach very high levels. Recycling of plastics packaging waste will achieve levels comparable with those of other packaging materials.
  • By 2030, sorting and recycling capacity will increase fourfold since 2015, leading to the creation of 200,000 new jobs, spread all across Europe

The UK’s circular approach is seemingly identical to the European Commission’s. But there are differences in the level of detail and commitment. The UK promises to achieve zero avoidable plastic waste by the end of 2042. The term ‘avoidable’ is left loosely defined; meaning, “what is technically, environmentally and economically practicable”, according to the document.

Presumably, this definition can allow the government to claim it has ‘achieved its goal’ regardless of how the plan works in practice. The ‘economically practicable’ term is particularly worrisome, as it is a term which could be applied in a multitude of ways. Stated reforms include reforming packaging waste regulations and extending producer responsibility requirements to plastic products not currently covered by existing regimes.

Yet if producers claim these regulations will not be economically viable, government could renege on its promise, citing issues with ‘economic practicability.’ To add to the imprecision, the document fails to state what new packaging waste regulations might look like, or what types/how many plastic products producer responsibility requirements will be extended to.

Similar approaches aside, the Commission’s plastics strategy is more specific and ambitious. Deadlines are more urgent (2030 as opposed to 2042). Regulations are clear. Numeric targets are given. The UK mainly builds off of policies which are already working (e.g. ‘continuing to implement the Litter Strategy’), without specifically stating how they can be made better or what weak spots need improvement.

There are some clearly defined proposals, such as the extension of the 5p plastic bag charge to small retailers and the proposed establishment of free water refill points. But in comparison to the European Commission’s strategy, the UK plastics plan comes across as trite, unspecific, and frankly, insecure.

As the UK will leave the EU in 2019, there is impetus for the UK to metamorphose into a new global leader with a clear strategic vision. Soft power will determine how favorably the global community views a post-Brexit UK. The country’s current plan to address plastic waste lacks the chutzpah, innovation and air-tight policies needed to achieve this power.

Roz KennyBirch is a Communications Officer at Local Partnerships, and lives in London.

‘United States of Europe’, a plan in process or an idealism?

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This article looks at the European Union’s future political development and current EU reform proposals, identifying connections between Brexit and the proposed plan of the “United States of Europe”.

In December 2017, former Leader of the Social Democratic Party, Martin Schulz, proposed a plan – supported by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron – which called for the creation of a “United States of Europe” by 2025. The “United States of Europe” is a proposal that calls for a constitutional treaty which integrates EU member states into a federalist institution with common foreign, security, and defence policies designed on a federal basis of the “union”.

The idea of the “United States of Europe” or a “Super-state Europe” is not new. On the 19th of September 1946, Winston Churchill delivered his famous speech in Zurich calling for the creation of a “United States of Europe”. Following the defeat of Nazi Germany, he called for a reconciliation between France and Germany, and “the re-creation of the European family” bringing up political and social stability and integration in the region. He suggested that, instead of Britain become a member, it should, along with the US and the then USSR, be the “friends and sponsors” of the project.
Nevertheless, the present plan seems to be a dream of Eurocentric governors’ who seek to promote European ideals and refute nationalist ideas and movements. For example, the European People’s Party leader, Manfred Weber, said on February 6th that “we are equal, we are all Europe and that is our future idea…The nationalists, dear friends, are stupid and naïve”. His comments reflect the wider arguments over a “United States of Europe” that were born in the wake of the Brexit negotiations and the rise of nationalistic parties across the EU’s member state.

Defence programme

Alongside the divisive issue over a “United States of Europe” are questions concerning to what extent European defence should be coordinated. In 2017, the European Commission launched the European Defence Fund, which is intended to encourage member states “to spend taxpayer money more efficiently and reduce duplications in spending”. Crucially, the fund aims to coordinate, supplement, and amplify national investments in defence research, in the development of prototypes, and in the acquisition of defence equipment and technology.
It also established the first ever single command centre for EU military training and advisory missions (called the MPCC), launched as a Centre of Excellence to improve analysis and capacity to address hybrid threats and stepped up cooperation with NATO.

On Friday 23th February 2018, European leaders also unanimously agreed, to expand on a common defence and security policy and deter illegal immigration in their next long-term budget.

Financial reforms

The European Commission also intends to reform the Financial Supervision (ESFS) and EU’s supervisory architecture.

With these reforms, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) are likely to make decisions more transparent, while newly-created Executive Boards will lead to EU-oriented decisions. The EU budget will continue to contribute a share of the ESAs’ funding and the rest will be funded by contributions from the EU financial sector.

But what does this mean for Brexit? The ESAs are expected to be given extra resources, taken from UK-headquartered firms, under order to enforce and regulate the City. The new reform proposes that the ESAs will report to the European Commission which implicates an influencing role of deciding which firms have access to the Single Market post Brexit.

The ESAs reforms are one aspect of th 37 EU laws that could be imposed on Britain during the Brexit transition period. Among the directives proposed, the EU would be allowed to force “clearing houses” in order to withdraw from the City and to be relocated to Europe before Britain’s official departure from the EU.

Brexit and institutionalism

The EU published its plan to keep Northern Ireland in the single market and customs union post Brexit, yet British PM Theresa May has ostentatiously rejected it. This has led EU leaders questioning the ability of UK government to take a lead on Brexit negotiations. At this moment both Ireland and Northern Ireland are part of the single market and customs union. The plan therefore is designed to stop a return to a hard border between the UK and Northern Ireland.

The EU’s institutionalism seems to be in an ongoing process of transforming its roles and proceedings alongside the Brexit negotiation process. Whereas its Eurocentric governors are proposing the creation of the “United States of Europe”, expanding the organisation’s influence over its member states and reinforcing the idea of the “union” that seek to negate nationalistic ideas and strengthen organisational autonomous policy-making.

Maria Ioannou is a graduate in International Relations from University of Amsterdam, and interested in international relations, current political affairs, European politics, political parties, Brexit, and industrial growth issues.