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The UK should acknowledge its role in shaping global discourse on sexual minorities

Although swathes of the British Empire collapsed in the late 20th century, following independence movements, attitudes from this colonial era still persist. The UK’s rhetoric is characterised by liberal acceptance of sexual minority identities, juxtaposing it with the supposedly contrary ‘global South’. Such discourses are oblivious to ongoing homophobia and transphobia in the UK, however, and ignore the fact that homophobic laws elsewhere predominantly originate from British colonial rule.

Discourses which romanticise the Western world as wholly accommodating to LGBT individuals ignore the fact that the many national laws which criminalise homosexuality remain in place from the British Empire. Colonial rule was often particularly destructive for indigenous people who were not heterosexual or who did not adhere to gender norms. In Nigeria, prior to colonisation, there was not a clear gender binary. The Hijra in India, sometimes known as the third gender, were seen as sacred. Despite this cultural significance, the British criminalised them in 1871.

These examples illustrate how the Empire enforced heterosexuality as the default, and solely acceptable, way of engaging in sexual or romantic relations. The imposition of such Victorian cultural attitudes has left many post-colonial states with deeply embedded homophobia and a legacy of heteronormativity, despite the formal end of the Empire decades ago. This is felt strongly in both cultural attitudes and through the lack of legislative protection.

A 2008 report from Human Rights Watch found that the criminalisation of homosexuality among adult men in more than half of the countries with those laws today, emerges from lingering colonial-era legislation. Eleven countries can still enact the death penalty for same-sex activity; Britain exercised significant power over domestic policy in nine of these countries, with all but one being formal protectorates. Slowly, it seems some laws are being abolished. In 2019, the Indian Supreme Court repealed a clause criminalising homosexuality from the Indian Penal Code, originally implemented by the British Raj in 1860.

Although vaguely addressed by Theresa May in her 2018 speech during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, governments still fail to take genuine responsibility for the detriment that their legacy has caused for the lived experiences of sexual minorities in post-colonial states.

Turning back to the contemporary UK, it was only since December 2020 that all gay and bisexual men have been able to donate blood, following a modification to donor rules. Such change triggers discussion around just how accepted, and legally protected, sexual minorities really are in Britain. This alteration, which the Government called a “landmark change”, is just one reason why it is not productive for Britain, or the West more generally, to be seen as the ideal framework for the acceptance and integration of sexual minority identities.

Cultural constructions of sexuality are shaped by both implicit attitudes, as well as the actions of those in power and the codification of rights. In the UK, symbols of LGBT activism are commonplace, including pride demonstrations and marches. From these gestures, one might conclude that Britain is truly accepting of diverse sexual and gender identities. But such rhetoric remains centred around ‘tolerance’, rather than ‘acceptance’.

In Angels of America, playwright Tony Kushner highlights that tolerance is not enough, because “underneath is intense, passionate hatred”. These attitudes materialise in daily life, particularly through the stigmatisation of sexual minorities, and the ongoing mainstream use of derogatory slurs. These displays of homophobia translate into real life violence, with hate crimes against sexual minorities in the UK tripling in the last five years, as reported by the BBC in 2020.

This implicit, and explicit, demonisation of non-straight individuals embodies the extent to which heteronormativity remains the hegemonic discourse in the UK, just as the British once imposed elsewhere. This should be dealt with, as stigmatisation and abuse has real, internalised effects on the health and wellbeing of LGBT persons, evidenced in a landmark research paper by Mink et al. in 2014.

Domestically, the Government should promote strong rights and encourage a more inclusive rhetoric surrounding sexual minorities in the media. The UK must also deconstruct its outlook of superiority over countries in the ‘global South’, and admit there is significant work to be done within Britain to improve the lives and protection of LGBT individuals. This requires a fundamental switch in how we conceive of sexual minorities: they are not something to be ‘tolerated’, but rather, real people who deserve to be celebrated and admired for their diversity.

April Whitworth is reading Anthropology at the University of Bristol.

Will the coronavirus pandemic end Europe’s relationship with coal?

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, many experts are calling for Europe to rebuild with a green economy at its core. With coal consumption plummeting and decarbonisation efforts becoming cheaper, does this finally spell the end of coal?

British and European history is characterised by coal and steel. It helped to spur the rise in steam technologies and spearheaded the Industrial Revolution over 200 years ago, which paved the way for the rise of globalisation. Whilst coal consumption dwindled throughout the 20th century, in favour of petroleum and natural gas, it has remained a vital part of Europe’s energy mix. That is, until now.

At the start of 2010, coal was responsible for up to 30% of the UK’s energy mix (second only to natural gas). At the beginning of 2020, coal had dropped to a staggeringly low 3.7% and the lockdown-related drop in energy consumption contributed to the UK’s longest coal-free period of almost 68 days (interrupted only because of a maintenance period at the Drax coal plant, which required it to generate energy). Though a significant drop in only 10 years, it is critical to unpack how this has come about and what it spells for coal as a fuel source.

As part of the UK’s Clean Growth Strategy, announced in 2018, the Government has outlined its plan to phase out the use of unabated coal to produce electricity by 2024. This is largely being facilitated through investment into renewable energy options such as offshore wind and solar PV, but also the transition of existing coal power production to biomass power production.

In addition, the cost of production for renewable energy sources has dropped significantly thanks to innovation and government assistance. Though the Feed-in Tariff (FiT) scheme (which was designed to promote the uptake of small-scale renewable and low-carbon electricity) was phased out at the beginning of 2019, the alternative Contracts for Difference (CfD) scheme has filled the void for subsidies and grants for renewable energy alternatives. It has meant a significant amount of investment into large-scale wind projects some of which are estimated to have a capacity of over 1200MW.

Does this spell the inevitable end of coal as an energy source? In the UK, this is likely. The Clean Growth Plan is a strategy which sets out proposals for decarbonising all sectors of the UK economy through the 2020s. It commits to phasing out unabated coal by 2024, which is fully feasible given its decline as part of the national energy mix that coal in all forms can be eliminated from the energy system by 2030 through transition to more efficient, renewable options.

Will Europe be able to follow suit? That depends on what concessions and agreements are established in the coming European Commission and economic recovery schemes post-COVID-19 such as Next Generation EU.

Last year, EU leaders failed to get unanimous agreement for a 2050 decarbonisation target at summit after summit. Whilst some states have chosen to push forward with legislation on coal – such as Germany’s Kohleverstromungsbeendigungsgesetz (Coal Exit Law) – and the Czech Republic backing the EU’s green recovery plan, their more coal-dependent neighbours will hesitate to jump on the bandwagon. Poland, for instance, has not eased on their coal stance even despite the impact on health and air quality as a result of reduced coal consumption during the pandemic and its conservative President-elect is unlikely to push the green agenda. A ‘green recovery’ is still a contentious topic in European energy realms, with multiple concerns for the economic impact on jobs and industry eclipsing the need for meeting climate targets.

The EU’s Green Deal is estimated to cost up to €1tn, with many experts saying this is only a third of the necessary expenditure for full decarbonisation. But with bold ambitions to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, and even a reduction in emissions by 50% over the course of the next 10 years, significant costs are inevitable.

There is a potential return on investment on the horizon. The EU has been the centre of a rise in jobs in the environmental and sustainability sector, contributing significant amounts to national economies. Despite Brexit, the UK is well poised to experience the same benefits.

As part of this future, the EU-wide phase-out of coal and carbon-intensive fuel sources will eventually become reality. In order to meet climate targets this not only must happen in this decade, but will occur with the natural expiration of coal.

Micheil Page is Head of Agora’s Energy & Climate Programme.

Mitigating the impact of Brexit on peace in Northern Ireland

Brexit threatens peace in Northern Ireland. The impact of the UK’s departure from the EU must be managed, amid rising tensions.

Brexit means big changes in the structure of the United Kingdom, not least in Northern Ireland. There is a moderate risk of a return to instability for Northern Ireland, which may necessitate certain policy measures. The chances of violence on a sustained scale akin to the Troubles of the 1960s-90s probably remain low, but the possibility of flare-ups and terrorist attacks cannot be ruled out. With this mind, the UK should strengthen the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), and increase intelligence gathering by UK police and local security services.

Although the UK and EU have agreed to avoid checks – including no use of cameras – on the Irish land border, checks are now in place on some goods coming via the new sea border, angering some Unionists. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 is at risk of failing. The violence that preceded the peace deal cost the lives of thousands of people throughout the UK. It hardly suggests a positive outcome if a peace deal contingent on the absence of border checks is undone by border checks, whether at sea or on land. The centuries-old cleavage between Catholics and Protestants could see latent tensions bubbling back to the surface, a point which has been made by former Prime Ministers Tony Blair and John Major.

Currently, however, concerns over a return to violence may be somewhat overblown. There have been no major flare-ups, although incidents involving a new generation of nationalist extremists – such as the murder of a journalist by the so-called ‘New IRA’ and the sending of explosive devices to sites in the mainland UK – are of some concern). Furthermore, the rise of Sinn Fein as a political force in the Republic of Ireland provides a concerning backdrop to the situation. While Sinn Fein fell short of forming a government in the Republic, it is still an event that could impact negatively on stability in Ireland as nationalist sentiment and calls for Irish reunification are likely to increase, in turn driving up the tension levels.

The experience of the British Army in counterinsurgency could be useful in managing any flare-ups, if utilised in an advisory role assisting the PSNI. Operationally deploying the Army in the event of a flare-up event should be avoided. The use of excessive force in dealing with civilian populations in insurgency situations may lead to alienation and increases the probability of sectarian violence. The UK has made that mistake in the past, with the internment of mostly nationalist people, many of them who were not involved in violence in the 1970s. This exacerbated tensions, being the prelude to increased violence in Northern Ireland. A better policy prescription might be the strengthening of the local police force, the PSNI, which has traditionally been the counterinsurgency (COIN) lead.

Furthermore ensuring continued operational co-operation between PSNI and the An Garda Siochana (Irish Police) outside of EU information sharing systems such as Europol and Eurojust will be a challenge, but one that needs to be addressed.

As the only UK police force whose officers are routinely armed, the PSNI is well equipped on multiple levels to tackle localised outbreaks of violence. Police led management of key trouble spots is often more psychologically palatable to local populations, less likely to exacerbate tensions and less expensive than deploying the military in theatre. In any case, the British military is undergoing sizable changes. The budgetary and resource constraints likely to be imposed by Whitehall’s new-found focus on space, cyber warfare and a naval build-up make it more likely that there will be less numbers of infantry available with the British Army for a Northern Ireland contingency.

The other policy measure the British government could implement would involve increasing the intelligence focus on Northern Ireland, drawing on its own decades of operational experience of intelligence gathering – including in coordination with the Garda- in Northern Ireland, predating EU intelligence sharing agreements. This can compensate to some extent for the loss of full access to European security databases such as SIS II. While the UK security apparatus is concerned with far-right and Islamist extremism, the possibility of violent republicanism reemerging must not be underestimated.

The key to managing post-Brexit stability in Northern Ireland depends heavily on minimising, if not avoiding, the impact of border checks at sea. Avoiding physical border checks, strengthening the PSNI and increasing intelligence oversight of Northern Ireland should drive UK efforts to preserve peace in Northern Ireland.

Jeevan Vipinachandran holds an MSc in Comparative Politics: Conflict Studies from the London School of Economics.

All blogs published by Agora represent the views of the author and not those of the think tank.

Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers means it’s no model for the UK

There are big question marks over immigrant rights and whether they are upheld internationally. In Australia, the rights of asylum seekers are not being upheld, making it a dangerous example for the UK to follow.

International law

The rights of individuals seeking asylum in foreign countries are outlined in international treaties and countries party to such treaties have legal obligations to ensure these rights are upheld. A refugee is an individual who is outside of their country of origin and has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” based on their nationality, political opinion, religion, or membership of a particular social group or race, whereas an asylum seeker is an individual waiting for the determination of the result of their application for legal refugee status. When fleeing ones own country due to a well-founded fear of persecution, one may legally enter foreign countries without documentation without fear of penalties being imposed by states.

Whilst awaiting processing, many asylum seekers are held in detention centres which are often overcrowded and insanitary. Such conditions are evident in the offshore detention centres utilised in Australia.

Australia’s approach: out of sight, out of mind

Australia has one of the toughest approaches to border control in the developed world, reinforcing its borders with military personnel. Despite being a country which has signed the Refugee Convention, it introduced Operation Sovereign Borders in 2013. Under this military-led operation, Australian naval ships were ordered to turn back asylum seekers approaching Australian shores by boat.

During the Tampa Affair of August 2001, law-makers passed emergency legislation enabling them to send all asylum seekers who reached Australian shores to either Nauru or the Manus Islands – sovereign island states near Australia – to wait in detention centres for their asylum claims to be heard. This practice, referred to as ‘offshoring’, creates ambiguity over who is responsible for the asylum seekers and makes it increasingly difficult for individuals to claim asylum from abroad.

This practice stopped in Australia between 2008-11 when a Labor government came into power. Yet the ‘immigration crisis’ in 2011 resulted in the then Labor Prime Minister entering into an agreement with Malaysia whereby Australia could disburden itself of some asylum seekers and transfer them to Malaysia. This deal fell through, however, so there was a return to offshoring in Australia, which has continued ever since.

In 2015 the Australian government spent the equivalent of £240m on its Nauru operation (£200,000 per person detained there). It could cost one-twelfth of this amount to allow these individuals to live on mainland Australia whilst awaiting the result of their refugee application, and potentially less still if such individuals had the right to work.

Questions are therefore raised around Australia’s logic of keeping out asylum seekers whilst allowing other types of immigrants in. It seems the only reason reflecting reality – including their villainising of asylum seekers through negative rhetoric used in the media – is a desire to maintain power over the type of people let in. This is most likely to ensure only those who can benefit them, such as tourists and skilled workers, may enter. By making the conditions immigrants stay in as harsh as possible, it seems they hope to deter such individuals from wanting to come at all.

Amnesty International found that one-third of asylum seekers and refugees on Nauru were housed in tents, not allowed smartphones in the centres, and were subjected to curfews and monitoring by guards, often not being provided with basic adequate healthcare. Many children in such centres have suffered significant psychological consequences from being there, as well as a number of abuse allegations against women and children by officials within such centres and neglect more generally by island workers hired by the Australian government. Human rights groups argue that Australia’s detention of asylum seekers in offshore centres has involved human rights abuses, with Amnesty International finding the conditions and detention of individuals in such centres has violated and continues to violate the right not to be subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as the right to not be arbitrarily detained.

Could the UK follow suit?

Australia’s tactics to deter asylum seekers from entering their territory, as well as the treatment of those who do, is arguably incompatible with international human rights laws.

Whilst the current Conservative British government seems to see benefits in following Australia’s example on migration, these must be weighed against the heavy human rights implications this could have upon genuine asylum seekers entering UK territory, as well as upon the value of human rights more generally.

Katy Adams is an MA Human Rights student at University College London.

This is the first of two blogs exploring the British government’s desire to mirror Australia’s immigration policies; the second outlines the current climate of asylum policy in the UK and the implications of following the Australian example.

Britain can transform the plight of climate refugees through its COP26 presidency

With traditional refugee law falling short, Britain should champion the protection of climate refugees as part of global climate change agreements.

An estimated 70,000-80,000 Jewish refugees were accepted into Britain before and during World War Two . At the time, the idea of turning our backs on those fleeing atrocities in continental Europe was reprehensible. The depth of this feeling was so widespread that the United Nations gathered numerous states from across the globe to agree to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a monumental effort to ensure that individuals could flee oppression and find refuge across an international border.

The Convention placed legally binding obligations on states to process the claims of asylum seekers, outlined the rights afforded to refugees, and, most importantly, created the recognised status of a refugee. Britain was among those quick to agree to the Convention.

Almost 70 years since the Convention was signed, the situation is very different. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) around 1% of the world’s population are displaced, yet European sentiment towards refugees has seen a significant shift from compassion to assist those forced to migrate towards greater reluctance. This sentiment appears to be dictating the global response to climate refugees and could have devastating impacts as climate change worsens.

Climate Refugees

Although without official definition, a climate refugee can broadly be categorised as an individual who has fled their home nation due to the effects of climate change – such as extreme weather, drought, or rising sea levels – threatening their lives or livelihoods.

Despite decades of warnings from some scholars, the danger to climate refugees remains comparatively overlooked. They are not recognised under the law and they are not entitled to any rights in foreign states. The Refugee Convention was written following World War Two and, since its adoption, has not evolved beyond its focus on wartime. This has led the UNHCR to the stark conclusion that the Convention cannot protect climate refugees.

There have been numerous calls to address these inadequacies, though there remains a lack of appetite to expand the Convention’s current scope of protection. This is less about climate refugees being viewed as undeserving and more to do with a general atmosphere of anti-refugee sentiment. The UNHCR has stated that opening the Convention to encompass climate refugees in the current political climate could actually lead to restricted protection for all refugees. It is worrying that the UNHCR find themselves in this position, given their role as champion for all refugees. Protection must now be found elsewhere, and Britain should lead the drive to provide this.

COP26 is Britain’s opportunity

A major barrier to finding a solution for the future flow of climate refugees is the absence of international willingness. Since the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference (COP21), many governments have exhibited greater hostility towards immigration and refugees, including in key nations such as Australia and the US. Equally, the UK’s 2016 Brexit campaign focused heavily on limiting future immigration. It is possible that, following this mandate, the British government may avoid seeking a global protection mechanism for climate refugees, both to appease their citizens and to retain favour with countries which they are now seeking trade deals with.

Nevertheless, as hosts of the delayed COP26, the UK should recognise that it has one of the key remaining opportunities to address the lack of protection for climate refugees by incorporating it into climate change agreements. Alok Sharma, who recently left his ministerial position to focus on his role as COP26 President, demonstrated in his address to UN nations that he is cognisant of climate change migration. It is now imperative that this be followed up with concrete action.

This action should take the form of an agreement between states whereby climate refugees can be identified, relocated equitably, and conferred with rights enabling them to begin a new life. This provides a response which would ensure climate refugees are protected whilst equally avoiding a burden on any one state.

This could be achieved and is not without precedent. During COP21 there were numerous proposals surrounding a coordination facility for those displaced by climate change; a plan which would have facilitated relocation for climate refugees. This gained traction, although talks were eventually discontinued following Australia’s opposition and the belief that a more efficient alternative could be found. A lack of progress since COP21 suggests that this may not be the case and with the effects of climate change showing no signs of slowing it is now time to resurrect this idea.

The UK government must recognise that, through their own hosting of a COP summit, they have a wonderful opportunity to provide lasting protection for climate refugees.

Tomos Owen works to facilitate refugee integration in Wales, having graduated with a Masters in Human Rights Law from Cardiff University.

The UK has a renewed role in the future of Afghanistan

The UK has provided military, diplomatic, and development support to Afghanistan for for nearly two decades. Now it must continue to work closely with the US in pressuring Pakistan to keep the Taliban at the intra-Afghan talks.

Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab recently voiced support for the intra-Afghan peace talks, which began on 12 September in Doha, Qatar. He advocated for all parties to strive for an “inclusive and sustainable peace”. This is no easy task, as 20 years of similar talks, beginning after the Taliban regime was toppled by US-led coalition forces in 2001, have shown.

In his speech, Raab reiterated the UK’s extensive military and diplomatic role in Afghanistan since 2001. The UK became the second largest contributor of troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), deploying approximately 140,000 British troops to Afghanistan between 2001-14 under Operation Herrick. UK involvement in Afghanistan accelerated in 2006 with the construction of Camp Bastion, which alone would house 30,000 troops.

As the war became increasingly unpopular among the alliance, NATO members agreed on an exit strategy to withdraw foreign troops from Afghanistan and to assist in the transfer of responsibility for security to Afghan forces. In 2014, Cameron withdrew most UK troops from Operation Herrick, leaving behind an estimated 1000 soldiers in the country to mentor and assist local forces under Operation Toral. The Ministry of Defence predicts that the costs of UK involvement in Afghanistan may exceed £40bn. The UK has lost 456 soldiers, with more than 2000 wounded.

Despite a declining military presence in Afghanistan, the UK continues to push for peace and stability. Over the last three years, the UK has delivered £750m to Afghanistan in development and humanitarian aid. Recently, the Government announced a package to help combat the threat of COVID-19 and famine to “protect the poorest”. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has said the UK’s motivation for a stable Afghanistan is “to prevent Afghanistan once again becoming a place from which al-Qaeda and other extremists can attack the UK and our interests”.

More broadly, international concerns for the future of Afghanistan are driven by various interests. Firstly, stability creates economic opportunities for regional actors. China’s main motivation in the Doha talks are the vast resources in Central Asia, to which Afghanistan can provide better access. Secondly, the proximity of NATO forces to Russia’s sphere of influence increases tensions and means the future of the country is a high priority for both. Thirdly, combatting the spread of terrorism is high on the agenda for many, particularly given that multiple terrorist cells are emerging across India and Central Asia. With this in mind, fruitful negotiations seem, now more than ever, of highest priority and relevance for all parties involved.

Negotiating a stable Afghanistan requires the British government to cooperate closely with Pakistan. In a post-9/11 context, the UK’s diplomatic mission in Pakistan has evolved to become one of the largest in the world to reflect Pakistan’s critical role in the global war on terror. But British interests in Pakistan, which previously acted as a safe haven for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, go beyond threats to national security. Post-Brexit, the UK is incentivised to pursue as many allies as possible beyond Europe and the Anglosphere. Promoting strong relations with Commonwealth states, such as Pakistan and India, paves the way for a stronger UK presence in South Asia, whilst granting the nation access to a broader scope of trading partners.

British High Commissioner to Pakistan, Christian Turner, recently described Pakistan as ‘key in […] Intra-Afghan Negotiations’, however Pakistan’s intentions at the talks are unclear. Whilst officials emphasise Pakistan’s role only as a facilitator in the process, some experts suggest that Islamabad’s attempts to push the Taliban to the table are a move to reduce India’s influence in Afghanistan and the wider region. Protesters have demanded that the British government increase efforts to pressure Pakistan to halt its interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, but the UK is less convinced that they can have a direct influence on Pakistan.

Only diplomatic pressure can keep the Taliban at the table. This begins with eliminating the Taliban’s spoiling strategies which continue to disrupt the peace talks. Whilst the UK may have limited influence on Pakistan’s role, if the UK is to reduce the risks emanating from an unstable Afghanistan and protect regional interests, then the British government must work closer with the US to reassure Pakistan. Cooperation is required between all actors at the table in order to reach an agreement that will satisfy the interests of all parties and most importantly, secure the peace and stability of Afghanistan and its citizens.

Eleanor Wong is studying for a Masters in Peace Research and International Relations at the University of Tübingen.