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What future for intelligence cooperation between the UK and the EU post-Brexit?

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Common and borderless threats require strong intelligence cooperation and joint operations between European states to minimise risks. It is essential that the UK and the EU develop a new security partnership which reflects the depth of their current collaboration.

Europe is currently facing growing borderless threats; terrorism, violent extremism, nuclear weapons, misinformation, and cyberattacks to name but a few. While intelligence is at the heart of national sovereignty, the answer to those threats can only have a positive outcome with an increasing and durable intelligence cooperation, data sharing and joint operations among European countries. Security and defence collaboration has become a source of leverage for several prominent decision-makers and a cause for concern in the Brexit talks. In her speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2018, Theresa May stressed the need to maintain and strengthen security cooperation with European countries. Andrew Parker, gave the first-ever public speech of an MI5 Director outside of the UK in Berlin, emphasising the importance of the vital intelligence partnerships the UK has bilaterally and within European institutions. Although neither the UK nor the EU is willing to compromise the safety of their citizens and institutions, intelligence cooperation is being exploited by British leaders as a bargaining chip to minimise post-Brexit losses and by the EU as a threat.

The main reason for intelligence cooperation is pragmatic. However, such collaboration is highly dependent on common threat perception, shared interests and trust. States, therefore, tend to prefer collaborating bilaterally instead of multilateral settings where there are higher risks of data misuse, breaches of confidentiality to third parties and reputational damage. In the case of the UK, bilateral partnerships will not be affected by Brexit. Trust with European partners will not cease following Brexit as it has been proven over years of mutual collaboration. Furthermore, those partnerships take place outside of the European institutions, so it will not be negatively influenced by any deal outcomes.

At a European level however, the UK will most likely be forced to withdraw from European intelligence institutions after Brexit. While the necessity of European intelligence cooperation is certainly not called into question since it addresses common threats and shared interests, the access to key data and strategic intelligence platforms will be diminished. The main European intelligence sharing agencies or systems affected are Europol’s platform for criminal intelligence sharing and police cooperation, Intcen, the European intelligence entity providing analytical assessment on current threats and the Schengen Information System II (SIS), which allows European countries to include and check live alerts on missing individuals, suspects as well as goods. Additionally, the UK will be restricted in its ability to access the Passenger Name Record Directive (PNR), the system to better detect and follow criminals and terrorists travelling in the EU.

Theresa May, supported by Andrew Parker and the Heads of the foreign intelligence agencies of Germany and France among others, promotes the indispensable collaboration among European agencies. She also declared that a security alliance between the UK and the EU was “fully achievable.” Nevertheless, no such partnership illustrating the depth of UK-EU relations currently exists between the EU and a third country. Theresa May is right to defend the necessity of a strong alliance with the UK along with her affirmation of the importance of British intelligence. Michel Barnier, the EU chief Brexit negotiator, declared in June 2018 that the UK decided to leave the European “ecosystem” and could only expect to be treated as a third country. Nonetheless, the UK undeniably has substantial assets in the domain of intelligence. Firstly, it is one of the main participants, providing crucial data and resources to Europol, Intcen and SIS as well as further European security programmes such as the European Arrest Warrant or Galileo. The UK is also a close partner to the US, which provides significant intelligence and know-how in the domain of security worldwide. Lastly, the UK is part of the Five Eyes, which is the intelligence sharing arrangement of five leaders in the global intelligence community: the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

The UK possesses strong bargaining chips to conceive a potential special intelligence relationship with the EU. Yet, British decision-makers also need to be more realistic and reduce their red lines, particularly regarding the European Court of Justice, which should be recognised as the institution overseeing joint operations and resolving legal disputes with the EU. If no agreement on security collaboration is found or if the UK is seriously limited through the new alliance, the EU will lose a major source of intelligence and the security situation of both sides will end up worse off. Political realism and pragmatism must prevail to ensure the safety of European citizens.

Marine Paclet works in public affairs in London and holds a Master degree in Public Policy.

Can we make Brexit work for the environment?

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Michael Gove’s Environmental Principles and Governance after EU Exit consultation document should be used as an opportunity to set up binding environmental standards.

Climate change will affect all of us: rising temperatures, poor air quality and unpredictable weather do not distinguish. When announcing a consultation on the contents of the new Environmental Principles and Governance Bill, which shall lead to the creation of a new, world-leading, statutory and independent environmental watchdog, environment secretary Michael Gove has stated that ‘we will discuss with the devolved administrations the possibility of shared environmental principles and whether they wish to be covered by the new body. Alternatively, they may wish to create their own national arrangements’. Now that the UK is leaving the EU, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will be autonomous on this subject and differences among their regulatory frameworks may occur.

As this issue that affects all British citizens equally, whether in Glasgow or Portsmouth, the UK government together with devolved administrations should seize the opportunity to ensure all regions of the UK are held to the same minimum environmental standards. To do so effectively, it should establish a watchdog holding all governments accountable over delivery of and compliance with environmental law.

The current consultation instead would concern and affect environmental governance in England only, although the government is also exploring with national administrations whether they want to follow a similar approach. If disparities among regions’ environmental policies are permitted, regions which have less stringent regulations will hurt people from across the country. Air, water and earth are shared commodities.

In addition, in his March speech announcing ‘Green Brexit: a new era for farming, fishing and the environment’, Gove kept labelling people and mentioning differences between Leavers and Remainers, as if environmental issues affect these groups differently. When speaking about the environment, the Environment Secretary should rather abandon this referendum rhetoric, as this may actually detract him from his greater goals: strengthening environmental protection and establishing an effective environmental watchdog for the UK.

In fact, the majority of UK citizens does believe we need to do more to tackle climate change. A poll conducted by ComRes in 2017 found that 69 per cent of people polled in Scotland, 67 per cent in Wales and 63 per cent in England believe that climate change is a reality Moreover, 80 percent of respondents considered harm to wildlife and nature as a key concern. Accordingly, protecting the environment shall transcend the shallow ‘Leave/Remain’ boxes.

Whether a Leave or Remain voter, Scottish or Cornish, all British citizens deserve an enforced minimum of environmental standards. The fight to save the environment is bigger than Brexit, and tribal labels should remain outside of the conversation.

Roz KennyBirch (22) is a Communications Officer at Local Partnerships, living in London.

The problem of Russia for post-Brexit Britain

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Following the poisoning of Sergei and Julia Skripal, the UK has crystallised its identity as opposed to Russia. However, this position may be undermined by the growing cleavages in European politics, and the UK’s inability to shape EU policy in the future.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is expected to face unpredictable changes upon Britain’s departure from the European Union. The UK is considered to be more powerful as a member of a collective of European democracies with largely similar values and interests. While the UK will most likely retain a strong relationship with the EU in terms of defence and security cooperation, it could also lose the ability to amplify its interests from within the EU. Having derived a significant part of its international identity from EU membership, the UK could appear politically weaker and more isolated to foreign actors as a result of an inadequate representation. Present ongoing tensions suggest that Russia is a growing area of concern.

Historically speaking, with the exception of a brief rapprochement between Blair and Putin, British relations with post-Soviet Russia have been fraught with crisis and mistrust. According to the Russian narrative, NATO’s neo-imperialist expansion into the post-Soviet space is unjustified and poses a threat to Russian sovereignty. This specific narrative has been used to justify Russian military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine and, more recently, in Syria. In contrast, the British narrative holds that the Kremlin has continually and calculatedly violated international law in relation to its role in the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko on British soil, the illegal annexation of Crimea, its war crimes in Syria, the maintenance of an unlawful military presence in Ukraine, and recent allegations over disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks. These tensions have led to the re-emergence of Cold War rhetoric and a rejection of the Kremlin’s Russian unlawfulness has become an important factor shaping Britain’s foreign policy.

After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the EU member states multilaterally imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia. As an EU member state, the UK, alongside the Baltic States, Poland and Denmark, successfully lobbied for the continuation of these anti-Russian sanctions. However, in recent years Russia has exploited cleavages in European politics fomented by the migration crisis and gained support amongst neo-nationalist parties in the EU. In Austria, Hungary and Italy these parties have acceded to power and are calling for an end to anti-Russian sanctions. At the same time, more influential states in the EU – France, Germany and the Netherlands – are currently opposed to escalating tensions, largely due to their productive energy deals with Russia. From the British perspective, the annulment of the multilateral sanctions would undermine the sanctity of international law and leave Britain isolated as other EU member states benefit from closer trade deals with Russia. Brexit has strengthened the resolve of those calling for a revision of the economic and diplomatic penalties, weakening the UK’s foreign policy position.

Given these tensions, the poisoning of Sergei and Julia Skripal on British sovereign soil was acutely politically charged. Although the Kremlin denies any involvement, British intelligence services, which were corroborated by the European Council and the US security services, concluded that it was a Russian initiative. In response, the UK expelled 23 Russian diplomats – the largest-scale diplomatic ejection since 1985. Significantly, by pleading its case in Brussels, the UK managed to corral 18 out of 28 EU member states into expelling their own Russian diplomats. What does this reaction tell us?

The immediate British response was mild; the expulsion of diplomats was a measure used in 2006 following Litvinenko’s murder and clearly did not work as a deterrent. However, recently British MPs have backed the introduction of a British version of the Magnitsky Act, an effective measure which directly targets Putin’s inner circle of kleptocrats in ‘Londongrad’ by freezing their assets and refusing them visas. This legislation sends a clear message that Britain rejects the human rights violations of the incumbent Kremlin regime. However, the show of European solidarity was nominal – approximately 2 diplomats were expelled by each of the 18 EU member states. This shows the reticence of EU states to seriously confront Russia’s contraventions of international law and the growing fissures in European politics are a concern for post-Brexit Britain.

The British response to the Salisbury poisoning further crystallised the UK’s identity as opposed to Russia, but it remains to be seen if this position will be supported. Unanimity on the continuation of sanctions will be the true litmus test of European solidarity against the gross human rights violations of the Kremlin regime.

Angus McWhirter is studying at UCL for a MA in Politics, Security and Russian.

Remainers must make the case for the Single Market

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Many argue that the referendum of June 2016 was won by a Leave campaign that sought to appeal to the heart as opposed to the mind. However, now for remainers to achieve their best post-Brexit outcome it is more important than ever to show that winning minds is not only possible but desirable in modern political campaigning. Most importantly, this will involve arguing effectively for the best possible access to the Single Market.

Theresa May confirmed in January last year that the UK will leave the EU’s Single Market. Her announcement was typical of a Government that has focused on the narrative of a “hard Brexit” rather than on a more nuanced debate over negotiations and options for the UK. She said “hard Brexit […] cannot mean membership of the Single Market”.

However, remainers must change this narrative and much harder for access to the Single Market. The most successful endgame would be a level of membership (important to distinguish between this and access) of the EU Single Market. This would most probably look something like the European Economic Area (sometimes referred to as the ‘Norway option’).

In terms of trade, this option is arguably better than a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Whilst a FTA might eliminate tariffs and keep trade flowing between the two blocs, such agreements deal almost exclusively in goods and often is not as concerned with services. This could be problematic for a UK economy so reliant on these sectors. The UK has large deficits in goods with the EU and so it is probable that a situation may occur in which the EU will have an upper hand in discussions on any post-Brexit trade agreement. Whilst EU businesses will want to keep selling their goods competitively to the UK market, they have trade with the rest of the EU bloc to fall back on. As well as the countries with which the EU already has agreements with e.g. South Korea and Canada. The UK on the other hand is only just beginning to negotiate these trade deals. These negotiations could well be long and complex, given the the necessity to plug the gap left by the current tensions, temporary or otherwise, between the UK and the EU.

Here is where the argument must be made. The highlighting of the economic consequences has to be foremost. A paper by the Institute for Fiscal Studies estimates that retaining Single Market membership in the form of the European Economic Area could be worth an extra 4% GDP growth. Similarly, the Independent stated “a huge 44% of Britain’s exports go to the EU – £220bn out of £510bn – according to the Office for National Statistics. If the UK did not negotiate a favourable trade deal with the EU, those exports would be subject to import tariffs as well as extra administrative costs”.

In making the case for the best possible access to the Single Market, the route towards this must be a relentless focus on an economic message: that the hardest Brexit is financially irresponsible. Bill Clinton once said that it was ‘the economy stupid’ and political operatives have long framed issues around its impact on the Pound or Dollar in your pocket. Remainers should be no different.

It will not be easy for remainers to reform around a push to stay in the Single Market but it may be the best chance they have to improve the future prospects of the UK. As the debate appears evermore emotive, playing to people’s minds rather than hearts will encourage a more informed British debate.

Ben Campbell (24) works in the charity sector in Birmingham. He is interested in European politics and most recently the impact Brexit will have on British industry. He is a contributor to Agora’s European program

Brexit Britain’s blue economy

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How can Great Britain, an island nation with a historic presence on the world’s oceans, work to sustainably manage their oceans post-Brexit?

In the face of the overwhelming rise of ecological devastation around the world, our seas need to be managed sustainably, both leading up to and post-Brexit. The past couple of decades has been rife with several ecological disasters and build ups, from billions of gallons of crude oil spilling into waters, to pollution pile-ups ranging in size from microplastics to entire fishing nets. Thus, we have to engage with the idea of a ‘Blue Economy’.

The Blue Economy, as defined by the World Bank, is an economic model ‘designed to promote the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods and jobs, and ocean ecosystem health’ through multiple different flows of finance and resources. In particular this includes the navigation of oceanic resources such as minerals and biodiversity, of which their mismanagement has had some of the largest impacts on our oceans. This could even consist of tougher regulation on offshore drilling, unsustainable fishing practices such as ghost fishing or deep-sea trawling, or even a ban on microplastics so as to ensure that the resources the ocean provides is protected and able to be used far into the future for both local communities and the national economy.

So far, the UK allegedly made steps to develop a sustainable approach to oceans. Last April, the Environmental Audit Committee stated: “We will look at emerging marine industries, and how the Government can build a sustainable ‘blue’ economy.” Yet, how concrete is this claim in the face of a potentially volatile relationship with other markets after Brexit?

The power of the fishing industry and its scepticism of the rights and quotas could well have an impact on the UK’s ability to achieve these goals. Even prior to Brexit, the fishing industry’s relationship with the other countries was tumultuous, being the source of previous tensions with Spain, and one of the causes of the Cod Wars – a trade war in the North Atlantic with Iceland during the second half of the 20th Century.

The UK boasts the second largest fishing fleet in Europe in terms of output, contributing £775 million in landings (the catches of marine fish landed in foreign or domestics ports) alone in 2015. However, the dropping rate of catch predicted for the future years is estimated to cost the economy millions of pounds as a result of fishery mismanagement.

A potential solution to this is sustainable management of fisheries and oceanic resources as dictated in a Blue Economy. The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is one of the largest advocates for sustainable fishing in Europe. They have long advocated, with some notable success, for more sustainable British consumption habits. They have worked to ensure that fish that is caught is from certifiably sustainable sources, which allows for fish stocks to be managed at adequate levels for recovery and accounts for the environmental impacts that the industry may have on the ecological balance. However, the MSC is a not-for-profit organisation, and as such may not actually be that well placed in policy-making sectors to be able to ensure such sustainable policy is implemented in Brexit Britain alone, and it should be approached perhaps with a combination of research and advocacy groups too.

Beyond this, Britain’s Blue Economy also has to deal with issues like mineral exploitation and pollution. This may be difficult for the UK, which has long been one of the largest oil and natural gas producers in Europe. This is slowly changing. As of 2005, British production of oil and natural gas dropped lower than its consumption and, thus, Britain became a net importer of fuel.

Despite the decline in production, the UK government still offers many tax breaks benefiting production of fossil fuels, and was one of the few G20 countries to increase their subsidies in recent years, as reported in a study by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Thus, it’s hard to gauge the dedication of the current parliament to a Blue Economy, or even sustainability in general, whilst subsidies for exploration and mineral extraction in our oceans – which can sometimes result in oil spills – continue to be offered.

Britain claims to be dedicating time to establishing a sustainable economy with our oceans, especially given our stake in them; however, the government’s history of ocean management leaves a lot to be desired both domestically and internationally. If the UK hopes to be a world leader on these issues post-Brexit it needs to rectify this immediately and commit in both words and actions to a Blue Economy.

Micheil Page is currently reading an MSc in Global Energy and Climate Policy at SOAS, University of London, specialising in Arctic governance. He is a fellow at the Polar Research and Policy Initiative, and is also one of the Co-Directors of UniSolar, the UK’s first student-led community energy enterprise.

The UK-Japan energy dialogue after Brexit: beyond nuclear?

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Brexit could bring benefits to the UK energy sector. Theresa May’s cabinet should seize the opportunity to reshape energy cooperation with non-EU partners, including Japan.

Japan and Britain are long-standing trading partners who have enjoyed a history of fruitful cooperation in different sectors. In the energy field, the UK-Japan relations – known as Nichiei Kankei in Japanese – have thrived on nuclear. Collaboration between the two islands began already in the 60s, when the UK supplied Japan’s first commercial power reactor.

But first, why is nuclear so important for London and Tokyo? Historically, nuclear power has represented a core element in both countries’ domestic energy policies and their climate strategies. Nuclear has been an essential energy source to ensure stability and security of supply, reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and tackle fuel poverty at national level.

Domestic policies

Japan is notably poor in energy resources and has recently ranked as the least self-sufficient among other developed economies. Nuclear has then helped the Asian nation satisfy its energy needs for decades. In 2011, before the Great East Japan Earthquake which triggered a tsunami causing the meltdown of three reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, the country produced up to 30% of its electricity from nuclear.

After having shut down most of its reactors, this figure fell drastically, and nuclear currently provides less than 2 percent of the country’s power. However, it is not a mystery that Prime Minister Shinzō Abe is now betting again on nuclear. The Japanese Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) wants to generate between 20 and 22 percent of the nation’s power supply in 2030 from this energy source. This target would require 25 to 30 reactors in operation by that year, experts indicate. In such scenario, Japan would diminish its reliance on rising coal and natural gas imports, but also divert investments for renewable energy generation and technologies.

In the UK, even Whitehall has often shown enthusiasm and been broadly supportive of nuclear especially over the last few years. In October 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron secured the deal with Electricité de France (EDF) for the construction of the heavily-criticised Hinkley Point C plant. Under Theresa May, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) has made clear on several occasions that increasing generation from nuclear power is among its top priorities for the years to come. In the next few decades, there are plans to build several new reactors across the country. This includes small modular ones (SMRs), with capacity between 10 and 300 MWe, on which the UK may take the international lead in technology development. According to BEIS data, nuclear generated 21 percent of total electricity in 2017 and it with renewables will account for over 80 percent of total generation in 2050.

Cooperation

Similar domestic policies and objectives have led Japan and the UK to align their positions at the international level. In May 2018, they joined the “Nuclear Innovation: Clean Energy” (Nice) coalition, a global alliance championed by the US, supporting nuclear power as a carbon-free source for the future energy systems.

However, as said, both nations consider each other as a strategic partner on nuclear energy. Cooperation in the field spans a wide range of commercial and regulatory areas, including nuclear safety, decontamination, research and development and plant construction. Additionally, in 2012, in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, former Prime Ministers David Cameron and Yoshihiko Noda formalised the strategic partnership through the launch of bilateral annual nuclear dialogues.

Concurrently, the two countries have developed complementary expertise, paving the way for joint projects and experience sharing in the sector. Interestingly enough, Japan has often looked into British technology for decommissioning and waste management, while the UK has taken guidance from at the Japanese leadership in plant design and construction.

Recently, the Japanese conglomerate Hitachi has taken on the development of the Wyfla power station in Wales, which will consist of two nuclear reactors with a minimum capacity of 2,700 Megawatt (MW). On 4 June 2018, the Business and Energy Secretary Greg Clark announced to the Parliament that the government was considering to co-finance the project with direct investment alongside the Japanese giant and other government agencies. This would represent a return to public funding to nuclear construction in the UK, previously ruled out by government policy for decades. Nevertheless, as of July 2018, it is still unclear what the financial commitment will look like.

The future

As Brexit approaches, should May’s cabinet pursue cooperation in other energy fields? With increasingly cheaper renewables challenging other energy sources, will Nichiei Kanke in the energy sector still rotate around nuclear in the future? In the author’s opinion, nuclear will continue to dominate the Japanese-British cooperation in the sector.

However, after leaving the European Union, the UK should bring clean energy to the centre of its partnership with Japan. Renewables and related technologies are already one of the top priorities of the EU-Japan Energy Dialogue. Japanese energy markets are currently going through a radical phase of liberalisation and renewable energy sources have gained momentum since the Fukushima disaster, as the Asian country aims to increase their share in the energy mix.

Japan has then an interest in investing in decentralised types of energy and can learn from the UK experience with offshore wind and marine energy. On the other side, British companies could find fertile ground for their distributed energy resource, storage, demand-side response and smart energy management solutions. A more diversified energy mix would certainly make the Land of the Rising Sun shine again.

Fabio Orlando is Head of the Energy & Climate Programme at Agora.