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Morality or diplomacy? The UK’s role in assisting Pacific states who have been directly affected by the impacts of climate change

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What is the role of developed economies such as the UK in assisting smaller developing states in mitigating and adapting to the impacts of climate change.

When projections become daily realities

Unbeknownst to many, we are teetering on what could be referred to as a climate armageddon. The intrinsic threat of climate change to so many different facets of life on this planet makes it particularly unique. Yet, what is especially alarming for certain countries is the simple reality that they are not ready – or, in many instances, not able – to tackle climate change head on. Varied capabilities and acute vulnerabilities will bear unimaginable social and economic stress on countries that did not have a sizable role in contributing to the underlying causes of global climate change.

Small Island Developing States (SIDS) believe their determined efforts to unite nations in addressing climate change have not gained the traction nor the reward that they were intended to. A combination of self-interest, concentration of political and economic power as well as different levels of development have all contributed to SIDS and other states experiencing repeated diplomatic and political disappointments. Perhaps best exemplified by the failure of Copenhagen Agreement (where a combination of political and organisational drawbacks failed to produce a legally binding agreement), financial considerations and technical expertise continue to impede the potential progress made at climate change conferences. This then raises the question: what is the role of countries that have so far remained relatively unscathed from the impacts of global climate change?

What role can the UK play?

To quote British Prime Minister Theresa May “there is a clear moral imperative for developed countries such as the UK to help those around the world who stand to lose the most from the consequences of manmade climate change.” At the United Nations General Assembly in 2018, her government announced a raft of bold and commendable measures to assist countries that are affected by climate change. £160 million will be directed to countries to transition to cleaner/greener energy systems and provide the necessary support to communities already affected by climate change. This commitment is additional to the already sizeable £5.8 billion of funding between 2016-2020. It also follows the Climate Change Act, which was passed in 2008 and serves as the legislative basis for the UK’s approach to reducing carbon dioxide emissions and responding to climate change.

In directing this noteworthy amount of funding, the UK should provide technical assistance to SIDS on three key elements: first, combining the current social/environmental momentum to spur and enact developments and processes of climate legislation in SIDS; second, through the UK’s expertise in the fields of energy markets and clean growth, government led socio-economic initiatives could be implemented to assist economies struggling to adapt to the effects of climate change; and third, the UK should lead on efforts to adopt stricter and more progressive provisions and policies of climate resilience at international climate conferences and other supranational settings. Thus, climate change offers an opportunity for the UK to revitalise its role as a climate leader and improve its reputation and standing in the global arena.

Looking ahead

It would be a mistake to believe that developed nations hold sole responsibility for the problems facing SIDS. Instead, what must be demonstrated is leadership. Leadership that rises above the complexities of climate change and encompasses its different facets including obligation, capabilities, fairness and universal participation. This requires that SIDS look also to their own role and capabilities in developing ecological sustainable development, which reflects their needs and the global requirement.

By utilising financial, technological and diplomatic efforts, the UK must address the needs of SIDS through a pragmatic lens. Addressing these needs should not be viewed as a form of charity or aid. Instead it is an explicit obligation owed to these countries by the UK and the wider international community. Previous multilateral environmental agreements recognise the enormity of the challenge faced. Yet, a concerted global effort needs to focus on an equitable and distributive approach that speaks to the most vulnerable and cements what is a common problem with many shared responsibilities.

Andrew Williamson is currently working in international development and has a keen interest in environmental diplomacy and governance.

Crime and punishment? UK-Russia relations following the Kerch Strait incident

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Following the seizure of three Ukrainian vessels in the Sea of Azov in late November, the UK must continue to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions on Moscow in order to maintain a coherent and long-term Russia deterrence strategy.

On 25 November 2018, three Ukrainian boats and their crew, traveling from the Black Sea port of Odessa to Mariupol in the Sea of Azov, were seized after an altercation with the Russian Navy on the Kerch Strait. As ever, attempts to assign culpability are undermined by contested versions of the truth. Moscow argues that the Ukrainian vessels were not following a pre-planned route and that they had not been notified about the boats’ transit, which is why they detained the vessels and their crew. Ukraine claims that it had followed agreed procedure as on previous occasions and that Russia’s actions clearly violated the 2003 agreement, signed by Kiev and Moscow, that established shared control of the Sea of Azov.

Russia’s seizure of these vessels is a clear indication that the war in Ukraine continues to flare up and that sanctions imposed by Western countries on Russia have had a limited effect on Russia’s foreign policy risk appetite. The completion of the Kerch Bridge has reinforced the annexation of Crimea as a geopolitical reality, even for those who still argue that de jure it is still Ukrainian territory. It also constitutes another attempt by Russia to destabilise the region and further strangle the Ukrainian economy. Because of the bridge’s 33m height limitation, a third of the vessels traveling to Mariupol – Ukraine’s third largest port – can no longer cross the Kerch Strait.

The UK is one of the few countries that has taken action against Russia’s latest aggression. Previous sanctions against Russia have included the expulsion of four diplomats, after British citizen and former Russian intelligence officer Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned in 2006. In March 2018, 23 diplomats considered “undeclared intelligence officers” by British Prime Minister Theresa May were expelled following the use of the Novichok nerve agent on Sergei Skripal, a former double agent, and his daughter Yulia.

These sanctions have been considered heavy on rhetoric but light on substance. Therefore, when the British Defence Minister Gavin Williamson declared that London would send HMS Echo to Odessa for a freedom of navigation maneuver in support of Ukraine, it seemed the UK had upped its game. However, it is questionable what deterrence the deployment of this ship may have against further Russian aggression on the Kerch Strait or in the Black Sea. The HMS Echo is a hydrographic survey vessel designed for amphibious training and mine-hunting, equipped with nothing more menacing than a GPS and a sonar.

Moscow clearly counts on the West’s inaction and does not expect the status quo to change anytime soon. Does this mean that the UK should take a more assertive stance to deter Russia? Despite public condemnation of Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, Russia is still considered a major ally for global security, particularly in counter-terrorism and the successful cooperation on Iran’s nuclear deal. Even since the Skripal incident, Theresa May has argued that it is not in the UK’s interest to cut all bilateral relations with Russia. Most recently, despite a clear indication that the UK would take a stronger stance on Russia, many commentators noted that the the 2018 Modernising Defence Programme review was often vague and light on substantial policy.

There are several reasons why maintaining the status quo is the best and only option for the UK right now. Firstly, if London were to increase its military presence in the Black Sea region, there is a chance it would not deter Moscow but backfire by provoking a more assertive response from the Russian side. The greater the tensions between Russia and the West, the higher the chances of misinterpreted actions and unintended conflict. Since 2014, Russia has been bolstering the capabilities of its Black Sea Fleet. The higher the level of military involvement, higher the likelihood of a human error occurring. It could end up in war and potentially spillover to Europe.

Secondly, maintaining UK diplomatic and economic sanctions forms part of a long-term strategy. Russia is starting to feel the effect of sanctions. As part of this strategy, the MoD should continue to conduct freedom of navigation exercises to signal that the Black Sea is far from becoming a ‘Russian lake’ and extend a helping hand to partners on the Black Sea, primarily Ukraine and Georgia.

Critics of the UK’s limited response to Russian aggression should be mindful of the dangers of ‘upping our game’, both for the stability of the region and for the success of the UK’s broader, longer-term strategy. This is no less true in light of the recent Kerch Strait incident.

Andrea Gutierrez Cristobal is a postgraduate student of EU Politics at the London School of Economics.

Beyond Islamist terrorism: the rise of right-wing extremism

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Right-wing extremism is growing in the UK and, while other forms of terrorism remain a threat, there is a heightened possibility that future terrorist attacks will be perpetrated by right-wing terrorists. This growing risk could be curtailed by a better awareness from law enforcement services and other relevant statutory bodies.

Europe has seen an increase in terrorist attacks on its soil, particularly since 2015. The UK is not immune to this trend, and it has also seen an increased frequency of successful terrorist acts.

The main focus of UK law enforcement services has been on Islamist terrorism, which has been at the root of the majority of the recent attacks. However, there has also been a more insidious rise of extreme right-wing terror plots. In February 2018 the UK’s former lead for counter-terrorism policing Mark Rowley stated that, in the 11 months since the March 2017 Westminster attack, the British police had foiled four extreme right-wing inspired plots.

Right-wing extremism is a loose, ill-defined concept that comprises a number of different ideologies and aims. Broadly, right-wing extremism encompasses a wish for the status quo ante, or ‘how things were before’, and neo-fascist aspects, such as ultra-nationalism. Some groups may be focused on a single issue, while others may hold several views, including anti-Semitic, anti-democratic, and anti-immigration beliefs.

Right-wing extremism has been growing steadily over recent years, as seen in the number of referrals of right-wing extremists to Prevent (one of the four branches of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST). In 2017/18, 18% of referrals to Prevent were due to concerns relating to right-wing extremism, compared to only 10% in 2015/16.

Not only have right-wing ideologies become more prevalent, but there has also been a growing number of extreme right-wing terrorist attacks, attempted acts, or failed or foiled attacks. These include the murder of Jo Cox in 2016 by Thomas Mair who held extreme right-wing beliefs, the 2017 Finsbury Park attack where Darren Osborn drove a van in a crowd of people near the Finsbury Park mosque, an attack planned on an LGBT event by white supremacist Ethan Stables, and a number of arrests of members of the National Action – a proscribed neo-Nazi group – some of whom were arrested on terror charges for allegedly planning a ‘race war’.

Right-wing extremism has been deemed serious enough by the UK that MI5 is due to take over responsibility from the police on preventing right-wing extremism. Contrary to the recent Islamist attacks, which have mostly all been claimed by the Islamic State (IS), there is no single right-wing faction which claims to either coordinate or inspire attacks. Indeed, in their 2017 Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, Europol states that extreme right-wing activities are mainly carried out by lone actors or loosely coordinated groups.

The growth of right-wing extremism, and related risk of right-wing terrorist attacks, is fuelled by a mixture of factors. The rise of populist politics and movements in the UK and abroad stem from a general dissatisfaction with political elites, combined with increasing economic inequalities. External factors have also exacerbated the rise of right-wing extremism. The high migration levels from Africa and the Middle East – particularly during the peak of the migration crisis in 2015 – combined with Islamist terrorist attacks have reinforced an ‘us versus them’, and an increasingly inward-looking, mentality.

Another issue fuelling this growth is the fact that the UK’s counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism tools and experience are primarily geared towards dealing with Islamist terrorism. Furthermore, the right-wing extremist movement has shown signs that it is increasingly organising itself, a recent development that makes it more dangerous. While Islamist extremism remains the primary cause of terrorism – driven partly by the continued threat of IS in Syria – right-wing extremist movements have increased and, consequently, so has the possibility of right-wing terror attacks.

There are a number of ways in which right-wing extremists may be impeded. Firstly, while there are some well-known right-wing groups, a better mapping of these extremist groups would be beneficial, as trends so far indicate fragmentation and a lack of knowledge amongst authorities. There is also the need to improve recognition of the early warning signs of potential right-wing terrorists by other statutory bodies involved in the UK’s counter-terrorism effort, such as schools, universities, social care and healthcare providers.

Secondly, a better recognition and understanding of the threat by law enforcement services, placing right-wing extremism more firmly in the agenda and within people’s minds as a threat factor.

Finally, there needs to be a concerted effort to prevent further reductions within counter-terrorism resourcing, in order to ensure greater preparedness by forces across the country against the threat of terrorist attacks.

Sarah Grand-Clement is a defence and security policy researcher. Her research interests include counter-terrorism, counter-violent extremism, and the Middle East. She holds an MSc in Arab World Studies from Durham University.

Drugs, guns and religion: the Hezbollah ‘model’ of criminal empire

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In aggressively pursuing crime as a source of revenue, Hezbollah has created a model which other groups are liable to copy, creating further regional destabilisation. The UK can help combat this by promoting greater global financial controls and supporting a crackdown on suspected criminal revenue streams.

Hezbollah emerged in the 1980s from a critical mass of social and political unrest in Lebanon. Shi’ites in Lebanon were disenfranchised by dismal economic prospects, and inspired by the Iranian revolution. The exporting of revolutionary ideals by Iran in the 80s and the revolutionary bent of Hezbollah allowed for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to effectively militarise Hezbollah. The IRGC reportedly sent 1,500 advisors, who transferred operational experience in small unit tactics and warfare from the ongoing Iran-Iraq War to the nascent Hezbollah. This culminated in catastrophic attacks on French and US forces in Lebanon in 1983.

As an organisation, Hezbollah grew rapidly through the favouritism shown to them by Syria in the 80s during their occupation of Lebanon. The Lebanese civil war and Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon provided them with opportunities for legitimation through anti-Israeli operations. However, Hezbollah’s provision of social services, reconstruction efforts, and need for advanced weapons forced the organisation to aggressively pursue crime as a form of income. Today, this drive has created a large criminal network operating across the globe.

Hezbollah has developed an international criminal operation which profits from what Europol describes as the “use of legal business structures, cross-border opportunities, identity theft, document forgery and violence”. Their ongoing operations in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil raises tens of millions of dollars annually. As a testament to Hezbollah’s global footprint in illicit drug trafficking, operations have been uncovered in Germany, Poland, Romania, the US and Canada, to name but a few. This expertise has also been transposed into different areas, such as human trafficking, arms trafficking, counterfeit currency operations, and ‘blood diamond’ exports. While it is difficult to calculate revenue from these activities exactly, the proceeds are estimated to run in the millions of dollars.

This has allowed the group to gain some independence from Iran. While Iran remains the key supplier of Hezbollah’s vast missile arsenal, they have diversified their income, covering multiple criminal trades across the globe. Iranian support remains significant. Iran provides complex weapon systems, training, and as much as US$200 million annually. However, the relationship has matured into one of near equals, with Hezbollah providing key forces in Syria and intelligence operatives to support the IRGC Quds Force. Looking to the future, Iran’s co-operation with Hezbollah is only going to grow as tensions with Israel increase and the Syrian Civil War moves to a close.

Hezbollah, then, provides a viable blueprint for non-state actors in today’s globalised world. Hezbollah has demonstrated the benefits of involvement in international crime. This is not just the case financially, but also in developing organisational experience and capability which can be easily harnessed for violent ends. Many violent groups operate in areas with weak states or complicit governments, and within communities that are pliable to the benefits of organised crime.

This is especially true for other Shi’ite groups which receive Iranian support; the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and Syria. The Houthi’s proximity to the horn of Africa provides access to a variety of criminal enterprises for groups in search of income. Potential criminal activities overlap with Hezbollah, with opportunities in human trafficking, the drug trade and more. This may be less true with Shi’ite militias in Iraq, whose range of possible ventures are limited by potential blowback of criminality for Iran given their geographical proximity.

The potential for non-state actors and violent groups across the world to follow the ‘model’ of Hezbollah is a concern which merits greater focus from British policymakers, especially as the UK pushes its post-Brexit ‘Global Britain’ agenda. With a major financial centre and strong diplomatic and intelligence capabilities, the UK is well positioned to take up a leading role in combating violent groups that adopt the ‘Hezbollah model’.

The British government should expand its scope from an initial crackdown on illicit Russian money to examining the financial channels from criminal networks associated with violent groups. Disrupting the illicit financial practices of violent groups can serve not only to promote global stability, but also to highlight the UK as a key player in the nexus between organised crime and terrorism.

Jack Sargent is pursuing a Masters in the History of International Relations at the LSE, with a particular interest in non-state actors in the Middle East.

Why globalisation is disadvantageous to women

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The macro-economic policies underlying globalisation exacerbate female inequality. The ‘hegemonic masculinity’ of global capitalism and corporate non-responsibility have informalised and exploited female labour. Moreover, gendered migrant labour reproduces a gendered and racialised order, which disadvantages women.

Whilst I consider ‘women’ as individuals with a configuration of intersecting identities, rather than a monolith, I believe that globalisation is bad for women overall, on either side of the North/South divide, and particularly those from ethnic minorities and lower socio-economic spheres. In order to explore this issue further, I employ Peterson’s dual understanding of globalisation as both a continuation of the ‘capitalist racialised patriarchy’ that characterises modernity and a new conjecture constituted by neo-liberal policies since the 1970s.

The concept of feminisation is important for understanding the uneven effects of globalisation on men and women. The devalorisation of the feminine, and all things considered so, produces processes of exploitation and violence against feminised concepts. Globalisation and the pursuit of profit has resulted in the ‘feminisation of employment’ with respect to the increased number of women in work and the deterioration of labour conditions, income and employment status. This has resulted in the overall degradation of women’s work as subjective, voluntary, unskilled and poorly paid or not paid at all.

Transnational competition has forced domestic capitalists to cut labour costs in order to increase productivity, with multinational corporations relocating production to the global South in search of cheaper wages. In the global North, women of colour are disproportionately impoverished by the relocation of well-paid jobs due to a legacy of racialised gender inequality. A rise in ‘McJobs’, or low-paid positions lacking in benefits, and reductions in minimum wage are the result of this repositioning. In the global South, poor working-class women fulfil the low-wage labour demands of multinational corporations that establish production in areas with weak labour laws. Globally, labour has become increasingly ‘flexible’ with the expansion of informal sectors, temporary and self-employment or a ‘feminisation’ of labour.

Capitalist workplaces are built around hidden assumptions of a separation of reproduction and production. Neo-liberal capitalism is characterised by a division between the masculinised and productive ‘monetary’ economy and the feminised and reproductive ‘non-monetary’ economy. The process of capital accumulation renders reproductive survival needs invisible, assuming informal economic activity to be in unlimited supply. Consequently, women are subordinated in both spheres, being responsible for reproductive labour in the ‘private’ sphere and holding a marginalised position in the productive economy.

Although women have increasingly participated in the labour market since the 1970s, this period has seen a deterioration of the material conditions of life for poorer women globally, as a result of macro-economic policies of privatisation, deregulation and structural adjustment. The flexibilisation of labour has seen the creation of feminised jobs that are temporary, part-time, and precarious. Cutbacks in social welfare have increased poverty for women, who are more reliant on social programs due to their burden of caring. In the global North, ethnic minorities and the working class have suffered from reduced public spending – in Britain, 86% of the burden of austerity since 2010 has fallen on women. In the global South, cuts to public health have seen increases in maternal mortality and school dropout rates for girls.

Structural adjustment programs (SAP) imposed on the global South as a form of international debt repayment by International Financial Institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, have forced women to take up additional productive and reproductive labour to survive austerity. Higher prices, reductions in government food subsidies and the devaluation of local currencies have disproportionately affected urban-poor and working-class women and disrupted the education of young girls. In Nicaragua, for instance, macro-economic gains achieved by a SAP, including a drop in inflation and increase in exports, also caused a rise in infant and maternal mortality, malnutrition, poverty and unemployment.

Neo-liberal capitalism’s neglect of the reproductive economy has prompted a commodification of the immigrant labour of Southern women. This ‘maid-trade’ – the employment of immigrant women from the global South to fulfil the domestic needs of the global North – has become a resource, upon which the centres of transnational business in ‘global cities’ depend. Immigrant labour, which frees Western women from their domestic ‘duties’, also exempts men from domestic responsibilities and relieves states’ pressure to support the reproductive economy, instead exploiting the racialised inequality of Southern women. Although foreign domestic work can be an important source of remittances for Southern countries, immigrant workers are particularly vulnerable to employer intimidation and abuse. In Britain, the domestic workers of wealthy Gulf families have faced conditions of slavery and trafficking. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 was introduced to protect migrant workers from exploitative employers, however the UK government’s measures to date have failed to significantly reduce levels of abuse.

To conclude, the ‘hegemonic masculinity’ of neo-liberal capitalism, rooted in the ‘racialised patriarchy’ of colonialism, reproduces female inequality in its neglect of the non-monetary economy and feminisation of women’s labour. Prioritising profit over reproductive needs and rendering domestic work invisible, marginalises women in the global North and South as they are simultaneously devalued in the productive economy and carry the burden of reproductive labour and caring.

Isla Wilson is active in the field of gender equality, and holds a Masters degree in International Relations.

The Irish backstop could damage, not secure, national sovereignty

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The unpopular Withdrawal Agreement vote inflicted the largest defeat on the Government in history. The Irish backstop within the Agreement, far from Brexit bringing back national sovereignty, will in reality undermine it.

The UK has always had an ambivalent view of the European project since it joined in 1973. One of its criticisms is that since the UK joined, it has morphed into a political union from an economic community. The media narrative has invariably been about what the EU has done to us, as opposed to what we have contributed to the bloc as a whole. Even during the referendum campaign, the argument against the EU was that faceless bureaucrats in Brussels were to blame for forcing our country to abide by rules and regulations – often downplaying the fact that elected Members of European Parliament (MEP)’s and Prime Ministers of the member states shape and change these very regulations. Since the UK voted to leave this institution many hours have been spent deciding how.

The result of this negotiation is the deal before the House of Commons, which suffered a record breaking defeat of 230 votes. A large reason for this was due to the Irish backstop, which would keep Northern Ireland tied to Single Market rules and customs codes in order to avoid a hard border through the island of Ireland. According to the agreement as it currently stands neither the UK nor EU can unilaterally decide to end this backstop, without the agreement of the other party. If the two sides can come to a trade deal then this never needs to be implemented, as May and the EU are at pains to point out. The result of this is, in effect, an insurance policy against a hard border. Nevertheless, there is potential for this to be implemented. This forces a key referendum campaign issue back to the surface: parliamentary and national sovereignty.

Whilst the UK is a member of the EU, it is bound to follow the rules and laws created by the initial legislation that passed through the house in 1972, the European Communities Act which Parliament voted to ascend to the statute book. In theory, the country could leave the bloc by repealing this act, a sovereign decision. However, additionally the Lisbon Treaty gives member states the sovereign right to leave the EU through the mechanism of Article 50. This is a mechanism the UK has decided on its own to invoke. If May’s deal had passed in Westminster, as well as in the European Council and the European Parliament, it would have become legally enforceable in international treaty law.

May is looking to negotiate changes to the backstop from Brussels, however the EU have said many times that the principle of a backstop is non-negotiable. As a result, it is difficult to see any significant changes being made which would facilitate the Agreement’s passage through the House of Commons.

For the sake of argument, imagine the deal with the backstop makes it through a meaningful vote and becomes law. Although the UK will have used its national sovereignty to formally leave the EU and all its institutions we will have a perverse situation whereby the UK, will be committed into a mechanism, which, if activated, will not allow it to leave by its own volition. The referendum campaign slogan ‘take back control’ in this scenario seems rather hollow a statement.

In fact, in leaving the EU’s Institutions the UK will no longer be there using its connections to states inside the EU to shape the laws of the EU. As a consequence, the UK will have less sovereignty than it did when a fully-fledged member. Both the Commission President Jean Claude Junker and the President of the Council, Donald Tusk have said this deal is the only deal on offer.

The implications of this for the island of Ireland remain worrying. The UK and Ireland joined the EU at the same time to ensure trade between the two would not be subject to friction, and the common travel area would not be impacted by a hard border between the two nations. As the former Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair stated on Good Morning Britain on ITV on 3 December, this would be the first time in both our relationships with Europe that the UK and Ireland would be on opposite sides of the line.

This whole exercise in exerting national sovereignty has the potential to hand over greater sovereignty, over the issue of the backstop. Whatever the eventual result of the negotiations with Brussels, and the meaningful vote in Westminster, the prosperity of both sides of the border hang in the balance.

David Reece is a Global Politics and International Relations Graduate from Birkbeck, University of London.