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The term ‘BAME’ misrepresents history and identity

Finding the proper word to describe the diverse minority groups within Britain is about more than just semantics; it becomes an issue of finding a single word that is both accurate and respectful. In contemporary Britain, the acronym ‘BAME’ (Black, Asian, and minority ethnic) is often used as a catch-all term to describe non-white people. However, this superficially conflates Black and Asian identities and promotes a false sense of unity in favour of linguistic expediency.

Reviewing the historical dynamic between Africans and Indians in the British Caribbean exemplifies how the burden of societal injustice is seldom borne uniformly; using a single umbrella term to encapsulate an inherently diverse experience obfuscates the social realities of each group.

In the wake of the emancipation of African slaves in 1833, British plantation owners were desperate for a new source of cheap labour. To fill the labour vacuum, destitute Indians were recruited by the hundreds of thousands through the promise of a better life in the British Caribbean. Known as the indentured labour system, Indians who were otherwise unable to pay for the voyage signed a contract binding them to approximately five years of plantation labour for a fixed wage in exchange for passage to the British Caribbean. Between 1845-1917, 147,592 Indians arrived in Trinidad under the indentured labour system and an approximate total of 239,000 Indians arrived in Guyana. While slavery was technically illegal, indentured servitude became a new form of government-sanctioned ‘unfreedom’.

The influx of cheap Indian labour kept wages artificially low. Workers were unable to strike for higher wages or better treatment because the constant arrival of new Indians with contracts binding them to low-wage labour made all workers dispensable. Additionally, the draconian terms of Indian labour contracts, strictly enforced by colonial authorities, meant that any insurrection or refusal to work would result in heavy fines and imprisonment. Although initially the white plantation owners were outraged by African emancipation, the indentured labour system filled the labour vacuum as Africans moved to other occupations, which ultimately enabled the British to consolidate power and production that might have otherwise been challenged by freed Africans on their own.

Although Indian indentured labourers occupied the lowest socio-economic positions in Trinidad and Guyana, emancipated Africans generally viewed these new arrivals as an existential threat to their economic livelihood. Few freed Africans worked for their former slave masters. Rather, their newfound economic mobility had laid the foundations for a fragile yet burgeoning middle class. In his book Caribbean Masala: Indian identity in Guyana and Trinidad, Dave Ramsaran explains how “Africans, once at the bottom of the social scale, now had an easily recognisable class to which they could feel superior”. Furthermore, “Indo-Trinidadians were also hostile to African Trinidadians […] because of the colour of the Africans’ skin and the texture of their hair, Indo-Trinidadians equated them with the followers of the demon god Raavan from the Hindu Ramayana”. British colonial authorities recognised and manipulated these economic and political conditions to consolidate the social divisions amongst Indians and freed Africans, thereby pre-empting any threat of a unified African-Indian front.

While there is inherent power in solidarity, this extends only as far as it does not compromise the unique interests of each group. In the case of colonial Trinidad and Guyana, both Africans and Indians may have benefitted from lobbying collectively for fairer labour laws. However, despite both groups being oppressed under British rule, the African and Indian experience under this repressive rule diverged greatly. Using a single term to describe this oppression would unjustly conflate the experience of both groups and promote a false sense of historical unity.

Similarly, using the term BAME when describing the nuances of contemporary societal injustices, would be as futile as trying to use this umbrella term to understand the diverse historical reality of oppressed groups in colonial Trinidad and Guyana.

Furthermore, the term BAME explicitly singles out two groups: black and Asian. Yet delineating a rigid separation between these two groups implies that ethnic identities are mutually-exclusive. In reality, according to the CIA World Factbook, around 20% of Guyanese and 23% of Trinidadians today identify as ‘mixed race’ to some degree. Umbrella terms with specific delineations, therefore, run the risk both being too ambiguous and too specific to represent the true intersectional nature of identity.

Viewing racial oppression in colonial Trinidad and Guyana through a BAME lens exemplifies how superficial terms often lead to a superficial understanding of reality. The contemporary use of the term in the UK equally conflates the unique experience of each group it is meant to represent, which undermines its overall utility as an accurate descriptor. While there is space in the English vernacular for certain umbrella terms, BAME attempts to balance the intersection between generalisation and specificity, but ultimately fails at both.

Christopher Lindrud is International Coordinator at the Trade Center of the Americas.

Nationalism, populism, and the impact of right-wing discourse on immigration during the COVID-19 pandemic

With border restrictions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK government must avoid nationalist rhetoric as it will harm its most vulnerable populations.

The outbreak of COVID-19 early this year has caused mass border closures. Even now, as governments begin to reopen their borders, controlled migration through approved travel corridors looks to be the ‘new normal’.

Governments are prioritising mitigating the economic repercussions of restricted travel on their own countries. In the wake of such inward-looking policies, it is important to understand how nationalist sentiments can impact the governance of some of the UK’s most vulnerable population: asylum seekers and other refugees.

Nationalism has long been a pervasive factor in UK migration policies. Before Boris Johnson entered the picture, the Parliament had already passed the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016. These were introduced to limit non-European Economic Area (EEA) migration into the UK and create a ‘hostile environment’ for undocumented migrants in the country. Non-EEA migrants in the UK were faced with increasingly stringent policies in an effort to deter them from living in the UK. Since migration from the EEA is predominantly white, these policies disproportionately targeted non-white people, thereby creating a framework where the national identity could be manufactured around the white identity. Former Prime Minister Theresa May’s manifesto for the 2017 snap election echoed previous Conservative Party leader, David Cameron’s desire to ‘bear down on immigration from outside the European Union’.

The global nature of this pandemic has been instrumental for nationalist, right-wing voices to amplify their concerns over immigration. Migration Watch UK, an anti-immigration think tank, has announced a controversial policy proposal to ban the entry of those over the age of 50 coming from non-EEA countries into the UK and restrict visas for other age groups.

The right-wing immigration rhetoric: erasing refugees from the picture

Populism and nationalism revolve around defining a person through their shared heritage and the country they were born in. This national identity is then juxtaposed with an ‘other’, someone who does not share the same lineage of a particular demographic. Right-wing nationalism in particular, founded on the ‘us’ vs ‘them’ narrative, privileges the lives of the citizens (‘us’) over immigrants (‘them’).

With COVID-19 resulting in rapid border controls and an inconsistent restriction on international movement; refugees are further defined as ‘others’. The Government is more concerned over the management of its governable population – its citizens – than that of immigrants.

At present, there are 51,906 documented asylum seekers still awaiting a decision on their status as a refugee in the UK. Asylum seekers are often too afraid to access healthcare in fear of their possible refugee status being overturned. They are not legally allowed to work to make a living and have to depend on ill-equipped government systems to sustain themselves.

Refugee migration will continue even as the pandemic rages. While a global pandemic may halt some economic activities, it does not stop wars, natural disasters, or tyrannical regimes from committing human rights violations on their own citizens. Thus, even during a pandemic, the drivers of migration continue. History has shown us time and time again that migration cannot be curbed simply by imposing stricter border controls. In fact, the number of migrants crossing the Channel from France to the UK has risen to more than 1,400 in the month of June from a mere 200 earlier this year.

The UK’s migration management policy needs to see a drastic shift from merely containing refugees to creating structures that can better oversee their governance. Providing a healthcare system that is accessible to refugees and spans both physical and mental health should be a priority for the Government. This global pandemic has shown the myopic nature of nationalist immigration policies but it has also provided us with an opportunity to learn and improve our systems of governing immigration.

Paakhi Bhatnagar studies International Relations at King’s College London.

COVID-19 holds a mirror up to identity-based divides in the UK

The #YouClapForMeNow campaign emerged following a video in which key workers from immigrant backgrounds recited a poem, targeting an audience who demonstrate anti-immigrant sentiments. A hashtag using the poem’s title has now come to symbolise a powerful online wave, which is thanking the ethnically diverse community of key workers. With the streets of Britain filled with clapping every Thursday evening to celebrate the efforts of a multicultural NHS, this video urged those clapping to not forget this nationwide diversity in a post-coronavirus Britain.

The poem in the video aims to break down identity-based divides and appreciate immigrant workers. Nevertheless, the importance given to solidarity is convoluted by the repeated reference to antagonising differences. Constructed around the binary of ‘you’ and ‘me’, a hashtag for solidarity became one bound up in a separating logic, exacerbating the issue of ethnic differentiation. Yet perhaps it is this awareness of systemic, racial segregation that gives the poem its power. By consciously critiquing a historically divisive rhetoric, it demands an acknowledgement and re-articulation of anti-immigrant sentiments, hinting towards an inclusive future beyond reductive identity-based divides.

A multicultural society must recognise ethnic minorities’ contributions towards collective, socio-economic progress. In the recently published Research and Development Roadmap Policy paper, Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Alok Sharma writes that “we want to send a powerful signal to talented people around the world: come to the UK, be part of this exciting new future”. Society must recognise that this ‘future’ relies upon diverse talent.

With visa regulations favouring ‘skilled’ workers and graduate routes favouring those attaining higher education, many ethnic minorities – especially key workers – are slipping through the net. In spite of the increasing demand for workers, ethnically diverse workers who might not technically qualify as high-skilled are notably underrepresented. For the UK to truly build a brighter future for all, society must move to displace the deep-rooted perception that ethnic minorities are taking jobs, and instead value their present resilience and courage. Yet, as we remember the efforts of immigrant workers in a post-COVID-19 society, these efforts should not constitute their place in a UK allegedly ‘for all’; a place where inclusivity must not be contingent on tangible contributions.

Frequent circulations of the phrase ‘COVID-19 doesn’t discriminate’ has perhaps only exposed and exacerbated the societal structures that do. As the global crisis intensified, the conversation shifted to its disproportionate impact on certain domestic demographics. Belly Mujinga, a key worker for TfL, suffered a racially motivated attack when she was spat on by a man claiming to have COVID-19. A few days later, Mujinga tested positive, dying after two weeks. In spite of her respiratory problems, she was expected to resume work on the concourse as usual, where she was not supplied with personal protective equipment (PPE). Alongside the attack, Mujinga’s deprivation of PPE reflects the systemic, discriminatory treatment of many ethnic minority workers. her death represents the ultimate outcome of a societal injustice where socio-economic structures are both a causal and enabling factor.

As racial prejudices often impact the quality of life of individuals and communities, we must be able to trace the racially divisive foundations on which these are built. To envision a post-COVID-19 UK that intrinsically appreciates and celebrates ethnic diversity, policy makers must deconstruct the umbrella of racism when examining the correlation of socio-economic divides with ethnicity. We know that 63% of healthcare workers who died due to COVID-19 were from a BAME background, prompting researchers to investigate why ethnic minorities are overwhelmingly vulnerable. As Judith Butler has asserted, “the virus alone does not discriminate, but we humans surely do”.

Socio-economic inequality has isolated minorities in their particular battles with the pandemic. Due to existing social and economic factors, COVID-19 is worsening inequality in a society already laced with, and built upon, structures that discriminate. Amidst a pandemic encouraging an increasingly global consciousness, society and governing structures must assume this mindset in the UK as well. To normalise diversity, we must act upon the reality of racial disparities exposed by COVID-19, epitomised by the binary of ‘you’ and ‘me’; a binary that reflects the prevailing treatment of ethnic minorities. A future that is able to break-down identity divides must celebrate the claps that are fuelling national efforts to investigate ethnic inequality, proposing a future consciousness that seeks to overcome racial divisions and is built on present hopes for a more inclusive society.

Mahi Shah studies German and Spanish at the University of Cambridge.

Are aircraft carriers still relevant to British security in the hypersonic age?

With China now deploying hypersonic missiles, the aircraft carriers HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales could be at a distinct risk. To address this, the UK should invest carefully in defences capable of defeating hypersonic missiles whose extreme speed may overwhelm missile defense systems.

The carrier

HMS Queen Elizabeth currently serves with the Royal Navy as the latest and largest in a long line of UK aircraft carriers, which carry British jets at sea, enabling the UK to project power and protect its global interests. Announced in 2007, her entry into service was delayed until 2020 due to budget cuts announced in the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review, at a final cost of a little over £6bn. HMS Queen Elizabeth will be followed in front-line service by sister ship the HMS Prince of Wales in 2023.

Aircraft carriers are the best means of projecting UK naval power, enabling Britain to swiftly intervene in international crises and also to protect vital sea-based trade effectively.

There has been debate over how effectively carriers such as HMS Queen Elizabeth can continue to protect British interests. Two alternatives – missile carrying arsenal ships and submarines – cannot effectively replace them. Arsenal ships do not match the complexity of the aircraft carrier, which possess greater flexibility in striking power. Carrier-based aircraft can carry many different weapons for distinct targets and jet pilots can adapt to changing circumstances. Carriers also possess assets such as airborne early warning radars, which can scan the skies and seas for threats; these cannot operate on a smaller arsenal ship due to lack of space on board.
Submarines can deny enemy access to strategic waters. However their utility for sea control, dominating the waters in a given area, is limited by their need for stealth. Once detected, submarines are vulnerable. Submarines, such as the under-induction Astute class, can effectively supplement the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier but cannot replace it.

Enter hypersonic missiles

Hypersonic weapons move at over five times the speed of sound, leaving mere seconds for a ship’s defences to react.. However with adequate investment in defences, such as early warning and directed energy weapons, there is no reason the aircraft carrier cannot remain at the fore of Britain’s security strategy.

China has been claiming vast swathes of ocean in South-East Asia, denying ships from smaller nations the right of movement – freedom of navigation – on the seas. The so-called Asian Quad (India, Japan, the US, and Australia) is therefore stepping up military efforts to balance China’s challenge to regional freedom of navigation in the South China Seas. The Quad nations are now holding exercises in the Indian Ocean and deploying warships to waters in East Asia to balance Chinese power.

As a key US and Australian ally, and a beneficiary of open sea lanes, the UK would well become involved in any confrontation with China. China is now making concerted investment in hypersonic weapons as part of a package of offensive weapon systems, designed to deny access to and restrict movement in contested areas. Chinese hypersonic missiles pose a genuine threat to British aircraft carriers.

Investing in counter-measures

Counter-measures to hypersonic weapons do exist. Speeding up the induction of Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems such as the ‘Crowsnest’ – Airborne Early Warning (AEW) – helicopter by the end of 2020 enables early detection. A helicopter based radar like Crowsnest can scan over the horizon to detect an incoming hypersonic threat early enough for defences to be effective. Sophisticated infrared sensors on the F-35 jet, which the Queen Elizabeth class carry, can detect a hypersonic launch early, as will space based surveillance assets. Together, these multi-spectral, multi-platform sensors can make a deployment of aircraft carriers viable in a hypersonic weapon environment.

Laser weapons and railguns are potentially able to defend against emerging naval threats, because they can match high hypersonic speeds. The US Navy has begun deploying small scale laser weapons for missile defence. Railguns use electromagnetic force to fire projectiles at roughly six times the speed of sound. Research into railguns is actively focusing on their use in missile defence. Another such system could be Glide Breaker, a US project to develop anti-missile systems to neutralise hypersonic threats. Both could theoretically deal with the hypersonic threat, potentially intercepting them a few seconds before they hit the ship. The Royal Navy should increase cooperation with the US, which leads global research on railgun technology.

While hypersonic weapons will require a renewed focus on space and airborne early warning, they will not make the aircraft carrier obsolete. With multiple solutions emerging, a ‘hard-kill’ response that can protect carriers is imminent. The UK and the Royal Navy would be well served by continued investment in a modern carrier capability going forward.

Jeevan Vipinachandran holds an MSc in Comparative Politics: Conflict Studies from the London School of Economics.

In Iraq, the UK is at risk of war with Iran

Iran’s proxy forces in Iraq could operate independently of Iran’s wishes. They may inadvertently draw the UK into armed conflict with Iran. Only comprehensive domestic reform in Iraq can minimise the threat of these groups.

Iran supports and trains large Shia militias in the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). The PMF were formed in response to the disintegration of the Iraqi military in the face of ISIS. These groups include Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, The Badr Organisation and others. Members of these militias occupy key positions in Iraqi institutions and occupy seats in the Iraqi Parliament. These groups are key fronts for Iranian influence in Iraq.

While Iran undoubtedly wields decisive influence in these groups, this does not translate into direct control. Iran’s proxy groups generally behave according to their own best interests, taking into account local considerations. Some of these militias lack a clear command structure and are, in the words of researcher Michael Knights, “extraordinarily complex, and hard to manage at the best of times”.

For example, Kata’ib Hezbollah has carried out lethal strikes against western forces in Iraq. In response, the US has struck Kata’ib Hezbollah’s bases throughout Iraq and Syria and assassinated its leader, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis.

UK policy must recognise that two emerging trends in Iraq might weaken Iran’s control of these groups. These are the growing political conflict between Shia clergy in Najaf (Iraq) and Qom (Iran), and emerging Iraqi nationalism.

The Najaf-Qom dispute is a fundamental disagreement between two distinct worldviews. The Najaf clergy advance the traditional belief that they should have limited involvement in governance. In contrast, Qom is the home of Valeyet-e which is the current political system of Iran and involves key control of state matters by the Shia clergy. This dispute has taken on strong political dimensions. Iranian efforts to dominate Iraq have become increasingly unpopular amongst the Iraqi public and the Najaf clergy is seeking to regain prominence after decades of Baathist repression. Most recently, PMF militias loyal to Najaf have left the PMF at Najaf’s beckoning, as Iraqi efforts to exert control over the PMF and absorb it into the state increase. This move damages the legitimacy of the remaining pro-Iranian groups. Since the PMF originally formed at Sistani’s behest in 2014, the public has called for Najaf-aligned groups to withdraw, which damages the legitimacy initially held by the PMF.

Likewise, emerging Iraqi nationalism is going to frustrate Iran’s efforts to control the PMF groups it carefully cultivated. Iraq has seen repeated and widespread protests against the perceived chronically corrupt and inept post-2003 political system as well as the foreign influence considered to contribute to its failure. The 2019 protests, which started in October, saw several hundred thousand protestors stall the nation’s economy in pursuit of political reform. Iran itself was often the target of these protests, with the Iranian consulate in Najaf being burnt down. These protests have also rallied against foreign interference more broadly. As recently as January of this year protestors decried Iraq’s role as staging ground for any would-be conflict between Iran and the US. Iran-backed militias have harshly opposed the protests. They are alleged to have used lethal violence against protestors.

The burgeoning Najaf-Qom dispute and emerging Iraqi nationalism has the potential to socially and politically ostracise Iran-backed Shia militias, given Iran’s sharp dip in popularity in Iraq. The removal of pro-Najaf forces from the PMF strips them of the legitimacy it gave them, and their opposition to the widespread protests might damage their standing in any new political order that may emerge.

In order to avoid social and political ostracisation, they may aggressively target Western forces to co-opt the widespread unpopularity of foreign interference in Iraq and offset their own foreign backing. As well as, this Iranian-backed groups may agitate any nationalist government in Baghdad, which they may perceive as a threat to their existence or as anti-Shia.

This has significant policy implications for the UK. Should an Iranian-backed militia strike coalition forces without Iranian approval, it could spark conflict. The US has already struck both key Iranian officials in Iraq and Iran-backed militias. If Iran’s proxies aggressively target Western forces, US response may precipitate war.

Consequently, British policy should be to strengthen the Iraqi state and diffuse tensions with Iran regionally. The UK must recognise that its interests are best served by helping to combat the chronic levels of corruption within the Iraqi state, to restore its capacity and legitimacy. In tandem, diplomatic efforts with Iran must be renewed.

The 2015 Nuclear Deal showed that diplomatic settlements with Iran are achievable, sustainable, and able to greatly reduce tensions. Relations with Iran could be guaranteed despite the dismal state of US-Iran diplomacy given the UK’s track record in maintaining notably better relations. Only decisive diplomatic engagement with Iran can remove the risk of war.

Jack Sargent is co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme.

Why a global pandemic demands greater regional autonomy

The fragmentation of Britain’s COVID-19 ‘lockdown’ strategy has been apparent since the virus first hit the country. The start of social isolation and economic shutdown may have been uniformly implemented across the UK on 23 March but, as different countries within the union start to emerge from lockdown, each region seems to have chosen a strikingly individual route out. It may turn out that this global disease normalises more policy decisions being made at the regional level in Britain.

Do I stay at home or stay alert? Over the last few months, varying demands such as these from the UK’s different political bodies have supplied the nation with a generous helping of confusion (and, in some instances, hysteria). Yet a united response to the pandemic may not necessarily be the best way to defeat it. Centralised government control should roll back, in order for local areas to better assess the threat of the virus there and administer the necessary steps to stop it from spreading.

The fluctuation of the R number across Britain

Westminster granted sub-national bodies greater independence as it became clear that the coronavirus R rate – the rate at which the disease is spreading – varied greatly in different communities. London’s mid-May infection rate, between 0.6 and 0.9, put it at slightly safer levels than Scotland’s estimations which lay somewhere between 0.7 and 1.

Scientific evidence suggests that if the R number is consistently below 1, slower transmission levels of the virus would eventually eradicate it from the nation. However, cases would inevitably exponentially grow if the number crept above 1. In this instance, the removal of a harsh lockdown would only allow the disease to embed itself deeper into the lives of the population. Consequently, Scotland’s predicament demanded a later lifting of its lockdown due to the teetering position of its R number of around 1.

The biological effect of COVID-19 only accounts for a fraction of the havoc it has wreaked on humanity. Education, finance, and social interaction have all been affected. This is fundamentally why Boris Johnson has had to cede so many of his Cabinet’s powers to separate governments in the devolved nations of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

Prioritising the reopening of certain regions first

London accounts for 23% of the entire UK economy and a 2018 City of London study found that the capital employed 1 in 59 British workers. It would have been economically unproductive for London, and the rest of England, to wait for Scotland’s transmission rate to be suppressed and for the two countries to come out of lockdown at a unified date. A financial and employment hub like London could not dawdle lifting measures when scientists announced that it was safe for England to begin the gradual reopening of its economy, especially when it was revealed that Rishi Sunak’s furlough scheme was costing upwards of £14bn each month.

When combined, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland account for just 15% of UK GDP. Scotland may have contributed £1.2bn in oil revenue to the nation’s economy in 2018, but that same year a nearly a fifth of its population were economically inactive.

Devolved bodies do contribute billions to the UK’s economy and their economies need to be reopened, but their politicians have erred on the side of caution. From a health perspective, Scotland was unable to follow England’s timetable of easing lockdown, but England’s economic output into the nation’s economy perhaps emphasised its need to open sooner. Ultimately, autonomy was granted for local leaders to better scrutinise the scope of their region’s infection rate and do what was best for either the public health or the economy.

However, it is also tempting to subscribe to a more cynical perspective that delegation of power has allowed central government to escape a degree of accountability. With figures such as Nicola Sturgeon and Mark Drakeford holding down separate forts, any failures in their lockdown strategies will leave a clear direction for their electorates to point the finger .

The threat posed by the virus is not an easily dismissed issue. Public safety and higher levels of government scrutiny are deeply intertwined. Ultimately, a centralised approach from Westminster would undermine the varying needs of different communities across the UK. It may well be that the pandemic convinces more people of this.

Emily Wilson studies Politics and International Relations at the University of Manchester.