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Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers means it’s no model for the UK

There are big question marks over immigrant rights and whether they are upheld internationally. In Australia, the rights of asylum seekers are not being upheld, making it a dangerous example for the UK to follow.

International law

The rights of individuals seeking asylum in foreign countries are outlined in international treaties and countries party to such treaties have legal obligations to ensure these rights are upheld. A refugee is an individual who is outside of their country of origin and has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” based on their nationality, political opinion, religion, or membership of a particular social group or race, whereas an asylum seeker is an individual waiting for the determination of the result of their application for legal refugee status. When fleeing ones own country due to a well-founded fear of persecution, one may legally enter foreign countries without documentation without fear of penalties being imposed by states.

Whilst awaiting processing, many asylum seekers are held in detention centres which are often overcrowded and insanitary. Such conditions are evident in the offshore detention centres utilised in Australia.

Australia’s approach: out of sight, out of mind

Australia has one of the toughest approaches to border control in the developed world, reinforcing its borders with military personnel. Despite being a country which has signed the Refugee Convention, it introduced Operation Sovereign Borders in 2013. Under this military-led operation, Australian naval ships were ordered to turn back asylum seekers approaching Australian shores by boat.

During the Tampa Affair of August 2001, law-makers passed emergency legislation enabling them to send all asylum seekers who reached Australian shores to either Nauru or the Manus Islands – sovereign island states near Australia – to wait in detention centres for their asylum claims to be heard. This practice, referred to as ‘offshoring’, creates ambiguity over who is responsible for the asylum seekers and makes it increasingly difficult for individuals to claim asylum from abroad.

This practice stopped in Australia between 2008-11 when a Labor government came into power. Yet the ‘immigration crisis’ in 2011 resulted in the then Labor Prime Minister entering into an agreement with Malaysia whereby Australia could disburden itself of some asylum seekers and transfer them to Malaysia. This deal fell through, however, so there was a return to offshoring in Australia, which has continued ever since.

In 2015 the Australian government spent the equivalent of £240m on its Nauru operation (£200,000 per person detained there). It could cost one-twelfth of this amount to allow these individuals to live on mainland Australia whilst awaiting the result of their refugee application, and potentially less still if such individuals had the right to work.

Questions are therefore raised around Australia’s logic of keeping out asylum seekers whilst allowing other types of immigrants in. It seems the only reason reflecting reality – including their villainising of asylum seekers through negative rhetoric used in the media – is a desire to maintain power over the type of people let in. This is most likely to ensure only those who can benefit them, such as tourists and skilled workers, may enter. By making the conditions immigrants stay in as harsh as possible, it seems they hope to deter such individuals from wanting to come at all.

Amnesty International found that one-third of asylum seekers and refugees on Nauru were housed in tents, not allowed smartphones in the centres, and were subjected to curfews and monitoring by guards, often not being provided with basic adequate healthcare. Many children in such centres have suffered significant psychological consequences from being there, as well as a number of abuse allegations against women and children by officials within such centres and neglect more generally by island workers hired by the Australian government. Human rights groups argue that Australia’s detention of asylum seekers in offshore centres has involved human rights abuses, with Amnesty International finding the conditions and detention of individuals in such centres has violated and continues to violate the right not to be subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as the right to not be arbitrarily detained.

Could the UK follow suit?

Australia’s tactics to deter asylum seekers from entering their territory, as well as the treatment of those who do, is arguably incompatible with international human rights laws.

Whilst the current Conservative British government seems to see benefits in following Australia’s example on migration, these must be weighed against the heavy human rights implications this could have upon genuine asylum seekers entering UK territory, as well as upon the value of human rights more generally.

Katy Adams is an MA Human Rights student at University College London.

This is the first of two blogs exploring the British government’s desire to mirror Australia’s immigration policies; the second outlines the current climate of asylum policy in the UK and the implications of following the Australian example.

Britain can transform the plight of climate refugees through its COP26 presidency

With traditional refugee law falling short, Britain should champion the protection of climate refugees as part of global climate change agreements.

An estimated 70,000-80,000 Jewish refugees were accepted into Britain before and during World War Two . At the time, the idea of turning our backs on those fleeing atrocities in continental Europe was reprehensible. The depth of this feeling was so widespread that the United Nations gathered numerous states from across the globe to agree to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a monumental effort to ensure that individuals could flee oppression and find refuge across an international border.

The Convention placed legally binding obligations on states to process the claims of asylum seekers, outlined the rights afforded to refugees, and, most importantly, created the recognised status of a refugee. Britain was among those quick to agree to the Convention.

Almost 70 years since the Convention was signed, the situation is very different. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) around 1% of the world’s population are displaced, yet European sentiment towards refugees has seen a significant shift from compassion to assist those forced to migrate towards greater reluctance. This sentiment appears to be dictating the global response to climate refugees and could have devastating impacts as climate change worsens.

Climate Refugees

Although without official definition, a climate refugee can broadly be categorised as an individual who has fled their home nation due to the effects of climate change – such as extreme weather, drought, or rising sea levels – threatening their lives or livelihoods.

Despite decades of warnings from some scholars, the danger to climate refugees remains comparatively overlooked. They are not recognised under the law and they are not entitled to any rights in foreign states. The Refugee Convention was written following World War Two and, since its adoption, has not evolved beyond its focus on wartime. This has led the UNHCR to the stark conclusion that the Convention cannot protect climate refugees.

There have been numerous calls to address these inadequacies, though there remains a lack of appetite to expand the Convention’s current scope of protection. This is less about climate refugees being viewed as undeserving and more to do with a general atmosphere of anti-refugee sentiment. The UNHCR has stated that opening the Convention to encompass climate refugees in the current political climate could actually lead to restricted protection for all refugees. It is worrying that the UNHCR find themselves in this position, given their role as champion for all refugees. Protection must now be found elsewhere, and Britain should lead the drive to provide this.

COP26 is Britain’s opportunity

A major barrier to finding a solution for the future flow of climate refugees is the absence of international willingness. Since the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference (COP21), many governments have exhibited greater hostility towards immigration and refugees, including in key nations such as Australia and the US. Equally, the UK’s 2016 Brexit campaign focused heavily on limiting future immigration. It is possible that, following this mandate, the British government may avoid seeking a global protection mechanism for climate refugees, both to appease their citizens and to retain favour with countries which they are now seeking trade deals with.

Nevertheless, as hosts of the delayed COP26, the UK should recognise that it has one of the key remaining opportunities to address the lack of protection for climate refugees by incorporating it into climate change agreements. Alok Sharma, who recently left his ministerial position to focus on his role as COP26 President, demonstrated in his address to UN nations that he is cognisant of climate change migration. It is now imperative that this be followed up with concrete action.

This action should take the form of an agreement between states whereby climate refugees can be identified, relocated equitably, and conferred with rights enabling them to begin a new life. This provides a response which would ensure climate refugees are protected whilst equally avoiding a burden on any one state.

This could be achieved and is not without precedent. During COP21 there were numerous proposals surrounding a coordination facility for those displaced by climate change; a plan which would have facilitated relocation for climate refugees. This gained traction, although talks were eventually discontinued following Australia’s opposition and the belief that a more efficient alternative could be found. A lack of progress since COP21 suggests that this may not be the case and with the effects of climate change showing no signs of slowing it is now time to resurrect this idea.

The UK government must recognise that, through their own hosting of a COP summit, they have a wonderful opportunity to provide lasting protection for climate refugees.

Tomos Owen works to facilitate refugee integration in Wales, having graduated with a Masters in Human Rights Law from Cardiff University.

The UK has a renewed role in the future of Afghanistan

The UK has provided military, diplomatic, and development support to Afghanistan for for nearly two decades. Now it must continue to work closely with the US in pressuring Pakistan to keep the Taliban at the intra-Afghan talks.

Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab recently voiced support for the intra-Afghan peace talks, which began on 12 September in Doha, Qatar. He advocated for all parties to strive for an “inclusive and sustainable peace”. This is no easy task, as 20 years of similar talks, beginning after the Taliban regime was toppled by US-led coalition forces in 2001, have shown.

In his speech, Raab reiterated the UK’s extensive military and diplomatic role in Afghanistan since 2001. The UK became the second largest contributor of troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), deploying approximately 140,000 British troops to Afghanistan between 2001-14 under Operation Herrick. UK involvement in Afghanistan accelerated in 2006 with the construction of Camp Bastion, which alone would house 30,000 troops.

As the war became increasingly unpopular among the alliance, NATO members agreed on an exit strategy to withdraw foreign troops from Afghanistan and to assist in the transfer of responsibility for security to Afghan forces. In 2014, Cameron withdrew most UK troops from Operation Herrick, leaving behind an estimated 1000 soldiers in the country to mentor and assist local forces under Operation Toral. The Ministry of Defence predicts that the costs of UK involvement in Afghanistan may exceed £40bn. The UK has lost 456 soldiers, with more than 2000 wounded.

Despite a declining military presence in Afghanistan, the UK continues to push for peace and stability. Over the last three years, the UK has delivered £750m to Afghanistan in development and humanitarian aid. Recently, the Government announced a package to help combat the threat of COVID-19 and famine to “protect the poorest”. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has said the UK’s motivation for a stable Afghanistan is “to prevent Afghanistan once again becoming a place from which al-Qaeda and other extremists can attack the UK and our interests”.

More broadly, international concerns for the future of Afghanistan are driven by various interests. Firstly, stability creates economic opportunities for regional actors. China’s main motivation in the Doha talks are the vast resources in Central Asia, to which Afghanistan can provide better access. Secondly, the proximity of NATO forces to Russia’s sphere of influence increases tensions and means the future of the country is a high priority for both. Thirdly, combatting the spread of terrorism is high on the agenda for many, particularly given that multiple terrorist cells are emerging across India and Central Asia. With this in mind, fruitful negotiations seem, now more than ever, of highest priority and relevance for all parties involved.

Negotiating a stable Afghanistan requires the British government to cooperate closely with Pakistan. In a post-9/11 context, the UK’s diplomatic mission in Pakistan has evolved to become one of the largest in the world to reflect Pakistan’s critical role in the global war on terror. But British interests in Pakistan, which previously acted as a safe haven for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, go beyond threats to national security. Post-Brexit, the UK is incentivised to pursue as many allies as possible beyond Europe and the Anglosphere. Promoting strong relations with Commonwealth states, such as Pakistan and India, paves the way for a stronger UK presence in South Asia, whilst granting the nation access to a broader scope of trading partners.

British High Commissioner to Pakistan, Christian Turner, recently described Pakistan as ‘key in […] Intra-Afghan Negotiations’, however Pakistan’s intentions at the talks are unclear. Whilst officials emphasise Pakistan’s role only as a facilitator in the process, some experts suggest that Islamabad’s attempts to push the Taliban to the table are a move to reduce India’s influence in Afghanistan and the wider region. Protesters have demanded that the British government increase efforts to pressure Pakistan to halt its interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, but the UK is less convinced that they can have a direct influence on Pakistan.

Only diplomatic pressure can keep the Taliban at the table. This begins with eliminating the Taliban’s spoiling strategies which continue to disrupt the peace talks. Whilst the UK may have limited influence on Pakistan’s role, if the UK is to reduce the risks emanating from an unstable Afghanistan and protect regional interests, then the British government must work closer with the US to reassure Pakistan. Cooperation is required between all actors at the table in order to reach an agreement that will satisfy the interests of all parties and most importantly, secure the peace and stability of Afghanistan and its citizens.

Eleanor Wong is studying for a Masters in Peace Research and International Relations at the University of Tübingen.

The dangerous consequences of COVID-19 for gender equality in global education

The full consequences of COVID-19 are unknown, but there are several critical factors which will accentuate its impact on girls’ education.

The consequences of COVID-19 are countless. Many of them we do not know about yet, and will only become apparent in the coming years. Nevertheless, it is clear that the pandemic has already had a dramatic impact on schooling and that students will experience it differently based on their gender. There are several critical factors which will accentuate the impact of COVID-19 on girls’ education around the world, and recovery initiatives will need to consider these gendered experiences if they are to succeed.

In the current health crisis, education is being undertaken through laptops, tablets, and smartphones outside of the classroom. However, few are discussing how these changes will exacerbate the gender digital divide. This divide, which long proceeded the spread of coronavirus, is where women and girls have less access to technology and the internet than men and boys. For instance, a recent study by the International Telecommunications Union found that the share of women worldwide using the internet is 12% lower than the share of men using the internet, and this rises to 25% in Africa. The same problem is seen with mobile phone ownership. In South Asia, for instance, women are 23% less likely than men to have their own mobile, according to the Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA).

With this in mind, what happens when you impose remote studying to students across the world? It is a real possibility that many girls may never recover the time and education that they would have gained if they were able to physically go to school. Indeed, our relationship with technology will never be the same as it was before the pandemic. The way we work, shop, exercise, travel, and entertain ourselves has been revolutionised, and the majority of these changes will remain in place long after we have overcome the challenge of COVID-19. Alongside the advantages of this transformation, the hard truth is that our economies and societies will leave behind those without access to digital technologies and the skills to use them, and many of these will be women and girls.

Beyond the digital skills gap, women and girls face an additional barrier impeding their access to education. Prior to the present pandemic, research from UN Women found that women across the globe were already doing three times as much unpaid care and domestic work as men. In forcing people into their homes, coronavirus has increased this gender skew, with women taking on the bulk of the housework and care responsibilities (often combining this with their newly-remote job). Data collected by IpsosMORI in May suggests that women around the world are more likely than men to find that their care responsibilities have increased during the pandemic.

UNICEF has shown that this inequality starts from an early age, with girls between the ages of five and 14 spending 40% more time on unpaid household chores than boys of the same age. Combined, that represents 160m hours per day of time which could be spent elsewhere, including studying. What does this mean for girls who were previously going to school, and are now required to pursue their education from home? It likely translates into them having less time to focus on their schooling than previously, because their support is required on domestic tasks and care duties instead.

Furthermore, these girls might be prevented from going back to school once the pandemic is over, particularly if they need to take on new domestic tasks and care responsibilities as a result of illness or death in the family caused by COVID-19. The Malala Fund estimates that an additional 20m secondary school aged girls could be permanently out of school once this pandemic has passed. Again, this would effectively result in a generation of girls being prevented from reaching their full potential in school, with the plethora of consequences this has on the social and economic opportunities available to them later in life.

Our recovery from COVID-19 will take decades, but it is important that we think about these issues now and take the necessary steps to ensure that women and girls around the world are not disproportionately affected by the pandemic’s impact on school closures. So much effort has gone into getting girls into school to begin with that we simply cannot afford such a monumental setback.

Maëlys Bablon is a research analyst working on gender equality.

The UK must work with its allies to stop Russian escalation in Libya

Russia’s deployment of combat aircraft to support warlord Khalifa Haftar in the ongoing Libyan Civil War indicates a desire to retain a permanent footing in Libya. This has serious implications for the UK, NATO, and the EU.

The civil war in Libya

Following the fall of leader Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, efforts to deliver real and lasting political stability in Libya have failed. The weak government institutions, formed after Qaddafi was removed, could not prevent armed violence and non-state groups proliferating.

Amidst the chaos, Khalifa Hafter seized Libya’s oil infrastructure. He would then lay siege to the UN recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in the country’s capital, Tripoli. Recently, he has been pushed back from the city and is poised to withdraw from western Libya.

The conflict between General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army and the GNA has become increasingly internationalised. The international backers of both Haftar and the GNA have committed significant support. Hafter enjoys the support of Russia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and others. The GNA has strong backing from Turkey. As Haftar suffers heavy losses and retreats from western Libya, Russia has escalated its involvement, by quietly deploying 14 combat aircraft to Libya.

The rise of Russia

An increased Russian role in Libya has a number of risks for the EU and NATO, either through a permanent military presence, strong political influence, or both.

Firstly, Russia could weaponise the major migration routes that move through Libya. Libya is a major transit hub for migrants seeking to reach the EU, because of its porous southern borders and proximity to regions experiencing severe economic and political issues. This was previously weaponised by Qaddafi, who exploited Europe’s nativist fears to secure billions in investments. Following the fall of Qaddafi, migration through Libya to Europe rose dramatically. To combat this, Italy signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA, which involves the GNA intercepting migrant vessels and forcing their return to Libya, where migrants are detained indefinitely in grave conditions.

Russia has been accused of weaponising migration previously in Syria. This, according to one US and NATO Commander, drove hundreds of thousands of Syrians to Europe “to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve”. It could do the same again in Libya. Manipulating migration patterns into southern Europe could be used to sow dissent and discord within the EU and NATO.

Secondly, Russia could deploy assets to eastern Libya to threaten NATO’s southern flank and frustrate access to the mediterranean. Given the UK’s military bases in Cyprus and naval facilities in the Middle East, this could seriously threaten access to Suez and the eastern Mediteranean. This is particularly worrying, given how Russia possesses weapons systems that can be rapidly deployed with little infrastructure support. Russia has already deployed the SU-24 – a strike aircraft with significant anti-ship capability and an effective range over 1000KM – to Libya. More lethal aircraft could be deployed if necessary.

Two systems merit consideration: the S-400 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system and the P-800 Anti Ship Missile (ASM) system. The S-400 can target aircraft out to 250-400km, and the P-800 can target ships up to 300km offshore. Both the S-400 and P-800 are wheeled, all-terrain mobile systems that require limited manpower to operate. When they are deployed in appropriate numbers and with readily available support systems – aircraft, drones, satellites and other missile systems – they are highly effective.

The UK response

Russian strategy has been deeply opportunistic (capitalising on western ambivalence) in seizing territory in Georgia and Ukraine, and intervening in Syria. Its escalating involvement in Libya fits comfortably within this pattern; the conflict in Libya is highly internationalised, with a number of nations wielding decisive influence.

The UK and its allies must advocate for peaceful negotiations to achieve a cohesive government that is not expressly beholden to the interests of foreign powers. To do this, the UK and its close allies can influence Khalifa Haftar’s main backers – Turkey, Russia, UAE, Egypt – individually, to effect broad change. If they want to avoid increased Russian leverage over them, the UK, EU, and NATO must prevent the exploitation of Libya by Russia.

Jack Sargent is co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme.

The UK should pay closer attention to the impacts of climate change in MENA

The local is global. Climate change is likely to exacerbate conflicts and areas of instability. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), an already volatile region, stands to be particularly affected. UK foreign policy needs to improve its awareness of the impact climate change may have on the region and the wider security repercussions.

Climate change has already resulted in a 1°C rise in temperatures compared to the previous century. The UK’s Global Strategic Trends assessment views it as one of the most certain and influential global trends affecting all geographic and policy areas.

The MENA region is no exception. Research has shown that the region will suffer from an even higher number of hot days than it currently is, with warnings of droughts and overall water deficit. There is a risk of these impacts increasing, should the overall warming of the world go beyond 1.5-2°C.

Climate change may be indirectly linked to an increase in conflict, due to it exacerbating pre-existing issues such as resource scarcity, economic issues, and weak governance. Institutions and proper governance are important factors in being able to deal effectively with climate change. Where there is already fragmented governance, states could be further weakened by the consequences of climate change.

There is limited understanding regarding the impact climate change will have on global security, however. This includes a lack of knowledge as to how already vulnerable areas may be affected by climate change itself and how climate change-related instability could aggravate existing tensions or create new instability.

The MENA region is currently experiencing widespread insecurity due to ongoing and systemic violence and unrest. This is exacerbated by self-serving interventionist external powers, such as the Russian intervention in the Syrian conflict, or the Russian and Turkish intervention in Libya’s civil war. Climate change may exacerbate the instability prevalent in the region. Of particular importance is the impact climate change could have on water scarcity, food insecurity, disease, and conflict in the region.

Water scarcity is a pressing issue in the MENA region. Tensions have risen between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over the Tigris‐Euphrates basin. This is caused by an unequal water flow from the rivers to the three countries, grievances around water management, and the use of water as a way to exert pressure on downstream countries. In North Africa, Ethiopian plans to build a dam on the Nile would have serious consequences for Egyptian agriculture which depends on the river. While discussions over the dam are ongoing, Egypt has previously threatened war with Ethiopia over its construction, and tensions remain high. Additionally, water scarcity would likely lead to increased food insecurity, with consequences being famines or malnutrition, as 70% of the region’s agriculture depends on rainfall, which is projected to decline by 60% should temperatures increase by 4°C.

Climate change could also act as a threat multiplier to countries with weak governance. In Iraq, there are reports the Islamic State (IS) used periods of drought to entice people to join its ranks. In Syria, Libya, and Yemen, populations are already in precarious situations and governments would be either unable or unwilling to alleviate climate change driven issues. This may provide opportunities for non-state groups to take control and spread further instability, as was witnessed with the rise of the IS, facilitated by weak governance in Iraq and Syria.

Climate change fuelled instability and insecurity in MENA will have a direct impact on neighbouring countries and regions, including Europe. This may lead European countries being faced with increased migration. External powers may need to provide humanitarian assistance to populations in response to situations that may be brought, or exacerbated, by climate change, or even requested to intervene in regional conflicts.

Climate change will also impact the rest of the world. Europe, including Britain, will be dealing with its own climate change issues. This raises the question of whether the UK can cope with climate change fuelled difficulties both at home and in other regions.

To address this, the UK must begin early planning and preparation for the impacts of climate change in the MENA region and seek to help reduce climate change driven instability. Preventative measures include helping improve governance, facilitating discussions over water sharing, and aiding the development of policies and strategies focused on coping with the effects of climate change.

Ultimately, the UK’s climate change preparations should also seek to offset the wider impact on global security that could be provoked by climate change-related instability, as both will come hand in hand.

Sarah Grand-Clement is a defence and security policy researcher, and holds an MSc in Arab World Studies from Durham University.