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The UK can use COP26 to prove its climate credentials

The next COP summit on climate change will be hosted in Glasgow. In the face of the climate crisis and the past few years of political uncertainty, the UK should use the meeting to successfully deliver on their large climate change promises.

Following the Conservative Party’s win in the December general election, the new government is expected by various public sectors and stakeholders to deliver in multiple fields of policy, from dealing with problems facing the NHS, to relationships with the United States, to combatting homelessness, to the rise in rental prices in the UK.

Among these is the most important of all: climate change. Following it’s postponement, the UK is due to host the 26th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP26) in 2021, the first such international forum to be hosted in Britain. With climate change becoming increasingly important across the world, the demand and pressure to deliver a substantial agreement is greater than ever.

The UK has long heralded itself as a ‘world leader’ in the fight against climate change, the reality of which is a matter for debate. Despite landmark victories in declaring a ‘climate emergency’, palpable progress on environmental policy in the UK is slow, with the only significant recent victory being the U-turn on policy approaches to new onshore wind farms.

Many parts of the Government and other MPs are currently discussing new approaches through Parliamentary groups and Whitehall Departments. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) recently focused on achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. Then Chair of the BEIS Committee Rachel Reeves stated in March: “Putting the 2050 net zero target into law was a big sign of the UK’s climate change ambitions. However, the target is only the first step, it’s crucial the Government now comes forward with a roadmap to achieve it”.

The UK has remained a reliable signatory to agreements and participant in further negotiations that arise from COP summits. The country has an additional opportunity to develop a vital, though potentially only cosmetic, association with climate policy. Throughout COP, there are multiple instances where essential agreements become enshrined in the body of climate dialogues. We all recall the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement and, with the summit in Glasgow, the UK can stamp its name into the environmental history books.

The road ahead is still rife with bumps and potholes. The Government has already had to change the President of the proceedings, from the former Minister for Energy and Clean Growth, Claire Perry O’Neill, to the current Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Alok Sharma. In addition, the EU may be seeking to exert its influence both ahead of and during COP26 in Glasgow, with the bloc already having separate discussions on increasing European emissions’ targets for 2030. Additionally, as a result of the coronavirus crisis, the summit has now been postponed, throwing yet another wrench into the works in the lead up to COP26.

With an additional year ahead of the conference, it would be foolish to rule out further trials and tribulations. Undoubtedly, 2020 marks an important year for both British and international climate policy, and we must keep a critical eye on what unfolds in the lead up to and during the proceedings at COP26 next year.

Micheil Page is Head of Agora’s Energy & Climate Programme.

Coronavirus will prolong the Brexit transition period. It’s better to request an extension now

Reaching agreement on the future EU-UK relationship within a year was always ambitious. Now, with Ministers and civil servants focused on fighting coronavirus, it is impossible. An extension to the transition period is needed to protect citizens and the economy.

In December last year, British voters gave Boris Johnson a strong parliamentary majority, having been promised that his Conservative Party would “get Brexit done” by the end of 2019. Once formed, the new Government almost immediately committed to another self-imposed Brexit deadline, this time telling voters that the transition period would not be extended beyond 2020.

A transition period was written into the Withdrawal Agreement to fulfil a need – recognised by both the European institutions and the May administration in the UK – to provide citizens and businesses with a level of certainty and continuity during the time between Britain leaving the EU and a deal being ratified to govern the future relationship between the two polities.

As many politicians and commentators have noted, attempting to strike a trade agreement that will, unavoidably, be both complex and unprecedented is ambitious to say the least. Let us use the Government’s favourite comparison, CETA, to illustrate this point. The EU-Canadian FTA was signed in 2016 and entered into force the year after (although some provisions are still not in action). Those negotiations were launched in 2009, after half a decade of cooperative scoping exercises.

At times, when there is less media attention, members of the Cabinet admit that twelve months is a tight timescale for negotiating and ratifying an FTA with the EU. Minister Michael Gove, who is coordinating future relationship negotiations across Whitehall, conceded during a select committee hearing in early March that negotiations may spill over into 2021 and beyond in areas such as internal security. This suggests the Government may privately have a strategy to strike a limited trade deal first and move on to negotiate other, more contentious sectoral agreements at a later date.

A year is not a long time to strike a trade agreement, even one of limited scope (we can ignore for now the fact that the relationship which both the UK and EU committed to in the Political Declaration goes far deeper than any FTA that has ever existed). This would be true even if three months had not already passed and negotiations were taking place. But, due to the coronavirus pandemic, talks have been frozen. The UK has pushed back the publication of its draft legal text for its preferred future relationship with the bloc and a Commission briefing to the EU27 reportedly said that negotiations via video conference had proved impossible.

Increasingly, there are calls to extend the transition period. Speaking in January, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned British negotiators that “you cannot expect to agree every single aspect of our new partnership” within a year. Earlier this month, representatives from the European Parliament’s main political groups in the influential Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) Committee proposed a cross-Committee statement urging the UK to request an extension and avoid that recurring threat of the ‘no deal’ cliff edge.

Two main arguments have been employed by those opposed to such an extension. The first is sovereignty. It is true that the transition period leaves the UK in an undesirable position as a ‘rule taker’ without formal political representation, but equally undesirable would be rushing through a trade agreement without proper scrutiny (an inevitability at a time where parliamentary activity is largely suspended and political energy is necessarily focused on fighting coronavirus).

The second argument centres around money. Extending the transition period would likely require the Treasury to contribute to the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework, either directly or indirectly, however any such payment would be nugatory compared with the COVID-19 package already announced by Chancellor Rishi Sunak. More importantly, the double blow of a pandemic and a ‘no deal’ Brexit would be paralysing to the national finances and should be avoided at all costs.

Attempting to conclude a future relationship agreement with the EU by the end of the year would not only be unacceptably undemocratic, it would result in a worse deal. Failure to extend or reach a deal would cost the economy dear, in terms of tax receipts and job losses. These are things any rational person would want to avoid.

If an extension to the transition period is required, then better to request it sooner rather than later. Earlier notice gives certainty to citizens and to businesses. The public has already proved itself to be understanding of extraordinary measures and political decisions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not an ideological question of remain or leave, left or right; it is a question of democratic principles and sound economic management. The Government must request a transition extension now.

John McStravick is Vice-Chair of Agora. @JS_McStravick

The UK cannot forget about Iran in Afghanistan

The recent escalation of conflict between the US and Iran has turned international attention towards Iraq, however, with the potential for Iran to strike Western forces in Afghanistan, it is more important than ever to ensure meaningful peace and stability in the country.

As tensions with Iran spiral following the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, the UK needs to recognise the vulnerability of the Resolute Support coalition – a NATO-led train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan – to Iranian attack. Iran has demonstrated expertise in conducting strikes that have made attributing blame difficult and allowed them to extend their influence relatively unhindered (an ability that can be readily applied to Afghanistan). Recent Iranian attacks should alarm Resolute Support, whose theatre of operations is deeply vulnerable to Iran.

Since 1983, Iran has orchestrated devastating attacks against Western forces in the Middle East, while avoiding military retaliation. The success of this strategy was demonstrated in its first attack, where massive bombings were carried out against US and French forces deployed in Lebanon. Following the loss of nearly 300 personnel, both nations withdrew. Since these attacks, Iran has developed a sophisticated asymmetric warfare capability.

Since the deployment of western forces to Afghanistan in late 2001, Iran has maintained an active presence in the country. The leaked Afghan war logs indicate Iran – among other things – incentivised the assassination of Afghan government officials and soldiers, supplied parts for Taliban Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) against UK forces in Sangin Province, Helmand and facilitated the movement and training of foreign fighters into Afghanistan. These operations provide the requisite experience to launch direct and destructive operations against coalition forces.

Domestic changes may make Tehran more willing to make risky moves internationally, and the most recent Iranian actions, such as targeting key global infrastructure, point to this. Internally, Iran is under intense pressure, as the country struggles with international sanctions and costly endeavours in Syria. Iran’s strategy is to force a change in US policy and weaken economic sanctions.

Soleimani’s killing and the accidental shooting down of a commercial airline flight have created a strong impetus for Iran to shift focus away from their loss and embarrassment. This increasing appetite for retaliation comes at a time when the Resolute Support coalition has shifted away from the large International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) missions into a more limited training and advising mission. Accompanying this shift are highly restrictive rules of engagement that limit access of advisers to Afghan forces and key stakeholders. For many local and international actors in Afghanistan, this has signalled the decreasing interest of Western policymakers in Afghanistan and created an opportunity for Iran to increase its own foothold.

While there is significant combat capability within the current NATO forces, it is greatly reduced. UK and US forces deployed with NATO number roughly 1,000 and 12,500 respectively.

The opportunity for Iran, then, is clearly exploitable through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which was set up after the Iranian Revolution and has a long history of training and equipping local groups across the Middle East. Iran would almost certainly attempt to retain some degree of plausible deniability, such as staging well planned and coordinated bombings that target US or UK forces, with a seperate organisation claiming responsibility. Iran already operates militias in Afghanistan, which could provide a front for attacks against Western forces.

As with the 1983 attack, a single large strike against a coalition target could precipitate a hastier withdrawal from a US administration with little appetite for ‘endless wars’. Every other Resolute Support partner lacks real ability to maintain Afghan operations in the event of a US withdrawal.

To mitigate against this, the UK needs to push for change in Resolute Support. The UK must strongly advocate for reduced violence between the Taliban and the Afghan government, even if it will prove difficult for both sides. This is important because Iranian asymmetrical activity thrives in instability. Without a viable peace deal, Western forces will likely remain in Afghanistan to some extent, while remaining vulnerable to Iranian attacks.

Great effort must be made by the UK to ensure continued negotiations take place, given the possibility of ceasefire violations and compliance issues. Should they fail, the UK must press for their renewal. British policy should recognise the support for intra-Afghan talks that exists in Afghanistan. While the Taliban have repeatedly refused to negotiate with the Afghan government, such sentiment is waning as they have negotiated with former government officials such as Hamid Karzai. Furthermore, the Afghan Government invited the Taliban to peace talks (though they did not attend). Such moves and strong public sentiment for peace bode well for building lasting stability. Such peace is necessary for the UK and its allies to extricate themselves from Afghanistan and from the threat Iran poses.

Jack Sargent is co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme.

Technology and policy – can democracy keep up with technological advancements?

Blockchain. Cryptocurrencies. Artificial intelligence. Algorithms. People are abuzz with technological advancements that are impacting our relationship with people, politics, and consumer culture. But can democratic policymaking keep up with the never-ending waves of new developments

Technology and policy

The 21st Century has been rife with issues and scandals arising from technological advancements. From the labour conditions issue with Foxconn in 2010, to the more recent Cambridge Analytica scandal involving the exploitation of users’ data for political purposes in 2018, technology has multiple implications and cautionary tales that could hinder progress. Yet, despite these disruptions and challenges, technology continues to evolve. With the speed at which advancements continue – which demonstrate even more implications for people and society – can policy keep up?

At first glance, it appears that democratic policy-making is struggling. The rate at which new technologies are being rolled out, tested and deployed is exponentially faster than the rate at which governments and policymakers are able to understand and implement measures with which to reduce the consequences that arise. For instance, we can look at the implications of algorithms which are currently being used in various public services and policing, and the various, though inadvertent, biases that may and have already arisen.

Furthermore, there are multiple disruptive, yet necessary, technologies which do not have the proper foundation and support in policy for them to be invested in and deployed where currently needed in vital public services, identifying another pace at which policy and democracy is failing to keep up.

AI and policymaking

A key emerging technology that has significant potential, as well as risks, is the deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) in the UK compared to the rest of Europe. AI has become an exciting buzzword for policymakers and politicians, who herald it as the most important innovation for the next-generation economy. However, AI is also a competitive race in which multiple countries are engaged, many pushing to be a world-leader in the integration of technology into industry. This includes the UK, which released their AI Sector Deal in 2019, aiming to scale up investment and industrial opportunities to achieve goals such as green growth and mobility.

According to consultancy McKinsey & Company, the integration of AI into industrial and commercial sectors could deliver an economic boost of 22% by 2030 if it overcomes the challenges of making it commercially successful. In contrast, the EU is at a more complicated stage, given that member states have different levels of readiness for its integration. However, there still remains an underlying issue surrounding policy – particularly around the issues of regulation and ethics.

MPs on both sides of the chamber have raised concerns over the use of advanced AI and algorithms in facial recognition technology, citing not only that it is a dangerous miscarriage of individual privacy, but also that it can be influenced by various biases. However, the current disputes are granted the loophole of legality given the absence of pre-existing policy and laws surrounding the use of such technology. The EU has already begun to consider stricter regulations given these immediate issues, even going so far as proposing a potential 5-year ban on the use of such technologies.

In 2018, the EU published multiple frameworks for AI, from guidelines on ethics in AI to the High Level Working Group on Artificial Intelligence. The UK, by contrast, has identified the flaws and key policy areas on AI by the House of Lords with particular focus on industrial strategy. Nevertheless, there remain gaps between these two publications that must be filled both independently and as a result of Brexit, which widens the discrepancy between technological advancements and policy and regulation.

Making policy work

We are well within an era defined by technological advancements, where innovation is key in industrial, social, political, economic, and environmental sectors. Policy needs to be established and must keep pace with the progress that is happening at such a rapid pace.

Democracy has already come under threat from technology, with further scandals such as interference in the US elections, skewed algorithms for political content, and even enabling the spread of fake news. As such, governments should be able to adapt and evolve with such scientific advancements, as well as secure accountability for citizens in a growing technological era. Otherwise there may be dangerous implications for democracy as we know it.

Micheil Page is Head of Agora’s Energy & Climate Programme.

Reforming democracy: the revolution of citizens’ assemblies

Citizens’ assemblies seem like the epitome of good democracy, allowing ordinary citizens to have their say on major policy issues. The recent climate change citizens’ assemblies in France and Britain provided valuable insights for the future potential of deliberative democracy.

What are citizens’ assemblies?

Citizens’ assemblies aim to strengthen the deliberative nature of the decision-making process in policy-making. Deliberative democracy is strengthened when citizens have the opportunity to debate issues before decisions are made on them. In the UK, there have been three notable examples of citizens’ assemblies: Democracy Matters in Autumn 2015, Brexit in 2017, and climate change in January 2020. Citizens’ assemblies have taken place in many countries, including France, Belgium, United States, Australia, and Poland.

In these examples, the assemblies brought together citizens and policy-makers in a sphere where citizens can directly voice their views. Through this process, the public is able to debate key issues with politicians and regional leaders, which brings the issues closer to local communities by giving them the opportunity to share their knowledge and experiences. In theory, this leads to more effective outcomes, with more informed citizens and more legitimised decisions.

In this way, citizens’ assemblies try to address a democratic deficit by adopting a more democratic model. Ordinarily, this opportunity for people to have their voices heard on pertinent issues is limited. In an ideal democracy, this should exist by default. But, in democracies where the integrity of parliaments is questioned and representation is limited on high levels, there is a need for a platform that can fill these gaps. Citizens’ assemblies aim to achieve this by developing the principles of random selection and deliberation through inviting a group of representative people to share their views.

People-shaped solutions to global issues

The use of citizens’ assemblies in both France and the UK in January 2020 provide an opportunity to learn about the role of these fora in solving global issues.

A downfall of the Brexit citizens’ assembly in 2017 was that it was poorly publicised; in fact, many politicians called for such an initiative on Brexit afterwards, unaware that one had been held already. It was strongly implied that any outcome of this citizens’ assembly would be dismissed unless it offered a recommendation that politicians wanted to hear. This gives the impression of hypocrisy: are citizens’ assemblies only effective when they offer what politicians want?

But the latest climate change assemblies provide hope. In 2020, 110 randomly selected citizens became members of the UK Climate Change Citizens’ Assembly, and in France 150 citizens were randomly selected by sortition.

This citizens’ assembly was called for in response to one of the three core demands of the climate activist group, Extinction Rebellion. Although climate change is an international problem, Extinction Rebellion saw value in engaging citizens on a local level to have their views heard by local leaders. This allowed the issue to transcend traditional partisan party lines that can lead to divisive policies, and alleviated the risk that people’s experiences could be forgotten in central policy-making.

In the UK, members tried to inform Parliament on how policies can be redefined to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The members learned about climate change from experts before forming their decisions. In France, members also discussed measures to fight against climate change, and both assemblies raised challenging questions to leaders, spanning from how homes should be heated to how businesses and governments should tackle climate change together. One goal of these assemblies was to put pressure on politicians to act faster; this is especially important since climate change is a pressing issue that cannot wait for a typical five-year term length.

The future of citizens’ assemblies

The presence of climate assemblies across borders, whilst debating the same issue, suggests there is an important role that citizens’ assemblies can adopt. This comes at a time when the University of Cambridge’s Centre for the Future of Democracy found that 57.5% of people surveyed were dissatisfied with democracy in 2019 (compared to 47.5% in the mid-1990s).

If democratic institutions are not meeting the needs or expectations of people, then one way to address this could be by establishing more legitimacy and bringing democracy closer to people with citizens’ assemblies. The examples from the UK and France helped to bring together ordinary people to debate global issues. The long-term outcomes of these climate assemblies is yet to be seen, but for the future, it could lead to a more interactive democracy, where citizens’ assemblies are seen as a normal feature of government decision-making.

Preeti Pasricha is co-Head of Agora’s Democracy & Governance Programme

The EU cannot face external challenges without solving its internal ones

The new European Commission is ambitious about improving the EU’s capacity to act on the international stage and ability to respond to the challenges of the next decade. But policymakers should understand that solving internal challenges and divisions is just as crucial as facing external crises.

Due to its focus on economic integration, the EU has often struggled to respond to geopolitical crises it has had to face during the last decade. The new leadership of the European Commission, as well as several EU leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron, is planning to change this in the near future, arguing that Europe needs to develop the means of becoming a geopolitical actor.

At this year’s World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, the Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, argued that Brussels should complement its diplomatic efforts in Libya with hard power measures. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, said Europe should develop an “appetite for power” in its security and defence policy. Macron has been pushing for greater military capabilities for the EU, arguing that it would bring “credibility in terms of foreign policy”.

Such comments raise the expectations that Europe could finally overcome its classical dilemma of not living up to its foreign policy ambitions. But, as it thinks about how to respond to the challenges of the next decade, the new EU leadership must also consider internal obstacles and relations between the EU institutions and EU27 member states that prevent progress on this issue.

Foreign and defence policies are still run by member states, and there is no commonly held desired level of integration in defence. On one hand, there is an increased desire to move on in the sphere of defence – including spending and procurement – even though it is too premature to speak of a ‘European army’. Von der Leyen is planning to push for “a genuine European Defence Union” in the next five years.

On the other hand, several member states fear that it would affect transatlantic relations and refuse to contribute more. In an attempt to find a compromise between the different security interests of the EU27, the Commission presented a Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) proposal which cut funds from several defence initiatives such as space programmes, and consequently reduces Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ ambitions.

There is also a lack of coherence between different initiatives at the EU level (such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund) and outside of EU structures (such as the European Intervention Initiative, set up under France’s leadership). This is partly due to the differences in French and German visions and strategic cultures. Under Macron’s leadership, Paris is eager to emphasise capabilities and preparedness to respond to crises together, while Berlin follows a more integrationist approach.

Another internal challenge is the inability, or unwillingness, to change European voting rules in foreign and security policy. The Commission is pushing to move to qualified majority voting (QMV) on some foreign policy issues, as unanimity voting effectively gives a veto to all member states and constitutes an easy obstacle to efficient decision making.

Recently, Austria blocked the creation of a new EU mission in the Mediterranean, arguing that it would encourage more migration flows to Europe. Hours of discussion were needed before a common decision could be found. Such an approach is not reliable in the event of a crisis situation that requires an urgent response. As many member states do not show the political will to change voting rules, internal divisions will continue to plague the EU’s ability to act effectively.

Finally, there are visible internal disagreements about how to deal with the neighbourhood, whether it is the enlargement process in the Western Balkans, relations with Russia, or the conflict in Libya. The EU27 will now have to reconsider the format for its new security relationship with the UK, which will remain a major defence actor on the European continent. So far Brussels has been reluctant to grant the UK a special status in EU defence initiatives, meaning bilateral relationships, ad hoc meetings, or a new European Security Council with the UK’s participation could be the way to go.

Policymakers in Brussels and many national capitals would like the EU to be more relevant on the international stage in the next decade, but there is still much confusion about how this should be achieved. Going beyond the lowest common denominator will be crucial for Europe to develop its ‘strategic autonomy’. Nevertheless, current internal divisions between member states over issues such as the direction of defence integration, voting rules, or dealing with neighbours are likely to persist and be as challenging as any external crises the EU will face.

Anna Nadibaidze is an analyst of European politics focusing on foreign policy and security.