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Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: regulating war beyond the human

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There is something unsettling about the idea of ‘lethal autonomous weapon system’ (LAWS), so it is hardly surprising that it has sparked hot debates. Much of this discussion has been speculative as today humans are still supervising weapon systems. Automatic weapon systems already exist. They are often rather simple mechanisms that respond in a predictable way to external inputs such as landmines. Autonomous weapons in contrast, demonstrate more complex behaviour, which cannot be fully deduced from their programming. They display a certain degree of self-determination and self-learning.

Last November, CEO of Tesla, Elon Musk and other industry leaders presented an open letter warning against LAWS. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots launched in London in 2013 with the objective of banning LAWS; it argues that they significantly transform war and are unable to resolve ethical dilemmas on the battlefield. Human Rights Watch released a report in 2012 also calling for pre-emptive bans. The case against autonomous weapons has already become a point of discussion at the United Nations.

As the UK commands one of the most technologically advanced armed forces, it will inevitably be confronted with questions of the legal and moral consequences of autonomous military technology. After Musk and others published their letter, the British government declared that future unmanned systems will always be under human supervision except in cyber warfare. However, there has not been further specification what such control constitute. Robotics expert Professor Noel Sharkey applauded this statement but pointed out that ‘control’ could simply mean that humans confirm a lethal strike on a target selected by AI. In 2015, the British government refused to support an international ban on LAWS, arguing that current international humanitarian law already provides enough regulation.

Major concerns from activist groups about the impact of LAWS include a disruption of strategic stability through an arms race in autonomous systems as well faster, more intense escalation of violence. There have already been signs of this, for example Chinese and Russian leaders have stated their desire to acquire LAWS. Others fear that replacing human soldiers with robots will make the decision to go war easier by seemingly reducing the domestic political consequences – given that the loss of a machine is more acceptable to society than human lives. These are valid concerns that require evaluation and appropriate measures in order to prevent the risks of mistakes.

Machines may also lack the larger context of a particular course of action. The example of Stanislav Petkov, a Soviet Lieutenant Colonel who disobeyed direct orders to launch nuclear missiles after recognising a false alarm, illustrates this conundrum. Had a few lines of code been responsible for of launching the missiles on input from the alert system, a nuclear war would have erupted. To make a decision like Petkov’s requires knowledge of military and political context, accurate judgement of human behaviour and intuition. It is questionable whether machines can ever be programmed to a near-human degree of situational and emotional perception.

On the other side of the debate, many have been critical of the term “killer robots” which seems to render the debate overly emotional. Similarly, they note that, it is important to note that humans make mistakes as well; problems such as stress or a demonisation of the enemy can increase the chance of miscalculation or excessive violence. In fact, they argue, that machines have the potential to significantly reduce these risks and act more rationally than a human would in the same situation.

At the moment, it seems unlikely that further research on LAWS will be prevented. While the UK announced that it will maintain ‘human-in-the-loop’ systems, there are projects in the US, Russia, Israel and other countries to develop autonomous military robots. A future with autonomous weapons is plausible. As soon as one state develops functional LAWS, others will see the need to follow suit. A ban might therefore be impossible to realise.

Nevertheless, it is imperative to have a public debate about the potential implications of LAWS on the battlefield, particularly with regards to how machines will select targets and decide when to engage. The international community can however pre-emptively organise frameworks to regulate the use of LAWS. A UN body on autonomous weapons already exists, based on which future measures can be built.A priority should be given to determine the precise nature of ‘human control’ is. Multilateral deliberation between experts in robotics, delegates of humanitarian organisations and government representatives is essential to identify the shortcomings of LAWS and evaluate which measures are effective, sufficient and feasible to ensure that the use of autonomous weapons will be compatible with international law.

A war where humans are no longer the prime actor may one day exist and the UK, as well as the rest of the world, must make sure it’s ready.

Would an EU-Canada style agreement work for the UK after Brexit?

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Estimates say that around 2.2 million people work in the financial and related services sector. A sector that makes up a staggering 10.7% of the UK economy (£176 billion in 2015) and is the leading contributor to the UK’s export portfolio, delivering a £72 billion trade surplus. The fate of this sector will be one of the most eagerly anticipated conclusions of any post Brexit arrangement.

It is believed that Michel Barnier (European Commission’s chief Brexit negotiator) sees the trade deal agreed between Canada and the European Union on the 30th October 2016 (applicable 21st September 2017) as the most viable way forward. However, such a free trade deal could hamper the prosperity the financial sector currently enjoys, thus negating the significant contribution it makes to the UK’s economy. No trade deal could contain provision for the export of services meaning the current trade arrangements (commonly known as services passport) would be scrapped upon the UK’s withdrawal from the Single Market. Eagerness to avoid such an outcome has led calls from David Davis for CETA + + + or a special deal for the City which would allow for market access after Brexit and the expiry of any transitional phase. Barnier dismisses this idea as both parties brace themselves for what will be painstaking negotiations on the future of trade. From the financial industry itself the message is clear. JP Morgan’s Chief Executive Jamie Dimon says that more than 4000 jobs could leave London if sufficient access to the EU’s trade arrangements is not maintained and Goldman Sachs may do the same. The think tank Bruegel estimates 30,000 related jobs could relocate from London to the EU. Combine this with the loss of the European Banking Authority (it is moving to Paris), constitutes a precarious future for the sector.

On the face of it CETA is an ambitious and far reaching agreement, and by virtually eliminating all tariffs trade will increase between Canada and the EU (already worth 60 billion euros). However, the deal mainly relates to goods and products. For example, CETA will eliminate tariffs on bread, biscuits, pastries and chocolate but many quotas on the amounts traded will remain. Sweetcorn, beef and pork will be tariff free but limited by quotas, whilst the quota on cheese has been increased from 8000 tons to 18,500 tons.

So, UK decision makers will be aware of the restraints of a free trade deal and the probable reality that the benefits of the status quo cannot be replicated. It’s also worth noting that before it leaves the UK could benefit from CETA as part of the EU and any additional trade that is accrued.

We must also consider the greater geopolitical trends at play here. Anti-globalisation fervour has coloured most political events not only in Britain and the USA, but also across the European Union. Marine Le Pen in France, Norbert Hofer in Austria and the AFD (Alternative for Germany) have all found political traction in recent times. The establishment Left in the UK remain overwhelmingly pro-EU, and although many voters in Labour’s northern heartlands backed an exit, 65% of labour voters went with remain. However, imagine if much of the concerns raised about CETA and the access it would grant for private companies to our public services turned out to be prescient. If a similar agreement to CETA or TTIP (proposed deal between the EU and the USA) was struck in the UK, a left-wing backlash could be provoked. An already weak Prime Minister could find herself caught in a pincer movement between the anti-privatisation Left on the one side and the anti-EU Right on the other.

To summarise, the CETA trade deal between Canada and the EU will be an effective agreement that will strengthen economic ties between the two. However, the relationship between the EU and Canada is very different from the one it currently enjoys with the UK. We are far more integrated, relying on reciprocal trade in both services and goods. The unprecedented nature of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU means that we cannot simply rely on a ‘copy and paste’ approach using previous templates. It must find a way to carve a path calibrated to our unique needs and past reliance on EU regulations and institutions.

Ben Campbell works in the charity sector in Birmingham. He is interested in European politics and most recently the impact Brexit will have on British industry.

Air-tight or sprouting leaks? Comparing the UK and European Commission’s plastics policies

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Comparing the European Commission’s strategy on plastics and the sub-chapter exploring plastics in the UK’s 25 year environmental plan is akin to examining the differences between a tightly sealed plastic bag and a plastic bag with a small puncture in it: they look entirely alike, yet only the former is air-tight.

The UK proposes to work towards the goal of achieving zero avoidable plastic waste by the end of 2042 through a four-point circular plan, focusing on:

  • Production
  • Consumption
  • End of use stage
  • End of life/waste management stage

The European Commission’s strategy also touts the benefits of a circular approach, to:

  • Improve the economics and quality of plastics recycling
  • Curb plastic waste and littering
  • Driving innovation and investment towards circular solutions
  • Harnessing global action

This will ensure that:

  • All plastics packaging placed on the EU market is either reusable or can be recycled in a cost-effective manner by 2030
  • More than half of plastics waste generated in Europe is recycled by 2030. Separate collection of plastics waste will reach very high levels. Recycling of plastics packaging waste will achieve levels comparable with those of other packaging materials.
  • By 2030, sorting and recycling capacity will increase fourfold since 2015, leading to the creation of 200,000 new jobs, spread all across Europe

The UK’s circular approach is seemingly identical to the European Commission’s. But there are differences in the level of detail and commitment. The UK promises to achieve zero avoidable plastic waste by the end of 2042. The term ‘avoidable’ is left loosely defined; meaning, “what is technically, environmentally and economically practicable”, according to the document.

Presumably, this definition can allow the government to claim it has ‘achieved its goal’ regardless of how the plan works in practice. The ‘economically practicable’ term is particularly worrisome, as it is a term which could be applied in a multitude of ways. Stated reforms include reforming packaging waste regulations and extending producer responsibility requirements to plastic products not currently covered by existing regimes.

Yet if producers claim these regulations will not be economically viable, government could renege on its promise, citing issues with ‘economic practicability.’ To add to the imprecision, the document fails to state what new packaging waste regulations might look like, or what types/how many plastic products producer responsibility requirements will be extended to.

Similar approaches aside, the Commission’s plastics strategy is more specific and ambitious. Deadlines are more urgent (2030 as opposed to 2042). Regulations are clear. Numeric targets are given. The UK mainly builds off of policies which are already working (e.g. ‘continuing to implement the Litter Strategy’), without specifically stating how they can be made better or what weak spots need improvement.

There are some clearly defined proposals, such as the extension of the 5p plastic bag charge to small retailers and the proposed establishment of free water refill points. But in comparison to the European Commission’s strategy, the UK plastics plan comes across as trite, unspecific, and frankly, insecure.

As the UK will leave the EU in 2019, there is impetus for the UK to metamorphose into a new global leader with a clear strategic vision. Soft power will determine how favorably the global community views a post-Brexit UK. The country’s current plan to address plastic waste lacks the chutzpah, innovation and air-tight policies needed to achieve this power.

Roz KennyBirch is a Communications Officer at Local Partnerships, and lives in London.

‘United States of Europe’, a plan in process or an idealism?

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This article looks at the European Union’s future political development and current EU reform proposals, identifying connections between Brexit and the proposed plan of the “United States of Europe”.

In December 2017, former Leader of the Social Democratic Party, Martin Schulz, proposed a plan – supported by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron – which called for the creation of a “United States of Europe” by 2025. The “United States of Europe” is a proposal that calls for a constitutional treaty which integrates EU member states into a federalist institution with common foreign, security, and defence policies designed on a federal basis of the “union”.

The idea of the “United States of Europe” or a “Super-state Europe” is not new. On the 19th of September 1946, Winston Churchill delivered his famous speech in Zurich calling for the creation of a “United States of Europe”. Following the defeat of Nazi Germany, he called for a reconciliation between France and Germany, and “the re-creation of the European family” bringing up political and social stability and integration in the region. He suggested that, instead of Britain become a member, it should, along with the US and the then USSR, be the “friends and sponsors” of the project.
Nevertheless, the present plan seems to be a dream of Eurocentric governors’ who seek to promote European ideals and refute nationalist ideas and movements. For example, the European People’s Party leader, Manfred Weber, said on February 6th that “we are equal, we are all Europe and that is our future idea…The nationalists, dear friends, are stupid and naïve”. His comments reflect the wider arguments over a “United States of Europe” that were born in the wake of the Brexit negotiations and the rise of nationalistic parties across the EU’s member state.

Defence programme

Alongside the divisive issue over a “United States of Europe” are questions concerning to what extent European defence should be coordinated. In 2017, the European Commission launched the European Defence Fund, which is intended to encourage member states “to spend taxpayer money more efficiently and reduce duplications in spending”. Crucially, the fund aims to coordinate, supplement, and amplify national investments in defence research, in the development of prototypes, and in the acquisition of defence equipment and technology.
It also established the first ever single command centre for EU military training and advisory missions (called the MPCC), launched as a Centre of Excellence to improve analysis and capacity to address hybrid threats and stepped up cooperation with NATO.

On Friday 23th February 2018, European leaders also unanimously agreed, to expand on a common defence and security policy and deter illegal immigration in their next long-term budget.

Financial reforms

The European Commission also intends to reform the Financial Supervision (ESFS) and EU’s supervisory architecture.

With these reforms, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) are likely to make decisions more transparent, while newly-created Executive Boards will lead to EU-oriented decisions. The EU budget will continue to contribute a share of the ESAs’ funding and the rest will be funded by contributions from the EU financial sector.

But what does this mean for Brexit? The ESAs are expected to be given extra resources, taken from UK-headquartered firms, under order to enforce and regulate the City. The new reform proposes that the ESAs will report to the European Commission which implicates an influencing role of deciding which firms have access to the Single Market post Brexit.

The ESAs reforms are one aspect of th 37 EU laws that could be imposed on Britain during the Brexit transition period. Among the directives proposed, the EU would be allowed to force “clearing houses” in order to withdraw from the City and to be relocated to Europe before Britain’s official departure from the EU.

Brexit and institutionalism

The EU published its plan to keep Northern Ireland in the single market and customs union post Brexit, yet British PM Theresa May has ostentatiously rejected it. This has led EU leaders questioning the ability of UK government to take a lead on Brexit negotiations. At this moment both Ireland and Northern Ireland are part of the single market and customs union. The plan therefore is designed to stop a return to a hard border between the UK and Northern Ireland.

The EU’s institutionalism seems to be in an ongoing process of transforming its roles and proceedings alongside the Brexit negotiation process. Whereas its Eurocentric governors are proposing the creation of the “United States of Europe”, expanding the organisation’s influence over its member states and reinforcing the idea of the “union” that seek to negate nationalistic ideas and strengthen organisational autonomous policy-making.

Maria Ioannou is a graduate in International Relations from University of Amsterdam, and interested in international relations, current political affairs, European politics, political parties, Brexit, and industrial growth issues.

Can carbon capture and storage find its second wind?

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The UK government passed up the opportunity to lead the global carbon capture and storage (CCS) sector. Can they learn from offshore wind to give the much-maligned technology a genuine chance?

In 2014 then UK Prime Minister David Cameron sat before the House of Commons Liaison Committee to discuss the UK’s approach to staving off the threat of climate change. Reflecting on the strategies needed to decarbonise the UK’s economy, he singled out one technology as “absolutely crucial if we are going to decarbonise effectively”. Fast-forward four years and many readers would be surprised to know Cameron was referring to CCS.

In an industry understandably excited by the potential new era of smart grids, decentralised energy systems and renewables, advocates of this decidedly less glamorous technology have struggled to be heard. Like all good tales however the history of CCS is littered with plot twists, conflicts and lessons for those who appreciate the morals of the story.

The latest chapter of the CCS saga began in 2010 with the announcement of the second iteration of a £1 billion CCS Commercialisation Competition. This flagship programme was billed as the final push needed to take the technology from demonstration phase to commercial scale, pitting industry heavyweights such as Shell and Drax against each other in a race to build an economically viable CCS system. The government’s enthusiasm did not last long however and following the formal cancellation of the project five years later (by the now divisive Chancellor George Osborne) the competition’s last remaining project in Peterhead, Scotland, was shelved.

Today the North Sea storage sites proposed by the Peterhead projects remain conspicuously free of CO2. In the waters surrounding them however, a different low-carbon energy source is fast emerging as a significant force in the UK energy mix. 2017 saw a stunning 25% increase in wind power capacity in Europe, with the UK accounting for over half of this rise. Industry insiders were similarly stunned when two wind farms agreed to a Contract-for-Difference (CfD) price of less than £58/MWh in September, representing a drop of over 50% in just 2 years.

The contrasting fortunes of CCS and wind power offer many lessons for policymakers. The decision to abandon the CCS Commercialisation Competition, described succinctly by the then Scottish Energy Minister Fergus Ewing as a “disgrace”, seems emblematic of the thinking around CCS that has undermined attempts to get the industry off the ground. Economic assessments of CCS, whilst rightly pointing to the prohibitively high costs in the short-term, have given less thought to the wider picture. The remarkable drop in the wind energy prices show how costs can be driven down in an environment where companies can learn on the job in a competitive market. CCS has yet to be given the chance to realise the efficiency improvements that come naturally from operating a plant at commercial scale.

Through the CfD scheme wind has also benefited from the security of receiving a guaranteed ‘strike price’ for the energy it produces, providing vital stability to project funders. Subsidies for CCS have invariably come in the form of grants for initial capital costs, leaving organisations at the mercy of the market once the technology is in operation and spooking would-be investors.

The elephant in the room is that there is currently little financial incentive to develop CCS, meaning successive governments have kicked the technology into the long grass. There are however many future scenarios in which it becomes a commercially necessity (ramping up of carbon taxes being the obvious one), and if countries are actually serious about their emissions reduction targets the intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC) reckons widespread CCS is probably unavoidable. This, therefore, suggests a significant possibility of there being global demand for CCS technologies and expertise over the coming decades, and in the author’s opinion CCS could be a smart bet for any government willing to take a mature, long-term approach. The recently announced CCS Cost Reduction Taskforce is a start, but the chequered history of CCS suggests its wise not to count the chickens until they’ve hatched.

For all its successes the offshore wind boom is notable for its absence of UK-based organisations, and the key players in the industry’s growth from France, Denmark and Portugal have left little room for any British entrants. Supporting the British CCS industry at this stage however gives the UK a chance to be a world-leader in the sector. Whilst international carbon transport and storage infrastructure may seem a lofty ambition it will be vital in the long-term if CCS is to make a dent in global emissions. Taking a lead in the development of such infrastructure can extend the UK’s geopolitical influence.

With Brexit around the corner the opportunity to establish knowledge-exchange partnerships with countries at an earlier stage of their CCS journey and would also be an excellent source of soft power as the UK attempts to define its new role in the global knowledge economy. Perhaps CCS deserves another chance?

Jacob Ohrvik-Stott is a policy professional from London whose research interests span the relationships between energy, technology, and society.

‘Us versus Them’ – how immigrants are portrayed by the British press

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Why do some members of the electorate feel so irrationally hostile towards immigrants? The answer: a rabid and divisive press that has manufactured an ethnic consensus in which there is very little scope or variety.

The UK political landscape is becoming increasingly divided with debate and reason replaced by tribalism and emotion. Nowhere is this trend better witnessed than in the debate surrounding immigration.

The possibility of ever increasing migration into Britain ensures that immigrants and asylum seekers are highly valued as a newsworthy topic. This coverage is rarely positive however, and is dominated by a discourse that immigrants undermine ‘British culture’, ‘our’ culture; how ‘they’ take our jobs and offer ‘us’ terrorism and disease in return. This narrative is dominant in the mainstream media, with news outlets such as the Express and Daily Mail openly crusading on an anti-immigrant platform.

The press are able to maintain the salience of this negative rhetoric by producing content that is culturally resonant with the British population. They achieve this by constructing a binary opposition that casts migrants as criminals and immoral ‘invaders’, versus the lawful, hardworking and innocent British host society. Other depictions include migrants as dangerous and fearful, who threaten our ‘British values’ and the freedoms we hold dear. The employment of these negative terms by the press to describe immigrants encourages readers to make similar associations.

Another interesting component in the press’s coverage of immigration is its frequent use of language that degrades and dehumanises migrants to this country. By referring to migrants as a ‘swarm’ or a ‘flood’, the press questions their status as human being and subtly suggests that they have not risen above their animal origins; they are less than human. The description of migrants living conditions as a ‘jungle’ epitomises this. Why bother about people who live in a ‘jungle’, who are cast as primitive and uncivilised? Why bother about people who are not like us, civilised citizens in a democracy? This characterisation is unchallenged, and becomes normalised by politicians using similar rhetoric. The most notable instance of this involves former PM David Cameron, and his infamous pledge to get tougher on immigration and “end the swarm of migrants”. The use of this language compares migrants to insects. Not only are insects devoid of human emotions, but they are also disease carriers, pests, and potentially harmful. The press frame immigrants to be considered in the same way.

The effectiveness of the press’s representation of immigrants as threatening, as invasive creatures, is increased by the general uncertainty over the contextual and legal status of immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. It is difficult for the press to challenge refugees from a humanitarian perspective, as refugees have strong legal rights and are worthy of sympathy. It appeals to the public’s basic compassion to help other humans who face persecution or are fleeing from an oppressive regime. The tragic death of Alayn Kurdi – the three year old Syrian refugee found on a Turkish beach after his boat sank in the Mediterranean – illustrates this point.

The strategy is to reclassify refugees as something else. New labels such as ‘asylum seeker’ are applied which changes the eligibility for the status of a refugee. These labels are effective in removing the humanitarian frame, and reinforcing a negative association with asylum seekers. This allows the press and, by extension, the public, to stigmatise and dismiss the needs of asylum seekers in a normalised and acceptable fashion.

It is clear then that a negative portrayal of immigrants is well established in the British press. Themes of invasion and hostility are predominant, fostering a climate of unease, suspicion and resentment towards immigrants. By framing immigration as an ‘us versus them’ issue, the press has created a consensus where its readers are invited and encouraged to view the incomers as a threat. This has culturally resonated with the British population, allowing the press to manufacture an ethnic consensus in which there is very little scope or variety. This offers a partial explanation as to why positive depictions of immigrants – centred on their significant contribution to British society and public services – are less salient. It does not resonate with readers. What can we do to rectify this unjust narrative?

Ideally, the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) would adhere to stronger guidelines concerning the demonisation of immigrants. This could be achieved by preventing irrelevant references to an individual’s immigration status in a negative story. This would avoid the generalisation that immigration status is the primary reason behind a person’s negative actions. IPSO could also be more proactive in challenging the press’s emotive rhetoric that has converted editorial opinion into fact. Even with a wealth of data maintaining that immigrants do, in fact, provide a positive contribution to British society, there is a common misconception that they are a burden on public services and the welfare system. These perceptions are based not on figures, but on inaccurate, divisive and unchallenged media portrayals. As long as these negative portrayals continue, along with the ‘us versus them’ mentality that the press adopts, immigrants will continue to be considered in a negative light by the British public.

Joel Wilson-Hunt is a recent politics graduate from the University of Essex and lives in Kent. His research interests include British politics, political communication and migration studies.