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The UK must work with its allies to stop Russian escalation in Libya

Russia’s deployment of combat aircraft to support warlord Khalifa Haftar in the ongoing Libyan Civil War indicates a desire to retain a permanent footing in Libya. This has serious implications for the UK, NATO, and the EU.

The civil war in Libya

Following the fall of leader Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, efforts to deliver real and lasting political stability in Libya have failed. The weak government institutions, formed after Qaddafi was removed, could not prevent armed violence and non-state groups proliferating.

Amidst the chaos, Khalifa Hafter seized Libya’s oil infrastructure. He would then lay siege to the UN recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in the country’s capital, Tripoli. Recently, he has been pushed back from the city and is poised to withdraw from western Libya.

The conflict between General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army and the GNA has become increasingly internationalised. The international backers of both Haftar and the GNA have committed significant support. Hafter enjoys the support of Russia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and others. The GNA has strong backing from Turkey. As Haftar suffers heavy losses and retreats from western Libya, Russia has escalated its involvement, by quietly deploying 14 combat aircraft to Libya.

The rise of Russia

An increased Russian role in Libya has a number of risks for the EU and NATO, either through a permanent military presence, strong political influence, or both.

Firstly, Russia could weaponise the major migration routes that move through Libya. Libya is a major transit hub for migrants seeking to reach the EU, because of its porous southern borders and proximity to regions experiencing severe economic and political issues. This was previously weaponised by Qaddafi, who exploited Europe’s nativist fears to secure billions in investments. Following the fall of Qaddafi, migration through Libya to Europe rose dramatically. To combat this, Italy signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA, which involves the GNA intercepting migrant vessels and forcing their return to Libya, where migrants are detained indefinitely in grave conditions.

Russia has been accused of weaponising migration previously in Syria. This, according to one US and NATO Commander, drove hundreds of thousands of Syrians to Europe “to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve”. It could do the same again in Libya. Manipulating migration patterns into southern Europe could be used to sow dissent and discord within the EU and NATO.

Secondly, Russia could deploy assets to eastern Libya to threaten NATO’s southern flank and frustrate access to the mediterranean. Given the UK’s military bases in Cyprus and naval facilities in the Middle East, this could seriously threaten access to Suez and the eastern Mediteranean. This is particularly worrying, given how Russia possesses weapons systems that can be rapidly deployed with little infrastructure support. Russia has already deployed the SU-24 – a strike aircraft with significant anti-ship capability and an effective range over 1000KM – to Libya. More lethal aircraft could be deployed if necessary.

Two systems merit consideration: the S-400 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system and the P-800 Anti Ship Missile (ASM) system. The S-400 can target aircraft out to 250-400km, and the P-800 can target ships up to 300km offshore. Both the S-400 and P-800 are wheeled, all-terrain mobile systems that require limited manpower to operate. When they are deployed in appropriate numbers and with readily available support systems – aircraft, drones, satellites and other missile systems – they are highly effective.

The UK response

Russian strategy has been deeply opportunistic (capitalising on western ambivalence) in seizing territory in Georgia and Ukraine, and intervening in Syria. Its escalating involvement in Libya fits comfortably within this pattern; the conflict in Libya is highly internationalised, with a number of nations wielding decisive influence.

The UK and its allies must advocate for peaceful negotiations to achieve a cohesive government that is not expressly beholden to the interests of foreign powers. To do this, the UK and its close allies can influence Khalifa Haftar’s main backers – Turkey, Russia, UAE, Egypt – individually, to effect broad change. If they want to avoid increased Russian leverage over them, the UK, EU, and NATO must prevent the exploitation of Libya by Russia.

Jack Sargent is co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme.

The UK should pay closer attention to the impacts of climate change in MENA

The local is global. Climate change is likely to exacerbate conflicts and areas of instability. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), an already volatile region, stands to be particularly affected. UK foreign policy needs to improve its awareness of the impact climate change may have on the region and the wider security repercussions.

Climate change has already resulted in a 1°C rise in temperatures compared to the previous century. The UK’s Global Strategic Trends assessment views it as one of the most certain and influential global trends affecting all geographic and policy areas.

The MENA region is no exception. Research has shown that the region will suffer from an even higher number of hot days than it currently is, with warnings of droughts and overall water deficit. There is a risk of these impacts increasing, should the overall warming of the world go beyond 1.5-2°C.

Climate change may be indirectly linked to an increase in conflict, due to it exacerbating pre-existing issues such as resource scarcity, economic issues, and weak governance. Institutions and proper governance are important factors in being able to deal effectively with climate change. Where there is already fragmented governance, states could be further weakened by the consequences of climate change.

There is limited understanding regarding the impact climate change will have on global security, however. This includes a lack of knowledge as to how already vulnerable areas may be affected by climate change itself and how climate change-related instability could aggravate existing tensions or create new instability.

The MENA region is currently experiencing widespread insecurity due to ongoing and systemic violence and unrest. This is exacerbated by self-serving interventionist external powers, such as the Russian intervention in the Syrian conflict, or the Russian and Turkish intervention in Libya’s civil war. Climate change may exacerbate the instability prevalent in the region. Of particular importance is the impact climate change could have on water scarcity, food insecurity, disease, and conflict in the region.

Water scarcity is a pressing issue in the MENA region. Tensions have risen between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over the Tigris‐Euphrates basin. This is caused by an unequal water flow from the rivers to the three countries, grievances around water management, and the use of water as a way to exert pressure on downstream countries. In North Africa, Ethiopian plans to build a dam on the Nile would have serious consequences for Egyptian agriculture which depends on the river. While discussions over the dam are ongoing, Egypt has previously threatened war with Ethiopia over its construction, and tensions remain high. Additionally, water scarcity would likely lead to increased food insecurity, with consequences being famines or malnutrition, as 70% of the region’s agriculture depends on rainfall, which is projected to decline by 60% should temperatures increase by 4°C.

Climate change could also act as a threat multiplier to countries with weak governance. In Iraq, there are reports the Islamic State (IS) used periods of drought to entice people to join its ranks. In Syria, Libya, and Yemen, populations are already in precarious situations and governments would be either unable or unwilling to alleviate climate change driven issues. This may provide opportunities for non-state groups to take control and spread further instability, as was witnessed with the rise of the IS, facilitated by weak governance in Iraq and Syria.

Climate change fuelled instability and insecurity in MENA will have a direct impact on neighbouring countries and regions, including Europe. This may lead European countries being faced with increased migration. External powers may need to provide humanitarian assistance to populations in response to situations that may be brought, or exacerbated, by climate change, or even requested to intervene in regional conflicts.

Climate change will also impact the rest of the world. Europe, including Britain, will be dealing with its own climate change issues. This raises the question of whether the UK can cope with climate change fuelled difficulties both at home and in other regions.

To address this, the UK must begin early planning and preparation for the impacts of climate change in the MENA region and seek to help reduce climate change driven instability. Preventative measures include helping improve governance, facilitating discussions over water sharing, and aiding the development of policies and strategies focused on coping with the effects of climate change.

Ultimately, the UK’s climate change preparations should also seek to offset the wider impact on global security that could be provoked by climate change-related instability, as both will come hand in hand.

Sarah Grand-Clement is a defence and security policy researcher, and holds an MSc in Arab World Studies from Durham University.

Are aircraft carriers still relevant to British security in the hypersonic age?

With China now deploying hypersonic missiles, the aircraft carriers HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales could be at a distinct risk. To address this, the UK should invest carefully in defences capable of defeating hypersonic missiles whose extreme speed may overwhelm missile defense systems.

The carrier

HMS Queen Elizabeth currently serves with the Royal Navy as the latest and largest in a long line of UK aircraft carriers, which carry British jets at sea, enabling the UK to project power and protect its global interests. Announced in 2007, her entry into service was delayed until 2020 due to budget cuts announced in the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review, at a final cost of a little over £6bn. HMS Queen Elizabeth will be followed in front-line service by sister ship the HMS Prince of Wales in 2023.

Aircraft carriers are the best means of projecting UK naval power, enabling Britain to swiftly intervene in international crises and also to protect vital sea-based trade effectively.

There has been debate over how effectively carriers such as HMS Queen Elizabeth can continue to protect British interests. Two alternatives – missile carrying arsenal ships and submarines – cannot effectively replace them. Arsenal ships do not match the complexity of the aircraft carrier, which possess greater flexibility in striking power. Carrier-based aircraft can carry many different weapons for distinct targets and jet pilots can adapt to changing circumstances. Carriers also possess assets such as airborne early warning radars, which can scan the skies and seas for threats; these cannot operate on a smaller arsenal ship due to lack of space on board.
Submarines can deny enemy access to strategic waters. However their utility for sea control, dominating the waters in a given area, is limited by their need for stealth. Once detected, submarines are vulnerable. Submarines, such as the under-induction Astute class, can effectively supplement the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier but cannot replace it.

Enter hypersonic missiles

Hypersonic weapons move at over five times the speed of sound, leaving mere seconds for a ship’s defences to react.. However with adequate investment in defences, such as early warning and directed energy weapons, there is no reason the aircraft carrier cannot remain at the fore of Britain’s security strategy.

China has been claiming vast swathes of ocean in South-East Asia, denying ships from smaller nations the right of movement – freedom of navigation – on the seas. The so-called Asian Quad (India, Japan, the US, and Australia) is therefore stepping up military efforts to balance China’s challenge to regional freedom of navigation in the South China Seas. The Quad nations are now holding exercises in the Indian Ocean and deploying warships to waters in East Asia to balance Chinese power.

As a key US and Australian ally, and a beneficiary of open sea lanes, the UK would well become involved in any confrontation with China. China is now making concerted investment in hypersonic weapons as part of a package of offensive weapon systems, designed to deny access to and restrict movement in contested areas. Chinese hypersonic missiles pose a genuine threat to British aircraft carriers.

Investing in counter-measures

Counter-measures to hypersonic weapons do exist. Speeding up the induction of Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems such as the ‘Crowsnest’ – Airborne Early Warning (AEW) – helicopter by the end of 2020 enables early detection. A helicopter based radar like Crowsnest can scan over the horizon to detect an incoming hypersonic threat early enough for defences to be effective. Sophisticated infrared sensors on the F-35 jet, which the Queen Elizabeth class carry, can detect a hypersonic launch early, as will space based surveillance assets. Together, these multi-spectral, multi-platform sensors can make a deployment of aircraft carriers viable in a hypersonic weapon environment.

Laser weapons and railguns are potentially able to defend against emerging naval threats, because they can match high hypersonic speeds. The US Navy has begun deploying small scale laser weapons for missile defence. Railguns use electromagnetic force to fire projectiles at roughly six times the speed of sound. Research into railguns is actively focusing on their use in missile defence. Another such system could be Glide Breaker, a US project to develop anti-missile systems to neutralise hypersonic threats. Both could theoretically deal with the hypersonic threat, potentially intercepting them a few seconds before they hit the ship. The Royal Navy should increase cooperation with the US, which leads global research on railgun technology.

While hypersonic weapons will require a renewed focus on space and airborne early warning, they will not make the aircraft carrier obsolete. With multiple solutions emerging, a ‘hard-kill’ response that can protect carriers is imminent. The UK and the Royal Navy would be well served by continued investment in a modern carrier capability going forward.

Jeevan Vipinachandran holds an MSc in Comparative Politics: Conflict Studies from the London School of Economics.

In Iraq, the UK is at risk of war with Iran

Iran’s proxy forces in Iraq could operate independently of Iran’s wishes. They may inadvertently draw the UK into armed conflict with Iran. Only comprehensive domestic reform in Iraq can minimise the threat of these groups.

Iran supports and trains large Shia militias in the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). The PMF were formed in response to the disintegration of the Iraqi military in the face of ISIS. These groups include Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, The Badr Organisation and others. Members of these militias occupy key positions in Iraqi institutions and occupy seats in the Iraqi Parliament. These groups are key fronts for Iranian influence in Iraq.

While Iran undoubtedly wields decisive influence in these groups, this does not translate into direct control. Iran’s proxy groups generally behave according to their own best interests, taking into account local considerations. Some of these militias lack a clear command structure and are, in the words of researcher Michael Knights, “extraordinarily complex, and hard to manage at the best of times”.

For example, Kata’ib Hezbollah has carried out lethal strikes against western forces in Iraq. In response, the US has struck Kata’ib Hezbollah’s bases throughout Iraq and Syria and assassinated its leader, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis.

UK policy must recognise that two emerging trends in Iraq might weaken Iran’s control of these groups. These are the growing political conflict between Shia clergy in Najaf (Iraq) and Qom (Iran), and emerging Iraqi nationalism.

The Najaf-Qom dispute is a fundamental disagreement between two distinct worldviews. The Najaf clergy advance the traditional belief that they should have limited involvement in governance. In contrast, Qom is the home of Valeyet-e which is the current political system of Iran and involves key control of state matters by the Shia clergy. This dispute has taken on strong political dimensions. Iranian efforts to dominate Iraq have become increasingly unpopular amongst the Iraqi public and the Najaf clergy is seeking to regain prominence after decades of Baathist repression. Most recently, PMF militias loyal to Najaf have left the PMF at Najaf’s beckoning, as Iraqi efforts to exert control over the PMF and absorb it into the state increase. This move damages the legitimacy of the remaining pro-Iranian groups. Since the PMF originally formed at Sistani’s behest in 2014, the public has called for Najaf-aligned groups to withdraw, which damages the legitimacy initially held by the PMF.

Likewise, emerging Iraqi nationalism is going to frustrate Iran’s efforts to control the PMF groups it carefully cultivated. Iraq has seen repeated and widespread protests against the perceived chronically corrupt and inept post-2003 political system as well as the foreign influence considered to contribute to its failure. The 2019 protests, which started in October, saw several hundred thousand protestors stall the nation’s economy in pursuit of political reform. Iran itself was often the target of these protests, with the Iranian consulate in Najaf being burnt down. These protests have also rallied against foreign interference more broadly. As recently as January of this year protestors decried Iraq’s role as staging ground for any would-be conflict between Iran and the US. Iran-backed militias have harshly opposed the protests. They are alleged to have used lethal violence against protestors.

The burgeoning Najaf-Qom dispute and emerging Iraqi nationalism has the potential to socially and politically ostracise Iran-backed Shia militias, given Iran’s sharp dip in popularity in Iraq. The removal of pro-Najaf forces from the PMF strips them of the legitimacy it gave them, and their opposition to the widespread protests might damage their standing in any new political order that may emerge.

In order to avoid social and political ostracisation, they may aggressively target Western forces to co-opt the widespread unpopularity of foreign interference in Iraq and offset their own foreign backing. As well as, this Iranian-backed groups may agitate any nationalist government in Baghdad, which they may perceive as a threat to their existence or as anti-Shia.

This has significant policy implications for the UK. Should an Iranian-backed militia strike coalition forces without Iranian approval, it could spark conflict. The US has already struck both key Iranian officials in Iraq and Iran-backed militias. If Iran’s proxies aggressively target Western forces, US response may precipitate war.

Consequently, British policy should be to strengthen the Iraqi state and diffuse tensions with Iran regionally. The UK must recognise that its interests are best served by helping to combat the chronic levels of corruption within the Iraqi state, to restore its capacity and legitimacy. In tandem, diplomatic efforts with Iran must be renewed.

The 2015 Nuclear Deal showed that diplomatic settlements with Iran are achievable, sustainable, and able to greatly reduce tensions. Relations with Iran could be guaranteed despite the dismal state of US-Iran diplomacy given the UK’s track record in maintaining notably better relations. Only decisive diplomatic engagement with Iran can remove the risk of war.

Jack Sargent is co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme.

Governments must recognise that aid and investment are about more than just development

COVID-19 will stretch the world further apart. The developed world should proactively invest in the developing world to avoid further humanitarian disasters and seismic migration across the world.

COVID-19 knows no borders, but that does not mean its damage will be distributed equally. Rich countries can sustain debts because their borrowing debts are low and their bonds are seen as ‘safe haven’ assets by investors. Furthermore, countries that control their own currency, such as the UK and US, have a significant advantage as rich investors from developing countries will want to invest in ‘stable’ currencies should COVID-19 significantly shrink their own. This may cause the exchange rate of developing countries to plummet, meaning that debt becomes much harder to hold. This precarious economic situation will be exacerbated in three main ways.

Firstly, many developing countries rely heavily on the service sector of their respective economies, which has been stalled due to lack of consumer demand from social distancing measures. Developed countries tend to have comparatively smaller service sectors and have benefited from bailout schemes which have softened the blow for workers, but this comparative luxury is not afforded to many. Social distancing is not an option for many in the developing world.

Secondly, international humanitarian aid has dropped dramatically as a result of the crisis. NGO’s have not escaped the financial hardship that COVID-19 has caused with more than 40% of British international development NGOs saying they will collapse within six months if they receive no new financial support. Furthermore, the aid that remains cannot reach its intended recipients in many cases because of international travel bans and lack of available transportation. Countries such as Lesotho and South Sudan rely on international aid for infrastructure projects, which are now more dangerous to complete but increasingly necessary to control the spread of coronavirus.

Thirdly, due to the economic shutdown in developed countries, remittances have dropped significantly. Many migrants who moved away from their families in order to provide for them work in the service sector in the UK and other developed countries. With the service sector on hold to prevent the spread of COVID-19, so has the money going back to the developing world. The World Bank is predicting global remittances will drop by some 20% because of the impact of coronavirus, to $445bn in 2020 which Dilip Ratha, an economist at the World Bank, has described this decline as ‘unprecedented in history’.

Lebanon, whose economy is emblematic of all three issues outlined above, defaulted on its debt for the first time in its history last month after its currency collapsed, causing riots in Beirut. This was not because of COVID-19, but this economic and political instability is likely to be replicated in many other countries around the world. This may soon take hold in Nigeria, which has a population of almost 200m, where the Air Force have been deployed to tackle an insurgency in the North East of the country. Violence will exacerbate the spread of the virus, causing further economic and political instability.

The 2015 migrant crisis was handled poorly by European countries, with the sole exception of Angela Merkel’s Germany who, by allowing a million refugees to enter the country, recognised both the scale of the crisis and the political consequences of inaction. Europe can see another crisis looming and should take economic action now to prevent it. Its governments need to recognise not only that the virus will continue to spread if it is not suppressed everywhere, but also that the effects of possible economic and political instability will not be contained in the developing world (as the Arab Spring showed in 2011). There is both a moral obligation and a political necessity to invest in the developing world.

The World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund have taken the first steps in this direction, with a $200bn package to regional development banks, and are encouraging creditors to suspend debt repayments until 2021 in order to provide much needed support to the poorest countries. The next decade will require national governments to rethink the integration between their international development, defence, and immigration policies, by prioritising investment and infrastructure over sanctions and military intervention. For example, investments in green energy startups and sustainable transportation will boost employment and help tackle the climate emergency. International cooperation on stabilising emerging economies through investment will require spending, but the expense will pale in comparison to the bill of inaction. The time to act is now.

Tom Whitting is Co-Coordinator for the Open Think Tank Network.

Reassessment of the UK’s sanctions regime is long overdue

Economic sanctions have been imposed on states – including Venezuela, Iran, and Cuba – by the US, EU, and UK for years. As the devastation of COVID-19 escalates, the morality of sustaining an economic sanctions regime is being challenged. The UK should embrace calls from the UN, lift economic sanctions indefinitely, and exert pressure on the US to follow suit (whilst holding the Trump administration to account for racial state-sanctioned violence).

For the first time in decades, every state faces the same monumental challenge: COVID-19. Globally, healthcare systems are being strained beyond capacity, as livelihoods are jeopardised. However, some states are uniquely penalised by economic sanctions in addition to the harrowing challenges to organisation and healthcare provision brought on by the pandemic.

The imposition of economic sanctions – the suspension of trade and financial relations – is often justified on grounds of democracy or human rights promotion and framed as a peaceful alternative to combat. In practice, economic sanctions often become a tool used by powerful states to coerce those viewed as a threat to their interests. The disastrous financial effects they inflict are often destabilising. Even under non-pandemic conditions, their use is highly contested and widely argued to be a far greater punishment to the citizens of a nation than their leaders. In Iran, economic sanctions have triggered a deep recession since reinstatement in 2018. Economically vulnerable Iranians are worst affected by these measures, yet they are entirely blameless.

The US has historically deployed an extensive sanctions regime, increasing in scope under the Trump administration. Many sanctions targets are arguably penalised for their ideological stance, with socialist Venezuela and Cuba a high priority. Such political motivations were recently evidenced by Trump’s attempts to barter a power-sharing agreement in Venezuela, in which economic sanctions would be lifted on the condition President Maduro step down. Shortly after this offer was refused, the US government sent warships to the Caribbean and indicted members of Venezuela’s government on charges of “narco-terrorism”. As well as being a highly disputed claim, it does not make sense for the US to target drug trafficking-crackdown efforts on Venezuela; there are more influenceable transit states (such as Colombia), with greater evidence of drug trafficking, to focus on. US government data even demonstrates that cocaine flows through Venezuela – beyond the control of government officials – have declined since 2017. In the context of a pandemic and recent denial of a critical IMF loan to Venezuela, economic sanctions and unwarranted geopolitical escalation are disastrous.

Despite a tumultuous political situation in Venezuela since April 2019, and widespread reports of human rights abuses, the actions of the US have exacerbated conflict and inflicted further economic suffering on citizens. The motivations for US economic sanctions remain highly politicised, often representing a broader attempt to interfere in matters of national sovereignty. There is no place for this amidst a global pandemic. Economic sanctions cost lives. Access to critical medical equipment becomes exponentially harder when states, companies, and financial institutions refuse to engage.

The pushback against the economic sanctions regime has risen in response to the pandemic. The UN has called on states to lift sanctions, and public petitions for the removal of sanctions on Iran and Cuba have received widespread support. The UK’s ‘special relationship’ and the recent upswing in diplomatic closeness with the US could prove pivotal in this sanctions debate. Thus far, the UK has taken steps to put pressure on the US to ease sanctions against Iran due to the pandemic, and a recent call from over 50 MPs to intervene against the US blockade of Cuba is promising.

Whilst putting pressure on the US to ease its economic sanctions against other states, the UK and EU governments should reassess their free arms trade relationship with the Trump administration. Recent Black Lives Matter protests against institutional racism and police brutality commencing in the US additionally impose foreign policy obligations on the UK government to instigate a police arms embargo. A call to end the export of policing equipment like rubber bullets and tear gas – currently utilised for internal repression – has been signed by 166 MPs across parties, and Scottish Parliament just passed a ban.

The UK sanctions regime needs to evolve; while economic sanctions cannot be condoned against states struggling under COVID-19, the free trade of rubber bullets and tear gas fuelling Trump’s oppressive response to protestors is equally unjustifiable. Failing to take these actions will result in inhumane and preventable loss of life for which the UK will be responsible. If international solidarity can be salvaged, and exclusionary economic sanctions lifted, perhaps dialogue with Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba could be resuscitated. Britain’s sanctions regime shouldn’t economically strangle citizens of recipient states, and neither should it allow citizens of its allies to become the targets of racialised state violence.

Holly Harwood is Agora’s Head of Outreach.