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How Trinidad became an incubator for Islamist terrorism

Once a colony at the fringes of the British Empire, Trinidad was an epicentre of human importation. Initially slaves from Africa, then nearly one hundred thousand indentured laborers from India, were brought to the island, mainly to produce and harvest sugarcane. But after generations of cohabitation, Trinidad has developed a unique multicultural social fabric, and with it, unique problems resulting from a history of colonial subjugation.

In the wake of emancipation, British authorities imported Indian indentured workers to fill the labour vacuum left by freed black slaves who typically refused to continue working for their former masters. Ethnic studies researcher Nasser Mustapha has noted that, unlike the Afro-Trinidadians, the newly arrived Indians “were able to maintain their religious identity due to their isolation on the estates”. Further, “because of the need to preserve their faith in an alien and somewhat hostile environment, Indo-Trinidadian Muslims became very defensive and introverted, with an emotional attachment to their ancestral traditions”. Nonetheless, “common external pressures led to greater mutual respect and acceptance between Indian Muslims and Hindus in the Caribbean”.

Although initially intended to prevent African and Indian Trinidadians unifying to revolt against British rule, colonial policies to encourage ethnic separation unintentionally pressured Indo-Trinidadians to forgo prior inter-ethnic religious rivalries out of a mutual interest to preserve shared cultural traditions. Similarly, slavery eroded Afro-Trinidadian slaves’ prior cultural identity, reenforcing absolute subservience to the British colonial system.

At the time of Trinidad’s independence, the Nation of Islam’s anti-imperialist political ideology appealed to descendants of slaves seeking to distance themselves from the legacy of colonial subjugation. Just as race became inseparable from religion amongst Indian Muslims, and in response to centuries of colonial oppression, Afro-Trinidadian Muslim converts embraced a particular brand of Sunni fundamentalist Islam which fused black-power rhetoric with anti-western-imperialist sentiments. Consequently, pervasive ethno-social divisions became only further entrenched as Afro-Trinidadian Muslim converts resented Indo-Trinidadian Muslims for incorporating ‘blasphemous’ cultural elements into worship, Indo-Trinidadian Hindus for practicing the ‘wrong’ religion, and demonised Afro-Trinidadian Christians for not rejecting the religion of their former colonial oppressor.

Ethno-religious tensions reached their peak in 1990 when a Trinidadian Islamic radical group, Jamaat al-Muslimeen (JAM), carried out an attempted coup which held various political officials hostage, including the Prime Minister, for six days and left at least 24 people dead. While the vast majority of Trinidadians, regardless of ethnicity or religion, disavowed the coup attempt, the Counter Extremism Project notes “Yasin Abu Bakr, the notorious leader of JAM […] targeted urban Afro-Trinidadian youth in his sermons through a mix of Islamic doctrine and Black Power rhetoric”.

The pervasive legacy of colonial oppression meant disempowered Afro-Trinidadians saw potential for Islam to rectify perceived social injustices. However, Afro-Trinidadian Muslim converts found themselves only more socially isolated as their particular interpretation of Islam demonised the established Muslim community on the grounds of race, or even members of their own race for their religion.

Although the majority of modern Trinidadians see their society as a patchwork of multicultural customs and racial unity, many of the social divisions which originally drove the 1990 coup attempt remain unaddressed. For example, political parties are often divided along racial lines, and Trinidadians still tend to marry within their own racial group.

More perniciously, the rise of the Islamic State has seen radicalised Trinidadians to channel their resentment elsewhere. Generations of compounded resentment preconditioned a subset of the Afro-Trinidadian Muslim community to be especially receptive to rhetoric promising social reordering, and therefore vulnerable to radicalisation. Predatory ISIS recruiters have been able to lure a disproportionately large number of Afro-Trinidadian Muslims by manipulating feelings of alienation towards their local community through the promise of global social reordering. In fact Trinidad is at the top of the list of Western and English speaking countries for rates of Islamic State recruitment.

Social isolation breeds resentment and the legacy of British colonial rule established a toxic precedent of disunity, making Trinidad fertile ground for extremist recruitment. As the only nation in the Western Hemisphere to ever experience an attempted Islamic coup, and as one of the largest ISIS recruitment centres, Trinidad exemplifies how the legacy of colonialism does not disappear with independence. It also shows how short sighted policies can have long-term consequences. Although British colonists could not have predicted that their actions would lead to the rise of Islamic extremism on the island, policies enacted in bad faith rarely end well. History cannot be undone, but similar blunders can be avoided in future by recognising that policy actions may have unintended consequences, especially those involving race and religion.

Christopher Lindrud is International Coordinator at the Trade Center of the Americas.

European governments must understand the Middle East’s borders before taking action in the region

In the 20th century, British and French governments in the Middle East laid the foundations for mass displacement. Today, their policies continue to shape the region, but fall short of resolving this issue.

Today’s map of the Middle East was shaped by European powers. In 1916, Britain and France divided it up in the Sykes-Picot agreement, laying claims over lands thousands of miles away. Borders were created without consideration for local ethnic groups or pre-existing territorial powers, changing the geo-political landscape and causing discontent amongst populations who were separated from their local groups and organised into different states.

This paved the way for subsequent instability in the Middle East. The UK and France should recognise the role they have played in destabilising their former mandates and take action to help end conflict and provide safe countries for returning migrants.

Complicated British-Israeli-Palestine relations

The Sykes-Picot agreement also created historical ties between Britain and Palestine. After the Second World War and the horrors of the Holocaust, there was considered to be an urgent need for a Jewish homeland. In 1947, the UN General Assembly approved Resolution 181 for the partition of Palestine, which was predominantly Arab, but gave the minority Jewish population over 50% of the land. Following Israel’s founding in 1948 and the Arab-Israeli war, the Israelis received 78% of the Palestinian Mandate.

This triggered mass displacement for the Palestinians and further territorial disputes. Britain kept a close eye on these affairs, sponsoring the UN Security Council Resolution 242 to bring an end to Israel’s 1967 war with its Arab neighbours.

Today, British-Israeli relations remain amicable. Last year marked 70 years of diplomatic relations between the two states, with Israel being one of the first countries to sign a trade continuity agreement with the UK. British diplomatic relations with Israel tend to avoid strong criticism of Israeli treatment of Palestinians. Nevertheless, in January 2021, the UK government expressed concern at Israel’s decision to build new settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, as this exceeds Israel’s 78% share of the Palestinian territories. The UK, in line with most of the international community, maintains that the former territory is Palestinian. It does not recognise Palestine as a state, but continues to advocate for a two-state solution. This raises the uncomfortable question of where these two states should draw their borders.

French lessons?

The French government also continues to have a vested interest in Middle East affairs, as evidenced by its actions in Syria. French withdrawal from that country in 1946 resulted in decades of violence, with the al-Assad family’s torture and killing of peaceful protestors sparking the 2011 civil war and mass displacement.

Along with members of an international coalition, France has attempted to end the conflict, committing over €1bn towards Syrian civilians between 2019-21. Much of that money has gone to neighbouring countries Lebanon and Jordan which are hosting fleeing Syrian refugees. France participates in military operations under Operation Chammal and founded the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons in 2018. It also advocates for peace negotiations, to protect civilians and bring about an end to the root causes of continuous mass displacement.

Although the Israel-Palestine conflict is different to that in Syria, France’s foreign policy is an example of what more the UK could do in the Middle East. For instance, it could provide more aid money for the Palestinians and be a more vocal advocate for finding a peaceful solution. Aiding peace in the Middle East would help the UK government in its desire for the country to be seen as a global player as well as providing much-needed stability for millions. Resolving decades of conflict could help resettle those who have fled and allow them to rebuild their lives in a safe environment.

Nearly ten years after it began, there is no sign of the Syrian conflict abating. There is also little indication of peace between Israel and Palestine. Continuous Israeli expansion and violence committed by both sides continue to fuel distrust. As of 2019, there were 5.6m Palestine refugees, according to UNRWA. Many remain in Palestine in desperate conditions and with no opportunity to leave.

It is important that European states prioritise the establishment of stable democratic governance, rather than anything which would exacerbate tensions by encouraging actors to struggle for power. Countries such as the UK and France must tread carefully in advocating peace and crisis resolution.

Lara Brett is studying for an MA in Contemporary European Studies at the University of Bath.

Mitigating the impact of Brexit on peace in Northern Ireland

Brexit threatens peace in Northern Ireland. The impact of the UK’s departure from the EU must be managed, amid rising tensions.

Brexit means big changes in the structure of the United Kingdom, not least in Northern Ireland. There is a moderate risk of a return to instability for Northern Ireland, which may necessitate certain policy measures. The chances of violence on a sustained scale akin to the Troubles of the 1960s-90s probably remain low, but the possibility of flare-ups and terrorist attacks cannot be ruled out. With this mind, the UK should strengthen the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), and increase intelligence gathering by UK police and local security services.

Although the UK and EU have agreed to avoid checks – including no use of cameras – on the Irish land border, checks are now in place on some goods coming via the new sea border, angering some Unionists. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 is at risk of failing. The violence that preceded the peace deal cost the lives of thousands of people throughout the UK. It hardly suggests a positive outcome if a peace deal contingent on the absence of border checks is undone by border checks, whether at sea or on land. The centuries-old cleavage between Catholics and Protestants could see latent tensions bubbling back to the surface, a point which has been made by former Prime Ministers Tony Blair and John Major.

Currently, however, concerns over a return to violence may be somewhat overblown. There have been no major flare-ups, although incidents involving a new generation of nationalist extremists – such as the murder of a journalist by the so-called ‘New IRA’ and the sending of explosive devices to sites in the mainland UK – are of some concern). Furthermore, the rise of Sinn Fein as a political force in the Republic of Ireland provides a concerning backdrop to the situation. While Sinn Fein fell short of forming a government in the Republic, it is still an event that could impact negatively on stability in Ireland as nationalist sentiment and calls for Irish reunification are likely to increase, in turn driving up the tension levels.

The experience of the British Army in counterinsurgency could be useful in managing any flare-ups, if utilised in an advisory role assisting the PSNI. Operationally deploying the Army in the event of a flare-up event should be avoided. The use of excessive force in dealing with civilian populations in insurgency situations may lead to alienation and increases the probability of sectarian violence. The UK has made that mistake in the past, with the internment of mostly nationalist people, many of them who were not involved in violence in the 1970s. This exacerbated tensions, being the prelude to increased violence in Northern Ireland. A better policy prescription might be the strengthening of the local police force, the PSNI, which has traditionally been the counterinsurgency (COIN) lead.

Furthermore ensuring continued operational co-operation between PSNI and the An Garda Siochana (Irish Police) outside of EU information sharing systems such as Europol and Eurojust will be a challenge, but one that needs to be addressed.

As the only UK police force whose officers are routinely armed, the PSNI is well equipped on multiple levels to tackle localised outbreaks of violence. Police led management of key trouble spots is often more psychologically palatable to local populations, less likely to exacerbate tensions and less expensive than deploying the military in theatre. In any case, the British military is undergoing sizable changes. The budgetary and resource constraints likely to be imposed by Whitehall’s new-found focus on space, cyber warfare and a naval build-up make it more likely that there will be less numbers of infantry available with the British Army for a Northern Ireland contingency.

The other policy measure the British government could implement would involve increasing the intelligence focus on Northern Ireland, drawing on its own decades of operational experience of intelligence gathering – including in coordination with the Garda- in Northern Ireland, predating EU intelligence sharing agreements. This can compensate to some extent for the loss of full access to European security databases such as SIS II. While the UK security apparatus is concerned with far-right and Islamist extremism, the possibility of violent republicanism reemerging must not be underestimated.

The key to managing post-Brexit stability in Northern Ireland depends heavily on minimising, if not avoiding, the impact of border checks at sea. Avoiding physical border checks, strengthening the PSNI and increasing intelligence oversight of Northern Ireland should drive UK efforts to preserve peace in Northern Ireland.

Jeevan Vipinachandran holds an MSc in Comparative Politics: Conflict Studies from the London School of Economics.

All blogs published by Agora represent the views of the author and not those of the think tank.

The UK’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and human rights

Recently, there have been calls for the UK to re-evaluate its relationship with Saudi Arabia. These calls have been based on the idea that the UK is muting its human rights criticism due to the country’s importance as an ally and arms trading partner.

Amidst this criticism, the government has argued that human rights in the region are best promoted when security co-operation and economic interdependence with the Saudi Arabia are maintained. Others argue that human rights in the region would be better served through a more assertive strategy, and that the UK government is not genuinely concerned with human rights in the region.

Evidence suggests that the government’s strategy of engaging Saudi Arabia on security matters to export more ethical international norms is not working. Moreover, any professionalisation that is achieved through continued close cooperation is overshadowed completely by the UK’s continued support of Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the war in Yemen.

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The UK has a renewed role in the future of Afghanistan

The UK has provided military, diplomatic, and development support to Afghanistan for for nearly two decades. Now it must continue to work closely with the US in pressuring Pakistan to keep the Taliban at the intra-Afghan talks.

Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab recently voiced support for the intra-Afghan peace talks, which began on 12 September in Doha, Qatar. He advocated for all parties to strive for an “inclusive and sustainable peace”. This is no easy task, as 20 years of similar talks, beginning after the Taliban regime was toppled by US-led coalition forces in 2001, have shown.

In his speech, Raab reiterated the UK’s extensive military and diplomatic role in Afghanistan since 2001. The UK became the second largest contributor of troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), deploying approximately 140,000 British troops to Afghanistan between 2001-14 under Operation Herrick. UK involvement in Afghanistan accelerated in 2006 with the construction of Camp Bastion, which alone would house 30,000 troops.

As the war became increasingly unpopular among the alliance, NATO members agreed on an exit strategy to withdraw foreign troops from Afghanistan and to assist in the transfer of responsibility for security to Afghan forces. In 2014, Cameron withdrew most UK troops from Operation Herrick, leaving behind an estimated 1000 soldiers in the country to mentor and assist local forces under Operation Toral. The Ministry of Defence predicts that the costs of UK involvement in Afghanistan may exceed £40bn. The UK has lost 456 soldiers, with more than 2000 wounded.

Despite a declining military presence in Afghanistan, the UK continues to push for peace and stability. Over the last three years, the UK has delivered £750m to Afghanistan in development and humanitarian aid. Recently, the Government announced a package to help combat the threat of COVID-19 and famine to “protect the poorest”. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has said the UK’s motivation for a stable Afghanistan is “to prevent Afghanistan once again becoming a place from which al-Qaeda and other extremists can attack the UK and our interests”.

More broadly, international concerns for the future of Afghanistan are driven by various interests. Firstly, stability creates economic opportunities for regional actors. China’s main motivation in the Doha talks are the vast resources in Central Asia, to which Afghanistan can provide better access. Secondly, the proximity of NATO forces to Russia’s sphere of influence increases tensions and means the future of the country is a high priority for both. Thirdly, combatting the spread of terrorism is high on the agenda for many, particularly given that multiple terrorist cells are emerging across India and Central Asia. With this in mind, fruitful negotiations seem, now more than ever, of highest priority and relevance for all parties involved.

Negotiating a stable Afghanistan requires the British government to cooperate closely with Pakistan. In a post-9/11 context, the UK’s diplomatic mission in Pakistan has evolved to become one of the largest in the world to reflect Pakistan’s critical role in the global war on terror. But British interests in Pakistan, which previously acted as a safe haven for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, go beyond threats to national security. Post-Brexit, the UK is incentivised to pursue as many allies as possible beyond Europe and the Anglosphere. Promoting strong relations with Commonwealth states, such as Pakistan and India, paves the way for a stronger UK presence in South Asia, whilst granting the nation access to a broader scope of trading partners.

British High Commissioner to Pakistan, Christian Turner, recently described Pakistan as ‘key in […] Intra-Afghan Negotiations’, however Pakistan’s intentions at the talks are unclear. Whilst officials emphasise Pakistan’s role only as a facilitator in the process, some experts suggest that Islamabad’s attempts to push the Taliban to the table are a move to reduce India’s influence in Afghanistan and the wider region. Protesters have demanded that the British government increase efforts to pressure Pakistan to halt its interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, but the UK is less convinced that they can have a direct influence on Pakistan.

Only diplomatic pressure can keep the Taliban at the table. This begins with eliminating the Taliban’s spoiling strategies which continue to disrupt the peace talks. Whilst the UK may have limited influence on Pakistan’s role, if the UK is to reduce the risks emanating from an unstable Afghanistan and protect regional interests, then the British government must work closer with the US to reassure Pakistan. Cooperation is required between all actors at the table in order to reach an agreement that will satisfy the interests of all parties and most importantly, secure the peace and stability of Afghanistan and its citizens.

Eleanor Wong is studying for a Masters in Peace Research and International Relations at the University of Tübingen.

The UK must work with its allies to stop Russian escalation in Libya

Russia’s deployment of combat aircraft to support warlord Khalifa Haftar in the ongoing Libyan Civil War indicates a desire to retain a permanent footing in Libya. This has serious implications for the UK, NATO, and the EU.

The civil war in Libya

Following the fall of leader Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, efforts to deliver real and lasting political stability in Libya have failed. The weak government institutions, formed after Qaddafi was removed, could not prevent armed violence and non-state groups proliferating.

Amidst the chaos, Khalifa Hafter seized Libya’s oil infrastructure. He would then lay siege to the UN recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in the country’s capital, Tripoli. Recently, he has been pushed back from the city and is poised to withdraw from western Libya.

The conflict between General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army and the GNA has become increasingly internationalised. The international backers of both Haftar and the GNA have committed significant support. Hafter enjoys the support of Russia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and others. The GNA has strong backing from Turkey. As Haftar suffers heavy losses and retreats from western Libya, Russia has escalated its involvement, by quietly deploying 14 combat aircraft to Libya.

The rise of Russia

An increased Russian role in Libya has a number of risks for the EU and NATO, either through a permanent military presence, strong political influence, or both.

Firstly, Russia could weaponise the major migration routes that move through Libya. Libya is a major transit hub for migrants seeking to reach the EU, because of its porous southern borders and proximity to regions experiencing severe economic and political issues. This was previously weaponised by Qaddafi, who exploited Europe’s nativist fears to secure billions in investments. Following the fall of Qaddafi, migration through Libya to Europe rose dramatically. To combat this, Italy signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA, which involves the GNA intercepting migrant vessels and forcing their return to Libya, where migrants are detained indefinitely in grave conditions.

Russia has been accused of weaponising migration previously in Syria. This, according to one US and NATO Commander, drove hundreds of thousands of Syrians to Europe “to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve”. It could do the same again in Libya. Manipulating migration patterns into southern Europe could be used to sow dissent and discord within the EU and NATO.

Secondly, Russia could deploy assets to eastern Libya to threaten NATO’s southern flank and frustrate access to the mediterranean. Given the UK’s military bases in Cyprus and naval facilities in the Middle East, this could seriously threaten access to Suez and the eastern Mediteranean. This is particularly worrying, given how Russia possesses weapons systems that can be rapidly deployed with little infrastructure support. Russia has already deployed the SU-24 – a strike aircraft with significant anti-ship capability and an effective range over 1000KM – to Libya. More lethal aircraft could be deployed if necessary.

Two systems merit consideration: the S-400 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system and the P-800 Anti Ship Missile (ASM) system. The S-400 can target aircraft out to 250-400km, and the P-800 can target ships up to 300km offshore. Both the S-400 and P-800 are wheeled, all-terrain mobile systems that require limited manpower to operate. When they are deployed in appropriate numbers and with readily available support systems – aircraft, drones, satellites and other missile systems – they are highly effective.

The UK response

Russian strategy has been deeply opportunistic (capitalising on western ambivalence) in seizing territory in Georgia and Ukraine, and intervening in Syria. Its escalating involvement in Libya fits comfortably within this pattern; the conflict in Libya is highly internationalised, with a number of nations wielding decisive influence.

The UK and its allies must advocate for peaceful negotiations to achieve a cohesive government that is not expressly beholden to the interests of foreign powers. To do this, the UK and its close allies can influence Khalifa Haftar’s main backers – Turkey, Russia, UAE, Egypt – individually, to effect broad change. If they want to avoid increased Russian leverage over them, the UK, EU, and NATO must prevent the exploitation of Libya by Russia.

Jack Sargent is co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme.