Defence & Security

The UK has provided military, diplomatic, and development support to Afghanistan for for nearly two decades. Now it must continue to work closely with the US in pressuring Pakistan to keep the Taliban at the intra-Afghan talks.

Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab recently voiced support for the intra-Afghan peace talks, which began on 12 September in Doha, Qatar. He advocated for all parties to strive for an “inclusive and sustainable peace”. This is no easy task, as 20 years of similar talks, beginning after the Taliban regime was toppled by US-led coalition forces in 2001, have shown.

In his speech, Raab reiterated the UK’s extensive military and diplomatic role in Afghanistan since 2001. The UK became the second largest contributor of troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), deploying approximately 140,000 British troops to Afghanistan between 2001-14 under Operation Herrick. UK involvement in Afghanistan accelerated in 2006 with the construction of Camp Bastion, which alone would house 30,000 troops.

As the war became increasingly unpopular among the alliance, NATO members agreed on an exit strategy to withdraw foreign troops from Afghanistan and to assist in the transfer of responsibility for security to Afghan forces. In 2014, Cameron withdrew most UK troops from Operation Herrick, leaving behind an estimated 1000 soldiers in the country to mentor and assist local forces under Operation Toral. The Ministry of Defence predicts that the costs of UK involvement in Afghanistan may exceed £40bn. The UK has lost 456 soldiers, with more than 2000 wounded.

Despite a declining military presence in Afghanistan, the UK continues to push for peace and stability. Over the last three years, the UK has delivered £750m to Afghanistan in development and humanitarian aid. Recently, the Government announced a package to help combat the threat of COVID-19 and famine to “protect the poorest”. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has said the UK’s motivation for a stable Afghanistan is “to prevent Afghanistan once again becoming a place from which al-Qaeda and other extremists can attack the UK and our interests”.

More broadly, international concerns for the future of Afghanistan are driven by various interests. Firstly, stability creates economic opportunities for regional actors. China’s main motivation in the Doha talks are the vast resources in Central Asia, to which Afghanistan can provide better access. Secondly, the proximity of NATO forces to Russia’s sphere of influence increases tensions and means the future of the country is a high priority for both. Thirdly, combatting the spread of terrorism is high on the agenda for many, particularly given that multiple terrorist cells are emerging across India and Central Asia. With this in mind, fruitful negotiations seem, now more than ever, of highest priority and relevance for all parties involved.

Negotiating a stable Afghanistan requires the British government to cooperate closely with Pakistan. In a post-9/11 context, the UK’s diplomatic mission in Pakistan has evolved to become one of the largest in the world to reflect Pakistan’s critical role in the global war on terror. But British interests in Pakistan, which previously acted as a safe haven for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, go beyond threats to national security. Post-Brexit, the UK is incentivised to pursue as many allies as possible beyond Europe and the Anglosphere. Promoting strong relations with Commonwealth states, such as Pakistan and India, paves the way for a stronger UK presence in South Asia, whilst granting the nation access to a broader scope of trading partners.

British High Commissioner to Pakistan, Christian Turner, recently described Pakistan as ‘key in […] Intra-Afghan Negotiations’, however Pakistan’s intentions at the talks are unclear. Whilst officials emphasise Pakistan’s role only as a facilitator in the process, some experts suggest that Islamabad’s attempts to push the Taliban to the table are a move to reduce India’s influence in Afghanistan and the wider region. Protesters have demanded that the British government increase efforts to pressure Pakistan to halt its interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, but the UK is less convinced that they can have a direct influence on Pakistan.

Only diplomatic pressure can keep the Taliban at the table. This begins with eliminating the Taliban’s spoiling strategies which continue to disrupt the peace talks. Whilst the UK may have limited influence on Pakistan’s role, if the UK is to reduce the risks emanating from an unstable Afghanistan and protect regional interests, then the British government must work closer with the US to reassure Pakistan. Cooperation is required between all actors at the table in order to reach an agreement that will satisfy the interests of all parties and most importantly, secure the peace and stability of Afghanistan and its citizens.

Eleanor Wong is studying for a Masters in Peace Research and International Relations at the University of Tübingen.

Russia’s deployment of combat aircraft to support warlord Khalifa Haftar in the ongoing Libyan Civil War indicates a desire to retain a permanent footing in Libya. This has serious implications for the UK, NATO, and the EU.

The civil war in Libya

Following the fall of leader Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, efforts to deliver real and lasting political stability in Libya have failed. The weak government institutions, formed after Qaddafi was removed, could not prevent armed violence and non-state groups proliferating.

Amidst the chaos, Khalifa Hafter seized Libya’s oil infrastructure. He would then lay siege to the UN recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in the country’s capital, Tripoli. Recently, he has been pushed back from the city and is poised to withdraw from western Libya.

The conflict between General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army and the GNA has become increasingly internationalised. The international backers of both Haftar and the GNA have committed significant support. Hafter enjoys the support of Russia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and others. The GNA has strong backing from Turkey. As Haftar suffers heavy losses and retreats from western Libya, Russia has escalated its involvement, by quietly deploying 14 combat aircraft to Libya.

The rise of Russia

An increased Russian role in Libya has a number of risks for the EU and NATO, either through a permanent military presence, strong political influence, or both.

Firstly, Russia could weaponise the major migration routes that move through Libya. Libya is a major transit hub for migrants seeking to reach the EU, because of its porous southern borders and proximity to regions experiencing severe economic and political issues. This was previously weaponised by Qaddafi, who exploited Europe’s nativist fears to secure billions in investments. Following the fall of Qaddafi, migration through Libya to Europe rose dramatically. To combat this, Italy signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA, which involves the GNA intercepting migrant vessels and forcing their return to Libya, where migrants are detained indefinitely in grave conditions.

Russia has been accused of weaponising migration previously in Syria. This, according to one US and NATO Commander, drove hundreds of thousands of Syrians to Europe “to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve”. It could do the same again in Libya. Manipulating migration patterns into southern Europe could be used to sow dissent and discord within the EU and NATO.

Secondly, Russia could deploy assets to eastern Libya to threaten NATO’s southern flank and frustrate access to the mediterranean. Given the UK’s military bases in Cyprus and naval facilities in the Middle East, this could seriously threaten access to Suez and the eastern Mediteranean. This is particularly worrying, given how Russia possesses weapons systems that can be rapidly deployed with little infrastructure support. Russia has already deployed the SU-24 – a strike aircraft with significant anti-ship capability and an effective range over 1000KM – to Libya. More lethal aircraft could be deployed if necessary.

Two systems merit consideration: the S-400 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system and the P-800 Anti Ship Missile (ASM) system. The S-400 can target aircraft out to 250-400km, and the P-800 can target ships up to 300km offshore. Both the S-400 and P-800 are wheeled, all-terrain mobile systems that require limited manpower to operate. When they are deployed in appropriate numbers and with readily available support systems – aircraft, drones, satellites and other missile systems – they are highly effective.

The UK response

Russian strategy has been deeply opportunistic (capitalising on western ambivalence) in seizing territory in Georgia and Ukraine, and intervening in Syria. Its escalating involvement in Libya fits comfortably within this pattern; the conflict in Libya is highly internationalised, with a number of nations wielding decisive influence.

The UK and its allies must advocate for peaceful negotiations to achieve a cohesive government that is not expressly beholden to the interests of foreign powers. To do this, the UK and its close allies can influence Khalifa Haftar’s main backers – Turkey, Russia, UAE, Egypt – individually, to effect broad change. If they want to avoid increased Russian leverage over them, the UK, EU, and NATO must prevent the exploitation of Libya by Russia.

Jack Sargent is co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme.

With China now deploying hypersonic missiles, the aircraft carriers HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales could be at a distinct risk. To address this, the UK should invest carefully in defences capable of defeating hypersonic missiles whose extreme speed may overwhelm missile defense systems.

The carrier

HMS Queen Elizabeth currently serves with the Royal Navy as the latest and largest in a long line of UK aircraft carriers, which carry British jets at sea, enabling the UK to project power and protect its global interests. Announced in 2007, her entry into service was delayed until 2020 due to budget cuts announced in the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review, at a final cost of a little over £6bn. HMS Queen Elizabeth will be followed in front-line service by sister ship the HMS Prince of Wales in 2023.

Aircraft carriers are the best means of projecting UK naval power, enabling Britain to swiftly intervene in international crises and also to protect vital sea-based trade effectively.

There has been debate over how effectively carriers such as HMS Queen Elizabeth can continue to protect British interests. Two alternatives – missile carrying arsenal ships and submarines – cannot effectively replace them. Arsenal ships do not match the complexity of the aircraft carrier, which possess greater flexibility in striking power. Carrier-based aircraft can carry many different weapons for distinct targets and jet pilots can adapt to changing circumstances. Carriers also possess assets such as airborne early warning radars, which can scan the skies and seas for threats; these cannot operate on a smaller arsenal ship due to lack of space on board.
Submarines can deny enemy access to strategic waters. However their utility for sea control, dominating the waters in a given area, is limited by their need for stealth. Once detected, submarines are vulnerable. Submarines, such as the under-induction Astute class, can effectively supplement the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier but cannot replace it.

Enter hypersonic missiles

Hypersonic weapons move at over five times the speed of sound, leaving mere seconds for a ship’s defences to react.. However with adequate investment in defences, such as early warning and directed energy weapons, there is no reason the aircraft carrier cannot remain at the fore of Britain’s security strategy.

China has been claiming vast swathes of ocean in South-East Asia, denying ships from smaller nations the right of movement – freedom of navigation – on the seas. The so-called Asian Quad (India, Japan, the US, and Australia) is therefore stepping up military efforts to balance China’s challenge to regional freedom of navigation in the South China Seas. The Quad nations are now holding exercises in the Indian Ocean and deploying warships to waters in East Asia to balance Chinese power.

As a key US and Australian ally, and a beneficiary of open sea lanes, the UK would well become involved in any confrontation with China. China is now making concerted investment in hypersonic weapons as part of a package of offensive weapon systems, designed to deny access to and restrict movement in contested areas. Chinese hypersonic missiles pose a genuine threat to British aircraft carriers.

Investing in counter-measures

Counter-measures to hypersonic weapons do exist. Speeding up the induction of Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems such as the ‘Crowsnest’ – Airborne Early Warning (AEW) – helicopter by the end of 2020 enables early detection. A helicopter based radar like Crowsnest can scan over the horizon to detect an incoming hypersonic threat early enough for defences to be effective. Sophisticated infrared sensors on the F-35 jet, which the Queen Elizabeth class carry, can detect a hypersonic launch early, as will space based surveillance assets. Together, these multi-spectral, multi-platform sensors can make a deployment of aircraft carriers viable in a hypersonic weapon environment.

Laser weapons and railguns are potentially able to defend against emerging naval threats, because they can match high hypersonic speeds. The US Navy has begun deploying small scale laser weapons for missile defence. Railguns use electromagnetic force to fire projectiles at roughly six times the speed of sound. Research into railguns is actively focusing on their use in missile defence. Another such system could be Glide Breaker, a US project to develop anti-missile systems to neutralise hypersonic threats. Both could theoretically deal with the hypersonic threat, potentially intercepting them a few seconds before they hit the ship. The Royal Navy should increase cooperation with the US, which leads global research on railgun technology.

While hypersonic weapons will require a renewed focus on space and airborne early warning, they will not make the aircraft carrier obsolete. With multiple solutions emerging, a ‘hard-kill’ response that can protect carriers is imminent. The UK and the Royal Navy would be well served by continued investment in a modern carrier capability going forward.

Jeevan Vipinachandran holds an MSc in Comparative Politics: Conflict Studies from the London School of Economics.

Iran’s proxy forces in Iraq could operate independently of Iran’s wishes. They may inadvertently draw the UK into armed conflict with Iran. Only comprehensive domestic reform in Iraq can minimise the threat of these groups.

Iran supports and trains large Shia militias in the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). The PMF were formed in response to the disintegration of the Iraqi military in the face of ISIS. These groups include Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, The Badr Organisation and others. Members of these militias occupy key positions in Iraqi institutions and occupy seats in the Iraqi Parliament. These groups are key fronts for Iranian influence in Iraq.

While Iran undoubtedly wields decisive influence in these groups, this does not translate into direct control. Iran’s proxy groups generally behave according to their own best interests, taking into account local considerations. Some of these militias lack a clear command structure and are, in the words of researcher Michael Knights, “extraordinarily complex, and hard to manage at the best of times”.

For example, Kata’ib Hezbollah has carried out lethal strikes against western forces in Iraq. In response, the US has struck Kata’ib Hezbollah’s bases throughout Iraq and Syria and assassinated its leader, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis.

UK policy must recognise that two emerging trends in Iraq might weaken Iran’s control of these groups. These are the growing political conflict between Shia clergy in Najaf (Iraq) and Qom (Iran), and emerging Iraqi nationalism.

The Najaf-Qom dispute is a fundamental disagreement between two distinct worldviews. The Najaf clergy advance the traditional belief that they should have limited involvement in governance. In contrast, Qom is the home of Valeyet-e which is the current political system of Iran and involves key control of state matters by the Shia clergy. This dispute has taken on strong political dimensions. Iranian efforts to dominate Iraq have become increasingly unpopular amongst the Iraqi public and the Najaf clergy is seeking to regain prominence after decades of Baathist repression. Most recently, PMF militias loyal to Najaf have left the PMF at Najaf’s beckoning, as Iraqi efforts to exert control over the PMF and absorb it into the state increase. This move damages the legitimacy of the remaining pro-Iranian groups. Since the PMF originally formed at Sistani’s behest in 2014, the public has called for Najaf-aligned groups to withdraw, which damages the legitimacy initially held by the PMF.

Likewise, emerging Iraqi nationalism is going to frustrate Iran’s efforts to control the PMF groups it carefully cultivated. Iraq has seen repeated and widespread protests against the perceived chronically corrupt and inept post-2003 political system as well as the foreign influence considered to contribute to its failure. The 2019 protests, which started in October, saw several hundred thousand protestors stall the nation’s economy in pursuit of political reform. Iran itself was often the target of these protests, with the Iranian consulate in Najaf being burnt down. These protests have also rallied against foreign interference more broadly. As recently as January of this year protestors decried Iraq’s role as staging ground for any would-be conflict between Iran and the US. Iran-backed militias have harshly opposed the protests. They are alleged to have used lethal violence against protestors.

The burgeoning Najaf-Qom dispute and emerging Iraqi nationalism has the potential to socially and politically ostracise Iran-backed Shia militias, given Iran’s sharp dip in popularity in Iraq. The removal of pro-Najaf forces from the PMF strips them of the legitimacy it gave them, and their opposition to the widespread protests might damage their standing in any new political order that may emerge.

In order to avoid social and political ostracisation, they may aggressively target Western forces to co-opt the widespread unpopularity of foreign interference in Iraq and offset their own foreign backing. As well as, this Iranian-backed groups may agitate any nationalist government in Baghdad, which they may perceive as a threat to their existence or as anti-Shia.

This has significant policy implications for the UK. Should an Iranian-backed militia strike coalition forces without Iranian approval, it could spark conflict. The US has already struck both key Iranian officials in Iraq and Iran-backed militias. If Iran’s proxies aggressively target Western forces, US response may precipitate war.

Consequently, British policy should be to strengthen the Iraqi state and diffuse tensions with Iran regionally. The UK must recognise that its interests are best served by helping to combat the chronic levels of corruption within the Iraqi state, to restore its capacity and legitimacy. In tandem, diplomatic efforts with Iran must be renewed.

The 2015 Nuclear Deal showed that diplomatic settlements with Iran are achievable, sustainable, and able to greatly reduce tensions. Relations with Iran could be guaranteed despite the dismal state of US-Iran diplomacy given the UK’s track record in maintaining notably better relations. Only decisive diplomatic engagement with Iran can remove the risk of war.

Jack Sargent is co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme.