Defence & Security

Economic sanctions have been imposed on states – including Venezuela, Iran, and Cuba – by the US, EU, and UK for years. As the devastation of COVID-19 escalates, the morality of sustaining an economic sanctions regime is being challenged. The UK should embrace calls from the UN, lift economic sanctions indefinitely, and exert pressure on the US to follow suit (whilst holding the Trump administration to account for racial state-sanctioned violence).

For the first time in decades, every state faces the same monumental challenge: COVID-19. Globally, healthcare systems are being strained beyond capacity, as livelihoods are jeopardised. However, some states are uniquely penalised by economic sanctions in addition to the harrowing challenges to organisation and healthcare provision brought on by the pandemic.

The imposition of economic sanctions – the suspension of trade and financial relations – is often justified on grounds of democracy or human rights promotion and framed as a peaceful alternative to combat. In practice, economic sanctions often become a tool used by powerful states to coerce those viewed as a threat to their interests. The disastrous financial effects they inflict are often destabilising. Even under non-pandemic conditions, their use is highly contested and widely argued to be a far greater punishment to the citizens of a nation than their leaders. In Iran, economic sanctions have triggered a deep recession since reinstatement in 2018. Economically vulnerable Iranians are worst affected by these measures, yet they are entirely blameless.

The US has historically deployed an extensive sanctions regime, increasing in scope under the Trump administration. Many sanctions targets are arguably penalised for their ideological stance, with socialist Venezuela and Cuba a high priority. Such political motivations were recently evidenced by Trump’s attempts to barter a power-sharing agreement in Venezuela, in which economic sanctions would be lifted on the condition President Maduro step down. Shortly after this offer was refused, the US government sent warships to the Caribbean and indicted members of Venezuela’s government on charges of “narco-terrorism”. As well as being a highly disputed claim, it does not make sense for the US to target drug trafficking-crackdown efforts on Venezuela; there are more influenceable transit states (such as Colombia), with greater evidence of drug trafficking, to focus on. US government data even demonstrates that cocaine flows through Venezuela – beyond the control of government officials – have declined since 2017. In the context of a pandemic and recent denial of a critical IMF loan to Venezuela, economic sanctions and unwarranted geopolitical escalation are disastrous.

Despite a tumultuous political situation in Venezuela since April 2019, and widespread reports of human rights abuses, the actions of the US have exacerbated conflict and inflicted further economic suffering on citizens. The motivations for US economic sanctions remain highly politicised, often representing a broader attempt to interfere in matters of national sovereignty. There is no place for this amidst a global pandemic. Economic sanctions cost lives. Access to critical medical equipment becomes exponentially harder when states, companies, and financial institutions refuse to engage.

The pushback against the economic sanctions regime has risen in response to the pandemic. The UN has called on states to lift sanctions, and public petitions for the removal of sanctions on Iran and Cuba have received widespread support. The UK’s ‘special relationship’ and the recent upswing in diplomatic closeness with the US could prove pivotal in this sanctions debate. Thus far, the UK has taken steps to put pressure on the US to ease sanctions against Iran due to the pandemic, and a recent call from over 50 MPs to intervene against the US blockade of Cuba is promising.

Whilst putting pressure on the US to ease its economic sanctions against other states, the UK and EU governments should reassess their free arms trade relationship with the Trump administration. Recent Black Lives Matter protests against institutional racism and police brutality commencing in the US additionally impose foreign policy obligations on the UK government to instigate a police arms embargo. A call to end the export of policing equipment like rubber bullets and tear gas – currently utilised for internal repression – has been signed by 166 MPs across parties, and Scottish Parliament just passed a ban.

The UK sanctions regime needs to evolve; while economic sanctions cannot be condoned against states struggling under COVID-19, the free trade of rubber bullets and tear gas fuelling Trump’s oppressive response to protestors is equally unjustifiable. Failing to take these actions will result in inhumane and preventable loss of life for which the UK will be responsible. If international solidarity can be salvaged, and exclusionary economic sanctions lifted, perhaps dialogue with Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba could be resuscitated. Britain’s sanctions regime shouldn’t economically strangle citizens of recipient states, and neither should it allow citizens of its allies to become the targets of racialised state violence.

Holly Harwood is Agora’s Head of Outreach.

COVID-19 has presented the UK with an abundance of challenges, including numerous threats to the country’s cyber security which have developed alongside the pandemic. More must be done to combat these threats.

COVID-19 is being increasingly exploited by cyber actors. Vulnerable individuals continue to be conned. In February alone, victims in the UK lost more than £800,000 to COVID-19-related scams. In March, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) was reported to have taken down more than 2,000 online coronavirus scams, including 471 hoax online shops which were selling “fraudulent virus-related items”.

There are other, serious threats to our online and offline presence. The security of remote platforms such as Zoom for sensitive commercial and government communication remains in doubt. A ransomware attack on a hospital in Brno, Czech Republic reminded the UK to not become complacent after the 2017 WannaCry attacks. In response, the NCSC recently released a joint advisory in cooperation with the United States’ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), pertaining to the exploitation of COVID-19 by cyber criminal and advanced persistent threat (APT) groups.

One of the most prominent cyber threats are phishing emails and sites. The NCSC has taken down over 470 fake online stores selling COVID-19-related items and 200 phishing sites designed to harvest user information in the last month. Google claims to be removing 240m coronavirus-themed spam messages and 18m malware and phishing e-mails daily. Scammers have most notably been circulating malicious e-mails under the pretense of the World Health Organisation, to exploit the public’s faith in trusted institutions. These e-mails advertise scam employment opportunities, request detailed information, or ask for donations or registration fees in return for funds or vague benefits. In response, the Government implemented its suspicious email reporting service (SERS) on 21 April which successfully led to the shutdown of 80 malicious web campaigns after 5,151 suspicious emails were reported on its first day of service.

The advice from the NCSC and CISA also observes a rise in cyberattacks on remote access infrastructures as the UK work force transitions to working from home. Cyber actors have exploited a range of known vulnerabilities in VPNs (Virtual Private Networks), which enable users to send and receive data shared across public or shared networks, and other remote working tools and software.

They have also been successful in hijacking online meetings, which has led to investigations after at least three Zoom meetings were infiltrated and images of child sexual abuse were projected onto screens. One group targeted were the Bristol-based Celebrate Recovery, whose Zoom meeting was disrupted by abuse images. While Zoom has been approved for everyday use, its vulnerabilities are still readily exploitable by malicious actors.

Ransomware attacks are a persistent risk to UK infrastructure. The 2017 WannaCry attack on the NHS affected 80 out of 236 hospital trusts across England, something the UK must not let this happen again as the country struggles with COVID-19.

This attack on a medical institution was not an isolated incident. In March, a hospital in the Czech Republic was hit by a ransomware attack which resulted in heavy disruption. An Illinois state health website was held hostage as hackers demanded a ransom to restore the system containing personal information of 210,000 patients. The NCSC is also aware of increasing attempts by APT groups – most notably China and Russia, who deny involvement – to exploit COVID-19 to penetrate government databases.

The NCSC details tips for defending against online-meeting hijacking, as well as providing guidance for individuals and organisations. However, more needs to be done to lower susceptibility to threats.

There are calls for the Government to further promote cybersecurity training, as it was recently discovered that 66% of remote workers have not been trained in cybersecurity in the last 12 months. Furthermore, the Government should continue to push businesses and organisations to update their cyberskills, with 48% of British organisations reporting that they were unable to carry out basic tasks defined in the Cyber Essentials Scheme, including setting up firewalls, storing data, and removing malware.

Particularly with the NHS tracing app in mind, the Government should be working closely with software developers to ensure that confidential information is not compromised. Moreover, the UK should continue to improve and secure its cyber security infrastructure, in order to avoid a repeat of the WannaCry scandal. All of these recommendations should be taken into consideration as the UK strives to be what the Government describes as “the safest place in the world to live and work online”.

Eleanor Wong is studying for a Masters in Peace Research and International Relations at the University of Tübingen.

MANPADS are a widespread, yet continually underestimated, weapon system that threatens the UK armed forces and their partner nations.

MANPADS (Man Portable, Air Defence Systems) are lightweight, shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles. These are short-range systems that particularly threaten low flying and slow moving aircraft. They originated in the Cold War to provide mobile air defence for ground forces and have spread widely. MANPADS are lethal to civilian aircraft during takeoff or landing.

MANPADS have struck 40 civilian aircraft since the 1970s, causing 800 deaths and 28 crashes. According to US estimates there are 500,000-750,000 MANPADS across the world. MANPADS are also potent against military aviation, downing 269 Soviet aircraft during the Soviet-Afghan War. They are attractive to underfunded militaries, as they provide a limited form of air-defence for a fraction of costly long range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.

Despite international efforts, MANPADS can still be illicitly distributed. Not only does corruption in many areas of the world ease the spread of these weapons, the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya rendered vast stockpiles of MANPADS unaccounted for. Likewise, the Syrian Civil War saw the dramatic loosening of control over regime stockpiles. A similar situation currently exists in Yemen.

MANPADS have also been supplied directly to terrorist groups by states. Gaddafi’s Libya supplied the Irish Republican Army with MANPADs. Iran and Syria are suspected of supplying MANPADS to Hamas and Hezbollah. Herein lies the threat of MANPADs, there are multiple illicit supply lines and a demonstrated effectiveness.

The UK armed forces needs to adopt measures to protect forces in combat environments from MANPADS. For example, the slow moving cargo aircraft that are critical to supplying forces in Afghanistan are highly vulnerable on takeoff or landing. The Taliban possess MANPADS and have targeted NATO heavy lift aircraft with them.

Further, MANPADS will be a part of any conflict in which the UK finds itself, such as a regional conflict with Iran in the Middle East. They could prove effective in frustrating efforts at deploying forces, evacuating nationals, and targeting allied nations. Iran manufactures its own MANPADS which have seen successful use with the Houthis in Yemen. Likewise, MANPADS could prove especially lethal to UK partner nations currently fighting terrorist groups in Africa. Nigeria’s operations against Boko Haram are aided greatly by their airpower, and MANPADS could frustrate this advantage.

This is also the case with Al-Shabaab, who have attacked Kenyan forces and military installations. Al-Shabaab possess MANPADS of varying sophistication, using one to shoot down a UN transport plane in 2007. This speaks to the broader trend of developing nations with limited military capacity being on the frontline of combatting terrorism. Without a viable counter, MANPADS could degrade these nation’s airpower and mobility (a critical advantage when fighting terrorist groups).

While modern air defence systems such as the UK Sky Sabre could potentially intercept MANPADS with its Common Anti-Air Modular Missile, this was designed to target cruise missiles and guided munitions, so it is unclear whether MANPADS are considered. Sky Sabre is also limited by its 25km range, which renders it unable to protect aircraft providing close air support and troop transport. Increased funding is needed to provide training and develop systems which can be shared with partner nations, and operated with minimal ground support on vulnerable aircraft. Such systems include electronic countermeasures (ECMs) and infrared countermeasures (IRCMs).

While these can be effective, they struggle against multiple coordinated volleys of modern missiles. Their patchy usage among the forces of developing nations leaves much room for improvement. The current enthusiasm for developing countermeasures to drones can provide a launchpad for renewing efforts to develop effective counters to MANPADS.

In addition to developing countermeasures, the UK should also pursue a policy campaign to drive the greater control of these systems. The Wassenaar Arrangement’s Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS is a welcome development in this field as it imposes strict regulations on participating states relating to the manufacturing, storage, and export of MANPADS. Nations who possess or manufacture large numbers of MANPADS, such as China, Egypt, Iran, North Korea and Pakistan, are, however, not party to it. The UK should actively seek to encourage their involvement.

Additionally, the implementation of ‘buyback’ programmes such as those carried out by the US during the Iraq and Afghan War, and in Libya may warrant consideration. In Libya, local militias sell their MANPADS to local government, who either secure or destroy the systems. While controversial, these programmes have secured hundreds of MANPADS in the past. Their success merits consideration.. MANPADS are certain to remain an ever present threat to British civilian and military interests, and the UK must do more to secure itself and its interests in the face of this widespread threat.

Jack Sargent is Co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme

The recent escalation of conflict between the US and Iran has turned international attention towards Iraq, however, with the potential for Iran to strike Western forces in Afghanistan, it is more important than ever to ensure meaningful peace and stability in the country.

As tensions with Iran spiral following the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, the UK needs to recognise the vulnerability of the Resolute Support coalition – a NATO-led train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan – to Iranian attack. Iran has demonstrated expertise in conducting strikes that have made attributing blame difficult and allowed them to extend their influence relatively unhindered (an ability that can be readily applied to Afghanistan). Recent Iranian attacks should alarm Resolute Support, whose theatre of operations is deeply vulnerable to Iran.

Since 1983, Iran has orchestrated devastating attacks against Western forces in the Middle East, while avoiding military retaliation. The success of this strategy was demonstrated in its first attack, where massive bombings were carried out against US and French forces deployed in Lebanon. Following the loss of nearly 300 personnel, both nations withdrew. Since these attacks, Iran has developed a sophisticated asymmetric warfare capability.

Since the deployment of western forces to Afghanistan in late 2001, Iran has maintained an active presence in the country. The leaked Afghan war logs indicate Iran – among other things – incentivised the assassination of Afghan government officials and soldiers, supplied parts for Taliban Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) against UK forces in Sangin Province, Helmand and facilitated the movement and training of foreign fighters into Afghanistan. These operations provide the requisite experience to launch direct and destructive operations against coalition forces.

Domestic changes may make Tehran more willing to make risky moves internationally, and the most recent Iranian actions, such as targeting key global infrastructure, point to this. Internally, Iran is under intense pressure, as the country struggles with international sanctions and costly endeavours in Syria. Iran’s strategy is to force a change in US policy and weaken economic sanctions.

Soleimani’s killing and the accidental shooting down of a commercial airline flight have created a strong impetus for Iran to shift focus away from their loss and embarrassment. This increasing appetite for retaliation comes at a time when the Resolute Support coalition has shifted away from the large International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) missions into a more limited training and advising mission. Accompanying this shift are highly restrictive rules of engagement that limit access of advisers to Afghan forces and key stakeholders. For many local and international actors in Afghanistan, this has signalled the decreasing interest of Western policymakers in Afghanistan and created an opportunity for Iran to increase its own foothold.

While there is significant combat capability within the current NATO forces, it is greatly reduced. UK and US forces deployed with NATO number roughly 1,000 and 12,500 respectively.

The opportunity for Iran, then, is clearly exploitable through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which was set up after the Iranian Revolution and has a long history of training and equipping local groups across the Middle East. Iran would almost certainly attempt to retain some degree of plausible deniability, such as staging well planned and coordinated bombings that target US or UK forces, with a seperate organisation claiming responsibility. Iran already operates militias in Afghanistan, which could provide a front for attacks against Western forces.

As with the 1983 attack, a single large strike against a coalition target could precipitate a hastier withdrawal from a US administration with little appetite for ‘endless wars’. Every other Resolute Support partner lacks real ability to maintain Afghan operations in the event of a US withdrawal.

To mitigate against this, the UK needs to push for change in Resolute Support. The UK must strongly advocate for reduced violence between the Taliban and the Afghan government, even if it will prove difficult for both sides. This is important because Iranian asymmetrical activity thrives in instability. Without a viable peace deal, Western forces will likely remain in Afghanistan to some extent, while remaining vulnerable to Iranian attacks.

Great effort must be made by the UK to ensure continued negotiations take place, given the possibility of ceasefire violations and compliance issues. Should they fail, the UK must press for their renewal. British policy should recognise the support for intra-Afghan talks that exists in Afghanistan. While the Taliban have repeatedly refused to negotiate with the Afghan government, such sentiment is waning as they have negotiated with former government officials such as Hamid Karzai. Furthermore, the Afghan Government invited the Taliban to peace talks (though they did not attend). Such moves and strong public sentiment for peace bode well for building lasting stability. Such peace is necessary for the UK and its allies to extricate themselves from Afghanistan and from the threat Iran poses.

Jack Sargent is co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme.