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Defence & Security

MANPADS: An underrated threat to the UK and their allies

MANPADS are a widespread, yet continually underestimated, weapon system that threatens the UK armed forces and their partner nations.

MANPADS (Man Portable, Air Defence Systems) are lightweight, shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles. These are short-range systems that particularly threaten low flying and slow moving aircraft. They originated in the Cold War to provide mobile air defence for ground forces and have spread widely. MANPADS are lethal to civilian aircraft during takeoff or landing.

MANPADS have struck 40 civilian aircraft since the 1970s, causing 800 deaths and 28 crashes. According to US estimates there are 500,000-750,000 MANPADS across the world. MANPADS are also potent against military aviation, downing 269 Soviet aircraft during the Soviet-Afghan War. They are attractive to underfunded militaries, as they provide a limited form of air-defence for a fraction of costly long range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.

Despite international efforts, MANPADS can still be illicitly distributed. Not only does corruption in many areas of the world ease the spread of these weapons, the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya rendered vast stockpiles of MANPADS unaccounted for. Likewise, the Syrian Civil War saw the dramatic loosening of control over regime stockpiles. A similar situation currently exists in Yemen.

MANPADS have also been supplied directly to terrorist groups by states. Gaddafi’s Libya supplied the Irish Republican Army with MANPADs. Iran and Syria are suspected of supplying MANPADS to Hamas and Hezbollah. Herein lies the threat of MANPADs, there are multiple illicit supply lines and a demonstrated effectiveness.

The UK armed forces needs to adopt measures to protect forces in combat environments from MANPADS. For example, the slow moving cargo aircraft that are critical to supplying forces in Afghanistan are highly vulnerable on takeoff or landing. The Taliban possess MANPADS and have targeted NATO heavy lift aircraft with them.

Further, MANPADS will be a part of any conflict in which the UK finds itself, such as a regional conflict with Iran in the Middle East. They could prove effective in frustrating efforts at deploying forces, evacuating nationals, and targeting allied nations. Iran manufactures its own MANPADS which have seen successful use with the Houthis in Yemen. Likewise, MANPADS could prove especially lethal to UK partner nations currently fighting terrorist groups in Africa. Nigeria’s operations against Boko Haram are aided greatly by their airpower, and MANPADS could frustrate this advantage.

This is also the case with Al-Shabaab, who have attacked Kenyan forces and military installations. Al-Shabaab possess MANPADS of varying sophistication, using one to shoot down a UN transport plane in 2007. This speaks to the broader trend of developing nations with limited military capacity being on the frontline of combatting terrorism. Without a viable counter, MANPADS could degrade these nation’s airpower and mobility (a critical advantage when fighting terrorist groups).

While modern air defence systems such as the UK Sky Sabre could potentially intercept MANPADS with its Common Anti-Air Modular Missile, this was designed to target cruise missiles and guided munitions, so it is unclear whether MANPADS are considered. Sky Sabre is also limited by its 25km range, which renders it unable to protect aircraft providing close air support and troop transport. Increased funding is needed to provide training and develop systems which can be shared with partner nations, and operated with minimal ground support on vulnerable aircraft. Such systems include electronic countermeasures (ECMs) and infrared countermeasures (IRCMs).

While these can be effective, they struggle against multiple coordinated volleys of modern missiles. Their patchy usage among the forces of developing nations leaves much room for improvement. The current enthusiasm for developing countermeasures to drones can provide a launchpad for renewing efforts to develop effective counters to MANPADS.

In addition to developing countermeasures, the UK should also pursue a policy campaign to drive the greater control of these systems. The Wassenaar Arrangement’s Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS is a welcome development in this field as it imposes strict regulations on participating states relating to the manufacturing, storage, and export of MANPADS. Nations who possess or manufacture large numbers of MANPADS, such as China, Egypt, Iran, North Korea and Pakistan, are, however, not party to it. The UK should actively seek to encourage their involvement.

Additionally, the implementation of ‘buyback’ programmes such as those carried out by the US during the Iraq and Afghan War, and in Libya may warrant consideration. In Libya, local militias sell their MANPADS to local government, who either secure or destroy the systems. While controversial, these programmes have secured hundreds of MANPADS in the past. Their success merits consideration.. MANPADS are certain to remain an ever present threat to British civilian and military interests, and the UK must do more to secure itself and its interests in the face of this widespread threat.

Jack Sargent is Co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme

The UK cannot forget about Iran in Afghanistan

The recent escalation of conflict between the US and Iran has turned international attention towards Iraq, however, with the potential for Iran to strike Western forces in Afghanistan, it is more important than ever to ensure meaningful peace and stability in the country.

As tensions with Iran spiral following the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, the UK needs to recognise the vulnerability of the Resolute Support coalition – a NATO-led train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan – to Iranian attack. Iran has demonstrated expertise in conducting strikes that have made attributing blame difficult and allowed them to extend their influence relatively unhindered (an ability that can be readily applied to Afghanistan). Recent Iranian attacks should alarm Resolute Support, whose theatre of operations is deeply vulnerable to Iran.

Since 1983, Iran has orchestrated devastating attacks against Western forces in the Middle East, while avoiding military retaliation. The success of this strategy was demonstrated in its first attack, where massive bombings were carried out against US and French forces deployed in Lebanon. Following the loss of nearly 300 personnel, both nations withdrew. Since these attacks, Iran has developed a sophisticated asymmetric warfare capability.

Since the deployment of western forces to Afghanistan in late 2001, Iran has maintained an active presence in the country. The leaked Afghan war logs indicate Iran – among other things – incentivised the assassination of Afghan government officials and soldiers, supplied parts for Taliban Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) against UK forces in Sangin Province, Helmand and facilitated the movement and training of foreign fighters into Afghanistan. These operations provide the requisite experience to launch direct and destructive operations against coalition forces.

Domestic changes may make Tehran more willing to make risky moves internationally, and the most recent Iranian actions, such as targeting key global infrastructure, point to this. Internally, Iran is under intense pressure, as the country struggles with international sanctions and costly endeavours in Syria. Iran’s strategy is to force a change in US policy and weaken economic sanctions.

Soleimani’s killing and the accidental shooting down of a commercial airline flight have created a strong impetus for Iran to shift focus away from their loss and embarrassment. This increasing appetite for retaliation comes at a time when the Resolute Support coalition has shifted away from the large International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) missions into a more limited training and advising mission. Accompanying this shift are highly restrictive rules of engagement that limit access of advisers to Afghan forces and key stakeholders. For many local and international actors in Afghanistan, this has signalled the decreasing interest of Western policymakers in Afghanistan and created an opportunity for Iran to increase its own foothold.

While there is significant combat capability within the current NATO forces, it is greatly reduced. UK and US forces deployed with NATO number roughly 1,000 and 12,500 respectively.

The opportunity for Iran, then, is clearly exploitable through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which was set up after the Iranian Revolution and has a long history of training and equipping local groups across the Middle East. Iran would almost certainly attempt to retain some degree of plausible deniability, such as staging well planned and coordinated bombings that target US or UK forces, with a seperate organisation claiming responsibility. Iran already operates militias in Afghanistan, which could provide a front for attacks against Western forces.

As with the 1983 attack, a single large strike against a coalition target could precipitate a hastier withdrawal from a US administration with little appetite for ‘endless wars’. Every other Resolute Support partner lacks real ability to maintain Afghan operations in the event of a US withdrawal.

To mitigate against this, the UK needs to push for change in Resolute Support. The UK must strongly advocate for reduced violence between the Taliban and the Afghan government, even if it will prove difficult for both sides. This is important because Iranian asymmetrical activity thrives in instability. Without a viable peace deal, Western forces will likely remain in Afghanistan to some extent, while remaining vulnerable to Iranian attacks.

Great effort must be made by the UK to ensure continued negotiations take place, given the possibility of ceasefire violations and compliance issues. Should they fail, the UK must press for their renewal. British policy should recognise the support for intra-Afghan talks that exists in Afghanistan. While the Taliban have repeatedly refused to negotiate with the Afghan government, such sentiment is waning as they have negotiated with former government officials such as Hamid Karzai. Furthermore, the Afghan Government invited the Taliban to peace talks (though they did not attend). Such moves and strong public sentiment for peace bode well for building lasting stability. Such peace is necessary for the UK and its allies to extricate themselves from Afghanistan and from the threat Iran poses.

Jack Sargent is co-Head of Agora’s Defence & Security Programme.

For a coherent European security, France and Germany must meet in the middle

Whilst European strategic autonomy may be a vision for the longer-term, strategic planning regarding the vulnerability of European infrastructure to external players is essential now. Despite strained relations and differing visions, France and Germany, as the powerhouses of Europe, need to find a way of working together to realise this.

Events of recent weeks suggest that Franco-German discord on security and foreign policy matters may be a consequential side-effect of the UK’s EU withdrawal. Without the presence of the UK as a partner whose views and resources are as consequential in decision-making and forward-planning as their own, the disparity in vision between France and Germany is increasingly clear. Whilst Germany is hampered by internal political woes, Macron has been widely criticised for a singular approach to addressing Europe’s challenges. Macron is understood by many to be keen on realising his own vision for Europe, and impatient to wait for others, such as Germany, to catch up or contribute their thoughts. Blocking the beginning of EU accession talks with North Macedonia is a case in point, as are Macron’s controversial comments that “we are currently experiencing […] the braindeath of NATO”.

The response of Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, German Minister of Defence, to Macron’s NATO comments provides important insight. By her interpretation, Macron wishes to replace NATO, whilst the Germans “want to strengthen it”. She continues that “When France talks about more European cooperation in defence, they’re talking about strategic autonomy. […] France has a different military culture than Germany.”

Strategic autonomy has often been discussed in European foreign policy circles, and with particular earnestness following the election of Donald Trump and the subsequent doubt cast over the American security guarantee. Differing military traditions and ambitions within Europe (as Kramp-Karrenbauer’s comments illustrate) have, however, long impeded the realisation of European security and defence cooperation with the potential to ultimately supercede the role of NATO.

It is, therefore, fair to say that strategic autonomy for Europe is a way off, if on the horizon at all. However, while hard power is undoubtedly important in the current global context, hybrid warfare and trade wars are also consequential. ‘Strategic autonomy’ might not, and indeed ought not, be wholly limited to traditional military means. The purchase and influence which foreign players have over and within national systems matter, as does the strength of Europe as a trading bloc. Europe cooperates most successfully economically and the strength of its trade deals demonstrates that, when united, European states can collectively protect their interests. Norm-setting initiatives such as the GDPR have also proven highly successful in safeguarding European citizens within a largely unregulated global commons.

Macron seems to understand this. Over recent years, he has argued at length that, in order for the EU to remedy the ills besetting it and to remain a global power, national sovereignty must be ceded and collectively pooled in the areas of finance, economics, the environment and immigration, as well as foreign policy and defence. He called for significantly more consideration than his German counterparts before opening European 5G markets to Chinese tech giant Huawei, suggesting vigilance against making Europe more vulnerable to external influence than is absolutely necessary. Germany, by contrast, has seemingly failed to learn from the ongoing saga of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which not only exposes the German economy to potential future Russian interference but has also recently received backlash from Ukraine, alongside criticism and threats of intervention from the Americans.

If France and Germany — the traditional ‘axis’ on which Europe traditionally rotates — are at odds, radical change in European defence policy is unlikely, at least for the short-to-medium term. Nevertheless, Europe should at a minimum aim for strategic prudence, coupled with as much economic and political autonomy as it can manage. Reducing exposure and vulnerability to potentially antagonistic players to the greatest possible degree is integral to achieving this. France and Germany must find a way of seeing eye-to-eye on this, and of prioritising consideration and coordination in matters pertaining to the security of infrastructure across the bloc.

Macron’s methods may leave something to be desired; his independent approach likely prevents his ideas from being fully appreciated, and may even be interpreted as somewhat hypocritical in an ostensibly consensus-driven European context. His intent is sensible, however. Joined-up thought on strategic matters is fundamental for Europe to forge a path to greater autonomy, security and consequence in the global sphere. This will be especially necessary once the UK — arguably the most capable defence power in the EU — exits the bloc. A crucial task — for France, for Germany, and for other European partners — will be to find a way of achieving such joined-up thinking by meeting one another in the middle.

Grace McLoughlin is head of Agora’s Europe programme.

Reconsidering security under climate change

Following a Parliamentary resolution in May, MPs have declared a “climate emergency”. Climate change is still primarily framed as an environmental problem, however. By reframing it as a security threat, policy makers will be better equipped to implement the drastic policies required.

Media outlets and politicians continue to focus on the environmental impacts of climate change: deforestation, rising sea levels, loss of habitat, increasing ocean acidity, drought. But the violent social consequences of these events have been overlooked.

It is increasingly accepted that climate change will diminish resource availability, destabilising political environments and sparking armed conflicts. While experts and commentators have been warning about this for years, mainstream coverage of climate change has yet to acknowledge the security ramifications of these natural disasters, partly due to the difficulty in analysing hypothetical scenarios.

However, we don’t need to turn to hypothetical scenarios to examine the link between climate change and violence. The first climate change war has already occurred in Darfur.

The first ‘climate change war’

The civil war in Darfur, Sudan, was arguably the first modern climate change war. In the 1980s, severe droughts in the region turned previously arable land into dust, leading to crop shortages and the death of livestock. Predominantly Arab Muslim herders were forced to migrate south in search of new pastures. This migration led to conflicts with the Christian farmers in the region over the limited resources. These conflicts over farmland exacerbated ethnic tensions, resulting in the Darfur wars of 1987-90 and 1994-98. By 2003, the intra-state violence had become a civil war, encompassing state, non-state and other ethnic groups.

In 2004, a peace agreement was signed. Drought raged on, however, intensifying the now decades long tensions over access to agricultural resources between the Christian farmers and Muslim herders. The conflict escalated into genocide, with government backing, perpetrated by Arab Muslims against Christian farmers.

Starvation and illness, caused by the extreme food shortages and the conflict itself, resulted in the deaths and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people in the region. Then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon said of the crisis: “Amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change”.

Implications for the Region

Darfur illustrates the causal relationship between environmental stress and conflict. This relationship is not deterministic and does not alleviate the responsibility of the perpetrators, but the factors that led to Darfur are not isolated to Sudan. Climate change will continue to limit resources and exacerbate existing social stresses, including poverty, ethnic tensions, and political instability.

Most African nations rely on rain-fed agriculture for their economy and food supply, and 80% of the population of the Horn of Africa relies upon subsistence farming. Added to this, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reported that last year alone 5.5m were displaced in the region due to conflict and 2.6m people due to natural disasters, accounting for more than a quarter of all displacements worldwide.

The pattern that emerged in Sudan is repeating in the region. In 2018 armed conflict erupted in Nigeria between herder and farmer groups, aggravated by drought. In a highly populated region like Sub-Saharan Africa, conflicts have high casualty rates and the human cost of climate change can be greatly felt.

What next?

The international community is slowly beginning to realise the security ramifications of climate change. In the UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson has accepted the science and the Government has pledged £193m for development aid concerning climate change. There is still a long way to go, however. Johnson’s voting record reveals a more ambivalent position, particularly concerning preventative measures against climate change. With the threat of a ‘no deal’ Brexit looming, structured cooperation between nation states looks set to fracture, risking the much needed international cooperation to combat climate change.

Climate change will not affect all states equally, and a state’s ability to mitigate and adapt to the adverse changes in the environment will depend on its wealth. The countries which will be most impacted by climate change are those with the least political clout in the international system.

To address this, the international community must stop framing climate change as primarily an environmental issue, and emphasise the relationship between climate and security. This altered emphasis could allow the UK to repurpose some of the £36.9bn defence budget to tackle the greatest threat to human security in the 21st Century, namely climate change.

Shona Warren holds a Masters of International Relations from the University of Melbourne and works in international development.

The spotlight is on UK Special Forces, whether the Government likes it or not

Allegations that UK special forces were assisting Saudi-backed militias in Yemen led to a short-lived public and parliamentary backlash. However, the Government should not be too quick to forget this backlash or the lessons it offers.

In March, the Daily Mail reported that at least five British Special Boat Service (SBS) soldiers had been wounded in a gun battle in Yemen. The story alleged that there were “up to 30 British troops based in Sa’dah” and that they had been fighting alongside Saudi-funded militia, many of which purportedly relied on child soldiers. These stories directly contravened statements by the UK government made as recently as January, “that we are not a party to the conflict. We are not a party to the military conflict as part of the coalition”.

It remains unclear how much of these allegations were true, and now they appear to have been mostly forgotten by the UK media. However, it is worth dwelling on their lessons a little longer and, particularly, the serious questions they raise around the UK’s policy of blanket opacity over its use of special forces.

No comment policy

In the UK, all questions about special forces are met with a boilerplate response in the style of “it is the [Ministry of Defence’s] long-held policy is not to comment on our Special Forces”. With this policy in hand, the Government has routinely deflected questions on all aspects of special forces, including information about where they are being used, how they fit into wider UK foreign policy, and what roles they are playing on the ground.

It makes strategic sense, of course, that certain information about special forces is not released to the public, as they are – by definition – units that operate covertly. However, in an era dominated by smart phones and burgeoning access to the internet, a policy which completely prevents the Government from participating in debates over an increasingly large part of the UK’s military activity abroad – debates that will happen with or without them – has proven be out-dated, unsustainable and, most importantly, counter-productive.

The dogged adherence to this policy seems particularly illogical since the Government itself has made it clear that it greatly values control over narratives in contemporary conflicts. The UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review states that “the growth of communications technology will increase our enemies’ ability to influence, not only all those on the battlefield, but also our own society directly. We must therefore win the battle for information, as well as the battle on the ground”. By refusing to engage in a constructive dialogue on UK military actions – even after a significant amount of information is available in the public domain – the Government is directly constraining its own ability to pursue this objective.

Even before this recent incident, the UK government has been reluctant to discuss its support of the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen with the media and the British public. This is despite the fact that the campaign has been steeped in controversy around the breaching of international law. Even parliamentary committees have argued that they do not have access to sufficient information on the topic, with the First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills and International Development Committees of Session 2016-17 concluding that “this is an area in which there is much confusion and greater clarity is needed”.

While the lack of engagement may have allowed the UK government to avoid difficult questions and debates around its role in a conflict that has caused the “worst humanitarian crisis in the world”, it has also undermined the UK’s ability to justify its relationship with Saudi Arabia, potentially stoking greater mistrust and concern.

Shaping the debate

Nowhere is this clearer than with the allegations by the Daily Mail. Unsurprisingly, these have led to outrage on the opposition benches. Shadow Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Emily Thornberry said of the recent report that, if true, “it would confirm that our forces are not just a party to this conflict but witnesses to war crimes”. Even senior Conservative MPs like former International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, a respected voice on the Yemen conflict, has expressed frustrations at these “exceedingly serious, credible, and authoritative allegations”. He added that “were it not for the all-consuming nature of Brexit, I suspect the House would want to explore this as a matter of urgency”.

As the Government seeks to downplay these revelations and reassert its ‘no comment’ policy, it is worth revisiting the dangers of doing so. This recent incident, like many in the last few years, has clearly shown that such an approach is no longer tenable or even desirable. If nothing else, recent interventions have shown the importance of a frank and honest debate with British public and Parliament to allow the UK to argue the case for its operations, instead of narrative to be hijacked, misinterpreted, or misunderstood by others.

Megan Karlshoej-Pedersen is a Research and Advocacy Assistant at the Oxford Research Group’s Remote Warfare Programme. Abigail Watson is a Senior Research Officer at the same programme and a Trustee of Agora. Both research, write and present on the legal, military and political implications of light footprint military engagement.

Covert action and overt war: Israeli special forces and the risk of regional conflict

Israeli special forces are the envy of many nations and a key factor in Israel’s military successes. However, failure of their operations could inadvertently trigger regional war in one of three regional flashpoints: Gaza, Syria or Lebanon. The UK, as an important special forces operator, could learn from the risks inherent in Israel’s reliance on special forces.

Israel has used its large and varied range of special operations forces throughout the past 40 years with exceptional success. Its credentials were cemented in the famous Entebbe Raid – a successful hostage-rescue mission in Uganda on 4 July 1976 – and in clandestine operations, such as the assassination of Syrian Army General Muhammad Suleiman in 2008.

Israel’s miniscule population relative to its Arab neighbours caused it to focus on developing a ‘qualitative edge’ in military capabilities over its rivals. Furthermore, the profound lack of strategic depth Israel faced vis-a-vis its immediate neighbours necessitated a policy of direct action with regards to potential threats.

Failures can and will happen, however. Such was the case in November 2018 when an Israeli covert operation into Gaza resulted in the death of one Israeli special forces operator. Despite the unit escaping Gaza, the incident led to two weeks of reciprocal violence between Hamas and Israel until peace was brokered by Egypt. Likewise, the disastrous September 1997 raid against Hezbollah, which saw 11 special forces soldiers die, precipitated a day long fire fight between Israel and Hezbollah. These are two examples of the destabilising effects of botched special forces operations. The severity of this risk is only increased by the fact that Hezbollah and Hamas are organisations with a proven ability to adapt and innovate. The inconclusive result in the 2006 War showed that Hezbollah can frustrate Israel’s military capabilities, whereas Hamas has developed a degree of resilience in the face of systemic covert action.

While the above examples have not resulted in major regional conflict, there are a number of regional fault lines where the risk of botched Israeli covert action could precipitate regional war. The primary risk posed by such mistakes would involve the killing or capture of Israeli special forces. Israel has gone to war over captured soldiers twice in 2006, against Hezbollah and Hamas.

There are three main areas in which botched raids could trigger regional conflict. The most obvious is with Hamas in Gaza. If, in later raids, soldiers were to be captured then Israel would certainly begin large scale military action. A similar situation exists with Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, unique to Hezbollah is the support they receive from Iran, adding a regional element to the tension. Large scale operations conducted against Hezbollah in response to a failed special forces raid could draw Israel into conflict with Iran. Iran has forward deployed assets to Syria, and has likely used these to target Israel previously. Thus any conflict with Hezbollah will involve Iranian support, creating regional violence. Lastly, and relatedly, covert actions taken against the Syrian regime or Iranian forces in Syria which end in calamity would probably result in war. Israeli special forces are likely to be at least peripherally involved in any operations in Syria. If personnel are captured or killed, the past actions of Israel indicate aggressive military action could take place.

The experience of Israel offers important takeaways for the UK, not only because Israel represents an important actor in a key region for British military engagement but also because its experiences provide many lessons for the UK that need to be internalised for future operations as the role of special forces grow while the end strength of the British Armed Forces declines. The UK fields world class special forces in the form of the Special Air Service, the Special Boat Service, and other covert units. The UK’s steadfast commitment to combating terrorism internationally has seen this capability increase. As the UK seeks to readjust to a more global focus, the proven ability of the UK special forces community is likely to play a more active role in this realignment. However, the UK government must be careful not to see the deployment of special forces as ‘clean’ or ‘risk free’. The Israeli experience shows that these elite forces can be just as likely to trigger greater conflict as conventional troops if used irresponsibly.

The UK should learn from Israel and avoid over-reliance on special forces so as to avoid potentially costly blowback. Crucially, the UK should explore the full range of political and military responses to any future crisis to avoid unnecessary escalation through high-risk deployment of covert units.

Jack Sargent is pursuing a Masters in the History of International Relations at the LSE, with a particular interest in non-state actors in the Middle East.