Defence & Security

Allegations that UK special forces were assisting Saudi-backed militias in Yemen led to a short-lived public and parliamentary backlash. However, the Government should not be too quick to forget this backlash or the lessons it offers.

In March, the Daily Mail reported that at least five British Special Boat Service (SBS) soldiers had been wounded in a gun battle in Yemen. The story alleged that there were “up to 30 British troops based in Sa’dah” and that they had been fighting alongside Saudi-funded militia, many of which purportedly relied on child soldiers. These stories directly contravened statements by the UK government made as recently as January, “that we are not a party to the conflict. We are not a party to the military conflict as part of the coalition”.

It remains unclear how much of these allegations were true, and now they appear to have been mostly forgotten by the UK media. However, it is worth dwelling on their lessons a little longer and, particularly, the serious questions they raise around the UK’s policy of blanket opacity over its use of special forces.

No comment policy

In the UK, all questions about special forces are met with a boilerplate response in the style of “it is the [Ministry of Defence’s] long-held policy is not to comment on our Special Forces”. With this policy in hand, the Government has routinely deflected questions on all aspects of special forces, including information about where they are being used, how they fit into wider UK foreign policy, and what roles they are playing on the ground.

It makes strategic sense, of course, that certain information about special forces is not released to the public, as they are – by definition – units that operate covertly. However, in an era dominated by smart phones and burgeoning access to the internet, a policy which completely prevents the Government from participating in debates over an increasingly large part of the UK’s military activity abroad – debates that will happen with or without them – has proven be out-dated, unsustainable and, most importantly, counter-productive.

The dogged adherence to this policy seems particularly illogical since the Government itself has made it clear that it greatly values control over narratives in contemporary conflicts. The UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review states that “the growth of communications technology will increase our enemies’ ability to influence, not only all those on the battlefield, but also our own society directly. We must therefore win the battle for information, as well as the battle on the ground”. By refusing to engage in a constructive dialogue on UK military actions – even after a significant amount of information is available in the public domain – the Government is directly constraining its own ability to pursue this objective.

Even before this recent incident, the UK government has been reluctant to discuss its support of the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen with the media and the British public. This is despite the fact that the campaign has been steeped in controversy around the breaching of international law. Even parliamentary committees have argued that they do not have access to sufficient information on the topic, with the First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills and International Development Committees of Session 2016-17 concluding that “this is an area in which there is much confusion and greater clarity is needed”.

While the lack of engagement may have allowed the UK government to avoid difficult questions and debates around its role in a conflict that has caused the “worst humanitarian crisis in the world”, it has also undermined the UK’s ability to justify its relationship with Saudi Arabia, potentially stoking greater mistrust and concern.

Shaping the debate

Nowhere is this clearer than with the allegations by the Daily Mail. Unsurprisingly, these have led to outrage on the opposition benches. Shadow Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Emily Thornberry said of the recent report that, if true, “it would confirm that our forces are not just a party to this conflict but witnesses to war crimes”. Even senior Conservative MPs like former International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, a respected voice on the Yemen conflict, has expressed frustrations at these “exceedingly serious, credible, and authoritative allegations”. He added that “were it not for the all-consuming nature of Brexit, I suspect the House would want to explore this as a matter of urgency”.

As the Government seeks to downplay these revelations and reassert its ‘no comment’ policy, it is worth revisiting the dangers of doing so. This recent incident, like many in the last few years, has clearly shown that such an approach is no longer tenable or even desirable. If nothing else, recent interventions have shown the importance of a frank and honest debate with British public and Parliament to allow the UK to argue the case for its operations, instead of narrative to be hijacked, misinterpreted, or misunderstood by others.

Megan Karlshoej-Pedersen is a Research and Advocacy Assistant at the Oxford Research Group’s Remote Warfare Programme. Abigail Watson is a Senior Research Officer at the same programme and a Trustee of Agora. Both research, write and present on the legal, military and political implications of light footprint military engagement.

Israeli special forces are the envy of many nations and a key factor in Israel’s military successes. However, failure of their operations could inadvertently trigger regional war in one of three regional flashpoints: Gaza, Syria or Lebanon. The UK, as an important special forces operator, could learn from the risks inherent in Israel’s reliance on special forces.

Israel has used its large and varied range of special operations forces throughout the past 40 years with exceptional success. Its credentials were cemented in the famous Entebbe Raid – a successful hostage-rescue mission in Uganda on 4 July 1976 – and in clandestine operations, such as the assassination of Syrian Army General Muhammad Suleiman in 2008.

Israel’s miniscule population relative to its Arab neighbours caused it to focus on developing a ‘qualitative edge’ in military capabilities over its rivals. Furthermore, the profound lack of strategic depth Israel faced vis-a-vis its immediate neighbours necessitated a policy of direct action with regards to potential threats.

Failures can and will happen, however. Such was the case in November 2018 when an Israeli covert operation into Gaza resulted in the death of one Israeli special forces operator. Despite the unit escaping Gaza, the incident led to two weeks of reciprocal violence between Hamas and Israel until peace was brokered by Egypt. Likewise, the disastrous September 1997 raid against Hezbollah, which saw 11 special forces soldiers die, precipitated a day long fire fight between Israel and Hezbollah. These are two examples of the destabilising effects of botched special forces operations. The severity of this risk is only increased by the fact that Hezbollah and Hamas are organisations with a proven ability to adapt and innovate. The inconclusive result in the 2006 War showed that Hezbollah can frustrate Israel’s military capabilities, whereas Hamas has developed a degree of resilience in the face of systemic covert action.

While the above examples have not resulted in major regional conflict, there are a number of regional fault lines where the risk of botched Israeli covert action could precipitate regional war. The primary risk posed by such mistakes would involve the killing or capture of Israeli special forces. Israel has gone to war over captured soldiers twice in 2006, against Hezbollah and Hamas.

There are three main areas in which botched raids could trigger regional conflict. The most obvious is with Hamas in Gaza. If, in later raids, soldiers were to be captured then Israel would certainly begin large scale military action. A similar situation exists with Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, unique to Hezbollah is the support they receive from Iran, adding a regional element to the tension. Large scale operations conducted against Hezbollah in response to a failed special forces raid could draw Israel into conflict with Iran. Iran has forward deployed assets to Syria, and has likely used these to target Israel previously. Thus any conflict with Hezbollah will involve Iranian support, creating regional violence. Lastly, and relatedly, covert actions taken against the Syrian regime or Iranian forces in Syria which end in calamity would probably result in war. Israeli special forces are likely to be at least peripherally involved in any operations in Syria. If personnel are captured or killed, the past actions of Israel indicate aggressive military action could take place.

The experience of Israel offers important takeaways for the UK, not only because Israel represents an important actor in a key region for British military engagement but also because its experiences provide many lessons for the UK that need to be internalised for future operations as the role of special forces grow while the end strength of the British Armed Forces declines. The UK fields world class special forces in the form of the Special Air Service, the Special Boat Service, and other covert units. The UK’s steadfast commitment to combating terrorism internationally has seen this capability increase. As the UK seeks to readjust to a more global focus, the proven ability of the UK special forces community is likely to play a more active role in this realignment. However, the UK government must be careful not to see the deployment of special forces as ‘clean’ or ‘risk free’. The Israeli experience shows that these elite forces can be just as likely to trigger greater conflict as conventional troops if used irresponsibly.

The UK should learn from Israel and avoid over-reliance on special forces so as to avoid potentially costly blowback. Crucially, the UK should explore the full range of political and military responses to any future crisis to avoid unnecessary escalation through high-risk deployment of covert units.

Jack Sargent is pursuing a Masters in the History of International Relations at the LSE, with a particular interest in non-state actors in the Middle East.

Following the seizure of three Ukrainian vessels in the Sea of Azov in late November, the UK must continue to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions on Moscow in order to maintain a coherent and long-term Russia deterrence strategy.

On 25 November 2018, three Ukrainian boats and their crew, traveling from the Black Sea port of Odessa to Mariupol in the Sea of Azov, were seized after an altercation with the Russian Navy on the Kerch Strait. As ever, attempts to assign culpability are undermined by contested versions of the truth. Moscow argues that the Ukrainian vessels were not following a pre-planned route and that they had not been notified about the boats’ transit, which is why they detained the vessels and their crew. Ukraine claims that it had followed agreed procedure as on previous occasions and that Russia’s actions clearly violated the 2003 agreement, signed by Kiev and Moscow, that established shared control of the Sea of Azov.

Russia’s seizure of these vessels is a clear indication that the war in Ukraine continues to flare up and that sanctions imposed by Western countries on Russia have had a limited effect on Russia’s foreign policy risk appetite. The completion of the Kerch Bridge has reinforced the annexation of Crimea as a geopolitical reality, even for those who still argue that de jure it is still Ukrainian territory. It also constitutes another attempt by Russia to destabilise the region and further strangle the Ukrainian economy. Because of the bridge’s 33m height limitation, a third of the vessels traveling to Mariupol – Ukraine’s third largest port – can no longer cross the Kerch Strait.

The UK is one of the few countries that has taken action against Russia’s latest aggression. Previous sanctions against Russia have included the expulsion of four diplomats, after British citizen and former Russian intelligence officer Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned in 2006. In March 2018, 23 diplomats considered “undeclared intelligence officers” by British Prime Minister Theresa May were expelled following the use of the Novichok nerve agent on Sergei Skripal, a former double agent, and his daughter Yulia.

These sanctions have been considered heavy on rhetoric but light on substance. Therefore, when the British Defence Minister Gavin Williamson declared that London would send HMS Echo to Odessa for a freedom of navigation maneuver in support of Ukraine, it seemed the UK had upped its game. However, it is questionable what deterrence the deployment of this ship may have against further Russian aggression on the Kerch Strait or in the Black Sea. The HMS Echo is a hydrographic survey vessel designed for amphibious training and mine-hunting, equipped with nothing more menacing than a GPS and a sonar.

Moscow clearly counts on the West’s inaction and does not expect the status quo to change anytime soon. Does this mean that the UK should take a more assertive stance to deter Russia? Despite public condemnation of Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, Russia is still considered a major ally for global security, particularly in counter-terrorism and the successful cooperation on Iran’s nuclear deal. Even since the Skripal incident, Theresa May has argued that it is not in the UK’s interest to cut all bilateral relations with Russia. Most recently, despite a clear indication that the UK would take a stronger stance on Russia, many commentators noted that the the 2018 Modernising Defence Programme review was often vague and light on substantial policy.

There are several reasons why maintaining the status quo is the best and only option for the UK right now. Firstly, if London were to increase its military presence in the Black Sea region, there is a chance it would not deter Moscow but backfire by provoking a more assertive response from the Russian side. The greater the tensions between Russia and the West, the higher the chances of misinterpreted actions and unintended conflict. Since 2014, Russia has been bolstering the capabilities of its Black Sea Fleet. The higher the level of military involvement, higher the likelihood of a human error occurring. It could end up in war and potentially spillover to Europe.

Secondly, maintaining UK diplomatic and economic sanctions forms part of a long-term strategy. Russia is starting to feel the effect of sanctions. As part of this strategy, the MoD should continue to conduct freedom of navigation exercises to signal that the Black Sea is far from becoming a ‘Russian lake’ and extend a helping hand to partners on the Black Sea, primarily Ukraine and Georgia.

Critics of the UK’s limited response to Russian aggression should be mindful of the dangers of ‘upping our game’, both for the stability of the region and for the success of the UK’s broader, longer-term strategy. This is no less true in light of the recent Kerch Strait incident.

Andrea Gutierrez Cristobal is a postgraduate student of EU Politics at the London School of Economics.

Right-wing extremism is growing in the UK and, while other forms of terrorism remain a threat, there is a heightened possibility that future terrorist attacks will be perpetrated by right-wing terrorists. This growing risk could be curtailed by a better awareness from law enforcement services and other relevant statutory bodies.

Europe has seen an increase in terrorist attacks on its soil, particularly since 2015. The UK is not immune to this trend, and it has also seen an increased frequency of successful terrorist acts.

The main focus of UK law enforcement services has been on Islamist terrorism, which has been at the root of the majority of the recent attacks. However, there has also been a more insidious rise of extreme right-wing terror plots. In February 2018 the UK’s former lead for counter-terrorism policing Mark Rowley stated that, in the 11 months since the March 2017 Westminster attack, the British police had foiled four extreme right-wing inspired plots.

Right-wing extremism is a loose, ill-defined concept that comprises a number of different ideologies and aims. Broadly, right-wing extremism encompasses a wish for the status quo ante, or ‘how things were before’, and neo-fascist aspects, such as ultra-nationalism. Some groups may be focused on a single issue, while others may hold several views, including anti-Semitic, anti-democratic, and anti-immigration beliefs.

Right-wing extremism has been growing steadily over recent years, as seen in the number of referrals of right-wing extremists to Prevent (one of the four branches of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST). In 2017/18, 18% of referrals to Prevent were due to concerns relating to right-wing extremism, compared to only 10% in 2015/16.

Not only have right-wing ideologies become more prevalent, but there has also been a growing number of extreme right-wing terrorist attacks, attempted acts, or failed or foiled attacks. These include the murder of Jo Cox in 2016 by Thomas Mair who held extreme right-wing beliefs, the 2017 Finsbury Park attack where Darren Osborn drove a van in a crowd of people near the Finsbury Park mosque, an attack planned on an LGBT event by white supremacist Ethan Stables, and a number of arrests of members of the National Action – a proscribed neo-Nazi group – some of whom were arrested on terror charges for allegedly planning a ‘race war’.

Right-wing extremism has been deemed serious enough by the UK that MI5 is due to take over responsibility from the police on preventing right-wing extremism. Contrary to the recent Islamist attacks, which have mostly all been claimed by the Islamic State (IS), there is no single right-wing faction which claims to either coordinate or inspire attacks. Indeed, in their 2017 Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, Europol states that extreme right-wing activities are mainly carried out by lone actors or loosely coordinated groups.

The growth of right-wing extremism, and related risk of right-wing terrorist attacks, is fuelled by a mixture of factors. The rise of populist politics and movements in the UK and abroad stem from a general dissatisfaction with political elites, combined with increasing economic inequalities. External factors have also exacerbated the rise of right-wing extremism. The high migration levels from Africa and the Middle East – particularly during the peak of the migration crisis in 2015 – combined with Islamist terrorist attacks have reinforced an ‘us versus them’, and an increasingly inward-looking, mentality.

Another issue fuelling this growth is the fact that the UK’s counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism tools and experience are primarily geared towards dealing with Islamist terrorism. Furthermore, the right-wing extremist movement has shown signs that it is increasingly organising itself, a recent development that makes it more dangerous. While Islamist extremism remains the primary cause of terrorism – driven partly by the continued threat of IS in Syria – right-wing extremist movements have increased and, consequently, so has the possibility of right-wing terror attacks.

There are a number of ways in which right-wing extremists may be impeded. Firstly, while there are some well-known right-wing groups, a better mapping of these extremist groups would be beneficial, as trends so far indicate fragmentation and a lack of knowledge amongst authorities. There is also the need to improve recognition of the early warning signs of potential right-wing terrorists by other statutory bodies involved in the UK’s counter-terrorism effort, such as schools, universities, social care and healthcare providers.

Secondly, a better recognition and understanding of the threat by law enforcement services, placing right-wing extremism more firmly in the agenda and within people’s minds as a threat factor.

Finally, there needs to be a concerted effort to prevent further reductions within counter-terrorism resourcing, in order to ensure greater preparedness by forces across the country against the threat of terrorist attacks.

Sarah Grand-Clement is a defence and security policy researcher. Her research interests include counter-terrorism, counter-violent extremism, and the Middle East. She holds an MSc in Arab World Studies from Durham University.

In aggressively pursuing crime as a source of revenue, Hezbollah has created a model which other groups are liable to copy, creating further regional destabilisation. The UK can help combat this by promoting greater global financial controls and supporting a crackdown on suspected criminal revenue streams.

Hezbollah emerged in the 1980s from a critical mass of social and political unrest in Lebanon. Shi’ites in Lebanon were disenfranchised by dismal economic prospects, and inspired by the Iranian revolution. The exporting of revolutionary ideals by Iran in the 80s and the revolutionary bent of Hezbollah allowed for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to effectively militarise Hezbollah. The IRGC reportedly sent 1,500 advisors, who transferred operational experience in small unit tactics and warfare from the ongoing Iran-Iraq War to the nascent Hezbollah. This culminated in catastrophic attacks on French and US forces in Lebanon in 1983.

As an organisation, Hezbollah grew rapidly through the favouritism shown to them by Syria in the 80s during their occupation of Lebanon. The Lebanese civil war and Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon provided them with opportunities for legitimation through anti-Israeli operations. However, Hezbollah’s provision of social services, reconstruction efforts, and need for advanced weapons forced the organisation to aggressively pursue crime as a form of income. Today, this drive has created a large criminal network operating across the globe.

Hezbollah has developed an international criminal operation which profits from what Europol describes as the “use of legal business structures, cross-border opportunities, identity theft, document forgery and violence”. Their ongoing operations in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil raises tens of millions of dollars annually. As a testament to Hezbollah’s global footprint in illicit drug trafficking, operations have been uncovered in Germany, Poland, Romania, the US and Canada, to name but a few. This expertise has also been transposed into different areas, such as human trafficking, arms trafficking, counterfeit currency operations, and ‘blood diamond’ exports. While it is difficult to calculate revenue from these activities exactly, the proceeds are estimated to run in the millions of dollars.

This has allowed the group to gain some independence from Iran. While Iran remains the key supplier of Hezbollah’s vast missile arsenal, they have diversified their income, covering multiple criminal trades across the globe. Iranian support remains significant. Iran provides complex weapon systems, training, and as much as US$200 million annually. However, the relationship has matured into one of near equals, with Hezbollah providing key forces in Syria and intelligence operatives to support the IRGC Quds Force. Looking to the future, Iran’s co-operation with Hezbollah is only going to grow as tensions with Israel increase and the Syrian Civil War moves to a close.

Hezbollah, then, provides a viable blueprint for non-state actors in today’s globalised world. Hezbollah has demonstrated the benefits of involvement in international crime. This is not just the case financially, but also in developing organisational experience and capability which can be easily harnessed for violent ends. Many violent groups operate in areas with weak states or complicit governments, and within communities that are pliable to the benefits of organised crime.

This is especially true for other Shi’ite groups which receive Iranian support; the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and Syria. The Houthi’s proximity to the horn of Africa provides access to a variety of criminal enterprises for groups in search of income. Potential criminal activities overlap with Hezbollah, with opportunities in human trafficking, the drug trade and more. This may be less true with Shi’ite militias in Iraq, whose range of possible ventures are limited by potential blowback of criminality for Iran given their geographical proximity.

The potential for non-state actors and violent groups across the world to follow the ‘model’ of Hezbollah is a concern which merits greater focus from British policymakers, especially as the UK pushes its post-Brexit ‘Global Britain’ agenda. With a major financial centre and strong diplomatic and intelligence capabilities, the UK is well positioned to take up a leading role in combating violent groups that adopt the ‘Hezbollah model’.

The British government should expand its scope from an initial crackdown on illicit Russian money to examining the financial channels from criminal networks associated with violent groups. Disrupting the illicit financial practices of violent groups can serve not only to promote global stability, but also to highlight the UK as a key player in the nexus between organised crime and terrorism.

Jack Sargent is pursuing a Masters in the History of International Relations at the LSE, with a particular interest in non-state actors in the Middle East.

The recent strategic attention being given by the House of Commons to the Arctic is overdue but budget constraints are likely to hamper good strategy. Given dramatic increases in Russian activity in the Atlantic and High North and the UK’s location on the Northern Sea Route, the UK Armed Forces must grow their ability to operate in this challenging theatre.

Over the past six months, we have seen a flurry of parliamentary strategies on the Arctic from a diplomatic, ecological, economic and security perspective. The Defence Committee’s report published in August 2018 is dedicated to this latter issue, considering the preparedness of the UK in a region with a rapidly changing ecological and geopolitical environment. Granted, the UK only holds observer status on the Arctic Council and has no claims to the 5.5 million square miles of frozen terrain. However,  increased Russian military presence in the region and the opening of Northern shipping lanes on the edge of British waters impact the UK’s security, making it crucial that the UK has the ability to promote peace, stability and environmental responsibility through diplomatic and military means.

Preparation for a future with warmer winters and receding ice shelves requires a security policy that anticipates busier shipping lanes in Arctic waters north of the UK. Greater reliance on passage through Northern waters for European supply chains may put further pressure on future naval resources. In particular, the ‘GIUK gap’ between Greenland, Iceland and the UK on the Northern sea route risks becoming a strategic choke point. All of this means that the maritime environment is becoming more important, more hostile and closer to home.

The UK has neglected the Arctic and High North since the Soviet Union’s collapse. August’s parliamentary report emphasises that “the focus on operating in this challenging environment has been reduced over the long years of engagement in expeditionary operations in hot weather climates.” Indeed, HMS Trenchant’s experience in ICEX 2018 ends an eleven-year hiatus of Royal Navy participation in a biennial U.S. Navy Submarine Force tactical development and torpedo exercise in the Arctic Ocean (ICEX), suggesting a degradation of UK extreme cold weather operational skills.

While there is increasing recognition that the Arctic Ocean is fundamental to the security of the North Atlantic, this has not yet fed through to the UK’s defence policy and capabilities. Crucially after the retirement of Nimrod in 2010, the RAF currently lacks a Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) capability, the backbone of anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The first new P-8 Poseidon MPA is not due until 2020 with the full squadron of nine expected to be operational by late 2023. Until then, the UK is dependent on NATO allies flying sorties from RAF Lossiemouth. The postponement of the Type 31e frigate procurement, which is due to play an active role in ASW missions, threatens the degree of British deterrence in an ever-changing region. The long-awaited defence review and a future National Security Capability Review should reprioritise ASW missions and the Arctic theatre, addressing these concerning naval capability gaps, although this remains unlikely.

Russia appears to have been emboldened by the decline in NATO’s extreme cold weather and ASW capabilities, as evidenced by the huge rise in recent maritime and military activity in the region. The recapitalisation of a previously ageing Russian submarine fleet under the Russian military modernization programme (GPV 2020) since 2008 has helped facilitate a “tenfold increase in the amount of submarine activity in the North Atlantic on behalf of the Russians” according to Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson in February 2018. At the same time, Chatham House Russia & Eurasia Research Fellow and Arctic specialist, Mathieu Boulegue, highlights Russia’s increasing military footprint in the Arctic through new bases, equipment and training in Russian territory in the Arctic and High North. While efforts must be made to avoid an Arctic arms race, Russia is beginning to assert itself beyond its defensive right to uphold its sovereignty.

In this security environment, the UK’s long-term freedom of navigation depends on growing its cold weather capability and Arctic interoperability with NATO allies. This includes an emphasis on bolstered submarine under-ice operations, Arctic training across the Army and Royal Marines, extreme cold weather requirements for equipment procurement and a robust Arctic concept of operations. The MoD faces difficult trade-offs due to post-Brexit budget constraints, weaker Sterling and competing policy priorities that include Tempest, F-35, two carrier groups, plus neglected operation and maintenance budgets. Gavin Williamson’s announcement on 30 September of plans to rotate 800 British commandos to Norway on an annual basis for the next 10 years is progress in the right direction. However, there is little doubt that improving British cold weather capability requires increased long-term MoD funding and a coherent, actionable “Arctic defence strategy” due to its close proximity to the UK and the fast-changing security situation. The UK must, therefore, work for the best but prepare for the worst on an environmental and a strategic level to maintain the policy goal of a “peaceful, stable and well-governed Arctic.”

Dan Fitter is Head of the Defence & Security Programme at Agora.