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Democracy & Governance

Keeping up with ASEAN: the UK’s role in the Indo-Pacific

The UK faces significant opportunities and challenges in the Indo-Pacific. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is at the height of its geopolitical importance, but this potential belies a fragile and uncertain region. It is imperative for the UK and ASEAN to come together on areas where both can benefit and to manage expectations on the limits and freedoms of both.

This policy paper attempts to map out the present areas of cooperation between ASEAN and UK on a variety of aspects including international cooperation, economic prosperity, and regional security. It focuses on the UK’s presence in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically in the context of its post-Brexit engagement as an entity separate from the European Union. The paper argues that ASEAN stands to benefit from the UK’s ‘tilt to the Indo-Pacific’, referenced in recent official documents such as the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. In the context of an ever-evolving region, the briefing will develop added areas of cooperation to undertake in the coming years.

Now operating as a separate political entity from the EU, the UK will require additional legwork in its engagement with ASEAN. Firstly, the UK must focus on being a force multiplier of international law and norms. Secondly, the UK must deepen economic ties with ASEAN – whether with the group as a whole or with its individual member states – and maximise the momentum towards post-pandemic recovery. Thirdly, the UK must strengthen and bolster security linkages in the region and be ambitious in its role as a strategic actor in the region. The Indo-Pacific region houses a variety of security partnerships and alliances that has helped maintain the peace and security in the region, despite traversing a tumultuous period.

The UK must build upon its previous engagement with the region to develop an independent Indo-Pacific policy centred around ASEAN and aiming to establish itself as a reliable and ambitious security partner.

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The UK’s relationship with the Sputnik vaccine

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The development of a successful vaccine was of central concern to governments around the world from the moment the coronavirus crisis began. When Russia’s Gamaleya Institute announced that their Sputnik V vaccine was ready for use in August 2020 — to great shock and derision — the Russian government made clear its intention that Sputnik would be a “vaccine for all mankind”. Yet, as the UK and her Western allies built their vaccine portfolios, Sputnik remained conspicuous by its absence. While information operations and wider geopolitical considerations were undoubtedly at play, this paper sets out the data and efficacy concerns that were central to explaining the lack of Western interest in the Sputnik jab.

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How Brexit poses risks to the EU’s climate policies

The UK’s departure from the EU is posing significant challenges to the latter’s usually strict environmental policies and climate change mitigation strategies.

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Brexit has usually been evaluated in terms of its economic, trade, security and diplomatic implications. It is significantly less well-analysed in relation to climate change impacts. This is likely to continue as long as climate change is not regarded as a security threat.

Brexit poses three major challenges to the EU’s environmental policy. Firstly, in attaining its greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets. Secondly, its impact on the Emission Trading System (ETS). Thirdly, its impact on the EU’s green finance.

The UK has one of the most ambitious GHG reduction targets when compared to its European counterparts. The UK’s sixth carbon budget seeks to cut 78% of emissions by 2035, bringing it closer to its net-zero target by 2050. Furthermore, the Climate Change Act sets a legally binding emission reduction target of 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Similarly, the EU is seeking to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. The European Commission has adopted several legislative proposals, including an intermediate target of a 55% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030. The extent to which Brexit will affect the EU’s environmental ambitions will require a careful analysis in the coming years, however.

In the short run, it is unlikely that Brexit will affect the EU’s emission reduction goals, as Brussels managed to meet its 2020 targets without Britain. The long-term impact, however, is contested. The EU27 is expected to increase its GHG emission targets by 4.5%, amounting to over 138MtCO2 equivalent.

Both the EU and the UK’s climate policies so far have been shaped by their constructive interaction. Britain’s strong leadership in the EU has made the EU ETS and single energy market possible. The EU ETS is considered the cornerstone of low-carbon innovation and covers over 40% of EU27’s GHG emissions. Interestingly, the UK’s divorce from the EU ETS is estimated to hamper Britain’s own businesses. British businesses are spending over £75 (€90) per tonne of carbon emission, whereas companies in the EU are paying a carbon price of €85. The EU ETS is well-established with greater liquidity that covers all heavy industries, which makes it more cost-effective relative to Britain’s carbon policy.

Although the EU pioneered the low-carbon innovation policy, it now needs to enhance its own ETS to fulfil its 2050 ambitions. Brussels is posed with the twin challenge of amending the present ETS and incentivising its industries towards low-carbon emissions. Post-Brexit, the EU’s environmental leadership will be further tested due to its close association with negative environmental power. Negative environmental power refers to a country’s capacity to carry the potential to invariably harm climate mitigation strategies, for example by pursuing large-scale deforestation policies. According to an The European Environment – state and outlook 2020 report, Europe’s contribution to environmental degradation is greater than any other region in the world.

Going forwards, it is important for Britain and the EU to constructively engage in achieving climate targets through better coordination on two fronts: the emission trading systems and sustainable finance regimes.

In terms of the EU27, there has been a steady increase in renewable energy consumption and a steady decrease in fossil fuel based energy consumption since 2010. In 2020, renewables overtook fossil fuels in the EU27 market, a significant development in the green energy transition. Nevertheless, the impressive stride of the EU is still slow for achieving 55% GHG reductions and climate neutrality by 2030 and 2050 respectively.

The UK is not aligning itself with the EU’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation, creating its own green finance regime instead. The Government has stated its intention to make a more ambitious emission trading system than the EU that would make it stand out as a global climate leader. This has created several uncertainties within the British companies. According to India Redrup, policy manager at trade association Energy UK: “If you are a power operator in the UK, you are looking at a Black Hole looking at the lack of carbon price signal”.

Post-Brexit, Britain will have a monumental challenge of establishing the UK ETS which is more robust and cost-efficient for the companies. As a way forward, the two regimes should aim to either co-benefit or complement their respective efforts, rather than hampering the present mitigation policies.

Akshay Honmane is a climate change and foreign policy researcher, currently studying for an International Relations masters at the London School of Economics.

How the West should respond to Russia’s adhocracy

Responding effectively to Russian interventionism abroad requires understanding its governance. Russia is an adhocracy – a decentralised regime defined less by top-down commands than by bottom-up opportunism – with oligarchs acting on President Vladimir Putin’s perceived interests to earn patronage. Approaching adhocracy requires resolve; the UK and its allies must establish a strong deterrence and clearly elucidated red lines to prevent conflict.

Russian opposition politician Boris Nemtsov was in sight of the Kremlin when he was killed. Crossing the Bolshoy Moskvoretsky Bridge around midnight, he was intercepted by an assassin who shot him four times before jumping a barrier and fleeing the scene.

Nemtsov’s muder shocked Moscow. Even Putin seemed stunned, condemning the “shameful” killing and announcing he would take “personal control” of the investigation.

Then came the cover-up. In three days the Federal Security Services had a list of suspects, including one Zaur Dadaev, the former deputy commander of Sever, a police battalion under the authority of Chechen strongman and Putin ally Ramzan Kadyrov. As suggestions of a connection between Kadyrov and the killing started circulating, the Chechen leader did little to dispel them, instead describing Dadaev as a brave soldier and devoted Muslim.

The investigation stalled. Further suspects were swept under the rug and the murder’s mastermind was unmasked as Ruslan Mukhudinov, a personal driver never found for questioning. Zaur Dadaev was sentenced to twenty years in prison. Case closed.

This rapid reversal exposes the reality of Russia’s governance structure. As researcher and author Mark Galeotti has argued, Russia is not a centralised autocracy but an opaque ‘adhocracy’. Members of Putin’s inner circle do not necessarily act on direct orders from the President. Instead, they entrepreneurially seek opportunities to advance his perceived interests and earn patronage.

This system permits Putin plausible deniability. But it can also cost the Kremlin. In the case of Boris Nemtsov, an ally embarrassed the regime by incorrectly interpreting the President’s description of opponents of the war in Ukraine as “national traitors” and assassinated one hours after he called for demonstrations against the ongoing conflict.

Adhocracy is equally evident in Russian foreign policy. Although the annexation of Crimea was state-led, the subsequent war in the Donbas has been sustained by entrepreneurial oligarchs such as Evgeny Prigozhin, who link separatists in Luhansk with the mercenaries that provide them men and arms. Despite denying involvement in such exchanges, Prigozhin recently bankrolled an action film dramatising the exploits of an infamous mercenary organisation, the Wagner Group, in a romanticised Luhansk.

It is unclear what Russia will do next in Ukraine. Putin’s desire to bring the country back into Russia’s sphere of influence is established, the President arguing Russians and Ukranians are “one people – a single whole” in a July article. The most recent mobilisation is more comprehensive than April’s, and there is evidence of combat preparations in the field modifications made to Russian armour, which correspond with Ukrainian capabilities. Yet Ukraine is better armed and trained than in 2014, and the publicity and slow pace of Russian movements might imply more diplomatic aims.

In such an uncertain environment, the risk of escalation relates to Russia’s adhocracy. The danger is that a powerful political opportunist acts on Putin’s increasingly bellicose rhetoric, oversteps the mark as Kadyrov did, and causes a major European conflict.

Approaching an adhocracy and avoiding this outcome requires resolve from Britain and its allies. More specifically, it requires a strong deterrence and clear red lines.

A strong deterrence means more than stern words like ‘severe consequences’. It means threatening to cut Russia off from the SWIFT banking network and ban lending to and business with Russian state-controlled banks. It means stressing to Russia that any intervention in Ukraine would force NATO to reassure its eastern members with more military support, creating the kind of border build-up that Moscow is keen to avoid.

This deterrence should come with clear conditions of use, established by the UK and European allies in partnership with the USA (which Russia sees as the West’s most influential actor on Ukraine). These red lines should include military incursions, but extend to blockades of strategic towns such as Mariupol as well as hybrid tactics such as cyberattacks on government offices or crucial infrastructure, similar to those carried out in 2015 and 2017.

Combined, these measures might alter the cost-benefit calculus not only of the Russian President but, crucially, of the adhocrats that make up his entourage, clarifying the fact that any opportunistic interventions in Ukraine would cause the Kremlin pain instead of earning them preferment.

Against adhocracy, strategic ambiguity invites instability. Strength and clarity are the best tools if the UK wants to stop the next shots in the dark escalating into a continental conflict.

Dylan Rogers is a member of Agora’s Democracy & Governance programme.

The UK risks repeating America’s disenfranchisement disaster

The Elections Bill introduced in 2021 includes a requirement for voters to show certain forms of ID when at a polling station. Voter ID laws are an unnecessary hindrance to the voting process, dissuading new voters and minority voters. There is little evidence of electoral fraud in the UK. Evidence from abroad shows that these laws often have an effect on voter turnout. Participation in the electoral system should be encouraged and aided, not blocked.

Impact on turnout

The proposal to introduce voter ID laws will have a disproportionate impact on underrepresented voters, as otherwise unnecessary pieces of identification are less commonly held by those from minority groups. Between 7.5-24% of the electorate do not hold a required form of ID, depending on how acceptable ID is categorised. Adding another step to the voter registration process, which should and does try to be a relatively painless process, risks dissuading many voters.

This proposed law would apply to all voters in general elections, as well as those going to the ballot box in English local elections. Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has said that she would not introduce ID requirements in Scotland, which creates a complication given that local and national elections are regularly held at the same time. If voters believed they could not vote in any election without ID, they might not turn up on polling day, and lower turnout for Scottish local elections could be a side effect.

As well as reducing voter turnout by 1-2% in certain American states, studies have found that it also leads to lower voting turnout by voters who incorrectly believe that they have the wrong form of ID. Thus, the appearance of formal barriers has the consequence of making voting seem like an intimidating and difficult process.

The holding of ID often has trends which correlate to racial background, socioeconomic class, and profession. As these factors often align with voting direction, there are also certain correlations between the holding of ID and the party voted for. Take drivers’ licenses for example. There is an association between holding a driver’s license and voting patterns (not holding: 57% Labour, 27% Conservative voting).

The over-estimated problem of voter fraud

The UK does not have a significant problem with voter fraud and, as such, this proposed law is a distraction from the issue of voter turnout and political education. Reported incidence of election fraud is low, and prosecution lower still; many instances are resolved locally without further action required. The proposed ID checks are countering a problem that hardly exists, and will only negatively impact turnout in the groups that already struggle with high turnout (first time voters being a significant one). It will cost an extra £40m in election expenses, money that could be better used to encourage higher levels of voter registration.

Again, America tells a cautionary tale. The US has seen similar attempts involving the requirement of voter ID checks, many of which have been struck down in the courts as restrictive or targeted, and many states have seen countless problems during elections stopping potential voters from casting their votes. The proposals in the UK are likely to create serious and harmful effects that are greater than the supposed problem they are seeking to resolve.

The US has received criticism on an international level for its restrictive voting laws and voting rights violations. If the UK goes ahead with measures that hinder the ease of voting then it will rightfully receive similar international attention and assessment for such a move.

Mathilda Walters is a recent graduate of the University of Oxford. She works in political fundraising and campaigning.

Bad tactics, good strategy: Britain’s inconsistent commitment to Security Council reform

Though the UN Security Council can appear defunct, it remains a crucial feature in the architecture of international governance. It is in British, and global, interests to reform it. But if Britain wants to transform its rhetoric on this issue into reality then it must take steps to expedite the process.

US Presidential confidante Daisy Suckley recalls that Franklin Roosevelt was in bed when it hit him. Next morning, as soon as he had finished breakfast, he climbed into his chair to be wheeled to Winston Churchill’s room. He knocked on the door. Hearing no answer, he went in and called for his guest. Churchill had just appeared, nude, in the bathroom door, when the President exploded: “The United Nations!”. “Good!”, the Prime Minister replied.

The UN was born in a Washington bedroom as the name for a wartime alliance. Yet in the face of newer, non-conventional threats such as cybercrime, terrorism, climate change, and now COVID-19, its executive body can appear deadlocked, even defunct.

Of course, the UN Security Council is not the only organisation confronting these challenges. NGOs and regulators worldwide are also working to tackle them, as are private corporations. But allowing our response to the 21st century’s most pressing problems to be outsourced to external actors is perilous.

NGOs are able to energise the public and policymakers on particular issues, but are often unable to take the kind of open, holistic approach that governing bodies are built for. Unelected advisors and businesses suffer from a similar paucity of democratic accountability.

For all their flaws, bodies like the Security Council remain a crucial feature in the architecture of international governance. It is in global interests that they are reformed rather than rejected.

It is also in British interests. By expanding the Council to redress its regional imbalances – there are 54 African UN member states but none are permanent members – the UK can help relocate important debates to a chamber where it enjoys disproportionate influence. Britain is a veto-wielding permanent member with a strong diplomatic reputation, and ‘penholder’ on 11 of the 41 issues regularly considered by the Council, meaning it leads negotiations and resolution writing on them. Leading Council expansion could also help signal that Whitehall is serious when it claims that the UK will be “more active in shaping the international order of the future”, as the Integrated Review reads.

The Government appears to recognise these arguments. Britain has been committed to securing permanent seats for a G4 of Japan, Brazil, India, and Germany as well as permanent African representation since 2008. It is also in favour of a moderate expansion in the number of non-permanent members, taking total membership to around 25.

This looks like bad tactics. Indeed it entails the dilution of Britain’s power in an important international body. Yet it is good long-term strategy, challenging efforts by the UK’s systemic rivals to claim that they are the sole supporters of developing nations.

Still, good strategy suffers without implementation. As the German Permanent Representative to the UN argued in a 2020 debate, citing one of Grimm’s fairy tales, if the UK wants to “kiss sleeping beauty” it must find the courage to “cut through the rose bushes” and act.

Cutting through the rose bushes might cause some scratches. Two-thirds of the General Assembly would have to approve any reform proposal, and Britain’s is opposed by G7 allies Italy and Canada.

Yet change has been achieved before – in 1963, when the number of non-permanent members was increased from six to 10 – and there are some steps the UK can take to expedite the process.

First, the UK should seek appointment by the President of the General Assembly as Chair of the next round of Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform.

Second, and preferably from that position, the UK should push for consultations on the basis of a single text. This text could be developed from the ‘commonality’ and ‘convergence’ documents produced over past years as well as an updated version of 2015’s Framework, which provided attributed positions on particular reform ‘clusters’. It could then be amended and rolled over into successive sessions, with the aim of drawing it steadily closer to a formal resolution.

This will likely be divisive. There is no consensus on moving to text-based negotiations, and building the text itself will require member states to pick sides as they give public opinions. Yet members have moved pressing issues to text without prior consensus before – on COVID-19 for example – and this could preclude another restatement of views, moving parties immediately into negotiations and, hopefully, compromise.

Britain can make its commitment to Security Council reform more than rhetoric. But it has to act.

Dylan Rogers is a Fellow at UN Watch. He writes in a personal capacity.