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Energy & Climate

Will the coronavirus pandemic end Europe’s relationship with coal?

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, many experts are calling for Europe to rebuild with a green economy at its core. With coal consumption plummeting and decarbonisation efforts becoming cheaper, does this finally spell the end of coal?

British and European history is characterised by coal and steel. It helped to spur the rise in steam technologies and spearheaded the Industrial Revolution over 200 years ago, which paved the way for the rise of globalisation. Whilst coal consumption dwindled throughout the 20th century, in favour of petroleum and natural gas, it has remained a vital part of Europe’s energy mix. That is, until now.

At the start of 2010, coal was responsible for up to 30% of the UK’s energy mix (second only to natural gas). At the beginning of 2020, coal had dropped to a staggeringly low 3.7% and the lockdown-related drop in energy consumption contributed to the UK’s longest coal-free period of almost 68 days (interrupted only because of a maintenance period at the Drax coal plant, which required it to generate energy). Though a significant drop in only 10 years, it is critical to unpack how this has come about and what it spells for coal as a fuel source.

As part of the UK’s Clean Growth Strategy, announced in 2018, the Government has outlined its plan to phase out the use of unabated coal to produce electricity by 2024. This is largely being facilitated through investment into renewable energy options such as offshore wind and solar PV, but also the transition of existing coal power production to biomass power production.

In addition, the cost of production for renewable energy sources has dropped significantly thanks to innovation and government assistance. Though the Feed-in Tariff (FiT) scheme (which was designed to promote the uptake of small-scale renewable and low-carbon electricity) was phased out at the beginning of 2019, the alternative Contracts for Difference (CfD) scheme has filled the void for subsidies and grants for renewable energy alternatives. It has meant a significant amount of investment into large-scale wind projects some of which are estimated to have a capacity of over 1200MW.

Does this spell the inevitable end of coal as an energy source? In the UK, this is likely. The Clean Growth Plan is a strategy which sets out proposals for decarbonising all sectors of the UK economy through the 2020s. It commits to phasing out unabated coal by 2024, which is fully feasible given its decline as part of the national energy mix that coal in all forms can be eliminated from the energy system by 2030 through transition to more efficient, renewable options.

Will Europe be able to follow suit? That depends on what concessions and agreements are established in the coming European Commission and economic recovery schemes post-COVID-19 such as Next Generation EU.

Last year, EU leaders failed to get unanimous agreement for a 2050 decarbonisation target at summit after summit. Whilst some states have chosen to push forward with legislation on coal – such as Germany’s Kohleverstromungsbeendigungsgesetz (Coal Exit Law) – and the Czech Republic backing the EU’s green recovery plan, their more coal-dependent neighbours will hesitate to jump on the bandwagon. Poland, for instance, has not eased on their coal stance even despite the impact on health and air quality as a result of reduced coal consumption during the pandemic and its conservative President-elect is unlikely to push the green agenda. A ‘green recovery’ is still a contentious topic in European energy realms, with multiple concerns for the economic impact on jobs and industry eclipsing the need for meeting climate targets.

The EU’s Green Deal is estimated to cost up to €1tn, with many experts saying this is only a third of the necessary expenditure for full decarbonisation. But with bold ambitions to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, and even a reduction in emissions by 50% over the course of the next 10 years, significant costs are inevitable.

There is a potential return on investment on the horizon. The EU has been the centre of a rise in jobs in the environmental and sustainability sector, contributing significant amounts to national economies. Despite Brexit, the UK is well poised to experience the same benefits.

As part of this future, the EU-wide phase-out of coal and carbon-intensive fuel sources will eventually become reality. In order to meet climate targets this not only must happen in this decade, but will occur with the natural expiration of coal.

Micheil Page is Head of Agora’s Energy & Climate Programme.

Britain can transform the plight of climate refugees through its COP26 presidency

With traditional refugee law falling short, Britain should champion the protection of climate refugees as part of global climate change agreements.

An estimated 70,000-80,000 Jewish refugees were accepted into Britain before and during World War Two . At the time, the idea of turning our backs on those fleeing atrocities in continental Europe was reprehensible. The depth of this feeling was so widespread that the United Nations gathered numerous states from across the globe to agree to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a monumental effort to ensure that individuals could flee oppression and find refuge across an international border.

The Convention placed legally binding obligations on states to process the claims of asylum seekers, outlined the rights afforded to refugees, and, most importantly, created the recognised status of a refugee. Britain was among those quick to agree to the Convention.

Almost 70 years since the Convention was signed, the situation is very different. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) around 1% of the world’s population are displaced, yet European sentiment towards refugees has seen a significant shift from compassion to assist those forced to migrate towards greater reluctance. This sentiment appears to be dictating the global response to climate refugees and could have devastating impacts as climate change worsens.

Climate Refugees

Although without official definition, a climate refugee can broadly be categorised as an individual who has fled their home nation due to the effects of climate change – such as extreme weather, drought, or rising sea levels – threatening their lives or livelihoods.

Despite decades of warnings from some scholars, the danger to climate refugees remains comparatively overlooked. They are not recognised under the law and they are not entitled to any rights in foreign states. The Refugee Convention was written following World War Two and, since its adoption, has not evolved beyond its focus on wartime. This has led the UNHCR to the stark conclusion that the Convention cannot protect climate refugees.

There have been numerous calls to address these inadequacies, though there remains a lack of appetite to expand the Convention’s current scope of protection. This is less about climate refugees being viewed as undeserving and more to do with a general atmosphere of anti-refugee sentiment. The UNHCR has stated that opening the Convention to encompass climate refugees in the current political climate could actually lead to restricted protection for all refugees. It is worrying that the UNHCR find themselves in this position, given their role as champion for all refugees. Protection must now be found elsewhere, and Britain should lead the drive to provide this.

COP26 is Britain’s opportunity

A major barrier to finding a solution for the future flow of climate refugees is the absence of international willingness. Since the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference (COP21), many governments have exhibited greater hostility towards immigration and refugees, including in key nations such as Australia and the US. Equally, the UK’s 2016 Brexit campaign focused heavily on limiting future immigration. It is possible that, following this mandate, the British government may avoid seeking a global protection mechanism for climate refugees, both to appease their citizens and to retain favour with countries which they are now seeking trade deals with.

Nevertheless, as hosts of the delayed COP26, the UK should recognise that it has one of the key remaining opportunities to address the lack of protection for climate refugees by incorporating it into climate change agreements. Alok Sharma, who recently left his ministerial position to focus on his role as COP26 President, demonstrated in his address to UN nations that he is cognisant of climate change migration. It is now imperative that this be followed up with concrete action.

This action should take the form of an agreement between states whereby climate refugees can be identified, relocated equitably, and conferred with rights enabling them to begin a new life. This provides a response which would ensure climate refugees are protected whilst equally avoiding a burden on any one state.

This could be achieved and is not without precedent. During COP21 there were numerous proposals surrounding a coordination facility for those displaced by climate change; a plan which would have facilitated relocation for climate refugees. This gained traction, although talks were eventually discontinued following Australia’s opposition and the belief that a more efficient alternative could be found. A lack of progress since COP21 suggests that this may not be the case and with the effects of climate change showing no signs of slowing it is now time to resurrect this idea.

The UK government must recognise that, through their own hosting of a COP summit, they have a wonderful opportunity to provide lasting protection for climate refugees.

Tomos Owen works to facilitate refugee integration in Wales, having graduated with a Masters in Human Rights Law from Cardiff University.

The UK should pay closer attention to the impacts of climate change in MENA

The local is global. Climate change is likely to exacerbate conflicts and areas of instability. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), an already volatile region, stands to be particularly affected. UK foreign policy needs to improve its awareness of the impact climate change may have on the region and the wider security repercussions.

Climate change has already resulted in a 1°C rise in temperatures compared to the previous century. The UK’s Global Strategic Trends assessment views it as one of the most certain and influential global trends affecting all geographic and policy areas.

The MENA region is no exception. Research has shown that the region will suffer from an even higher number of hot days than it currently is, with warnings of droughts and overall water deficit. There is a risk of these impacts increasing, should the overall warming of the world go beyond 1.5-2°C.

Climate change may be indirectly linked to an increase in conflict, due to it exacerbating pre-existing issues such as resource scarcity, economic issues, and weak governance. Institutions and proper governance are important factors in being able to deal effectively with climate change. Where there is already fragmented governance, states could be further weakened by the consequences of climate change.

There is limited understanding regarding the impact climate change will have on global security, however. This includes a lack of knowledge as to how already vulnerable areas may be affected by climate change itself and how climate change-related instability could aggravate existing tensions or create new instability.

The MENA region is currently experiencing widespread insecurity due to ongoing and systemic violence and unrest. This is exacerbated by self-serving interventionist external powers, such as the Russian intervention in the Syrian conflict, or the Russian and Turkish intervention in Libya’s civil war. Climate change may exacerbate the instability prevalent in the region. Of particular importance is the impact climate change could have on water scarcity, food insecurity, disease, and conflict in the region.

Water scarcity is a pressing issue in the MENA region. Tensions have risen between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over the Tigris‐Euphrates basin. This is caused by an unequal water flow from the rivers to the three countries, grievances around water management, and the use of water as a way to exert pressure on downstream countries. In North Africa, Ethiopian plans to build a dam on the Nile would have serious consequences for Egyptian agriculture which depends on the river. While discussions over the dam are ongoing, Egypt has previously threatened war with Ethiopia over its construction, and tensions remain high. Additionally, water scarcity would likely lead to increased food insecurity, with consequences being famines or malnutrition, as 70% of the region’s agriculture depends on rainfall, which is projected to decline by 60% should temperatures increase by 4°C.

Climate change could also act as a threat multiplier to countries with weak governance. In Iraq, there are reports the Islamic State (IS) used periods of drought to entice people to join its ranks. In Syria, Libya, and Yemen, populations are already in precarious situations and governments would be either unable or unwilling to alleviate climate change driven issues. This may provide opportunities for non-state groups to take control and spread further instability, as was witnessed with the rise of the IS, facilitated by weak governance in Iraq and Syria.

Climate change fuelled instability and insecurity in MENA will have a direct impact on neighbouring countries and regions, including Europe. This may lead European countries being faced with increased migration. External powers may need to provide humanitarian assistance to populations in response to situations that may be brought, or exacerbated, by climate change, or even requested to intervene in regional conflicts.

Climate change will also impact the rest of the world. Europe, including Britain, will be dealing with its own climate change issues. This raises the question of whether the UK can cope with climate change fuelled difficulties both at home and in other regions.

To address this, the UK must begin early planning and preparation for the impacts of climate change in the MENA region and seek to help reduce climate change driven instability. Preventative measures include helping improve governance, facilitating discussions over water sharing, and aiding the development of policies and strategies focused on coping with the effects of climate change.

Ultimately, the UK’s climate change preparations should also seek to offset the wider impact on global security that could be provoked by climate change-related instability, as both will come hand in hand.

Sarah Grand-Clement is a defence and security policy researcher, and holds an MSc in Arab World Studies from Durham University.

Field vs forest: readjusting livestock farming in Britain post-Brexit

Britain’s departure from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a golden opportunity for the Government to reform the way the UK farms sheep. The EU policy has previously prioritised mass production of livestock over environmental concerns and actual consumer demand.

Sheep oversaturate both economic markets and the English countryside as a legacy of farming subsidies. This poses a threat to our environment. Cows are also unknowing adversaries in our plight to lowering carbon emissions, however sheep rearing demands much more space and is far less economically productive then other agricultural pursuits.

The cost of higher carbon emissions

Mighty forests have been decimated and strategically replaced with sparse fields that enhance the capacity and food supply of the livestock that inhabit them. Making up 40% of the entire nation, British uplands are incompatible with agricultural farming so have been utilised as pastures for animals.

In England, sheep farming demands 44% of our upland land mass, whilst cows are granted 29% of the space to graze. These figures become increasingly unsettling when compared to the 13% of the UK we have generously allocated to our woodlands.

This deforestation has left the UK well acquainted with higher carbon emissions by rationing the natural absorbers of the gas: trees. Trees respire inversely to humans by taking in carbon and releasing oxygen, but a forest’s ability to process carbon is greatly affected by the number of trees that are actually in it. Through replanting efforts, forest coverage in England has increased 7.8% since 1905. However, this is barely enough to combat the 315.5m tonnes of carbon dioxide Britain produced in 2019.

The term ‘deforestation’ carries connotations of butchered rainforests in Brazil. It has been coined as an exotic term, barring the idea of it ever happening in the UK. Yet the only difference between Britain and developing countries cutting the trees down is that the former began prioritising farmland over woodland over 1,000 years ago. Northern Europe’s gift of naturally superior farming terrain has left a cultural brand on it. It signifies that it has always been okay to take from our environment, as that is what we have always done.

However, it is the sheep we are breeding now that are becoming the prime carbon culprits. Sheep select the most appetising plants, with tree saplings being a particular nutritious delicacy. This prevents the expansion of woodlands, and newly planted carbon trees are consumed as saplings in bulk before they can grow.

Ignoring evolution

Britain once boasted complex food chains with predators such as brown bears mediating the numbers of farmable livestock. The extinction of these creatures directly correlates to the threat they posed to our ancestors’ farm animals. In 1281 King Edward had already requested the killing of every wolf in England in order to protect pastoral farming. Biodiversity had been evicted and replaced with favourable conditions that would allow the mass production of animals.

Darwinism explains how species evolve over millions of years to best adhere to the demands of their environment. This concept has been altered by the explosion of our sheep population since the Middle Ages, when these natural predators were hunted to extinction. As seen in 2018, when Britain’s sheep population reached 22.5m.

Other species are unable to evolve; at the same time the livestock population rises. Sheep in their bulk devour the best produce in the fields, leaving other grazing species under threat. The destruction of the forests for their behalf means that many other animals that rely on the woodland for food and protection are becoming additionally vulnerable.

Where to point the finger

The UK has a culturally ingrained misconception that the demand for sheep is still high. Mutton and lamb consumption only accounts for 1.2% of the average Briton’s diet.

Britain’s relationship with the EU also dictates the success of sheep farmers. Over 30% of production is exported and 90% of that is to the EU. A ‘no deal’ Brexit would expose UK farmers’ exports to World Trade Organisation tariffs that could add 50% more to the production costs of sheep.

COVID-19 also greatly shrank the domestic market for sheep. Lamb is a popular meat consumed at pubs and restaurants. After these institutions were forced to close the market for the product fell sharply. This contributed to the price of the averaged cull ewe plummeting by £37 to £71.70 in mid-March.

Farming tends to go back generations and provides steady incomes for 34,000 households, often in poorer communities across Britain. What is needed is not the removal of sheep farming altogether but instead the reworking of the system with environmental problems that will soon parallel its lack of economic productivity. Following the end of the Brexit transition period and the UK’s departure from the CAP, the Government will be able to make these necessary changes.

Emily Wilson studies Politics and International Relations at the University of Manchester.

Diplomacy and mining the Moon

There are moves to mine resources on the Moon and the deep seabed, two distinct but related global ‘commons’. The UK must push for environmentally sound regulations ensuring the responsible management of these vulnerable areas.

A number of news outlets have reported the possibility of mining projects on the Moon and in the deep seabed. These areas are linked, despite their immense geographical differences. Both are global ‘commons’ – domains not under the jurisdiction of individual states, but international agreements, and to which all nations have access – with near limitless economic potential.

The Moon

President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order on 6 April 2020 asserting the right of the US and its firms to extract resources from the lunar surface and other celestial bodies. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) should work with the private sector, it says, spurring innovation toward its long-term goal: a human presence on Mars. NASA has since outlined how a lunar presence might work in its Artemis Accords.

Is this allowed? States are regulated in outer space by a suite of international treaties, the most important of which is known as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (or OST). This mandates that the exploration of outer space should be peaceful, and not subject to claims of sovereignty (international law partly inspired by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty).

Resource extraction is murkier legal territory, with no mention in the OST. Attempts were made to cover this with the 1979 ‘Moon Agreement’, which labelled resources the “common heritage of all mankind”. Only 18 states ever signed, however, rendering it largely ineffective.

In 2015 the US passed legislation recognising property in outer-space resources, with states such as Luxembourg following suit. The UK should support creating a clear rules-based system that regulates firms’ conduct in outer space to reflect the variety of policy options, both economic and environmental. Otherwise unilateralism risks triumph over multilateral governance.

The deep seabed

As in outer space, the seabed is an evolving area of international governance. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is the UN body designated to regulate resource extraction on the seabed in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Licences granted so far extend only to exploration in 30 regions, but the Authority is working towards a Mining Code that would allow exploitation. The intention was to agree to the Code in July 2020, although the COVID-19 pandemic has delayed this.

Still, the underlying desire to mine the deep seabed will not diminish. It holds enormous quantities of valuable minerals used in smartphones and by renewable-energy technologies. The World Bank estimates that, to keep global temperature rises this century to “well below” 2°C (the central aim of the 2015 Paris Agreement), demand for certain metals used in batteries will increase more than ten times by 2050. Indeed, prices for palladium, used in catalytic convertors, have risen by a third since the millennium. Platinum, used in electric-vehicle fuel cells, has more than doubled. Seafloor mining technology has also advanced markedly over recent years, according to ISA’s current Secretary-General.

What about the environment? A British Government-commissioned capability statement warned in 2017 of “the potential extinction of unique species which form the first rung of the food chain”. The prospect of mining has resulted in the classification of the scaly-foot snail – Chrysomallon squamiferum – as endangered on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List. More worrying, we simply have no idea what life would be destroyed. There are almost 26,000 species listed in the deep sea (below 500 metres depth), but research has modelled there could be over 10 million.

Defending multilateralism in the commons

The British government has sponsored two licences for polymetallic nodules in the Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone, an area of 4.5m square kilometres between Hawaii and Mexico. On exploitation, its position is to take the precautionary principle, specifying it will not sponsor “any exploitation licences for deep-sea mining projects until there is sufficient scientific evidence about the potential impact on deep-sea ecosystems” with “strong” ISA standards in place.

This is to be commended, but should go further. Regulations need to establish a baseline for biodiversity, from which subsequent divergence can be monitored. There should also be a clear roadmap towards ever-greater environmental protections as the industry matures.

Whether at the abyssal depths of our planet’s oceans or far beyond our atmosphere, rules on resource-extraction should be established on a multilateral basis. Responsibility demands that these prioritise environmental protection, based on the precautionary principle.

Max Daniels is a Fellow at the Polar Research & Policy Initiative, has worked in the House of Commons, and studied for an MA in Geopolitics, Territory and Security at King’s College London.

Where does energy from waste fit into the UK post-Brexit?

Britain’s circular economy strategy is part of a wider plan to mitigate climate change and will change how society operates; the materials we use, how we generate electricity, and how we consume and manage our waste.

The circular economy

The circular economy model is a key framework to realise a more sustainable future. It focuses on keeping materials and resources within the system for as long as possible or, if possible, indefinitely. As opposed to a linear model, where a resource is extracted, refined, consumed, and disposed, the circular model ensures the material is repurposed and reused either through recycling into another product, extraction of key metals and other materials, or potentially even conversion into energy. This approach is one of many potential catalysts for a sustainable future, where fewer virgin resources are extracted from rapidly depleting sources.

The role of waste

To fully embrace and refine this model, a major part of the circular economy is managing waste. The UK is currently following the EU strategy, with the aims to achieve a 60% recycling target for municipal waste by 2030. Landfill capacity is expected to expire by 2023 and, while newer sites will become available, they are not being opened fast enough to meet demand. The UK does not yet have its own strategy on dealing with waste management as part of the circular economy and, with the looming shadow of Brexit, it is unclear if these targets will be maintained or others developed.

Currently, UK policy is having a positive impact on waste. While 48% of total waste in 2016 was recycled and around 25% went to landfill – which includes municipal waste from construction and industry – the weightage amount is still too high to be sustainable. Municipal solid waste is defined as waste coming from homes, schools, shops and small businesses. Since 2010, there has been a 40% reduction in municipal waste sent to the landfill.

Energy from waste

One of the ways that we can reduce waste sent to landfill and support a more sustainable economy is by extracting energy from the waste for heating and electricity generation, a process known as energy from waste (EfW). The process outputs heat, which can be used for district heating, while the energy can be used to create steam, which is in turn used to generate electricity. Materials such as glass and metals, which do not combust in the process, are left at the bottom, known as bottom ash and can be used as aggregates in construction, with the remaining metals being sent for recycling.

There are many advantages of this approach. For instance, when we compare carbon emissions of EfW against sending waste to landfill, EfW has much lower emissions. Research on EfW has also shown that the health risks – cancerous and non-cancerous – from waste incineration are five times lower in comparison to landfill. Given that we are running out of landfill space, EfW can take as much as 60Mt out of landfill in the coming decade and be used to provide electricity to 1.8m homes. Currently, around 3.5m tonnes of waste are being sent abroad to be utilised to generate electricity, which the UK is then buying back.

There are still problems with EfW, the EU has recently removed EfW from its directives to be incorporated into the circular economy on the grounds that, compared to traditional fossil fuels, EfW produces twice as much carbon per unit of electricity generated, passing the limit set by the EU. Research into the technology involved in ensuring the emissions are purified is improving, however, and treatment of air pollution control (APC) residues may rectify some of these problems in the coming years.

What does this mean for the UK?

Weighing up the pros and cons, EfW should be a key part of the UK’s post-Brexit policies. Given we are unable to meet space demand for landfills, EfW will enable us to free up space and reduce the amount of CO2 emissions that would normally be generated. Exporting waste – to be turned into electricity and to be bought back – makes no sense when there is an option to reduce costs, provide investment opportunities, and create domestic capacity for baseline power generation.

EfW does not necessarily need to be a long term strategy for the UK. With society undergoing a transformation in the energy sector and climate being at the top of the agenda, using EfW in a short-to-medium term could provide a stepping stone to a cleaner world. While there are concerns about EfW emissions, a comprehensive national strategy needs to be developed to effectively place EfW in the future of the UK’s circular economy.

Usman Farooq is a data scientist at an international engineering consultancy.