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The UK should pay closer attention to the impacts of climate change in MENA

The local is global. Climate change is likely to exacerbate conflicts and areas of instability. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), an already volatile region, stands to be particularly affected. UK foreign policy needs to improve its awareness of the impact climate change may have on the region and the wider security repercussions.

Climate change has already resulted in a 1°C rise in temperatures compared to the previous century. The UK’s Global Strategic Trends assessment views it as one of the most certain and influential global trends affecting all geographic and policy areas.

The MENA region is no exception. Research has shown that the region will suffer from an even higher number of hot days than it currently is, with warnings of droughts and overall water deficit. There is a risk of these impacts increasing, should the overall warming of the world go beyond 1.5-2°C.

Climate change may be indirectly linked to an increase in conflict, due to it exacerbating pre-existing issues such as resource scarcity, economic issues, and weak governance. Institutions and proper governance are important factors in being able to deal effectively with climate change. Where there is already fragmented governance, states could be further weakened by the consequences of climate change.

There is limited understanding regarding the impact climate change will have on global security, however. This includes a lack of knowledge as to how already vulnerable areas may be affected by climate change itself and how climate change-related instability could aggravate existing tensions or create new instability.

The MENA region is currently experiencing widespread insecurity due to ongoing and systemic violence and unrest. This is exacerbated by self-serving interventionist external powers, such as the Russian intervention in the Syrian conflict, or the Russian and Turkish intervention in Libya’s civil war. Climate change may exacerbate the instability prevalent in the region. Of particular importance is the impact climate change could have on water scarcity, food insecurity, disease, and conflict in the region.

Water scarcity is a pressing issue in the MENA region. Tensions have risen between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over the Tigris‐Euphrates basin. This is caused by an unequal water flow from the rivers to the three countries, grievances around water management, and the use of water as a way to exert pressure on downstream countries. In North Africa, Ethiopian plans to build a dam on the Nile would have serious consequences for Egyptian agriculture which depends on the river. While discussions over the dam are ongoing, Egypt has previously threatened war with Ethiopia over its construction, and tensions remain high. Additionally, water scarcity would likely lead to increased food insecurity, with consequences being famines or malnutrition, as 70% of the region’s agriculture depends on rainfall, which is projected to decline by 60% should temperatures increase by 4°C.

Climate change could also act as a threat multiplier to countries with weak governance. In Iraq, there are reports the Islamic State (IS) used periods of drought to entice people to join its ranks. In Syria, Libya, and Yemen, populations are already in precarious situations and governments would be either unable or unwilling to alleviate climate change driven issues. This may provide opportunities for non-state groups to take control and spread further instability, as was witnessed with the rise of the IS, facilitated by weak governance in Iraq and Syria.

Climate change fuelled instability and insecurity in MENA will have a direct impact on neighbouring countries and regions, including Europe. This may lead European countries being faced with increased migration. External powers may need to provide humanitarian assistance to populations in response to situations that may be brought, or exacerbated, by climate change, or even requested to intervene in regional conflicts.

Climate change will also impact the rest of the world. Europe, including Britain, will be dealing with its own climate change issues. This raises the question of whether the UK can cope with climate change fuelled difficulties both at home and in other regions.

To address this, the UK must begin early planning and preparation for the impacts of climate change in the MENA region and seek to help reduce climate change driven instability. Preventative measures include helping improve governance, facilitating discussions over water sharing, and aiding the development of policies and strategies focused on coping with the effects of climate change.

Ultimately, the UK’s climate change preparations should also seek to offset the wider impact on global security that could be provoked by climate change-related instability, as both will come hand in hand.

Sarah Grand-Clement is a defence and security policy researcher, and holds an MSc in Arab World Studies from Durham University.

Field vs forest: readjusting livestock farming in Britain post-Brexit

Britain’s departure from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a golden opportunity for the Government to reform the way the UK farms sheep. The EU policy has previously prioritised mass production of livestock over environmental concerns and actual consumer demand.

Sheep oversaturate both economic markets and the English countryside as a legacy of farming subsidies. This poses a threat to our environment. Cows are also unknowing adversaries in our plight to lowering carbon emissions, however sheep rearing demands much more space and is far less economically productive then other agricultural pursuits.

The cost of higher carbon emissions

Mighty forests have been decimated and strategically replaced with sparse fields that enhance the capacity and food supply of the livestock that inhabit them. Making up 40% of the entire nation, British uplands are incompatible with agricultural farming so have been utilised as pastures for animals.

In England, sheep farming demands 44% of our upland land mass, whilst cows are granted 29% of the space to graze. These figures become increasingly unsettling when compared to the 13% of the UK we have generously allocated to our woodlands.

This deforestation has left the UK well acquainted with higher carbon emissions by rationing the natural absorbers of the gas: trees. Trees respire inversely to humans by taking in carbon and releasing oxygen, but a forest’s ability to process carbon is greatly affected by the number of trees that are actually in it. Through replanting efforts, forest coverage in England has increased 7.8% since 1905. However, this is barely enough to combat the 315.5m tonnes of carbon dioxide Britain produced in 2019.

The term ‘deforestation’ carries connotations of butchered rainforests in Brazil. It has been coined as an exotic term, barring the idea of it ever happening in the UK. Yet the only difference between Britain and developing countries cutting the trees down is that the former began prioritising farmland over woodland over 1,000 years ago. Northern Europe’s gift of naturally superior farming terrain has left a cultural brand on it. It signifies that it has always been okay to take from our environment, as that is what we have always done.

However, it is the sheep we are breeding now that are becoming the prime carbon culprits. Sheep select the most appetising plants, with tree saplings being a particular nutritious delicacy. This prevents the expansion of woodlands, and newly planted carbon trees are consumed as saplings in bulk before they can grow.

Ignoring evolution

Britain once boasted complex food chains with predators such as brown bears mediating the numbers of farmable livestock. The extinction of these creatures directly correlates to the threat they posed to our ancestors’ farm animals. In 1281 King Edward had already requested the killing of every wolf in England in order to protect pastoral farming. Biodiversity had been evicted and replaced with favourable conditions that would allow the mass production of animals.

Darwinism explains how species evolve over millions of years to best adhere to the demands of their environment. This concept has been altered by the explosion of our sheep population since the Middle Ages, when these natural predators were hunted to extinction. As seen in 2018, when Britain’s sheep population reached 22.5m.

Other species are unable to evolve; at the same time the livestock population rises. Sheep in their bulk devour the best produce in the fields, leaving other grazing species under threat. The destruction of the forests for their behalf means that many other animals that rely on the woodland for food and protection are becoming additionally vulnerable.

Where to point the finger

The UK has a culturally ingrained misconception that the demand for sheep is still high. Mutton and lamb consumption only accounts for 1.2% of the average Briton’s diet.

Britain’s relationship with the EU also dictates the success of sheep farmers. Over 30% of production is exported and 90% of that is to the EU. A ‘no deal’ Brexit would expose UK farmers’ exports to World Trade Organisation tariffs that could add 50% more to the production costs of sheep.

COVID-19 also greatly shrank the domestic market for sheep. Lamb is a popular meat consumed at pubs and restaurants. After these institutions were forced to close the market for the product fell sharply. This contributed to the price of the averaged cull ewe plummeting by £37 to £71.70 in mid-March.

Farming tends to go back generations and provides steady incomes for 34,000 households, often in poorer communities across Britain. What is needed is not the removal of sheep farming altogether but instead the reworking of the system with environmental problems that will soon parallel its lack of economic productivity. Following the end of the Brexit transition period and the UK’s departure from the CAP, the Government will be able to make these necessary changes.

Emily Wilson studies Politics and International Relations at the University of Manchester.

Diplomacy and mining the Moon

There are moves to mine resources on the Moon and the deep seabed, two distinct but related global ‘commons’. The UK must push for environmentally sound regulations ensuring the responsible management of these vulnerable areas.

A number of news outlets have reported the possibility of mining projects on the Moon and in the deep seabed. These areas are linked, despite their immense geographical differences. Both are global ‘commons’ – domains not under the jurisdiction of individual states, but international agreements, and to which all nations have access – with near limitless economic potential.

The Moon

President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order on 6 April 2020 asserting the right of the US and its firms to extract resources from the lunar surface and other celestial bodies. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) should work with the private sector, it says, spurring innovation toward its long-term goal: a human presence on Mars. NASA has since outlined how a lunar presence might work in its Artemis Accords.

Is this allowed? States are regulated in outer space by a suite of international treaties, the most important of which is known as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (or OST). This mandates that the exploration of outer space should be peaceful, and not subject to claims of sovereignty (international law partly inspired by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty).

Resource extraction is murkier legal territory, with no mention in the OST. Attempts were made to cover this with the 1979 ‘Moon Agreement’, which labelled resources the “common heritage of all mankind”. Only 18 states ever signed, however, rendering it largely ineffective.

In 2015 the US passed legislation recognising property in outer-space resources, with states such as Luxembourg following suit. The UK should support creating a clear rules-based system that regulates firms’ conduct in outer space to reflect the variety of policy options, both economic and environmental. Otherwise unilateralism risks triumph over multilateral governance.

The deep seabed

As in outer space, the seabed is an evolving area of international governance. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is the UN body designated to regulate resource extraction on the seabed in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Licences granted so far extend only to exploration in 30 regions, but the Authority is working towards a Mining Code that would allow exploitation. The intention was to agree to the Code in July 2020, although the COVID-19 pandemic has delayed this.

Still, the underlying desire to mine the deep seabed will not diminish. It holds enormous quantities of valuable minerals used in smartphones and by renewable-energy technologies. The World Bank estimates that, to keep global temperature rises this century to “well below” 2°C (the central aim of the 2015 Paris Agreement), demand for certain metals used in batteries will increase more than ten times by 2050. Indeed, prices for palladium, used in catalytic convertors, have risen by a third since the millennium. Platinum, used in electric-vehicle fuel cells, has more than doubled. Seafloor mining technology has also advanced markedly over recent years, according to ISA’s current Secretary-General.

What about the environment? A British Government-commissioned capability statement warned in 2017 of “the potential extinction of unique species which form the first rung of the food chain”. The prospect of mining has resulted in the classification of the scaly-foot snail – Chrysomallon squamiferum – as endangered on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List. More worrying, we simply have no idea what life would be destroyed. There are almost 26,000 species listed in the deep sea (below 500 metres depth), but research has modelled there could be over 10 million.

Defending multilateralism in the commons

The British government has sponsored two licences for polymetallic nodules in the Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone, an area of 4.5m square kilometres between Hawaii and Mexico. On exploitation, its position is to take the precautionary principle, specifying it will not sponsor “any exploitation licences for deep-sea mining projects until there is sufficient scientific evidence about the potential impact on deep-sea ecosystems” with “strong” ISA standards in place.

This is to be commended, but should go further. Regulations need to establish a baseline for biodiversity, from which subsequent divergence can be monitored. There should also be a clear roadmap towards ever-greater environmental protections as the industry matures.

Whether at the abyssal depths of our planet’s oceans or far beyond our atmosphere, rules on resource-extraction should be established on a multilateral basis. Responsibility demands that these prioritise environmental protection, based on the precautionary principle.

Max Daniels is a Fellow at the Polar Research & Policy Initiative, has worked in the House of Commons, and studied for an MA in Geopolitics, Territory and Security at King’s College London.

Where does energy from waste fit into the UK post-Brexit?

Britain’s circular economy strategy is part of a wider plan to mitigate climate change and will change how society operates; the materials we use, how we generate electricity, and how we consume and manage our waste.

The circular economy

The circular economy model is a key framework to realise a more sustainable future. It focuses on keeping materials and resources within the system for as long as possible or, if possible, indefinitely. As opposed to a linear model, where a resource is extracted, refined, consumed, and disposed, the circular model ensures the material is repurposed and reused either through recycling into another product, extraction of key metals and other materials, or potentially even conversion into energy. This approach is one of many potential catalysts for a sustainable future, where fewer virgin resources are extracted from rapidly depleting sources.

The role of waste

To fully embrace and refine this model, a major part of the circular economy is managing waste. The UK is currently following the EU strategy, with the aims to achieve a 60% recycling target for municipal waste by 2030. Landfill capacity is expected to expire by 2023 and, while newer sites will become available, they are not being opened fast enough to meet demand. The UK does not yet have its own strategy on dealing with waste management as part of the circular economy and, with the looming shadow of Brexit, it is unclear if these targets will be maintained or others developed.

Currently, UK policy is having a positive impact on waste. While 48% of total waste in 2016 was recycled and around 25% went to landfill – which includes municipal waste from construction and industry – the weightage amount is still too high to be sustainable. Municipal solid waste is defined as waste coming from homes, schools, shops and small businesses. Since 2010, there has been a 40% reduction in municipal waste sent to the landfill.

Energy from waste

One of the ways that we can reduce waste sent to landfill and support a more sustainable economy is by extracting energy from the waste for heating and electricity generation, a process known as energy from waste (EfW). The process outputs heat, which can be used for district heating, while the energy can be used to create steam, which is in turn used to generate electricity. Materials such as glass and metals, which do not combust in the process, are left at the bottom, known as bottom ash and can be used as aggregates in construction, with the remaining metals being sent for recycling.

There are many advantages of this approach. For instance, when we compare carbon emissions of EfW against sending waste to landfill, EfW has much lower emissions. Research on EfW has also shown that the health risks – cancerous and non-cancerous – from waste incineration are five times lower in comparison to landfill. Given that we are running out of landfill space, EfW can take as much as 60Mt out of landfill in the coming decade and be used to provide electricity to 1.8m homes. Currently, around 3.5m tonnes of waste are being sent abroad to be utilised to generate electricity, which the UK is then buying back.

There are still problems with EfW, the EU has recently removed EfW from its directives to be incorporated into the circular economy on the grounds that, compared to traditional fossil fuels, EfW produces twice as much carbon per unit of electricity generated, passing the limit set by the EU. Research into the technology involved in ensuring the emissions are purified is improving, however, and treatment of air pollution control (APC) residues may rectify some of these problems in the coming years.

What does this mean for the UK?

Weighing up the pros and cons, EfW should be a key part of the UK’s post-Brexit policies. Given we are unable to meet space demand for landfills, EfW will enable us to free up space and reduce the amount of CO2 emissions that would normally be generated. Exporting waste – to be turned into electricity and to be bought back – makes no sense when there is an option to reduce costs, provide investment opportunities, and create domestic capacity for baseline power generation.

EfW does not necessarily need to be a long term strategy for the UK. With society undergoing a transformation in the energy sector and climate being at the top of the agenda, using EfW in a short-to-medium term could provide a stepping stone to a cleaner world. While there are concerns about EfW emissions, a comprehensive national strategy needs to be developed to effectively place EfW in the future of the UK’s circular economy.

Usman Farooq is a data scientist at an international engineering consultancy.

The UK can use COP26 to prove its climate credentials

The next COP summit on climate change will be hosted in Glasgow. In the face of the climate crisis and the past few years of political uncertainty, the UK should use the meeting to successfully deliver on their large climate change promises.

Following the Conservative Party’s win in the December general election, the new government is expected by various public sectors and stakeholders to deliver in multiple fields of policy, from dealing with problems facing the NHS, to relationships with the United States, to combatting homelessness, to the rise in rental prices in the UK.

Among these is the most important of all: climate change. Following it’s postponement, the UK is due to host the 26th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP26) in 2021, the first such international forum to be hosted in Britain. With climate change becoming increasingly important across the world, the demand and pressure to deliver a substantial agreement is greater than ever.

The UK has long heralded itself as a ‘world leader’ in the fight against climate change, the reality of which is a matter for debate. Despite landmark victories in declaring a ‘climate emergency’, palpable progress on environmental policy in the UK is slow, with the only significant recent victory being the U-turn on policy approaches to new onshore wind farms.

Many parts of the Government and other MPs are currently discussing new approaches through Parliamentary groups and Whitehall Departments. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) recently focused on achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. Then Chair of the BEIS Committee Rachel Reeves stated in March: “Putting the 2050 net zero target into law was a big sign of the UK’s climate change ambitions. However, the target is only the first step, it’s crucial the Government now comes forward with a roadmap to achieve it”.

The UK has remained a reliable signatory to agreements and participant in further negotiations that arise from COP summits. The country has an additional opportunity to develop a vital, though potentially only cosmetic, association with climate policy. Throughout COP, there are multiple instances where essential agreements become enshrined in the body of climate dialogues. We all recall the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement and, with the summit in Glasgow, the UK can stamp its name into the environmental history books.

The road ahead is still rife with bumps and potholes. The Government has already had to change the President of the proceedings, from the former Minister for Energy and Clean Growth, Claire Perry O’Neill, to the current Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Alok Sharma. In addition, the EU may be seeking to exert its influence both ahead of and during COP26 in Glasgow, with the bloc already having separate discussions on increasing European emissions’ targets for 2030. Additionally, as a result of the coronavirus crisis, the summit has now been postponed, throwing yet another wrench into the works in the lead up to COP26.

With an additional year ahead of the conference, it would be foolish to rule out further trials and tribulations. Undoubtedly, 2020 marks an important year for both British and international climate policy, and we must keep a critical eye on what unfolds in the lead up to and during the proceedings at COP26 next year.

Micheil Page is Head of Agora’s Energy & Climate Programme.

Climate change could transform the way we think about democracy

Though it is mainly seen as an environmental catastrophe today, climate change will fundamentally alter our political and economic institutions, including popular rule. For democracy to survive, we need to expand it in definition and practice as part of the response to climate change.

When historians review the 21st century, they may well conclude that climate change ran through all the historical, political, and economic shifts of the era. As environmental collapses destabilise economic systems through resource scarcity, alter societies through mass migration, and jeopardise national security through environmental hazards, global political institutions will fundamentally shift.

One of these institutions we hold dear more than most is democracy, defined by US President Abraham Lincoln as “government of the people, by the people, for the people”. Although we focus on the populist election victories in the West since 2016 as the key challenge to democracy today, there may be a greater one hidden around the corner: what will the impact of climate change be?

A quick prognosis will not yield positive results. The short-term orientation of democratic term limits do not lend themselves to the long-term solutions climate change requires, and the unpalatability of the necessary reforms mean it is safer for democratic politicians to appeal to the rhetoric of climate change, rather than make real progress.

This was seen in Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s proposition that Canada should declare a climate emergency, shortly before he approved the construction of a trans-mountain oil pipeline. For re-election, the bad publicity was preferable to rising fuel costs.

Additionally, solutions must be on a global scale to have a realistic chance of success at fighting climate change. Treaties such as the 2015 Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal, proposed in May 2019 by the incoming European Commission, are an effective way to make sure every country takes action against climate change. In a world were these solutions have to be increasingly globalised, is there any room for the voice of small communities?

These arguments obscure the fact that climate change opposition can empower democratic institutions. For one thing, the notion that elected representatives try to avoid long-term climate policies is only really the case in majoritarian democracies such the UK; adherence to climate change policies is higher in more proportional democracies. This includes the many continental European nations with popular green parties, such as the Dutch GroenLinks who found popularity in elections in 2017.

Moreover, climate change activism is galvanizing young people to more participation in, not disenchantment with, democratic politics. This has led to increased support for presidential candidates in the US with strong climate change policies, and the global school strikes for the climate (we might also expect politicians to respond faster to climate change if the franchise were extended to 16-year-olds).

Additionally, viewing international agreements as globalisation out of the control of the masses is misleading when it comes to climate agreements. They are not imposed on citizens unfairly through unrepresentative organisations, rather people are encouraging states to abide by commitments though the international arena. This is through both traditional political participation and through activism taken to an enormous scale, such as the six to seven million people protesting in late September in a global climate strike. The decision for dozens of US cities to continue adhering to the Paris Climate Agreement, after the American refusal to abide by it in 2017, also reflects the support of communities beyond the state for these arrangements.

From here, we can see democratic principles beginning to shift. States currently employing majoritarian systems of democracy may have to make them more representative if they want to avoid climate disaster, and popular protests play an ever-increasing role in influencing policy makers. Yet while protests are traditionally national affairs in support of state aims, these new climate protests challenge the state system by organising worldwide for common goals and demanding that states adhere to international agreements. These emerging patterns point the way to a future where popular rule does not conform to traditional two-party power structures, nor even to state borders.

Lincoln gave his famous definition during the American Civil War, claiming that Union soldiers died so that democracy “shall not perish from the earth”. Soon we will find ourselves in a similar position, but the people shall no longer be of one nation, but of one, dying, earth. Maintaining democracy in the face of global challenges is far from inevitable, in fact it is unlikely. But maintaining democracy has always been a challenge, and in continuing its maintenance we must widen and deepen the idea of what it could mean to a broader, more global, and fundamentally fairer process.

Ross Twinn is a history student at the London School of Economics.