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Energy & Climate

How Brexit poses risks to the EU’s climate policies

27 March 2022

The UK’s departure from the EU is posing significant challenges to the latter’s usually strict environmental policies and climate change mitigation strategies.

Agora energy environment climate blog industry carbon emissions atmosphere smog

Brexit has usually been evaluated in terms of its economic, trade, security and diplomatic implications. It is significantly less well-analysed in relation to climate change impacts. This is likely to continue as long as climate change is not regarded as a security threat.

Brexit poses three major challenges to the EU’s environmental policy. Firstly, in attaining its greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets. Secondly, its impact on the Emission Trading System (ETS). Thirdly, its impact on the EU’s green finance.

The UK has one of the most ambitious GHG reduction targets when compared to its European counterparts. The UK’s sixth carbon budget seeks to cut 78% of emissions by 2035, bringing it closer to its net-zero target by 2050. Furthermore, the Climate Change Act sets a legally binding emission reduction target of 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Similarly, the EU is seeking to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. The European Commission has adopted several legislative proposals, including an intermediate target of a 55% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030. The extent to which Brexit will affect the EU’s environmental ambitions will require a careful analysis in the coming years, however.

In the short run, it is unlikely that Brexit will affect the EU’s emission reduction goals, as Brussels managed to meet its 2020 targets without Britain. The long-term impact, however, is contested. The EU27 is expected to increase its GHG emission targets by 4.5%, amounting to over 138MtCO2 equivalent.

Both the EU and the UK’s climate policies so far have been shaped by their constructive interaction. Britain’s strong leadership in the EU has made the EU ETS and single energy market possible. The EU ETS is considered the cornerstone of low-carbon innovation and covers over 40% of EU27’s GHG emissions. Interestingly, the UK’s divorce from the EU ETS is estimated to hamper Britain’s own businesses. British businesses are spending over £75 (€90) per tonne of carbon emission, whereas companies in the EU are paying a carbon price of €85. The EU ETS is well-established with greater liquidity that covers all heavy industries, which makes it more cost-effective relative to Britain’s carbon policy.

Although the EU pioneered the low-carbon innovation policy, it now needs to enhance its own ETS to fulfil its 2050 ambitions. Brussels is posed with the twin challenge of amending the present ETS and incentivising its industries towards low-carbon emissions. Post-Brexit, the EU’s environmental leadership will be further tested due to its close association with negative environmental power. Negative environmental power refers to a country’s capacity to carry the potential to invariably harm climate mitigation strategies, for example by pursuing large-scale deforestation policies. According to an The European Environment – state and outlook 2020 report, Europe’s contribution to environmental degradation is greater than any other region in the world.

Going forwards, it is important for Britain and the EU to constructively engage in achieving climate targets through better coordination on two fronts: the emission trading systems and sustainable finance regimes.

In terms of the EU27, there has been a steady increase in renewable energy consumption and a steady decrease in fossil fuel based energy consumption since 2010. In 2020, renewables overtook fossil fuels in the EU27 market, a significant development in the green energy transition. Nevertheless, the impressive stride of the EU is still slow for achieving 55% GHG reductions and climate neutrality by 2030 and 2050 respectively.

The UK is not aligning itself with the EU’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation, creating its own green finance regime instead. The Government has stated its intention to make a more ambitious emission trading system than the EU that would make it stand out as a global climate leader. This has created several uncertainties within the British companies. According to India Redrup, policy manager at trade association Energy UK: “If you are a power operator in the UK, you are looking at a Black Hole looking at the lack of carbon price signal”.

Post-Brexit, Britain will have a monumental challenge of establishing the UK ETS which is more robust and cost-efficient for the companies. As a way forward, the two regimes should aim to either co-benefit or complement their respective efforts, rather than hampering the present mitigation policies.

Akshay Honmane is a climate change and foreign policy researcher, currently studying for an International Relations masters at the London School of Economics.

Framing the climate crisis as a security threat

18 September 2021

The issue of climate change has long been discussed by states around the world. As the issue becomes more prominent, the threat of climate change must be understood and the necessary response agreed by all.

International organisations, domestic governments, media outlets, and non-governmental organisations have all played a part in securitising the invisible war against climate change. Securitisation as a process allows a state or, in this case, a network of interconnected states to transform an issue into a security threat. This in turn allows for extreme measures to be taken, mitigating said threat.

The securitisation has taken many forms, ranging from international law to domestic policies. The Paris Agreement (2015) is a clear example of how climate change has been securitised on an international level; a mutual understanding has been provided and a clear dialogue created to discuss the issues. The collective understanding is that a response to the threat is essential to securitisation. The Paris Agreement provided this, with 195 states, including the UK, signing the treaty. The Paris Agreement has not fully securitised climate change by any means, however it is a huge step in that direction. Climate change has been an issue for a long time, recognised by numerous states. The securitisation of climate change starts with recognition of the issue, then a reaction: the Paris Agreement. In short, the treaty outlined a clear goal for states: to reduce their contribution to climate change, therefore stopping the global temperature rising by more than two degrees, with a further emphasis on 1.5 degrees where possible.

Securitisation has unfolded as states have agreed that climate change is a threat to their security, with the potential to compromise their domestic policies on economics, migration, society, welfare, and so on. Although each state that signed the treaty acknowledges this threat, the level of threat perceived by each state varies.

For example, the Alliance of Small Island States experiences higher threats due to rising sea levels. It is essential to recognise that the commitment demonstrated by states reflects the level of threat they perceive.

This influences the way states deal with the issue. The Paris Agreement allows for perceptual differences creating legal obligations to the agreed target of temperature change, while allowing space for individual domestic policy.

Securitisation is clear as this process relies on the collective understanding which, in practice, is almost impossible to achieve. However, the Paris Agreement is a successful tool in the securitisation of climate change as it creates a mutual agreement and collective understanding by the states.

It can be argued the UK has securitised climate change domestically. The Government has passed legislation committing the country to reducing carbon emissions relative to that of 1990 by 100% by 2050, commonly referred to as ‘net zero’.

Although the policy attempts to contribute towards the global target outlined in the Paris Agreement, the UK was not legally obliged to reduce emissions by 100% and could have taken alternative measures. As climate change has been securitised domestically, however, the UK government was able to draft policy to reduce the level of threat.
The policy implemented in the UK, such as banning the sale of fossil fuel cars by 2030, will affect many people everyday. The effects could damage the economy with job losses due to the limited number of electrical car manufactures in the UK and the increased costs that businesses will incur. Nevertheless it can be observed that the securitisation of climate change has taken place, thus leading to this policy. This subsequently might have negative economic consequences, but this is viewed as acceptable as the threat of climate change is mitigated by policy and mutually agreed by citizens, as they elected the Government and granted them the legitimacy to implement policy.

Securitisation is a useful process to tackle a large-scale issue such as climate change as mutual agreement and collective understanding is the best weapon a state can deploy when fighting an invisible security threat. As such, climate change has become securitised internationally using legally binding obligations, while simultaneously being securitised domestically through government legislation. Therefore a legitimacy to intervene is created, which leads to legislation and government policy designed to reduce the threat. Overall framing climate change through a security lens is positive, because it directly affects nations and their citizens – similarly to an ordinary security threat. As the issue is securitised further it would be reasonable to assume a greater understanding and agreement on retaliation will arise, furthermore reducing the level of threat and eradicating climate change altogether.

Bailey Gould studies International Relations and Politics at the University of Sheffield.

Why the ‘staycation’ trend isn’t necessarily the environmental win we think it is

23 July 2021

Reduced tourism numbers may have meant a drop in CO2 emissions, but local travel carries environmental risks too, particularly for the biodiversity of national parks.

It was inevitable that international travel would be limited when Britain first went into lockdown in March of last year. In the summer of 2020, ‘staycations’ were up 500%; families had traded their all-inclusive week in Corfu for a less exotic trip to Cornwall. Even as the possibility of travel abroad reemerges, the risks and uncertainty involved will still deter many.

In light of this, Britons may utilise the beauty of their 15 national parks to escape to, with lockdown lifted. From the Lake District to the Brecon Beacons, national parks have been a feature of the UK landscape since 1951. The regions aim to preserve nature and heritage against property developers, whilst providing the public with a glimpse of the picturesque scenery that their country has to offer.

Tourists are not wrong to take advantage of the parks. Their existence is crucial to exhibit the beauty of the environment. Yet, the worry remains that, if 2020 saw record numbers of visitors flock to these places, 2021 may see a correlation between swelling tourist numbers and lamentable damage to the habitats that these areas strive to protect.

Using the USA as an example, sightseers have congregated around the Grand Canyon or Niagara Falls since air travel was invented. Areas of national beauty are appreciated, but at the same time spoilt by litter, air pollution, and noise. Rangers at Yellowstone label tourists as the real “wild animals” due to their swamping of local car parks, road rage, and debris that they spew all over the local ecosystems. More than 300m people visited American national parks in 2015 and this number has only grown since.

Britain’s parks accommodate significantly fewer visitors every year, totalling 13.71m in 2019 over all 15 locations. Although this figure is far less than numbers recorded in the USA, it is tallied pre-COVID. This summer, the appeal of the parks will only lure more sightseers in if many international destinations are placed on the Government’s so-called “red list”. Tourism to British parks has a very realistic potential to follow the same upwards trajectory as the USA. This could leave British national parks vulnerable to the environmental issues seen in places such as Yellowstone.

Preserving national parks is of global interest too. Foreign and domestic forests aid in carbon sequestration. Trees drain carbon dioxide from the air by acting as natural sinks. Tourists harming these designated basins with pollution only creates a further imbalance of carbon in the air. Consequently, Britain should not be the only country that takes into account the effects of staycations this year.

The Government must make the protection of national parks’ biodiversity a priority. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s 30 by 30 pledge commits to protecting 30% of the UK’s landmass by 2030 in efforts to enhance biodiversity. Westminster has also promised £40m for creating green jobs in these areas in the Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution.

However, these policies may face difficulty this summer. Any limitations on sightseer numbers could result in the hospitality sectors of the rural towns surrounding the parks to perish, and the pandemic has already cost the Government a great deal of money. The industry has suffered significantly from lockdowns and any spike in tourism could greatly benefit the local communities.

Perhaps as the threat to national parks is an international issue, there should be cross-border solutions to ensure their protection globally. For instance, 14.7% of Earth’s landmass is protected by a national park status, however less than a fifth of countries have actually committed to their duties of preserving biodiversity in these places. There must be an international response to prevent countries neglecting their nature reserves as they create balance for the rest of the world.

The Foundation for Environmental Education’s creation of the Blue Flag Beach Award provides countries with an incentive to keep their beaches clean. The achievement grants coastlines prestige for preserving the environmental integrity of their waters. Perhaps, a similar scheme could run to preserve the biodiversity of national parks. Countries could be given an internationally recognised ‘Green Trophy’ certificate for maintaining their parks.

National parks are there to be enjoyed, not squandered. However, the world must start treating them with respect to ensure their continuation and contribution to hindering climate change.

Emily Wilson studies Politics and International Relations at the University of Manchester.

Will the coronavirus pandemic end Europe’s relationship with coal?

17 February 2021

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, many experts are calling for Europe to rebuild with a green economy at its core. With coal consumption plummeting and decarbonisation efforts becoming cheaper, does this finally spell the end of coal?

British and European history is characterised by coal and steel. It helped to spur the rise in steam technologies and spearheaded the Industrial Revolution over 200 years ago, which paved the way for the rise of globalisation. Whilst coal consumption dwindled throughout the 20th century, in favour of petroleum and natural gas, it has remained a vital part of Europe’s energy mix. That is, until now.

At the start of 2010, coal was responsible for up to 30% of the UK’s energy mix (second only to natural gas). At the beginning of 2020, coal had dropped to a staggeringly low 3.7% and the lockdown-related drop in energy consumption contributed to the UK’s longest coal-free period of almost 68 days (interrupted only because of a maintenance period at the Drax coal plant, which required it to generate energy). Though a significant drop in only 10 years, it is critical to unpack how this has come about and what it spells for coal as a fuel source.

As part of the UK’s Clean Growth Strategy, announced in 2018, the Government has outlined its plan to phase out the use of unabated coal to produce electricity by 2024. This is largely being facilitated through investment into renewable energy options such as offshore wind and solar PV, but also the transition of existing coal power production to biomass power production.

In addition, the cost of production for renewable energy sources has dropped significantly thanks to innovation and government assistance. Though the Feed-in Tariff (FiT) scheme (which was designed to promote the uptake of small-scale renewable and low-carbon electricity) was phased out at the beginning of 2019, the alternative Contracts for Difference (CfD) scheme has filled the void for subsidies and grants for renewable energy alternatives. It has meant a significant amount of investment into large-scale wind projects some of which are estimated to have a capacity of over 1200MW.

Does this spell the inevitable end of coal as an energy source? In the UK, this is likely. The Clean Growth Plan is a strategy which sets out proposals for decarbonising all sectors of the UK economy through the 2020s. It commits to phasing out unabated coal by 2024, which is fully feasible given its decline as part of the national energy mix that coal in all forms can be eliminated from the energy system by 2030 through transition to more efficient, renewable options.

Will Europe be able to follow suit? That depends on what concessions and agreements are established in the coming European Commission and economic recovery schemes post-COVID-19 such as Next Generation EU.

Last year, EU leaders failed to get unanimous agreement for a 2050 decarbonisation target at summit after summit. Whilst some states have chosen to push forward with legislation on coal – such as Germany’s Kohleverstromungsbeendigungsgesetz (Coal Exit Law) – and the Czech Republic backing the EU’s green recovery plan, their more coal-dependent neighbours will hesitate to jump on the bandwagon. Poland, for instance, has not eased on their coal stance even despite the impact on health and air quality as a result of reduced coal consumption during the pandemic and its conservative President-elect is unlikely to push the green agenda. A ‘green recovery’ is still a contentious topic in European energy realms, with multiple concerns for the economic impact on jobs and industry eclipsing the need for meeting climate targets.

The EU’s Green Deal is estimated to cost up to €1tn, with many experts saying this is only a third of the necessary expenditure for full decarbonisation. But with bold ambitions to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, and even a reduction in emissions by 50% over the course of the next 10 years, significant costs are inevitable.

There is a potential return on investment on the horizon. The EU has been the centre of a rise in jobs in the environmental and sustainability sector, contributing significant amounts to national economies. Despite Brexit, the UK is well poised to experience the same benefits.

As part of this future, the EU-wide phase-out of coal and carbon-intensive fuel sources will eventually become reality. In order to meet climate targets this not only must happen in this decade, but will occur with the natural expiration of coal.

Micheil Page is Head of Agora’s Energy & Climate Programme.

Britain can transform the plight of climate refugees through its COP26 presidency

19 January 2021

With traditional refugee law falling short, Britain should champion the protection of climate refugees as part of global climate change agreements.

An estimated 70,000-80,000 Jewish refugees were accepted into Britain before and during World War Two . At the time, the idea of turning our backs on those fleeing atrocities in continental Europe was reprehensible. The depth of this feeling was so widespread that the United Nations gathered numerous states from across the globe to agree to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a monumental effort to ensure that individuals could flee oppression and find refuge across an international border.

The Convention placed legally binding obligations on states to process the claims of asylum seekers, outlined the rights afforded to refugees, and, most importantly, created the recognised status of a refugee. Britain was among those quick to agree to the Convention.

Almost 70 years since the Convention was signed, the situation is very different. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) around 1% of the world’s population are displaced, yet European sentiment towards refugees has seen a significant shift from compassion to assist those forced to migrate towards greater reluctance. This sentiment appears to be dictating the global response to climate refugees and could have devastating impacts as climate change worsens.

Climate Refugees

Although without official definition, a climate refugee can broadly be categorised as an individual who has fled their home nation due to the effects of climate change – such as extreme weather, drought, or rising sea levels – threatening their lives or livelihoods.

Despite decades of warnings from some scholars, the danger to climate refugees remains comparatively overlooked. They are not recognised under the law and they are not entitled to any rights in foreign states. The Refugee Convention was written following World War Two and, since its adoption, has not evolved beyond its focus on wartime. This has led the UNHCR to the stark conclusion that the Convention cannot protect climate refugees.

There have been numerous calls to address these inadequacies, though there remains a lack of appetite to expand the Convention’s current scope of protection. This is less about climate refugees being viewed as undeserving and more to do with a general atmosphere of anti-refugee sentiment. The UNHCR has stated that opening the Convention to encompass climate refugees in the current political climate could actually lead to restricted protection for all refugees. It is worrying that the UNHCR find themselves in this position, given their role as champion for all refugees. Protection must now be found elsewhere, and Britain should lead the drive to provide this.

COP26 is Britain’s opportunity

A major barrier to finding a solution for the future flow of climate refugees is the absence of international willingness. Since the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference (COP21), many governments have exhibited greater hostility towards immigration and refugees, including in key nations such as Australia and the US. Equally, the UK’s 2016 Brexit campaign focused heavily on limiting future immigration. It is possible that, following this mandate, the British government may avoid seeking a global protection mechanism for climate refugees, both to appease their citizens and to retain favour with countries which they are now seeking trade deals with.

Nevertheless, as hosts of the delayed COP26, the UK should recognise that it has one of the key remaining opportunities to address the lack of protection for climate refugees by incorporating it into climate change agreements. Alok Sharma, who recently left his ministerial position to focus on his role as COP26 President, demonstrated in his address to UN nations that he is cognisant of climate change migration. It is now imperative that this be followed up with concrete action.

This action should take the form of an agreement between states whereby climate refugees can be identified, relocated equitably, and conferred with rights enabling them to begin a new life. This provides a response which would ensure climate refugees are protected whilst equally avoiding a burden on any one state.

This could be achieved and is not without precedent. During COP21 there were numerous proposals surrounding a coordination facility for those displaced by climate change; a plan which would have facilitated relocation for climate refugees. This gained traction, although talks were eventually discontinued following Australia’s opposition and the belief that a more efficient alternative could be found. A lack of progress since COP21 suggests that this may not be the case and with the effects of climate change showing no signs of slowing it is now time to resurrect this idea.

The UK government must recognise that, through their own hosting of a COP summit, they have a wonderful opportunity to provide lasting protection for climate refugees.

Tomos Owen works to facilitate refugee integration in Wales, having graduated with a Masters in Human Rights Law from Cardiff University.

The UK should pay closer attention to the impacts of climate change in MENA

25 October 2020

The local is global. Climate change is likely to exacerbate conflicts and areas of instability. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), an already volatile region, stands to be particularly affected. UK foreign policy needs to improve its awareness of the impact climate change may have on the region and the wider security repercussions.

Climate change has already resulted in a 1°C rise in temperatures compared to the previous century. The UK’s Global Strategic Trends assessment views it as one of the most certain and influential global trends affecting all geographic and policy areas.

The MENA region is no exception. Research has shown that the region will suffer from an even higher number of hot days than it currently is, with warnings of droughts and overall water deficit. There is a risk of these impacts increasing, should the overall warming of the world go beyond 1.5-2°C.

Climate change may be indirectly linked to an increase in conflict, due to it exacerbating pre-existing issues such as resource scarcity, economic issues, and weak governance. Institutions and proper governance are important factors in being able to deal effectively with climate change. Where there is already fragmented governance, states could be further weakened by the consequences of climate change.

There is limited understanding regarding the impact climate change will have on global security, however. This includes a lack of knowledge as to how already vulnerable areas may be affected by climate change itself and how climate change-related instability could aggravate existing tensions or create new instability.

The MENA region is currently experiencing widespread insecurity due to ongoing and systemic violence and unrest. This is exacerbated by self-serving interventionist external powers, such as the Russian intervention in the Syrian conflict, or the Russian and Turkish intervention in Libya’s civil war. Climate change may exacerbate the instability prevalent in the region. Of particular importance is the impact climate change could have on water scarcity, food insecurity, disease, and conflict in the region.

Water scarcity is a pressing issue in the MENA region. Tensions have risen between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over the Tigris‐Euphrates basin. This is caused by an unequal water flow from the rivers to the three countries, grievances around water management, and the use of water as a way to exert pressure on downstream countries. In North Africa, Ethiopian plans to build a dam on the Nile would have serious consequences for Egyptian agriculture which depends on the river. While discussions over the dam are ongoing, Egypt has previously threatened war with Ethiopia over its construction, and tensions remain high. Additionally, water scarcity would likely lead to increased food insecurity, with consequences being famines or malnutrition, as 70% of the region’s agriculture depends on rainfall, which is projected to decline by 60% should temperatures increase by 4°C.

Climate change could also act as a threat multiplier to countries with weak governance. In Iraq, there are reports the Islamic State (IS) used periods of drought to entice people to join its ranks. In Syria, Libya, and Yemen, populations are already in precarious situations and governments would be either unable or unwilling to alleviate climate change driven issues. This may provide opportunities for non-state groups to take control and spread further instability, as was witnessed with the rise of the IS, facilitated by weak governance in Iraq and Syria.

Climate change fuelled instability and insecurity in MENA will have a direct impact on neighbouring countries and regions, including Europe. This may lead European countries being faced with increased migration. External powers may need to provide humanitarian assistance to populations in response to situations that may be brought, or exacerbated, by climate change, or even requested to intervene in regional conflicts.

Climate change will also impact the rest of the world. Europe, including Britain, will be dealing with its own climate change issues. This raises the question of whether the UK can cope with climate change fuelled difficulties both at home and in other regions.

To address this, the UK must begin early planning and preparation for the impacts of climate change in the MENA region and seek to help reduce climate change driven instability. Preventative measures include helping improve governance, facilitating discussions over water sharing, and aiding the development of policies and strategies focused on coping with the effects of climate change.

Ultimately, the UK’s climate change preparations should also seek to offset the wider impact on global security that could be provoked by climate change-related instability, as both will come hand in hand.

Sarah Grand-Clement is a defence and security policy researcher, and holds an MSc in Arab World Studies from Durham University.

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