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Migration

Britain can transform the plight of climate refugees through its COP26 presidency

With traditional refugee law falling short, Britain should champion the protection of climate refugees as part of global climate change agreements.

An estimated 70,000-80,000 Jewish refugees were accepted into Britain before and during World War Two . At the time, the idea of turning our backs on those fleeing atrocities in continental Europe was reprehensible. The depth of this feeling was so widespread that the United Nations gathered numerous states from across the globe to agree to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a monumental effort to ensure that individuals could flee oppression and find refuge across an international border.

The Convention placed legally binding obligations on states to process the claims of asylum seekers, outlined the rights afforded to refugees, and, most importantly, created the recognised status of a refugee. Britain was among those quick to agree to the Convention.

Almost 70 years since the Convention was signed, the situation is very different. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) around 1% of the world’s population are displaced, yet European sentiment towards refugees has seen a significant shift from compassion to assist those forced to migrate towards greater reluctance. This sentiment appears to be dictating the global response to climate refugees and could have devastating impacts as climate change worsens.

Climate Refugees

Although without official definition, a climate refugee can broadly be categorised as an individual who has fled their home nation due to the effects of climate change – such as extreme weather, drought, or rising sea levels – threatening their lives or livelihoods.

Despite decades of warnings from some scholars, the danger to climate refugees remains comparatively overlooked. They are not recognised under the law and they are not entitled to any rights in foreign states. The Refugee Convention was written following World War Two and, since its adoption, has not evolved beyond its focus on wartime. This has led the UNHCR to the stark conclusion that the Convention cannot protect climate refugees.

There have been numerous calls to address these inadequacies, though there remains a lack of appetite to expand the Convention’s current scope of protection. This is less about climate refugees being viewed as undeserving and more to do with a general atmosphere of anti-refugee sentiment. The UNHCR has stated that opening the Convention to encompass climate refugees in the current political climate could actually lead to restricted protection for all refugees. It is worrying that the UNHCR find themselves in this position, given their role as champion for all refugees. Protection must now be found elsewhere, and Britain should lead the drive to provide this.

COP26 is Britain’s opportunity

A major barrier to finding a solution for the future flow of climate refugees is the absence of international willingness. Since the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference (COP21), many governments have exhibited greater hostility towards immigration and refugees, including in key nations such as Australia and the US. Equally, the UK’s 2016 Brexit campaign focused heavily on limiting future immigration. It is possible that, following this mandate, the British government may avoid seeking a global protection mechanism for climate refugees, both to appease their citizens and to retain favour with countries which they are now seeking trade deals with.

Nevertheless, as hosts of the delayed COP26, the UK should recognise that it has one of the key remaining opportunities to address the lack of protection for climate refugees by incorporating it into climate change agreements. Alok Sharma, who recently left his ministerial position to focus on his role as COP26 President, demonstrated in his address to UN nations that he is cognisant of climate change migration. It is now imperative that this be followed up with concrete action.

This action should take the form of an agreement between states whereby climate refugees can be identified, relocated equitably, and conferred with rights enabling them to begin a new life. This provides a response which would ensure climate refugees are protected whilst equally avoiding a burden on any one state.

This could be achieved and is not without precedent. During COP21 there were numerous proposals surrounding a coordination facility for those displaced by climate change; a plan which would have facilitated relocation for climate refugees. This gained traction, although talks were eventually discontinued following Australia’s opposition and the belief that a more efficient alternative could be found. A lack of progress since COP21 suggests that this may not be the case and with the effects of climate change showing no signs of slowing it is now time to resurrect this idea.

The UK government must recognise that, through their own hosting of a COP summit, they have a wonderful opportunity to provide lasting protection for climate refugees.

Tomos Owen works to facilitate refugee integration in Wales, having graduated with a Masters in Human Rights Law from Cardiff University.

Nationalism, populism, and the impact of right-wing discourse on immigration during the COVID-19 pandemic

With border restrictions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK government must avoid nationalist rhetoric as it will harm its most vulnerable populations.

The outbreak of COVID-19 early this year has caused mass border closures. Even now, as governments begin to reopen their borders, controlled migration through approved travel corridors looks to be the ‘new normal’.

Governments are prioritising mitigating the economic repercussions of restricted travel on their own countries. In the wake of such inward-looking policies, it is important to understand how nationalist sentiments can impact the governance of some of the UK’s most vulnerable population: asylum seekers and other refugees.

Nationalism has long been a pervasive factor in UK migration policies. Before Boris Johnson entered the picture, the Parliament had already passed the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016. These were introduced to limit non-European Economic Area (EEA) migration into the UK and create a ‘hostile environment’ for undocumented migrants in the country. Non-EEA migrants in the UK were faced with increasingly stringent policies in an effort to deter them from living in the UK. Since migration from the EEA is predominantly white, these policies disproportionately targeted non-white people, thereby creating a framework where the national identity could be manufactured around the white identity. Former Prime Minister Theresa May’s manifesto for the 2017 snap election echoed previous Conservative Party leader, David Cameron’s desire to ‘bear down on immigration from outside the European Union’.

The global nature of this pandemic has been instrumental for nationalist, right-wing voices to amplify their concerns over immigration. Migration Watch UK, an anti-immigration think tank, has announced a controversial policy proposal to ban the entry of those over the age of 50 coming from non-EEA countries into the UK and restrict visas for other age groups.

The right-wing immigration rhetoric: erasing refugees from the picture

Populism and nationalism revolve around defining a person through their shared heritage and the country they were born in. This national identity is then juxtaposed with an ‘other’, someone who does not share the same lineage of a particular demographic. Right-wing nationalism in particular, founded on the ‘us’ vs ‘them’ narrative, privileges the lives of the citizens (‘us’) over immigrants (‘them’).

With COVID-19 resulting in rapid border controls and an inconsistent restriction on international movement; refugees are further defined as ‘others’. The Government is more concerned over the management of its governable population – its citizens – than that of immigrants.

At present, there are 51,906 documented asylum seekers still awaiting a decision on their status as a refugee in the UK. Asylum seekers are often too afraid to access healthcare in fear of their possible refugee status being overturned. They are not legally allowed to work to make a living and have to depend on ill-equipped government systems to sustain themselves.

Refugee migration will continue even as the pandemic rages. While a global pandemic may halt some economic activities, it does not stop wars, natural disasters, or tyrannical regimes from committing human rights violations on their own citizens. Thus, even during a pandemic, the drivers of migration continue. History has shown us time and time again that migration cannot be curbed simply by imposing stricter border controls. In fact, the number of migrants crossing the Channel from France to the UK has risen to more than 1,400 in the month of June from a mere 200 earlier this year.

The UK’s migration management policy needs to see a drastic shift from merely containing refugees to creating structures that can better oversee their governance. Providing a healthcare system that is accessible to refugees and spans both physical and mental health should be a priority for the Government. This global pandemic has shown the myopic nature of nationalist immigration policies but it has also provided us with an opportunity to learn and improve our systems of governing immigration.

Paakhi Bhatnagar studies International Relations at King’s College London.

The pandemic reveals the need for change in UK migration policy

COVID-19 has changed, and will continue to change, migration policy. As we move towards the end of the Brexit transition period and away from the height of the pandemic, the Government should adapt policy to provide stronger social rights for those migrants who have contributed so much to COVID-19 efforts, or else they risk losing them.

The way politics responds to both the COVID-19 pandemic and migration appears to be two sides of the same coin. Both matters transcend borders and are associated with policy responses which call for the tightening of borders. How will the future landscape for new and existing migrants in the UK change?

In the immediate aftermath of the pandemic, this landscape will drastically change. Beyond this, there is potential for the UK government to create an appreciative environment for those migrant workers that the UK and countries across the EU have relied on for the past few months.

Is migration an area of concern for the UK public?

Since the pandemic began, immigration has seemingly slipped from Britain’s policy agenda. Whilst it might feel like an era ago, it has only been a few months since Brexit was at the forefront of British politics, which itself was built on a foundation of hostile migration policies. It is important, therefore, to see how migration has shifted in the list of top issues facing Britain.

According to public surveys by Ipsos MORI in February and April 2020, “immigration/immigrants” was no longer a top 10 issue for the UK public. Just 5% mention this as a key issue, the lowest score for “immigration/immigrants” recorded since December 1999. The change in perception towards this issue is particularly stark when compared to views just before the EU referendum in early 2016, when over half (56%) of those surveyed stated that “immigration/immigrants” is a concern (the highest proportion recorded for this issue).

The beating heart of the country

During the pandemic, the efforts of migrants working in essential industries have been singled out. Notably, Boris Johnson publicly thanked two nurses: “Jenny from New Zealand” and “Luis from Portugal”, who were by his side for 48 hours when he was in a critical condition due to COVID-19. It is even more interesting that he stated an unnecessary piece of information when describing someone’s merits: their respective countries of origin. He described their roles in the NHS and referred to them as being part of the “beating heart of this country” and “the best of this country”.

Health Secretary Matt Hancock also paid tribute to NHS workers “from all over the world” who “came to this country to make a difference”. Indeed, according to a report published by Parliament in July 2019, 13.1% of the NHS workforce are not British, or around 153,000 staff. Losing such a sizable proportion of the NHS workforce would undoubtedly cause the NHS to suffer.

This immigrant-positive rhetoric is a far cry from the Conservative government’s previous announcement of the ‘hostile environment’. Many people from migrant backgrounds may be curious whether and how this will change in the aftermath of the pandemic. Will they still be welcomed in these sectors or is ‘clap for carers’ only temporary? It is questionable whether this rhetoric will manifest into concrete policy changes after the pandemic.

The aftermath of the pandemic

For the UK Government the topic of migration should become a renewed area of focus, but for different reasons to those prior to the pandemic. The pandemic has revealed the very visible contribution of migrant workers, yet many could face the double blow of being classed as ‘low-skilled’ and earning below the minimum salary requirement to work and settle in the UK. These include supermarket workers, caregivers, people working on farms, and those keeping the country moving by driving buses.

Indeed, there was a notorious call for people to fill a shortage of workers on British farms in April 2020. After a call for British workers failed to attract people to the role, the Government was forced to bring in seasonal workers from Eastern Europe using chartered flights. It seems, contrary to previous anti-immigration rhetoric, that there is a deep-rooted need for migrant workers.

Migration policies must change to provide stronger social rights for migrants. They are COVID-19’s unsung heroes, making the ultimate sacrifice to the pandemic and essential services recently. These policies should shift away from attracting solely skilled workers if the UK wants to keep our essential workers after the crisis. This is particularly crucial towards the end of the Brexit transition period when immigration may return to the agenda. If policies stay stagnant or move along their hostile trajectory, the Government risks losing those they have been relying on, something that may be hard for them to admit.

Preeti Pasricha is co-Head of Agora’s Democracy & Governance Programme.

Governments must recognise that aid and investment are about more than just development

COVID-19 will stretch the world further apart. The developed world should proactively invest in the developing world to avoid further humanitarian disasters and seismic migration across the world.

COVID-19 knows no borders, but that does not mean its damage will be distributed equally. Rich countries can sustain debts because their borrowing debts are low and their bonds are seen as ‘safe haven’ assets by investors. Furthermore, countries that control their own currency, such as the UK and US, have a significant advantage as rich investors from developing countries will want to invest in ‘stable’ currencies should COVID-19 significantly shrink their own. This may cause the exchange rate of developing countries to plummet, meaning that debt becomes much harder to hold. This precarious economic situation will be exacerbated in three main ways.

Firstly, many developing countries rely heavily on the service sector of their respective economies, which has been stalled due to lack of consumer demand from social distancing measures. Developed countries tend to have comparatively smaller service sectors and have benefited from bailout schemes which have softened the blow for workers, but this comparative luxury is not afforded to many. Social distancing is not an option for many in the developing world.

Secondly, international humanitarian aid has dropped dramatically as a result of the crisis. NGO’s have not escaped the financial hardship that COVID-19 has caused with more than 40% of British international development NGOs saying they will collapse within six months if they receive no new financial support. Furthermore, the aid that remains cannot reach its intended recipients in many cases because of international travel bans and lack of available transportation. Countries such as Lesotho and South Sudan rely on international aid for infrastructure projects, which are now more dangerous to complete but increasingly necessary to control the spread of coronavirus.

Thirdly, due to the economic shutdown in developed countries, remittances have dropped significantly. Many migrants who moved away from their families in order to provide for them work in the service sector in the UK and other developed countries. With the service sector on hold to prevent the spread of COVID-19, so has the money going back to the developing world. The World Bank is predicting global remittances will drop by some 20% because of the impact of coronavirus, to $445bn in 2020 which Dilip Ratha, an economist at the World Bank, has described this decline as ‘unprecedented in history’.

Lebanon, whose economy is emblematic of all three issues outlined above, defaulted on its debt for the first time in its history last month after its currency collapsed, causing riots in Beirut. This was not because of COVID-19, but this economic and political instability is likely to be replicated in many other countries around the world. This may soon take hold in Nigeria, which has a population of almost 200m, where the Air Force have been deployed to tackle an insurgency in the North East of the country. Violence will exacerbate the spread of the virus, causing further economic and political instability.

The 2015 migrant crisis was handled poorly by European countries, with the sole exception of Angela Merkel’s Germany who, by allowing a million refugees to enter the country, recognised both the scale of the crisis and the political consequences of inaction. Europe can see another crisis looming and should take economic action now to prevent it. Its governments need to recognise not only that the virus will continue to spread if it is not suppressed everywhere, but also that the effects of possible economic and political instability will not be contained in the developing world (as the Arab Spring showed in 2011). There is both a moral obligation and a political necessity to invest in the developing world.

The World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund have taken the first steps in this direction, with a $200bn package to regional development banks, and are encouraging creditors to suspend debt repayments until 2021 in order to provide much needed support to the poorest countries. The next decade will require national governments to rethink the integration between their international development, defence, and immigration policies, by prioritising investment and infrastructure over sanctions and military intervention. For example, investments in green energy startups and sustainable transportation will boost employment and help tackle the climate emergency. International cooperation on stabilising emerging economies through investment will require spending, but the expense will pale in comparison to the bill of inaction. The time to act is now.

Tom Whitting is Co-Coordinator for the Open Think Tank Network.

Avoiding a ‘hard’ Irish border may have created opportunities for human traffickers

A Brexit agreement based on ‘future technological arrangements’ will pose problems for Irish border officials and provide a potential haven for smugglers and traffickers.

Due to the island of Ireland’s unique political and geographical importance, it has always been a hotspot for both smugglers and traffickers. Along the roads connecting Northern Ireland with the Republic, smuggling and trafficking was common from the Irish War of Independence up until the start of the troubles in 1969. With the Good Friday Agreement and the official end of The Troubles, the European Union built numerous border crossings to promote trade cooperation between the nations and closed 40% of police stations near the border.

These changes have come back to the fore through Brexit negotiations, with the UK and EU determined to avoid a ‘hard’ border given the recent conflict. Prime Minister Boris Johnson has promised to address this through technology with his new deal. So far the details are vague, with motion sensors, scanners, infra-red, and surveillance cameras all being talked about that as possible solutions. There already appears to be a number of problems with this proposal, however.

These problems not only speak to a border that may be ineffective but also one that could create opportunities for goods smugglers and human traffickers. The most recent Annual Trafficking in Persons report from the US State Department downgraded Ireland to a tier two country, meaning it is no longer deemed to be meeting the minimum standards required in the fight against human trafficking.

The Withdrawal Agreement looks set to exacerbate this in three ways: failing to account for the complexity of the ‘technology fix’, changes to taxing regulation, and failing to address problems with the UK’s sex industry.

First, maintaining an open international border with technology is a much more difficult feat than is often accounted for. Norway and Sweden – two of the most technologically advanced countries in Europe – have been attempting this very exercise for many years and have yet to reach an answer that does not require physical customs checks at the border itself. These solutions are a multi-decade project.

Given the physical geography and historical context of the Irish border, the interim period between an open border, manned by technology alone, represents a unique opportunity for both goods smugglers and human traffickers. In fact, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) predicts that border staff will be asked to process a further 220 million customs declarations and that authorities “are likely to become overwhelmed” at the border; which could lead to an easier path for both traffickers and smugglers to enter the EU.

Second, the fact that goods would be taxed upon reaching Northern Ireland from Great Britain may provide an enticing market for smugglers. Smugglers are able to undercut the market in two ways, namely on speed and price. Although the tax will be refunded for goods which leave Northern Ireland to enter into the Republic, the initial heightened fees for buyers within Northern Ireland will affect trade. This, combined with the likely logistical problems at the interim border, may lead traders to use to alternative avenues to move their goods in and out of the EU. Illegal markets thrive in times of economic uncertainty; the incentives will be there for business, especially those handling perishable goods, to bypass regulation to ensure their food gets in on time.

Third, the current situation has been exacerbated by the growth of the UK sex industry, which has benefitted in recent years as a result of both job insecurity and the failure of universal credit to provide families with safety and security. This growth has attracted sex traffickers from around the EU to move people into Britain as the UK industry becomes increasingly lucrative. This growth is in line with research conducted by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime published earlier this year which found that the number of reported sex trafficked victims in Northern Ireland had risen from 98 in 2014 to 179 in 2016. Johnson’s failure to address this in his deal his likely to make matters worse.

The logistical issues cannot be solved before the 31 October and the transition period is set to be equally turbulent on the border. The technological solutions are not in place, and there is no evidence from other parts of the world to suggest that it is even possible to implement such checks. If the Government cannot find these solutions soon, Johnson’s deal may have major economic and humanitarian knock-on effects for decades to come.

Tom Whitting works as a researcher for the PIOT Foundation for the Human Rights of Migrant Workers.

Modern slavery and the UK immigration system

The International Labour Organisation estimates that there are 40 million men, women and children globally who are victim to modern slavery on any given day. Today, the issue of modern slavery is commanding increasing levels of international attention, with the UK government positioning itself as a ‘global leader’ in the fight for its eradication. However, while the UK government characterises modern slavery as caused by exploitative criminal groups, the issue ultimately has deeper structural roots.

Britain’s prioritisation of modern slavery

‘Modern slavery’ is a fairly new term within British political discourse. Having evolved from the older term of ‘human trafficking’, it was first given substance by the 2014 Modern Slavery Strategy and is defined as encompassing “slavery, servitude, forced and compulsory labour and human trafficking”. The Home Office estimates that there are between 10,000 and 13,000 potential victims of modern slavery in the UK, and government expenditure on this issue has grown rapidly in recent years. In 2017/18 an estimated £39 million was spent, and this figure is projected to rise to a high of £61 million in 2018/19.

The UK government characterises modern slavery through the lens of organised crime, and places the blame firmly upon the organised criminal networks that exploit vulnerable victims for their own financial gain. The acts of these criminal networks are defined in the Government’s 2014 report with the moralistic language of manipulation and abuse: “traffickers and slave drivers coerce, deceive and force individuals against their will into a life of abuse, servitude and inhumane treatment”. This conceptualisation of the issue – and the powerful language used to describe it – directs the state into a particular form of response, one which mobilises the weight of the criminal justice system and the British enforcement apparatus, including the National Crime Agency (NCA), the police and the Home Office. A key piece of legislation in this battle was the 2015 Modern Slavery Act, which Prime Minister Theresa May claimed created “tough new penalties to put slave masters behind bars where they belong”.

Addressing structural drivers

Whilst understandable, this characterisation is problematic as it diverts attention from a more pressing reality, namely that the exploitation that defines modern slavery is itself embedded into the structure of the UK’s restrictive immigration regime. At its core, modern slavery is defined by exploitation, whether that be physical or psychological, cultural or social. A prerequisite of exploitation is an imbalance of power, and the UK immigration system, including the ‘hostile environment’ strategy pursued by the Home Office, contributes to the emergence of these imbalances.

The UK immigration system is highly restrictive for low-skilled labour, and as such it is difficult for these individuals to obtain legitimate working visas. Low-skilled migrants are hence pushed underground into illegal employment, working in restaurants, on building sites and as cleaners. Their status puts these workers in a precarious position as they are not covered by the legal employment guarantees that ensure a base level of worker protection. In the absence of legal protection, power imbalances can easily transform a case of illegal working into one of modern slavery, when, for example, an employer forces an individual to work with little or no pay or to work when sick, or engages in sustained physical or verbal abuse.

Beyond this, there is a further coercive mechanism that prolongs exploitation, namely that the result of escape from an abusive situation can often lead to removal from the country. The National Referral Mechanism (NRM) is the body within the Home Office responsible for handling cases of modern slavery. Once a referral is made to this body, an investigation is initiated and a positive or negative decision is reached on whether an individual is a ‘confirmed victim’. Crucially, neither decision entails a permission to stay in the UK, with confirmed victims only being offered a 45 day ‘move-on’ period in which, in the absence of other leave entitlements, they must depart the country. Where the alternative to exploitation is removal from the UK, this creates a structural disincentive for victims of modern slavery to escape their abusive situations.

Reframing the causes

The Government’s discourse characterises modern slavery as an issue of organised crime, the blame for which rests with the criminals who exploit others for their own financial gain. This discourse hides a deeper reality, that the UK’s restrictive immigration regime and the Home Office’s policies create the conditions through which exploitation – and, ultimately, modern slavery – proliferate. It is therefore difficult to resist the conclusion that the responsibility for modern slavery cannot be solely attributed to criminals and the organised crime groups they populate; the Government itself and the policies it enacts also share in moral culpability.

Oliver Goodman is a graduate student in Migration Studies at the University of Oxford.