The Impact of the UK’s ‘Tilt to the Indo-Pacific’ foreign policy on British security interests in the South China Sea.

Executive Summary
The Tilt to the Indo-Pacific comprises several defence and economic policies aiming to increase British presence in the region. The South China Sea and the wider Indo-Pacific are geopolitically significant regions where the UK has several economic interests. Maintaining open navigation, under international maritime laws, is crucial for facilitating trade corridors to major economies such as Japan and Taiwan. Taiwan has particular importance as a key manufacturer of high quality semiconductor goods, therefore maintaining stable Cross-Strait relations and access to the South China Sea is a significant trade security concern for the UK. In recent years, China has been developing its military presence in the region as part of initiatives to establish a modernised and capable military force. The UK has identified this as a challenge to British security and trade interests, resulting in the introduction of its ‘Tilt to the Indo-Pacific’ policy framework. This framework includes several initiatives, which aim to: increase the UK’s military capability via the Australia, United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) military security partnership; enhance the UK’s military maritime presence in the region via developing existing regional partnerships; and increase trade linkages via joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”). In conjunction with other policies, these initiatives aim to secure British trading interests, and to provide a counter-balance to growing Chinese military presence, in order to maintain a multipolar rule-based regional order.

The Tilt’s impact may include opportunities to bolster trade security with major Asian powers, as well as potentially provide greater access to specialised high technology economies such as Japan and Taiwan. Alternatively, there are also risks of undermining security interests, by worsening tensions in the region and unintentionally creating heightened pressure on Taiwan’s economic autonomy. Achieving the Tilt’s purpose of promoting a rule-based and stable regional order would therefore require a cautious strategy to avoid inadvertently  worsening security challenges across the region. 

Context on South China Sea disputes and Indo-Pacific geopolitical significance
The Indo-Pacific and the South China Sea are crucial strategic regions for global trade security and access to Asian markets. Currently, the Indo-Pacific accounts for 17.5% of the UK’s global trade [1]. An estimated 30% of traded goods pass through the Malacca Strait which connects the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, facilitating trade corridors to major economies such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea [2]. Therefore, the Malacca Strait acts as a global choke point and is central in the flow of regional trade. With trade relations continuously developing and 1.7 million Brittons living in the region, the Indo-Pacific is increasingly critical to the UK’s economy and security [1]. 

Since the 1970s, there have been numerous territorial disputes within the South China Sea between China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Taiwan. These disputes have been particularly intense in areas with abundant natural resources such as the Spratly Islands [3]. As a whole, the South China Sea region is estimated to have ‘190 trillion cubic feet’ (5.38 trillion cubic metres) of natural gas and ‘11 billion barrels of oil’ [4], hence, giving the area geopolitical significance. In 2013, the Philippines began a case in the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration against China’s land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, highlighting a key example of inter-state disputes in the region. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Court ruled mostly in favour of the Philippines and ruled China’s nine-dash line, which claimed ‘about 90% of the South China Sea’ [5], as unlawful. Refusing to accept the court’s decision, China has continued constructing ‘3,200 acres’ of new artificial land in the Paracel and Spratly Islands to increase its territorial claim of the nine-dash line. [6]. Furthermore, China has increased its military presence in the area by conducting naval exercises and building military outposts in areas claimed by neighbouring states [3]. This activity has raised concerns in the UK regarding the future of much-needed regional stability given its above-mentioned resource abundance. 

In light of this, China has set ambitious goals to develop its military presence and capability in the region as part of a broader initiative to become a ‘strong country with a strong military’ [7]. These goals focus on the technological modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and are set to be achieved between 2020 and 2050. Since 2021, the PLA Navy has also commissioned several pieces of naval technology including several destroyers, guided-missile cruisers, two amphibious assault ships, a nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine and launched the Fujian aircraft carrier [7]. Admiral John Aquilino, commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, estimates that ‘China aims to have the capability to take Taiwan by 2027’ within a broader aim to challenge Western presence in the South China Sea [8]. Indeed, this would have great geopolitical consequences in the region, with Taiwan being a significant partner for Britain as an institutionally like-minded democracy and supplier of semiconductor chips. For example,Taiwanese firms, such as the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), enable Taiwan’s production of ‘60% of the world’s semiconductors and over 90% of the most advanced ones’ [9] consequently putting Taiwan at the centre of high technology industries and manufacturing. Undeniably, the possibility of China using force in the region would impact the Indo-Pacific balance of power and potentially ‘interrupt 30% of global trade’ as well as give China the capacity to exert its military strength outside its current sphere of influence [10].  

Overview of key UK policies
In 2021, in response to the potential challenges posed by China, the UK Government announced the ‘Integrated Review of Security, Defence and Development Foreign Policy’ (IR21) whilst setting out a framework for the ‘Global Britain’ strategy for the next decade [11]. The strategy aims to develop British presence in the South China Sea region via the ‘Tilt to the Indo Pacific’ policy in order to maintain ‘freedom of navigation’ and the rule of international maritime law, such as UNCLOS, which secures British national and trade interests [1]. This includes initiatives aiming to develop partnerships with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and enhance maritime security capacity. 

Another UK policy response followed the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, wherein the UK Government published the Integrated Review Refresh 2023 (IR23). IR23 reflected the UK Government’s stance that China’s policies were an ‘epoch-defining and systematic challenge’ [12]. In terms of the Tilt, IR23 aimed to complete the UK’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), continue developing bilateral relations with ASEAN states and strengthen cooperation with France to establish ‘a permanent European maritime presence in the region’ [12]. Through these policies, the UK aims to facilitate a stable regional setting regarding the South China Sea and Cross-Strait relations to ensure that trade interests are protected. 

Analysing multipolar maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific and South China Sea
Enhancing British maritime presence in the region aims to counterbalance the growing Chinese military developments that could risk destabilising the region. Since Xi Jinping’s military reform policy was initiated in 2013, the PLA has undergone rapid modernisation. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, between 2014 and 2018 the PLA Navy ‘launched naval vessels with a total tonnage greater than the tonnages of the entire French, German, Indian, Italian, South Korean, Spanish or Taiwanese navies’ [7]. These developments, in combination with continuous territorial disputes in the South China Sea with neighbouring states have raised concerns regarding China’s projection of power in a region crucial for international trade. In light of this, Tilt enables the development of closer ties with existing partners such as Australia, ASEAN states and potentially Taiwan to ensure security in the region, as part of the broader Global Britain initiative. This development is reflected in maritime security initiatives such as AUKUS and cooperation with France to establish a European regional presence. 

Similarly to Chinese initiatives, the UK’s increasing maritime military presence in the region is also evident. In September 2021, the UK, Australia and the United States announced the AUKUS trilateral security partnership in which the member states plan to collaborate on new Ship Submersible Nuclear (SNN) submarines for the UK Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy [14]. In the agreement announcement, Prime Minister Boris Johnson argued that ‘this partnership will become increasingly vital for defending [British] interests in the Indo-Pacific’ [15] and key in ensuring regional stability. The first batch of SSN-AUKUS submarines for the UK Royal Navy is due to be delivered in the late 2030s and will ‘replace the existing Astute-class submarines’ [16]. Furthermore, the UK will have a crucial role in the production of designs for the nuclear-powered submarines across the trilateral agreement, the manufacturing for which is due to be started ‘towards the end of the decade’. The AUKUS partnership is a reflection of the UK’s Tilt to the Indo-Pacific foreign policy initiative and carries opportunities for British ‘cyber, artificial intelligence and quantum technology’ industries [14]. For example, BAE Systems, one of Britain’s largest defence firms, received ‘£3.95 billion’ GBP of funding from the Ministry of Defence for the development of the nuclear-powered SSN-AUKUS submarines [17]. Similarly, Rolls-Royce will manufacture the engines for the project which will provide significant work and research opportunities within the industry surrounding the SSN-AUKUS technology [18]. Another UK-based engineering firm, Babcock International, received a five-year contract with the Ministry of Defence to take part in creating designs [19]. In this way, Britain aims to develop its maritime capabilities and presence in the Indo-Pacific region to counter the growing Chinese military developments.

Additionally, Britain aims to increase maritime presence in the region through engaging with other European partners such as France. In the 2023 UK- France Summit Joint Leaders’ Declaration, both countries welcomed a ‘deepening engagement with the Indo-Pacific region to intensify economic, security and rules-based partnerships, supporting a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ [20]. This will include an increased co-ordination of maritime military deployments to the Indian Ocean in order to enhance the efficiency of European regional presence. While this does provide a counter balance to the growing Chinese military activity, there is a risk of worsening escalation and destabilising the region. Both France and the UK ‘[reaffirmed] the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait’ [20], but deploying greater military presence in the Indo-Pacific may incentivise China to intensify their defence development too, a concern taken by states such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Therefore, developing military maritime cooperation with AUKUS and European powers ought to be carried out with caution.

Indeed,  there have been mixed responses from partners in the Indo-Pacific with growing concerns of destabilisation in the region. Malaysia and Indonesia have argued that AUKUS may push other states to pursue more active defence policies and could risk creating an arms race in the South China Sea. Alternatively, the Philippines and Japan have been more supportive of the initiative, with the Philippines Foreign Secretary crediting AUKUS for ‘[addressing] the military “imbalance” in Southeast Asia’ [14]. Hence, while AUKUS has the opportunity to develop the UK’s regional presence and facilitate a greater capacity to defend national trading interests, there is a risk of weakening ties with some cautious Indo-Pacific partners. 

Analysing the developing regional maritime partnerships and ASEAN cooperation
As part of the IR21 policy, Ben Wallace, the former Secretary of State for Defence, presented the ‘Defence in a competitive age’ [21] report which detailed the role of broader defence policies within the above-mentioned Tilt to the Indo-Pacific. The report highlights China’s military modernisation and ‘growing international assertiveness within the Indo-Pacific’ as an increasing challenge. In an attempt to mitigate the impact of these developments and to strengthen regional defence partnerships, the Royal Navy deployed the Carrier Strike Group (CSG21) to visit ‘40 nations including India, Japan, Republic of Korea and Singapore’ [22]. To further demonstrate ‘the UK’s ability to project global influence’ [21], the report mentioned a planned naval visit to Japan in 2025 as part of another Indo-Pacific deployment. This reflects the wider aim of the UK to increase military capacity and leverage in the region through more consistent naval  deployments and to develop regional maritime partnerships. However, this policy carries similar risks to AUKUS engagement and could undermine regional security by unintentionally incentivising an escalation in militarisation in the Indo-Pacific. 

Additionally, the Tilt towards the Indo-Pacific aims to strengthen political-security cooperation and dialogue with ASEAN. ASEAN plays a significant role in economic integration across the Pacific region as seen in the creation of the 2020 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a free trade agreement among Asia-Pacific member states [23]. Despite this success in facilitating greater free trade conditions in the region, ASEAN lacks a consistent approach to some regional security issues. This absence of unity is reflected in some ASEAN members’ disapproval of the Philippines’ 2013 case against China over the South China Sea [24].

In August of 2021, the UK became an ASEAN dialogue partner which marked the beginning of closer cooperation on areas such as ‘maritime security and maritime law’ [25]. The 2022-2026 plan of action to implement the ASEAN-UK dialogue partnership outlines a commitment to cooperate on the promotion of the 1982 UNCLOS maritime treaty and to ‘deepen defence and security relationships’ through consistent exchanges and developing ‘mutually beneficial capacity building opportunities’ [26]. Building on the progress of the Action Plan, in July 2024, the UK Foreign Secretary and ASEAN Foreign Ministers released the first-ever joint statement detailing new initiatives that aim to increase economic connectivity. This includes initiatives such as a new ‘ASEAN-UK Economic Integration Programme’ and the UK’s contribution to the Asian Development Bank’s ‘technical support package for the ASEAN Power Grid’ [27]. ASEAN’s acceptance of the UK as a new dialogue partner and willingness to collaborate in areas such as trade and defence suggests an opportunity for Britain to further pursue economic and security interests in the Indo-Pacific. However, if British engagement in the region develops a reliance on the ASEAN partnership, the UK may not be able to effectively deal with challenges posed by China’s policies due to increased economic and strategic vulnerability in the Asia Pacific. Consequently, this could undermine attempts to stabilise tensions in the Indo-Pacific. 

Analysing the impact of increased economic presence on Cross-Strait security
Alternatively, aside from military interests, the Tilt also focuses on strengthening economic engagement with Indo-Pacific partners. In July 2023, the UK joined the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) free trade agreement which is expected to facilitate lower tariffs on goods and greater access to regional markets [28]. Despite only an estimated ‘0.08%’ [29] predicted GDP boost over the next decade, CPTPP membership may provide lucrative long term trade opportunities as the trade agreement now makes up ‘14%’ of global GDP [30] and member states such as Vietnam and Singapore, are among the fastest growing economies in the Indo-Pacific region. Due to the limited forecasted economic benefit, it may also be argued that joining the CPTPP is a strategic initiative to increase British presence in the region in the pursuit of a ‘rule-based’ order [31]. Regardless, joining the trade agreement may increase Britain’s economic vulnerability to insecurity within the region, explaining why the UK has an interest in Indo-Pacific stability.

A further example of UK trade interests in the region is that of the development of economic relations with Taiwan in recent years. Since 1991, both sides have engaged in annual ministerial trade discussions [32]. In 2023, the UK and Taiwan signed an Enhanced Trade Partnership (ETP) arrangement with the aim to bolster bilateral trade, broaden investment relations and facilitate more open markets [33]. While the UK does not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state, it does support Taiwan’s observer status in international organisations such as the World Health Organisation. This highlights again that Cross-Strait security is a significant regional priority for the UK to maintain stable trade corridors and access to markets and underscores Taiwan as being a significant partner in achieving this.

With the UK’s accession increasing the CPTPP’s growing appeal, China and Taiwan have applied to join the trade agreement but both face obstacles in doing so. The accession requirements on regulation regarding tariffs, ‘intellectual property rights and protections for foreign companies’ are likely to be a greater challenge for China as opposed to Taiwan due to a lack of sufficient data and intellectual property protection policies in China [34]. Alternatively, the prospect of Taiwan’s accession to the CPTPP carries diplomatic and political challenges for the region as reflected in China’s condemnation of external engagement with Taiwan. Similarly, China’s accession may risk increased Taiwanese economic isolation and ‘one-China principle’ pressure [35]. This is because China's accession will likely lead to China blocking Taiwanese CPTPP membership as accession requires approval by all incumbent members and China does not recognise Taiwan as a state in other international organisations and agreements. Hence, Taiwan would risk experiencing worsened economic isolation in the Asia Pacific region and greater vulnerability. Simultaneously, this would emphasise one-China principle pressure as Taiwan relies on free trade agreement membership to elevate its legal position within the international community. In this way, while the CPTPP provides the UK with greater potential for regional security partnerships and influence, Taiwan’s autonomy and Cross-Strait stability could be undermined if China joins due to Taiwan’s reliance on external partnerships as a way to legitimise its pursuit of statehood. Consequently, by increasing the CPTPP’s prominence via the UK’s accession, the Tilt to the Indo-Pacific risks negatively impacting Cross-Strait security by either pressuring China or by weakening Taiwan’s economic position and statehood legitimacy. Therefore, this risk reflects how the Tilt has the potential to unintentionally undermine British regional security interests. 

Conclusions 
The key provisions set out in the UK’s ‘Tilt to the Indo-Pacific’ policy such as the initiation of AUKUS, becoming an ASEAN dialogue partner and joining the CPTPP free trade agreement have several impacts on British trade and security interests in the South China Sea and broader Indo-Pacific. AUKUS and developing closer defence partnerships with both European states and Indo-Pacific states could facilitate an expansion of the UK’s military capability and strategic maritime presence. This may enable a counterbalance to growing Chinese military presence and provide security to British national and trading interests in the region. Furthermore, the Tilt’s policies allow Britain to bolster trade security with major Asian powers as well as potentially provide greater access to specialised high technology economies such as Taiwan.

However, there are risks of destabilising regional security that arise from these policies. As argued by some Asian powers, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, AUKUS may develop an arms race situation across the region and hence undermine British security interests. Additionally, while joining the CPTPP may provide Britain with greater economic and strategic access to the Indo-Pacific, especially if other powers join, this puts more pressure on Taiwan’s reliance on international partnerships. Consequently, this may unintentionally create an environment with more pressure on Taiwan’s economic and political independence. Therefore, continuing the Tilt needs to be conducted with caution to maximise strategic advantages and minimise the risk of initiating unintentional instability. 

Marina Gruzer is an undergraduate student at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), reading for BSc International Relations and Chinese.

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